Improving Defence Inventory Management

This is a House of Commons Committee report, with recommendations to government. The Government has two months to respond.

Eighth Report of Session 2023–24

Author: Committee of Public Accounts

Related inquiry: Improving defence inventory management

Date Published: 19 January 2024

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Contents

Introduction

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) holds more than 640,000 types of inventory and more than 740 million individual items at a net book value of £11.8 billion. It spent £1.5 billion buying inventory in 2022–23. The MoD’s inventory falls into three categories:

  • Capital Spares – items used for repairing and enhancing or converting a larger equipment platform, such as wheels, rotary wings and windscreens. This also includes other low value items, such as tents or stretchers, which the MoD can issue and re-use;
  • Raw Materials and Consumables (RMC) – items such as munitions, food, clothing and medical supplies and fuels; and
  • Guided Weapons Missiles and Bombs (GWMB) - explosive inventory used in operations and training.

Inventory management sits within the MoD’s Support function, which is led by the Chief of Defence Logistics and Support (CDLS) and the Defence Support organisation within UK Strategic Command. However, many organisations contribute to the management of the MoD’s inventory, including Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), responsible for purchasing and delivering both equipment and support services to the Front Line Commands (namely the Army, Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and UK Strategic Command), which are responsible for the storage and distribution of inventory within their bases and at deployed locations.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. The MoD’s Chief of Defence Logistics and Support does not have the powers needed to deal with the fragmentation of its inventory management. Front Line Commands historically managed their own inventories, while Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) manage the MoD’s central warehousing and the procurement of much of its inventory. This has created a complex organisational set-up with inefficient working practices. The MoD established the post of Chief of Defence Logistics and Support (CDLS) and the Defence Support function in 2019 to cohere MoD’s inventory management, with the aim of implementing strategy, policies and standards across the MoD and its defence organisations. We are concerned, however, that CDLS does not have the power to direct these organisations, instead relying on influencing to improve inventory management. A recent internal review found that Defence Support and DE&S need to be much more integrated, and DE&S’s past behaviours have not been conducive to collaboration and external challenge. The MoD considers that the behaviours and culture across defence have already started to become more integrated, though it accepts that the change needed may take years, and is looking at how to grant CDLS the power of authority to direct the single services to take action or not.

Recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the MoD should set out the steps it has taken to provide CDLS and the Support function with the right levers and authority to implement its Support Strategy to achieve the 2025 strategic outcome “waypoints” (towards the 2035 goals).

2. The MoD’s inventory management systems remain outdated, and the quality of its data limits its ability to understand its inventory. MoD’s inventory management has faced long-standing issues with its many legacy IT systems, which have limited functionality and reinforce the fragmentation of its inventory management. While it has reduced the number of Support systems from around 250 in 2010 to 89 today, the two base inventory management systems used by the Army and Royal Navy respectively are nearly 40 years old. The MoD acknowledges that, while its visibility of its inventory is generally good, its system functionality can prevent staff from having a deeper understanding of it. For example, the Royal Navy’s base inventory system can record that an item is unserviceable, but not for what reason, meaning the MoD will not know what degree of repair it may need. In 2010, the MoD entered into a £800 million contract with Boeing Defence UK called Future Logistics Information Services (FLIS) that was due to run until 2022.1 However, in late 2020 the MoD signed a five-year contract extension worth £515 million called “Bridging the Gap”,2 which the MoD explained at the time would “provide capability that Bridges the Gap between the FLIS contract and the future long-term strategic solution, known as the Business Modernisation for Support (BMfS) project”.3 The MoD’s short-term plan for Bridging the Gap is to move the Army and Royal Navy onto an upgraded version of the Royal Air Force’s more modern inventory system. We do not see, however, how this step alone will address the existing gaps in its data. We are also concerned to hear that the MoD awarded the contract for this £515 million programme to a large defence prime contractor without a competitive tendering process.

Recommendation: Within six months, the MoD should provide an update to us setting out progress against its plans for the Bridging the Gap project, as well as any other measures it is undertaking to improve the quality of its inventory data. This should specifically address the likelihood that a further contract extension will be required to complete the Future Logistics Information Services work, and the expected cost and duration of any such extension.

