This is a House of Commons Committee report, with recommendations to government. The Government has two months to respond.
This is the full report, read the report summary.
After more than two decades of discussion, in 2017 the House of Commons voted to renew the Palace of Westminster and its facilities and in 2019 Parliament formally passed legislation.to create a Sponsor Body, overseeing a Delivery Authority, responsible for restoring and renewing the Palace (the programme).
On 1 January 2023, following debates in both Houses, a statutory instrument implementing significant changes came into effect. As a result, Parliament has now abolished the Sponsor Body with the Clerk of the House of Commons and Clerk of the Parliaments taking joint accountability for restoring and renewing the Palace. It has established the R&R Client team to support the Clerks and hold the Delivery Authority, which continues its role, to account. Parliament also created a two-tier governance structure comprising a Client Board to make strategic choices and recommendations to a Programme Board.
Following the Commissions’ proposal to change the programme in March 2022, the Sponsor Body paused working on a business case. Before the end of 2023, the R&R Client Team expects to return to Parliament and agree a way forward for the programme. It will then develop a more detailed business case.
1. During 2022 some critical programme changes were made at pace, but significant challenges still need to be addressed for progress to be made. After the House Commissions issued their joint statement on proposed changes to the programme in March 2022, the R&R Client Team introduced these changes within 12 months. This included gaining Parliamentary support for a new statutory instrument. Looking ahead, the R&R Client Team plans to present Parliament with strategic options in December 2023, then a business case for their approval in 2024 or 2025, depending on the next general election. The witnesses recognised that this timetable is ambitious, particularly given the need to build support across Parliament which had been a challenge for the Sponsor Body. For example, the Commissions previously paused the Sponsor Body’s work following concerns over the options and indicative costs. The pace of progress will impact the House Authorities’ work to maintain the Palace. They currently expect to spend up to £2 million a week on maintenance, with over 27 critical works projects being undertaken within the Palace itself. Nevertheless, the Palace may not be preservable should a catastrophic event occur and the Clerks told us they do not know how long the Palace would remain standing without critical work taking place.
Recommendation 1: The Clerks should:
a) set out the interim milestones they must meet to achieve the December 2023 timeframe for presenting initial options to Parliament, and then an outline business case in 2024 or 2025, to effectively assess the risks of not meeting these dates.
b) ensure that ongoing maintenance works do not cross purposes with the restoration and renewal works with the full portfolio of works on the Palace representing value for money.
2. There remains a lack of clarity over what a restored Palace will look like, and how it will be delivered, which makes the programme currently extremely difficult to cost with any certainty. In June 2022 we highlighted how critical value for money risks, which we had previously identified in October 2020, remained. This included securing Parliament’s agreement on how work should be undertaken and what the restored Palace should look like. This had created considerable uncertainty and significantly contributed to delays over the years, and the programme’s top risk is the ability of politicians to take the necessary decisions. Further uncertainties remain around the Palace’s condition – the House Authorities spent nearly three times more than expected renewing the Elizabeth Tower as they did not understand its underlying condition and did not reflect this in cost estimates. During the last 12 months, the Delivery Authority has continued surveys and is considering a pilot to better understand uncertainties.
Recommendation 2: The Delivery Authority should:
a) Present cost and time estimates in ranges, which will narrow over time as uncertainties reduced, and set out the built-in assumptions behind how estimates have been generated.
b) Report back on progress with the potential ‘R&R pilot’ and how this has impacted the assumptions underlying the programme.
3. Transparency will be critical to facilitate accountability, and for Parliament and the public to gain confidence in the programme and its leadership. The current Client Board, alongside the Programme SRO, identified previous parliamentary engagement as having been insufficient. For example, in June 2022 we reported how the Commissions requested further information and re-opened parliamentary decisions. But the detailed reasons behind this decision were not public. The R&R Client Team has committed to greater transparency over progress and decision-making through a more focused engagement approach with Members and, as agreed following our previous recommendations, publishing quarterly progress reports. It will increase engagement leading up to critical decisions that both Houses will need to make on how the works will be undertaken. These decisions will need to be made in the context of an approaching election and affordability constraints across government, and without fully understanding programme costs or where Parliament will move during the works.
Recommendation 3: The Clerks must commit to:
a) Fulfilling commitments made to this Committee in 2022 which include publishing an annual performance report providing a timely and accurate programme overview.
b) Improving member engagement, which will include managing their expectations on the information that will be available to make decisions at these early programme stages.
4. It is unclear how the Clerks will manage their legal responsibilities to the programme alongside those to individuals working in and visiting the Palace. From January 2023 the Clerks, acting jointly, have overall responsibility for the parliamentary building works. They acknowledge their new legislative responsibilities which they will be required to fulfil alongside existing responsibilities as corporate and accounting officers to Parliament. We have previously recommended that the Clerks should set out how they would approach the challenge of being asked to do something they considered to be unwise or not value for money, for example through laying a statement akin to a ministerial direction. The Clerk of the Commons told us the Speaker of the House of Commons would be content with such a process. However, no equivalent process has been identified for the Clerk of Parliaments and it is unclear how this process will practically work. The Clerks could be put in an untenable position if, for example, they were asked to ensure Members could access certain parts of the Palace during restoration and renewal works and they could not guarantee their personal safety.
