The UK Small Island Developing States Strategy – Report Summary

Summary

Small Island Developing States are among the world’s most vulnerable countries. They are particularly exposed to the impacts of climate change, including intensifying tropical cyclones, sea level rise, and coral reef destruction. In 2017, Hurricane Maria wiped out the equivalent of 226% of Dominica’s GDP overnight. If global temperatures rise by 1.5 Celsius, the earth will lose 70% of coral reefs, on which SIDS’ tourism and fishing industries depend. Rising sea levels destroy coastal settlements, cause the salination of agricultural land, and may lead to the disappearance of some SIDS by the end of this century. SIDS’ economies are fragile, characterised by over-reliance on industries such as tourism and fishing, high levels of external debt, and difficulties in accessing international climate finance. For SIDS, the impact of external shocks—whether extreme weather events, pandemics, or global economic volatility—is larger, and the recovery process slower.

Small Island Developing States are taking ambitious steps to address these challenges, but they need committed international partners to support them. This requires much more than the provision of greater financial assistance. It requires partner states to use their power and influence to drive forward global action on issues affecting SIDS, to amplify SIDS’ international voice, and to support SIDS’ own forms of collective advocacy.

As a centre of financial and legal and expertise with historical links to many SIDS and an influential voice within international institutions, the UK is well-placed to demonstrate international leadership on the issues of most concern to SIDS. The UK’s Small Island Developing States strategy 2022–2026 is a step in the right direction. The areas of focus identified in the strategy align well with the concerns outlined in evidence submitted to this inquiry by SIDS representatives.

However, the UK SIDS strategy lacks any concrete commitments or measurable objectives, running the risk that the UK’s support for SIDS may slip down the Government’s priority list over time. There is no discussion of the crucial issues of gender, loss and damage, or support for SIDS’ collective advocacy. Neither does the strategy address the question of what would happen to SIDS’ legal statehood and maritime zones should sea level rise cause their entire inhabitable land to disappear.

In addition, evidence to this inquiry highlighted ways in which the UK Government can improve its work in areas that are identified in the SIDS strategy. The UK has the opportunity to use its influence within bodies such as the OECD, the Green Climate Fund and the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to facilitate SIDS’ access to climate finance by advocating for vulnerability-based ODA criteria, simplified funding application procedures, and better representation for SIDS within MDBs’ governance structures. The UK Government has signed the crucial 2023 United Nations Global Ocean Treaty, but the Committee is disappointed that it has delayed the primary legislation required to ratify it until after the next election.

While the UK Government’s SIDS strategy pledges to support SIDS’ advocacy for more ambitious international action on climate change mitigation, its own domestic policies on net zero are undermining the UK’s claim to be a reliable international partner to SIDS—the countries likely to be hit hardest by a failure of the international community to meet the agreed target to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.