3. The MoD’s transformation plans are complex and ambitious, but its track record means we are sceptical about its ability to achieve them. The MoD has put in place the £2.5 billion Business Modernisation for Support (BMfS) programme to upgrade its legacy IT infrastructure and introduce aligned business processes across its bodies. This programme is intended to resolve many of the historic issues the MoD has faced in managing its inventory, however it is highly complex: transforming services for around 65,000 users across Defence whilst maintaining operations throughout. The MoD’s track record in delivering business and digital transformation is patchy, and the Committee is concerned about the level of skills and personnel available to MoD to manage these programmes. The MoD faces staffing gaps of around 25% across both BMfS and its Future Defence Support Services (FDSS) programme, which aims to find the best commercial arrangements for inventory management from 2028. While the MoD told us it has brought in digital skills for BMfS, it acknowledged that the staffing gaps create risks for FDSS, though it is confident it can still meet the 2028 target delivery date through sensible prioritisation.

Recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the MoD should write to us setting out progress on its Support transformation programmes, how it is ensuring it has the right skills and experience to deliver them, and how it will engage with industry in doing so.

4. MoD will need to work closely with industry to ensure resilience in its supply chains. The MoD outsourced its central warehousing and the procurement of some of its commodities—food, clothing, general and medical supplies—to a consortium under the “Team Leidos” banner through the Logistics Commodities and Services Transformation (LCST) contract in 2015. This has been successful overall, forecast to generate financial efficiencies of £403 million over the life of the contract and has increased the agility of MoD’s supply operations. The MoD is looking at incorporating the learning from the LCST contract into its £1.8 billion FDSS programme for future contracts which will replace LCST in 2028. The CDLS admits FDSS is a large, complex piece of work which he is expecting will require external advice. FDSS provides a once in a generation opportunity to merge important inventory-related software contracts into a single programme. Recent events, such as the war in Ukraine and covid-19, have brought about a reassessment of how the MoD should manage its inventory, away from prioritising efficiency to ensuring greater resilience. Ukraine and previous conflicts have also highlighted the importance of protecting support networks. For example, the MoD stated that throughout its recent operations in Afghanistan, 60% of casualties were among personnel involved in force protection of lines of communication, such as convoys of fuel or stores. Future conflicts may require sudden surges in demand and industrial capacity, which industry may need support to provide. MoD told us it helped develop a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) defence production action plan to signal demand clearly to industry and the MoD plans to invest around £2.4 billion in strengthening supply chains. In the longer term it intends to create an “always-on” demand pattern to create a more robust supply chain.

Recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the MoD should update on its plans for how it intends to work with industry ensure greater resilience in its inventory management, including its £2.4 billion of investment in supply chains.

  • Within six months, the MoD should inform the Committee by letter of the lessons learned from its review of the LCST contract and how it will take implement these.
  • Within twelve months the MoD should provide a progress report to the Committee on its plans for merging the LSCT contract and a number of similar contracts into FDCC programme. In particular, the MoD should set out how well the IT software programmes are being developed to support the logistics consolidation.

5. The MoD failed to consider the needs of its medical operations in outsourcing commodity procurement to Team Leidos and this has created significant risks for front-line personnel. Since the LCST contract began, the inventory needs of front-line medical personnel have not been well served. In particular, units have faced poor availability of medical inventory and been supplied with items without sufficient shelf life for longer deployments. In 2022, the Royal Navy assessed that, if unresolved, the situation would present a significant risk to life for its personnel. This issue arose because the contract applied a general target across all commodity supply. This meant that lower performance in supplying medical inventory (which generally requires higher performance than other commodities) was masked by better performance elsewhere. Furthermore, there is granularity within what is needed for certain elements of medical inventory: the MoD cited 90%, 95% and 98% inventory level requirements for different medical equipment.4 For the average inventory of “fast-moving commodity type medical items”, the MoD told us that Team Leidos was now achieving the 92% level “on a regular basis”.5 From 2019, the MoD changed the incentivisation in the contract to hit time targets and deliver new projects and equipment faster, which improved the situation but still not to the required level. However, in 2023 because performance for medical had still not improved to the required level, the MoD approved further improvement initiatives which will ultimately require it to pay the supplier a further £13.2 million.6

Recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the MoD should write to us setting out how it will ensure that the requirements of medical personnel will be properly addressed in its future inventory management arrangements, and how it will resolve risks more quickly in future. This should include providing data on a quarterly or monthly basis of how performance in the supply of medical inventory has changed over the life of the LCST contract, including performance against any target inventory level requirements for different sub-sectors of medical equipment as well as the overall medical equipment inventory target. Alongside this, the MoD should set when it expects to consistently achieve each of these targets.