Recommendation 4: The Clerks of the House of Commons and House of Lords need to set out the:
5. Compliance with health and safety protocols, in particular reporting asbestos incidents, remains unsatisfactory. The Clerks have personal responsibility for the health and safety of those working and using the Palace. To fulfil this responsibility, they will rely on others, such as contractors working within the Palace to follow expected processes and meet any requirements. Following our June 2022 report, the Clerks agreed they needed to improve health and safety incident processes, and said they had reviewed and updated Parliament’s safety escalation arrangements. However, despite the Clerks’ reassurances, existing processes are not operating effectively. For example, in September 2022 a contractor did not inform the Clerks of an asbestos incident or limit the dangers as quickly as expected. Fortunately, the asbestos discovered on that occasion in a roof void was not dislodged, but it could easily have been broken up as the contractor drilled through to gain access. This would have resulted in a far more serious incident. To help mitigate these risks, the Clerks have appointed a new Health and Safety Director and have been compiling an incidents database.
Recommendation 5: Before embarking on the more substantial R&R works, the Clerks must set out how they will reiterate the importance to contractors of their responsibilities and contractual requirements, particularly concerning the timeliness and accuracy of reporting, and what they will do to hold them to account for meeting these responsibilities.
1. Following our previous reports on the restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster (the Palace), we took evidence from the Programme SRO and Head of the R&R Client team, the Delivery Authority Chief Executive, the Clerk of the House and the Clerk of the Parliaments.
2. In spring 2020, the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019, created a Sponsor Body, overseeing a Delivery Authority, responsible for a Restoration and Renewal Programme (the programme). This followed almost two decades of discussion and, in 2019, Parliament passing legislation to progress the renewal of the Palace of Westminster and its facilities.1 In March 2022, following concerns over the Sponsor Body’s emerging costs and timeframes and the programme governance, the House of Commons and House of Lords Commissions issued a joint statement proposing to abolish the Sponsor Body and change the approach.2 There was little public information about how and why this decision was made.
3. On 1 January 2023, following debates in both houses, a statutory instrument implementing significant changes came into effect. As a result, Parliament has now abolished the Sponsor Body, with the Clerk of the Commons and Clerk of the Parliaments taking joint accountability for restoring and renewing the Palace. Within the House Administrations it has established a new joint department of both Houses, referred to as the R&R Client Team, with staff transferring from the Sponsor Body.3 The team will support the Clerks and hold the Delivery Authority, which continues its role, to account. Parliament also created a two-tier governance structure comprising a Client Board, bringing together the House Commissions, to make strategic choices and recommendations to a Programme Board. This will comprise parliamentary and non-parliamentary members and provide the main decision-making forum.4
4. Before the end of 2023, the R&R Client Team expects to return to Parliament and agree a way forward for the programme. It will then present a business case to Parliament for approval in 2024 or 2025 setting out the preferred option for undertaking the work and what the restored Palace will look like,5 Following the Commissions’ proposal to change the programme in March 2022, the Sponsor Body paused working on a business case, which subsequently stopped a large amount of the Delivery Authority’s work. In May 2022, the Clerks told us they had written to the Sponsor Body asking them to undertake only options-neutral work which would add value regardless as to what future option chosen.6
5. In 2020, this Committee reported significant concerns with the Palace’s condition, which continued to be badly in need of repair with Parliament having talked about significant works for over 20 years. The maintenance approach was unsustainable, with every week of delay to work resulting in significant costs to the taxpayer and putting the safety of employees and visitors at risk.7 At our February 2023 session, witnesses described continuing worries, which led to health and safety risks alongside periodic failures in building services. They recognised that building systems such as heating, ventilation, drainage and electrical systems, were out of date and needing replacing.8
6. The Clerks have legal responsibility for the safety of those working and using the Palace and the wider estate.9 The Clerk of the House of Commons told us he was very clear that eventually there will be ‘catastrophic and irreversible damage to the Palace’ if decisions continue to be deferred. Both Clerks were uncertain how long the Palace could continue to be used in its current condition.10 For example, the Palace does not have robust systems to stop fire spreading, and while the Clerks remain confident that the Palace could be cleared to minimise the risk to human life,11 the building itself would be unlikely to be preserved. Since 2016, there have been 44 fire incidents across the parliamentary estate, with fire described as the ‘foremost risk’ to preserving the Palace for future generation.12
7. The House Administrations undertake maintenance works across the parliamentary estate. The Clerks told us maintenance costs totalled approximately £2 million per week, with the House Administrations spending around £100 million a year.13 The sheer quantity of building and maintenance work currently being undertaken was staggering with 4,000 maintenance or reactive maintenance calls a month. Alongside this the House Administrations are managing 42 projects to repair the estate, 27 of which are in the Palace.14 Over recent years projects have included spending £140 million on temporary fire safety improvements and £8 million on temporary sewerage.15
8. Asbestos remains a serious and pressing concern for those who live and work in the Palace and wider parliamentary estate – since 2016 there have been 8 asbestos incidents.16 The Chief Executive of the R&R Delivery Authority informed us asbestos could perhaps be found at 2,500 sites, including within inaccessible areas such as pipe lagging, ducts and voids. Removing asbestos from the Palace could require an estimated 300 people working for two and a half years while the site was not being used.17 The Delivery Authority continues to undertake work to fully understand the type and distribution of asbestos throughout the Palace but does not expect to be able to fully catalogue its existence prior to any restoration work commencing.18
