Criminal Justice Bill

Supplementary written evidence submitted by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) (CJB43)

1 Introduction

1.1 Following oral evidence given by NPCC Chair Gavin Stephens to the Criminal Justice Bill Committee on 12 December 2023, the below is additional written evidence setting out further detail on knife crime provisions with practical examples of where they would support policing in keeping the public safe. We have also included some further information on various other provisions within the Bill.

2 Knife crime

2.1 We are fully supportive of the proposals in the Bill, which are based on operational concerns that we have raised with government about the ongoing sale and legality of various knives, including so called ‘zombie knives’.

2.2 Current legislation did not apply to very large knives such as machetes, combat or hunting knives, meaning that they were still legal to buy, sell, manufacture, import and possess in private. When these weapons were found by police in premises, we were unable to seize them as no specific offences had been committed.

2.3 There was also concern that there was a loophole within the definition of a zombie knife. To meet the definition, it needed to have three features - cutting edge, serrated edge, and images or words that suggest it is to be used for the purpose of violence. This simply led to manufacturers removing the images or words to make the same knives legal, which officers were continuing to find being used.

2.4 Below are specific examples of situations where proposals would have improved the police ability to respond.

2.5 Create a new criminal offence of possessing a bladed article with the intent to cause harm.

2.5.1 Example 1: On 12/01/2023 three males posted a video on social media in a public space suggesting they were in ‘enemy’ territory. They displayed a 15-inch and a 22-inch blade and were ‘baiting’ or ‘goading’ the opposition group in that area.

2.5.2 The language and manner of posting was provocative and intimated they wanted to cause serious harm to person/s unknown. The only purpose of them having these weapons and being in ‘opposition’ territory would be with the intent to cause harm to another.

2.5.3 The act was not an attempt to cause GBH. The practical application of a conspiracy could not be applied. The threat was towards a group rather than a person and therefore the threatening offence could not be proven. It was not a malicious communication or a Public Order Act offence. If police had stopped them, they would have only simple possession of a knife.

2.5.4 When the video/content is added we obtain context which is critical in gang offending and online goading. This would likely attract a harsher sentence than possession alone and reflect the seriousness of the offence.

2.5.5 Example 2: During the 2022 Notting Hill Carnival, social media intelligence identified a group of approximately 30 males enroute to the Carnival.

2.5.6 One member of the group revealed a knife in his waistband in the video and used abusive language towards an opposing gang, which there was well documented evidence that they were in dispute with.

2.5.7 In this scenario, the only offence available for our use was possession of an offensive weapon. The act was not ‘more than merely preparatory’ for an attempt, there was no clear target, and a conspiracy could not be proven as despite being in a large group he was the only one with a weapon and it could not be proven that a conversation or agreement between members had been made.

2.5.8 A possession with intent charge would attract a harsher sentence than possession alone and reflect the seriousness of the offense.

2.6 Increasing the maximum penalty for offences relating to offensive weapons.

2.6.1 Example 1: On 12/05/2021 police targeted the owner of a ‘snapchat’ account who was selling knives to be used in conflict to gang members under 18 across south London.

2.6.2 The seller was identified via a phone number, which led to two addresses being searched and two males arrested.

2.6.3 The investigation involved phone downloads, analysis, attribution and applications to providers and networks, which can take many months.

2.6.4 The practical element of the investigation makes it impossible to conclude within 6 months of the reported offence.

2.6.5 The police are currently challenged by the Statutory Time Limit of this offence to resolve the challenges of online investigations and other digital media.

2.6.6 Example 2: On 23/02/2021, B sent a Snapchat message saying "15s 10 for 150 22s 2 for pinky". This message is referring to knives with 15-inch-long blades and 22-inch blades.

2.6.7 He was arrested in the street for a S1 Knives Act 1997 offence (marketing a knife to suggest it is suitable for use in combat), a triable either way offence. A search was conducted at his home address and 28 brand new hunting-style and machete-style knives in their sheaths were found hidden behind the skirting board in the kitchen. Bank statements of his mother indicated her accounts were used to make the purchases.

2.6.8 In practical terms this case involved bank production orders, phone downloads, social media analysis and communication data from various social media companies which can take a substantial amount of time to conduct.

2.6.9 At court however, the S1 Knives Act offence was not proven. The police would not have been able to search the home address for selling to under-18s as a summary offence and would not have been able to conduct enquiries within the statutory time limit.

2.6.10 Bringing the maximum penalty for these offences in line with the offence of unlawful marketing would give police access to ancillary powers, increase the time allowed to undertake enquiries, as well as reflect the seriousness of the offence.

2.7 Power to seize, retain and destroy bladed articles found on private property.

2.7.1 Example 1: On 07/01/2022 police were called for a welfare check on a male showing sign of deteriorating mental health. He had a history of erratic behaviour and was known to support services and had criminal priors of drugs supply, weapons possession, assault, and threats to kill.

2.7.2 On this occasion, there was no power to detain the male either criminally or under the Mental Health Act.

2.7.3 He disclosed an apparent obsession with weaponry and an interest in buying a crossbow. Officer found 10 assorted knives around his bedroom and one Rambo-style knife in a black sheath in the living area.

2.7.4 None of the weapons were covered under current legislation.

2.7.5 Example 2: On 07/01/2022 police were called to a domestic incident. The male was not present, but the female had found drugs and knives and was in fear due to the history of domestic incidents in the home.