6. While the MoD has reduced the amount of stock it holds, it still holds large amounts of excess and unserviceable inventory. From 2011 to 2023, the MoD told us it achieved a 25% reduction in the net book value of its inventory, which it reduced from £16 billion to £12 billion. However, it is still holding substantial amounts of inventory that is unserviceable, overstocked or beyond the service date of its related platform. The MoD argues that there are many complex reasons for these build-ups of stock. For example, unserviceable inventory may still be useful if repaired, and other items are overstocked for contingency scenarios. It also stated that activity supporting the front line will always take priority over managing disposals, and the move towards building resilience will increase the level of inventory being held in future. Nonetheless, it acknowledged that its decision-making needs to be informed by better data; for example, missing data on why inventory is unserviceable makes it difficult to understand what should be disposed of. The MoD has now put in place projects to target disposals, but these are disparate and some areas, particularly the Royal Air Force, have achieved more than others.

Recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, the MoD should set out how it is improving its ability to understand which inventory items need disposing of, and ensuring this is done so consistently. It should also set out details of any targets it has to reduce the amount of the inventory overall and in particular areas.

1 The structure and organisation of inventory management

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) about its inventory management, with witnesses from MoD centre, Defence Support, and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S).7

2. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) holds more than 640,000 types of inventory and more than 740 million individual items at a net book value of £11.8 billion. It spent £1.5 billion buying inventory in 2022–23.8 The MoD’s inventory falls into three categories:

  • Capital Spares – items used for repairing and enhancing or converting a larger equipment platform, such as wheels, rotary wings and windscreens. This category also includes other lower value items, such as tents or stretchers, which the MoD can issue and re-use;
  • Raw Materials and Consumables (RMC) – items such as munitions, food, clothing, medical supplies and fuels; and
  • Guided Weapons Missiles and Bombs (GWMB) – explosive inventory used in operations and training.

3. Inventory management sits within the MoD’s Support function, which is led by the Chief of Defence Logistics and Support (CDLS) and the Defence Support organisation within UK Strategic Command. However, many organisations contribute to the management of the MoD’s inventory. These include Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), responsible for delivering equipment and support services to the armed forces, and the Front Line Commands (namely the Army, Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and UK Strategic Command), which are responsible for the storage and distribution of inventory within their bases and at deployed locations.9

Fragmentation of inventory management

4. Front Line Commands historically managed their own inventories, while DE&S managed the MoD’s central warehousing and the procurement of much of its inventory. This has created a complex organisational set-up with inefficient working practices.10 The MoD told us it that, in recognition of this siloed activity, it established the post of CDLS and the Defence Support organisation as leaders of the Support function in 2019 to cohere MoD’s inventory management. Its aim is to implement strategy, policies and standards across the MoD and its defence organisations, such as its Support strategy. This is like other functions across defence such as digital, medical and intelligence, who each have their own functional owners and plans.11

5. We challenged the MoD on whether CDLS had the levers necessary to fulfil their ambitions. Most expenditure on Support activities is owned by the Front Line Commands and other MoD organisations, as well as the contracts for delivering Support activity.12 The MoD acknowledged that there is a tension between the horizontal leadership that functions provide, and the vertical hierarchy within Front Line Commands and other Defence organisations. This means that CDLS and Defence Support rely on influencing these organisations through the strength of their relationships and by making evidence-based arguments. The MoD conceded that the relationship between Defence Support and DE&S had not been as close as it should have been, with a recent internal review highlighting that they need to be much more integrated. DE&S’s past behaviours have also not been conducive to collaboration and external challenge, with the recent Sheldon Review of the Ajax programme demonstrating one example of where DE&S has pushed back where other organisations have told it to do things differently.13