9. To fulfil their statutory responsibilities, the Clerks rely on others, such as contractors working within the Palace to follow expected processes and meet standards.19 As the Clerks have outlined previously, they have established dedicated processes to help them report and manage serious events where asbestos has been discovered or disturbed.20 In July 2022, the Clerks wrote to us setting out how they had reviewed and updated safety escalation processes and committed to improve how they were operating. This followed us challenging the Clerks in March and May 2022 on the failure of a contractor to report an asbestos incident in a timely manner. Although the site was immediately closed, there were delays informing the Clerks, alongside the 117 people potentially exposed to asbestos, of the incident.21
10. Since then, there have been two further asbestos incidents, one of which the Clerks accepted had not been handled appropriately. In September 2022 a contractor did not inform the Clerks of an asbestos incident or limit the dangers as quickly as expected. Fortunately, the asbestos discovered, on that occasion in a roof void, was not dislodged, but it could easily have been broken up as the contractor drilled through to gain access. This would have resulted in a far more serious incident.22 The Clerks have subsequently shared with us results from their assessment which found that whilst no ill health was foreseeable as a result, the matter was taken very seriously. It was used as an opportunity to learn from mistakes and continuously improve the management of asbestos across the parliamentary estate. The Clerks assured us that additional training and a review of procedures will be undertaken.23
11. Managing the safety of the Palace remains a top priority for the Clerks and House Administrations.24 As they have been unhappy about the treatment of several safety issues, which also includes 12 instances of falling masonry, and given an increase in the volume of maintenance work, the Clerks have considered the structure of their safety teams and recently appointed a new Health and Safety Director.25 They, along with an additional six safety professionals appointed in the last 12 months, will have operational oversight for construction and maintenance safety management alongside the existing team.26 The Clerks also explained to us how they were more robustly compiling safety incidents through a dedicated database. However, the Clerk of the House of Commons recognised that he did not yet feel confident that safety structures were robust enough.27
12. Following the House Commissions issuing a joint statement proposing changes to the approach and governance of the restoration and renewal programme in March 2022, the statutory instrument introducing these changes came into effect on 1st January 2023. Between these dates, the House Commissions issued a joint report, drawing on advice from an independent review panel, and both Houses of Parliament debated the potential changes at least once. The House Administrations also worked to set up revised governance arrangements, with the new Client Board, which brings together the two Commissions to make strategic choices and recommendations, holding its first meeting in October 2022. Also, the membership of a new Programme Board, the main forum for programme decision-making, was formally agreed by the Houses in February 2023. It held its first meeting at the end of the month.28
13. During this time, the House Administrations also worked to transition from the former Sponsor Body into the R&R Client Team. We have previously highlighted the risk that delays to changing the programme governance, and continuing uncertainty, could lead to a loss of vital capability from within the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority.29 The Clerks had committed to work on retaining and recruiting the staff it needed, with Sponsor Body staff being TUPE’d across.30 Although the House Administrations have made progress bringing the Sponsor body staff ‘in-house’, the reset resulted in the entire leadership team of the Sponsor Body leaving.31 In terms of filling these gaps, the programme SRO told us that success recruiting to a number of roles, such as business case director and Head of Risk, had been mixed. She described it as not being easy to fill these roles, with some feedback that people had been put off by the uncertain and political nature of the programme.32 However, the Delivery Authority Chief Executive told us that although he had been very concerned that, given the programme’s change in direction, people would leave, he was pleased this risk had not materialised. He highlighted though that the risk was still there.33
14. The Clerk of the Commons told us he felt that the governance was in as good a place as it could be, but recognised that this is a critical year for the programme. Managing the risks to the timetable will be vital to maintain the programme’s momentum,34 and the next significant step in this ambitious timetable will be for the R&R Client Team to present Parliament with a strategic case by the end of 2023. Following a steer from the Programme Board, this would be a high-level assessment of options, with designs and indicative costs and timings, so Parliament could decide on one preferred option to take forward. Subsequently, sometime during 2024 or 2025, depending on the timing of a general election, the R&R Client Team will then present Parliament a more specific, costed piece of work to vote on in a more conventional manner which will then potentially lead to work being started.35 Before the R&R Client Team presents a business case substantial volumes of work will need to be conducted to develop options and evaluation criteria, undertake evaluations and progress this work through the current governance structures.36
15. In 2020 we highlighted how the Programme is made ever-more complex by the number of uncertainties which underpin it, including the condition of the building, interdependencies with other parliamentary building projects, the lack of consensus over where Parliamentarians and staff will relocate to while the work is undertaken, and what people want from a modern parliament building.37 In 2022, we further reported how these critical uncertainties impacting the value for money risks remained.38
16. The Programme SRO outlined how, given the uncertainties, the Delivery Authority had worked up 30 options to help provide the evidence needed for decision-making. This analysis showed that how the programme was conducted, and on what timescale, had a much greater impact on the cost than scope decisions. Also, approximately 80% of the overall cost related to irreducible safety-critical works, with ‘nice to haves’ therefore only representing a relatively small portion.39
17. The scope of the work, in terms of what a restored Palace would look like and how work would be undertaken, remains uncertain. We asked the Programme SRO about the risk of Parliament being unable to decide how to reduce the programme scope by the end of 2023. She told us that the ability of politicians to make decisions was the “ top risk on our risk register.”40 In 2020, we raised the ability to reach decisions as a risk – at that time the former Sponsor Body had not made it clear how it would balance Parliament’s range of views on the programme.41 The Sponsor Body had previously been provided a vision, or broad range of underlying strategic themes, to develop as part of the business case. This included improving disabled access; installing new fire safety systems; repairing and conserving the Palace and creating a building that ensures efficient and responsible resource consumption.42