2.7.6 A consented search was conducted, and a supermarket bag was shown to police in a bedroom wardrobe containing a large ceremonial-style knife as well as cannabis residue.

2.7.7 The family were not part of a culture or religion that utilise a ceremonial style knife (e.g. a Kirpan). While the knife may have been simply an interest piece, it was clearly dangerous and kept in a carrier bag in the bedroom, rather than mounted on a wall or in a frame.

2.7.8 There were no criminal offences and police had no power to seize, retain or destroy the knife under current legislation.

3 Warrantless power of entry

3.1 We recognise that a warrantless power of entry could be supportive to operational policing if implemented and used carefully and thoughtfully, alongside current powers. However, there continues to be limits to the accuracy of technology which would allow us to be confident in its use without additional evidence.

3.2 Police will follow up every reasonable line of enquiry, but we will only be able to do so if we are confident that the intelligence we have is reliable.

3.3 Any use of the power of entry by police must be carried out based on strong intelligence to ensure legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

3.4 It is the view of policing that current systems which can show the location of certain electronics, such as mobile phones, are not accurate enough to give a precise location on every occasion, especially in densely populated areas. Other corroborative intelligence must always be sought by police before using our powers.

3.5 To maintain public trust and confidence, its use would need to be considered thoroughly on a case-by-case basis and would require a high bar of supporting evidence for it to be used.

3.6 It is also vital that such a power is not considered the standard response to reports of stolen property. This risks damaging trust and confidence in cases where the corroborating evidence, such as where it is based solely on tracking data, does not support its use to recover goods.

3.7 An example of the challenges inherent in searching for stolen property is below:

3.8 In the simplest scenario where a search takes place, there would be person(s) present on the premises who are reasonable suspected of involvement with the stolen property. They would be liable to arrest accordingly, and once arrested the powers of search afforded by s18 and s32 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) enable officers to continue the search of the premises notwithstanding the fact that the specific item sought has already been recovered.

3.9 However, it is less straightforward if either the premises are unoccupied or there are no reasonable grounds for suspecting anyone present of being involved in an offence. Once the items sought had been found, and any further stolen items that were clear and obvious to them were seized, officers would be obliged to cease searching, presenting an issue in cases where the premises are discovered to be filled with stolen property.

3.10 There would be a case for providing a power to permit a wider search where there are reasonable grounds to believe there is additional stolen property on the premises and a continued search is necessary to recover that property. However, it would require a high threshold to ensure it was proportionate to do so. For example, would it be proportionate to search the private room of another resident within that property?

3.11 The lack of power to search an individual on a premises has the potential to frustrate the purpose of the search, depending on the nature of the property being sought. For example, where it is a mobile phone which is easily concealed on a person, compared with stolen plant machinery. However, a power to enter someone’s property and search them without a warrant would be intrusive and would also require a very high threshold to ensure it was proportionate to do so.

3.12 Police do have the power to arrest someone if there are reasonable grounds to suspect an individual is involved in an offence of handling stolen goods and subsequently searched under s32 of PACE. If the property was not found, the officer would need to consider whether the ground for arrest remains, and if not, de-arrest the individual.

4 Anti-Social Behaviour

4.1 We welcome new provisions around anti-social behaviour (ASB), which will support police and partners in tackling ASB.

4.2 The ability to place requirements on those who have committed ASB, to require them to carry out or refrain from certain actions, provides additional flexibility which will help us and local partners to more effectively tackle this behaviour.

4.3 Used intelligently, requirements will help to deter crime and ASB, hold people to account for their actions, and provide reassurance to our communities.

4.4 Additional provisions around nuisance begging, where begging turns to harassment, can also help to make our communities feel safer.

4.5 While begging and rough sleeping are not policing-specific issues, we recognise that in some circumstances there will be a need for police intervention and these provisions could be of benefit.

4.6 Key to dealing with these issues will be continued working with local partners through well-established community safety partnerships.

4.7 As with all operational decisions, we will always consider the human rights implications before any action is taken.

5 Dismissals

5.1 We welcome the proposals around police misconduct and dismissals which will support chief constables in tackling wrongdoing within their forces.

5.2 We are committed to ensuring that those not fit to serve are removed from policing and welcome the large number of changes that have already been made to the police vetting and misconduct system.

5.3 As noted by HMICFRS earlier this year, there has been ‘undoubted’ progress across forces on vetting, misconduct, and counter-corruption practices.

5.4 The provision to allow police chiefs to appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal is strongly welcome and will support chief constables in removing those who they and the public do not believe are fit to serve.

5.5 Currently, while police officers can appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal (PAT) on a wide variety of grounds, police chiefs can only appeal the decision of a misconduct hearing panel by way of judicial review in far fewer circumstances.

5.6 This comes at a substantial cost to public money and can mean chief constables being unable to remove individuals from their force who should not be working in policing.

6 Duty of Candour

6.1 We fully support proposals around a duty of candour as part of the wider code of practice related to ethical policing.

6.2 The public rightly expect a duty of candour from officers and we have worked closely with government and the College of Policing to ensure that this is reflected in the updated code of ethics.

6.3 There was an extensive consultation to understand how a duty of candour would be most effective and on the back of this the code of practice for ethical policing was recently laid in Parliament.

January 2024