18. The Clerk of the House of Commons told us that resolutions passed by Parliament were unrealistic. There will be unavoidable trade-offs between cost, accessibility and sustainability. For example, the Commissions set out health and safety as their primary commitment but to meet sustainability expectations there will be additional costs and compromises over how space used. Also, ‘bold claims’ have been made relating to the removal of asbestos that will have a significant additional impact on cost, while attempts to make the building fully accessible would be “staggeringly expensive” despite consensus of the need for a ‘step-change’ in accessibility.43
19. The Delivery Authority continues to undertake intrusive surveys to understand as much as possible prior about the Palace before carrying out works. It has compiled over 1,750 technical reports on different aspects of the building. We were told that these will not finish prior to work commencing and that issues will continue to be discovered during the building phase.44 Any cost estimates will therefore include significant uncertainty with true costs impossible to forecast accurately due to, for example, asbestos or unexpected archaeological finds.45 In 2020, the National Audit Office reported how in refurbishing the Elizabeth Tower, the House Administrations then estimated the final cost would be £80 million, compared to the £29 million forecast in the business case that was approved in 2016; a rise of 176%. Reasons for the cost increase included subsequent surveys identifying that more work needed to be done, and the Tower’s full condition not being identifiable until work started.46 In February 2022, the Clerks told us the forecast final cost is now about £86 million, with £83 million spent to date.47
20. To date, the Delivery Authority has spent £270 million, with much of this on developing the previous schemes and preparing the business case prior to the programme being paused in 2022. It is now developing a wider range of options for how restoration and renewal will be undertaken.48 In response to uncertainty, the Delivery Authority is undertaking work to identify a discrete part of the Palace where it could conduct a pilot project. This would be a way to learn about the multiple challenges work would face, and the Clerk of the House felt could also support attempts to engage parliamentarians and the general public in terms of, ‘winning hearts and minds’ by being able to show a before and after picture.49
21. This Committee has often set out the significant benefits of transparency for supporting accountability over decision-making, alongside updating and engaging Parliament and the public on progress across critical major programmes. Transparency will also be critical for Parliament and the public to gain confidence in a programme and its leadership, as endorsed by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, which is the government’s major projects centre of expertise.
22. In our 2021 report drawing together lessons from numerous programmes we specifically highlighted the importance of Parliament’s own restoration and renewal programme being an exemplar of an open and transparent programme which welcomes scrutiny.50 The Delivery Authority Chief Executive commented that “Transparency in reporting is a very powerful and important tool. Many people in projects and programmes find it difficult, but I think it is actually helpful and beneficial to have visibility and scrutiny.”51 Following our June 2022 report the Clerks, former Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority Chief Executive accepted our recommendation to report regularly to Parliament on progress, describing how they would continue to publish quarterly progress reports and engage regularly to share information.52
23. The Clerk of the House of Commons described how restoration and renewal of the Palace would be a ‘hard sell’ to the public. Prior to the reset of the programme, the Sponsor Body estimated that works would cost between £7 billion to £13 billion if the Palace decanted, lasting between 19 to 28 years; and £22 billion under continued presence, which could take up to 76 years.53 However, witnesses suggested that the public’s support and love for the Palace was high. The Programme SRO described how their public polling showed 75% to 80% support for the building, which the public could separate from their views of government and politics. She suggested they would need to ‘trust the public’ but it is unclear to what extent support will continue as programme costs rise and issues potentially surface.54 We have previously reported that the former Sponsor Body had not engaged sufficiently with the public and other Palace users to understand what they wanted from a modern Parliament building. We recommended that members of the public are properly informed about the Programme and can contribute their views.55
24. Members of both Houses play a critical role in approving the forward direction of the programme. Back in 2020, we highlighted the challenges in building consensus across parliamentarians, which continues to be a significant risk.56 The Clerk of the House of Commons also highlighted the challenges presented by Parliaments not being able to bind their successors. As such, he could not be wholly confident in what the respective Houses would decide on any given issue.57
25. In terms of parliamentary engagement, the Programme SRO identified this as an area where the Sponsor Body had previously not done enough.58 In October 2022, the newly established Client Board acknowledged that engagement had not been sufficient, with a new approach and greater collaboration needed.59 This was also recognised by the Sponsor Body itself, with former Chair describing fundamental challenges around identifying the ‘client’ and the need for senior political figures to be more involved to drive decision taking and achieve consensus.60
26. We have previously seen the importance of getting senior political stakeholders on side. We reported that in February 2021, upon considering findings from a strategic review, the Commissions agreed the Sponsor Body could spend up to £5 million to carry out further work to fully understand the costs, time and other implications of restoration and renewal works being undertaken while a presence was maintained in the Palace. Parliament had previously endorsed legislation requiring Parliament to decant during the works, which was set out in the legislation in 2019.61 In February 2022, one week after they had received the provisional cost and schedule estimates requested, the House of Commons Commission proposed significant changes to the Programme, endorsed by the House of Lords Commission. The Delivery Authority told us that, as a result, it paused developing the business case. In May 2022, the Clerks told us that they had written to the Sponsor Body asking them to undertake only options-neutral work which would add value regardless of what future option is chosen.62
27. The Programme SRO recognises that to achieve the ambitious timetable, the R&R Client Team will need to improve its parliamentary engagement.63 The Programme SRO and Delivery Authority Chief Executive envisage that recent governance changes will lead to more political ownership, and therefore engagement, across Parliament as decision-makers including the Speakers and House Leaders will be more involved in the process.64 However, all witnesses also reinforced the need to get Member engagement right, crucial over the next year.65 The R&R Client Team will be leading the engagement to find out what Members feel, what they think might be acceptable and what matters to them. The Programme SRO recognised their engagement plans as ambitious, requiring lots of work particularly in the run-up to significant decisions. This included planning more focused engagement using existing communication networks, targeted one-to-one Member briefings and liaising with parliamentary committees.66
28. In 2020, the NAO reported that to reduce the likelihood of previous decisions being reopened, decisions should be based on the best available evidence, be transparent and make clear the cost and timing implications of alternatives.67 We challenged the witnesses on the extent and depth of information that would be available for Parliament decide on which strategic option to take forward at the end of 2023. They recognised how parliamentarians may find it hard to make early strategic decisions without details on the cost and time for different options.68 From the responses given, we remain unclear that the information provided, including on where the Houses could move to during the works, will be sufficient for Parliament to make a decision on which option to develop into a business case.69 In terms of decant options, the Chief Executive of the Delivery Authority agreed that there were significant risks around developing decant options, and that Members would need clarity on these to engage fully with the programme. The wide range of options being considered to undertake the work would each impact the temporary accommodation differently. Decisions on the decant accommodation would soon become part of the critical path.70
29. On 1 January 2023, the Parliamentary Works Sponsor Body (Abolition) regulations 2022 came into effect. These set out that the Corporate Officers of the Houses would, acting jointly, “have overall responsibility for the Parliamentary building works.”71 The Sponsor Body’s previous responsibilities, as set out in previous legislation, will also be relevant including to prepare a strategy for consulting Members of Parliament; funding the Delivery Authority and overseeing their activities; determining the strategic objectives of the building works; and promoting public understanding of the purpose of the works.72 Before these changes, the Clerks’ were to engage the House of Lords and House of Lords Commissions and represent their views to the Sponsor Body. They had an agreement with the Sponsor Body to provide a formal mechanism for consultation and cooperation.73
30. When we last reported on restoration and renewal in June 2022, we were concerned that the Clerks may have felt constrained in sharing their professional views, as accounting officers, on what the restoration and renewal programme could deliver.74 In addition, the Clerks will need to balance their accountabilities to the programme alongside those they hold as Corporate Officers to the Houses. These responsibilities include protecting the personal safety of those working in and using the Palace, which the Clerk of the Parliaments described as ‘working on a building site.’75
31. The Clerks recognise the significance of the responsibilities they now hold and the complexities they face when fulfilling and balancing these respective responsibilities. They felt it was conceivable that they would be asked to do something they felt unwise or disastrous value for money,76 and in such an event the Clerks could be put in an untenable position. For example, we were told that the Clerks would have powers to close parts of the Palace from the general public should safety concerns escalate to the point that it was no longer viable to allow access. They could not however, prevent Members from accessing the Palace but may retain corporate responsibility if an incident occurred. Should Members access the building while Corporate Officers had closed the site to all other users, they could seek only to resist any claim for compensation on the grounds that a Member had acted voluntarily at their own risk and contrary to advice given.77
32. There is currently no formal process in place should the Clerks be requested to do something they felt did not align with their respective responsibilities. For example, the Clerks cannot overrule the restoration and renewal Client Board or the Programme Board, but retain accountability for any decisions taken (whether or not they disagree). We have previously reported how government has in place processes for accounting officers to assess delivery risks, and seek a ministerial direction should they consider what they are being asked to do is undeliverable.78 There is no procedure akin to the Ministerial Direction the Clerks could apply.
33. The Clerk of the House of Commons suggested that where there was a real abuse of procedure, there would be value to him being able to put this on record through placing a letter in the Library. He mentioned how the Speaker of the Commons recognised the value of introducing such a procedure.79 However, in response the Speaker does not have authority to provide the Clerk with a letter of direction, effectively authorising him to take action beyond his responsibilities. It remained unclear how decisions could be overridden. Also the Clerks had not considered how a similar process could be undertaken for the Clerk to the Parliaments.80
34. We have previously expressed concern that the Clerks do not have the expertise or the capacity to successfully oversee a large infrastructure project of this cost and complexity. Their previous experience overseeing work on, for example, Elizabeth Tower shows how challenging this can be, with renovation set to cost £86 million, compared with the original £29 million budget.81 We questioned the Clerks on the skills they felt they would need to have accountability for a unique programme of this size and complexity. The Clerks told us they recognised the differing skillsets, and had recently appointed staff to support them in delivering their responsibilities. This included a new director general (operations) within the House of Commons administrations and a chief operating officer within the House of Lords administrations.82 Shortly after our evidence session, the Clerk of the House of Commons, Sir John Benger, announced his intention to step down from his post in the autumn of 2023.
Members present:
Dame Meg Hillier
Mr Jonathan Djanogly
Mr Louie French
Peter Grant
Anne Marie Morris
Sarah Olney
Nick Smith
Draft Report (Restoration & Renewal of the Palace of Westminster – 2023 Recall), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 34 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Introduction agreed to.
Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Fifty-second of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Adjourned till Wednesday 26 April at 9.30am.
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
Sir John Benger KCB, Clerk of the House, House of Commons; Simon Burton, Clerk of the Parliaments, House of Lords; David Goldstone CBE, Chief Executive, Palace of Westminster Restoration and Renewal Delivery Authority; Dr Patsy Richards, Interim Chief Executive, Palace of Westminster Restoration and Renewal Sponsor BodyQ1–129
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Annual Report and Accounts 2020–21 |
HC 59 |
|
2nd |
Lessons from implementing IR35 reforms |
HC 60 |
|
3rd |
The future of the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors |
HC 118 |
|
4th |
Use of evaluation and modelling in government |
HC 254 |
|
5th |
Local economic growth |
HC 252 |
|
6th |
Department of Health and Social Care 2020–21 Annual Report and Accounts |
HC 253 |
|
7th |
Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme |
HC 259 |
|
8th |
Financial sustainability of the higher education sector in England |
HC 257 |
|
9th |
Child Maintenance |
HC 255 |
|
10th |
Restoration and Renewal of Parliament |
HC 49 |
|
11th |
The rollout of the COVID-19 vaccine programme in England |
HC 258 |
|
12th |
Management of PPE contracts |
HC 260 |
|
13th |
Secure training centres and secure schools |
HC 30 |
|
14th |
Investigation into the British Steel Pension Scheme |
HC 251 |
|
15th |
The Police Uplift Programme |
HC 261 |
|
16th |
Managing cross-border travel during the COVID-19 pandemic |
HC 29 |
|
17th |
Government’s contracts with Randox Laboratories Ltd |
HC 28 |
|
18th |
Government actions to combat waste crime |
HC 33 |
|
19th |
Regulating after EU Exit |
HC 32 |
|
20th |
Whole of Government Accounts 2019–20 |
HC 31 |
|
21st |
Transforming electronic monitoring services |
HC 34 |
|
22nd |
Tackling local air quality breaches |
HC 37 |
|
23rd |
Measuring and reporting public sector greenhouse gas emissions |
HC 39 |
|
24th |
Redevelopment of Defra’s animal health infrastructure |
HC 42 |
|
25th |
Regulation of energy suppliers |
HC 41 |
|
26th |
The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2021–22 – Fraud and error in the benefits system |
HC 44 |
|
27th |
Evaluating innovation projects in children’s social care |
HC 38 |
|
28th |
Improving the Accounting Officer Assessment process |
HC 43 |
|
29th |
The Affordable Homes Programme since 2015 |
HC 684 |
|
30th |
Developing workforce skills for a strong economy |
HC 685 |
|
31st |
Managing central government property |
HC 48 |
|
32nd |
Grassroots participation in sport and physical activity |
HC 46 |
|
33rd |
HMRC performance in 2021–22 |
HC 686 |
|
34th |
The Creation of the UK Infrastructure Bank |
HC 45 |
|
35th |
Introducing Integrated Care Systems |
HC 47 |
|
36th |
The Defence digital strategy |
HC 727 |
|
37th |
Support for vulnerable adolescents |
HC 730 |
|
38th |
Managing NHS backlogs and waiting times in England |
HC 729 |
|
39th |
Excess Votes 2021–22 |
HC 1132 |
|
40th |
COVID employment support schemes |
HC 810 |
|
41st |
Driving licence backlogs at the DVLA |
HC 735 |
|
42nd |
The Restart Scheme for long-term unemployed people |
HC 733 |
|
43rd |
Progress combatting fraud |
HC 40 |
|
44th |
The Digital Services Tax |
HC 732 |
|
45th |
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Annual Report and Accounts 2021–22 |
HC 1254 |
|
46th |
BBC Digital |
HC 736 |
|
47th |
Investigation into the UK Passport Office |
HC 738 |
|
48th |
MoD Equipment Plan 2022–2032 |
HC 731 |
|
49th |
Managing tax compliance following the pandemic |
HC 739 |
|
50th |
Government Shared Services |
HC 734 |
|
51st |
Tackling Defra’s ageing digital services |
HC 737 |
|
53rd |
The performance of UK Security Vetting |
HC 994 |
|
1st Special Report |
Sixth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts |
HC 50 |
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Low emission cars |
HC 186 |
|
2nd |
BBC strategic financial management |
HC 187 |
|
3rd |
COVID-19: Support for children’s education |
HC 240 |
|
4th |
COVID-19: Local government finance |
HC 239 |
|
5th |
COVID-19: Government Support for Charities |
HC 250 |
|
6th |
Public Sector Pensions |
HC 289 |
|
7th |
Adult Social Care Markets |
HC 252 |
|
8th |
COVID 19: Culture Recovery Fund |
HC 340 |
|
9th |
Fraud and Error |
HC 253 |
|
10th |
Overview of the English rail system |
HC 170 |
|
11th |
Local auditor reporting on local government in England |
HC 171 |
|
12th |
COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update |
HC 173 |
|
13th |
Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic |
HC 175 |
|
14th |
Windrush Compensation Scheme |
HC 174 |
|
15th |
DWP Employment support |
HC 177 |
|
16th |
Principles of effective regulation |
HC 176 |
|
17th |
High Speed 2: Progress at Summer 2021 |
HC 329 |
|
18th |
Government’s delivery through arm’s-length bodies |
HC 181 |
|
19th |
Protecting consumers from unsafe products |
HC 180 |
|
20th |
Optimising the defence estate |
HC 179 |
|
21st |
School Funding |
HC 183 |
|
22nd |
Improving the performance of major defence equipment contracts |
HC 185 |
|
23rd |
Test and Trace update |
HC 182 |
|
24th |
Crossrail: A progress update |
HC 184 |
|
25th |
The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2020–21 – Fraud and error in the benefits system |
HC 633 |
|
26th |
Lessons from Greensill Capital: accreditation to business support schemes |
HC 169 |
|
27th |
Green Homes Grant Voucher Scheme |
HC 635 |
|
28th |
Efficiency in government |
HC 636 |
|
29th |
The National Law Enforcement Data Programme |
HC 638 |
|
30th |
Challenges in implementing digital change |
HC 637 |
|
31st |
Environmental Land Management Scheme |
HC 639 |
|
32nd |
Delivering gigabitcapable broadband |
HC 743 |
|
33rd |
Underpayments of the State Pension |
HC 654 |
|
34th |
Local Government Finance System: Overview and Challenges |
HC 646 |
|
35th |
The pharmacy early payment and salary advance schemes in the NHS |
HC 745 |
|
36th |
EU Exit: UK Border post transition |
HC 746 |
|
37th |
HMRC Performance in 2020–21 |
HC 641 |
|
38th |
COVID-19 cost tracker update |
HC 640 |
|
39th |
DWP Employment Support: Kickstart Scheme |
HC 655 |
|
40th |
Excess votes 2020–21: Serious Fraud Office |
HC 1099 |
|
41st |
Achieving Net Zero: Follow up |
HC 642 |
|
42nd |
Financial sustainability of schools in England |
HC 650 |
|
43rd |
Reducing the backlog in criminal courts |
HC 643 |
|
44th |
NHS backlogs and waiting times in England |
HC 747 |
|
45th |
Progress with trade negotiations |
HC 993 |
|
46th |
Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk |
HC 952 |
|
47th |
Academies Sector Annual Report and Accounts 2019/20 |
HC 994 |
|
48th |
HMRC’s management of tax debt |
HC 953 |
|
49th |
Regulation of private renting |
HC 996 |
|
50th |
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up |
HC 951 |
|
51st |
Improving outcomes for women in the criminal justice system |
HC 997 |
|
52nd |
Ministry of Defence Equipment Plan 2021–31 |
HC 1164 |
|
1st Special Report |
Fifth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts |
HC 222 |
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Support for children with special educational needs and disabilities |
HC 85 |
|
2nd |
Defence Nuclear Infrastructure |
HC 86 |
|
3rd |
High Speed 2: Spring 2020 Update |
HC 84 |
|
4th |
EU Exit: Get ready for Brexit Campaign |
HC 131 |
|
5th |
University technical colleges |
HC 87 |
|
6th |
Excess votes 2018–19 |
HC 243 |
|
7th |
Gambling regulation: problem gambling and protecting vulnerable people |
HC 134 |
|
8th |
NHS capital expenditure and financial management |
HC 344 |
|
9th |
Water supply and demand management |
HC 378 |
|
10th |
Defence capability and the Equipment Plan |
HC 247 |
|
11th |
Local authority investment in commercial property |
HC 312 |
|
12th |
Management of tax reliefs |
HC 379 |
|
13th |
Whole of Government Response to COVID-19 |
HC 404 |
|
14th |
Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak |
HC 405 |
|
15th |
Improving the prison estate |
HC 244 |
|
16th |
Progress in remediating dangerous cladding |
HC 406 |
|
17th |
Immigration enforcement |
HC 407 |
|
18th |
NHS nursing workforce |
HC 408 |
|
19th |
Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster |
HC 549 |
|
20th |
Tackling the tax gap |
HC 650 |
|
21st |
Government support for UK exporters |
HC 679 |
|
22nd |
Digital transformation in the NHS |
HC 680 |
|
23rd |
Delivering carrier strike |
HC 684 |
|
24th |
Selecting towns for the Towns Fund |
HC 651 |
|
25th |
Asylum accommodation and support transformation programme |
HC 683 |
|
26th |
Department of Work and Pensions Accounts 2019–20 |
HC 681 |
|
27th |
Covid-19: Supply of ventilators |
HC 685 |
|
28th |
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s management of the Magnox contract |
HC 653 |
|
29th |
Whitehall preparations for EU Exit |
HC 682 |
|
30th |
The production and distribution of cash |
HC 654 |
|
31st |
Starter Homes |
HC 88 |
|
32nd |
Specialist Skills in the civil service |
HC 686 |
|
33rd |
Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme |
HC 687 |
|
34th |
Covid-19: Support for jobs |
HC 920 |
|
35th |
Improving Broadband |
HC 688 |
|
36th |
HMRC performance 2019–20 |
HC 690 |
|
37th |
Whole of Government Accounts 2018–19 |
HC 655 |
|
38th |
Managing colleges’ financial sustainability |
HC 692 |
|
39th |
Lessons from major projects and programmes |
HC 694 |
|
40th |
Achieving government’s long-term environmental goals |
HC 927 |
|
41st |
COVID 19: the free school meals voucher scheme |
HC 689 |
|
42nd |
COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal Protective Equipment |
HC 928 |
|
43rd |
COVID-19: Planning for a vaccine Part 1 |
HC 930 |
|
44th |
Excess Votes 2019–20 |
HC 1205 |
|
45th |
Managing flood risk |
HC 931 |
|
46th |
Achieving Net Zero |
HC 935 |
|
47th |
COVID-19: Test, track and trace (part 1) |
HC 932 |
|
48th |
Digital Services at the Border |
HC 936 |
|
49th |
COVID-19: housing people sleeping rough |
HC 934 |
|
50th |
Defence Equipment Plan 2020–2030 |
HC 693 |
|
51st |
Managing the expiry of PFI contracts |
HC 1114 |
|
52nd |
Key challenges facing the Ministry of Justice |
HC 1190 |
|
53rd |
Covid 19: supporting the vulnerable during lockdown |
HC 938 |
|
54th |
Improving single living accommodation for service personnel |
HC 940 |
|
55th |
Environmental tax measures |
HC 937 |
|
56th |
Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund |
HC 941 |
1 Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2019–21, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 549, 2 October 2020
2 Joint statement from the House of Commons and House of Lords Commissions, 18 March 2022
3 The Parliamentary Works Sponsor Body (Abolition) Regulations 2022
4 Joint report from the House of Lords and House of Commons Commissions, 14 June 2022
5 Qq 18–19
6 Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
7 Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2019–21, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 549, 2 October 2020
8 Q 2
9 Qq 37–38
10 Q 2
11 Q 1
12 Qq 3, 35
13 Q 61
14 Q 26
15 Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2019–21, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 549, 2 October 2020; Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
16 Letter from Sir John Benger, 1 February 2023; Letter from Sir John Benger 29 March 2022
17 Qq 11–12
18 Q 47
19 Q 25
20 Q 21
21 Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
22 Qq 17, 23
23 Letter from Sir John Benger, 27 February 2023
24 Q 24
25 Q 3
26 Qq 3, 26
27 Q 24
28 Hansard Volume 827, Restoration and Renewal Programme Board, 22 February 2023
29 Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
30 Response to Committee of Public Accounts Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and Renewal of the Palace of Westminster
31 Q 102
32 Q 106
33 Q 108
34 Qq 108, 113; Joint letter to PAC from the Clerks, Delivery Authority CEO and Sponsor Body CEO, 31 October 2022
35 Qq 18–19
36 Qq 44, 55
37 Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2019–21, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 549, 2 October 2020
38 Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
39 Q 120
40 Q 120
41 Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2019–21, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 549, 2 October 2020
42 C&AG’s report, Palace of Westminster Restoration and Renewal Programme, HC 315, Session 2019–2021 24 April 2020
43 Q 110
44 Q q 46, Q47
45 Q55
46 C&AG’s report, Palace of Westminster Restoration and Renewal Programme, HC 315, Session 2019–2021, 24 April 2020
47 Q 57
48 Q 44
49 Q 113
50 Committee of Public Accounts, Thirty-ninth Report of Session 2019–21, Lessons from major projects and programmes, HC 694, 29 January 2021
51 Q 123
52 Response to Committee of Public Accounts Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and Renewal of the Palace of Westminster
53 Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
54 Q 89
55 Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2019–21, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 549, 2 October 2020
56 Committee of Public Accounts, Nineteenth Report of Session 2019–21, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 549, 2 October 2020; C&AG’s report, Restoration and Renewal of the Palace of Westminster: Progress Update, HC1016, Session 2021–22, 21 January 2022
57 Q 113
58 Q 86
59 Restoration and Renewal Client Board meeting, 17 October 2022
60 Letter from Liz Peace, Chair of Sponsor Body December 2022
61 C&AG’s report, Restoration and Renewal of the Palace of Westminster: Progress Update, HC1016, Session 2021–22, 21 January 2022
62 Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
63 Q 86
64 Qq 82–83,86
65 Qq 62, 83, 86
66 Q 82
67 C&AG’s report, Palace of Westminster Restoration and Renewal Programme, HC 315, Session 2019–2021, 24 April 2020
68 Q 60
69 Qq 60–63, 115
70 Qq 115 – Q120
71 The Parliamentary Works Sponsor Body (Abolition) Regulations 2022
72 Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019
73 C&AG’s report, Palace of Westminster Restoration and Renewal Programme, HC 315, Session 2019–2021 24 April 2020
74 Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
75 Q 38
76 Q 64
77 Qq 75, 76, 98
78 Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-Eight Report of Session 2022–23, Improving the Accounting Officer Assessment process, HC43, 30 November 2022
79 Qq 64–65
80 Qq 65, 66–79
81 Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of Session 2022–23, Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, HC 49, 29 June 2022
82 Q28 & Q31