6. The MoD stated that, while the behaviours and culture across Defence have already started to become more integrated, it accepted that the change needed might take years. The MoD is currently looking at how to grant functions across Defence, including CDLS’s Support function, more levers as part of its defence design work. These include giving CDLS a seat on DE&S’s executive committee and giving the CDLS “more teeth” to be involved in the strategic balance of the investment process of other defence organisations. For example, at present a Front Line Command could theoretically take a savings measure which might not be beneficial to the wider efficiency and effectiveness of Support. Ideally CDLS would like to be able to direct Front Line Commands to take action (or not) to create a harmonised end-to-end defence supply chain.14

Outdated systems and poor quality data

7. MoD’s inventory management has faced long-standing issues with its many legacy IT systems, which have limited functionality and reinforce the fragmentation of its inventory management. Each Command has its own core inventory management system, and there are other systems used across the Support function for managing other types of inventory, as well as aspects such as engineering. Whilst the MoD has reduced the number of Support systems from around 250 in 2010 to 89 today, two of its base inventory management systems (SS3 and CRISP, used by the Army and Royal Navy respectively) are nearly 40 years old.15

8. We remain concerned about the quality of the MoD’s inventory data; the MoD stated that while its visibility of its inventory is generally good, its system functionality can prevent staff from having a deeper understanding of it. For example, the Royal Navy’s base inventory system can record that an item is unserviceable, but not for what reason, meaning the MoD will not know what degree of repair it may need.16 The MoD’s short-term plan (known as ‘Bridging the Gap’, see below) is to move the Army and Royal Navy onto an upgraded version of the Royal Air Force’s inventory system, which is a more modern inventory management system with greater functionality. For example, the Royal Air Force inventory system has a much greater ability to recognise in more detail the repair status of individual items.17

9. However, we do not see how this step alone will address the existing gaps in the MoD’s data. For instance, when new systems were introduced in DE&S’s central warehouses through the Team Leidos contract, DE&S stated that it had to engage a private company to do a lot of work on the data for them.18 We were also concerned to hear that the contract for the Bridging the Gap programme, valued at £515 million, was awarded to a large defence prime contractor without a competitive tendering process.19 The Bridging the Gap contract was a five-year contract extension with the same supplier—Boeing Defence UK—of the £800 million Future Logistics Information Services (FLIS) that was signed in 2010 and due to run until 2022.20 The MoD explained that the contract extension would “provide capability that Bridges the Gap between the FLIS contract and the future long-term strategic solution, known as the Business Modernisation for Support (BMfS) project”.21 The MoD told us that it intended to competitively procure the suite of contracts relating to its larger future transformation of its legacy IT systems, with its contract for engineering support and asset management software currently out to tender.22

Transformation plans

10. The MoD has put in place the £2.5 billion Business Modernisation for Support (BMfS) programme to upgrade its legacy IT infrastructure and introduce aligned business processes across its bodies. This programme is intended to resolve many of the historic issues the MoD has faced in managing its inventory, however, it is highly complex, transforming services for around 65,000 users across Defence whilst maintaining operations throughout.23 It has also put in place the Future Defence Support Services (FDSS) transformation programme, which aims to find the best commercial arrangements for inventory management from 2028. This is when logistics contracts held by DE&S and Front Line Commands come up for renewal or expiry, with the aim of ensuring that future contracts for inventory management across the MoD are aligned to the same strategic goals.24

11. The MoD’s track record in delivering business and digital transformation is patchy; when we reported on The Defence Digital Strategy in 2022, we found that the MoD was struggling to deliver its largest and most transformational digital programmes. We also observed that the MoD faced challenges recruiting all the digital skills it needed, and as a result, the Committee is concerned about the level of skills and personnel available to MoD to manage these programmes.25 The MoD stated that it has been pragmatic and incremental in its approach to the BMfS programme, with the first phase focused on stabilising and modernising its systems. The programme is also divided into thematic areas so that the MoD can acquire commercial off-the-shelf software for each one.26

12. Nonetheless, the MoD acknowledged it faces staffing gaps of around 25% across both BMfS and FDSS. For BMfS, the MoD has contracted a delivery support partner and is looking to bring in a digital non-executive director to provide advice. CDLS himself also took a four-month secondment in digital industry. The MoD acknowledged, however, that the staffing gaps created risks for FDSS, although it was confident it could still meet the 2028 target delivery date through sensible prioritisation.27

2 Engagement with industry

Building resilience into the supply chain

13. The MoD outsourced its central warehousing and the procurement of some of its commodities—food, clothing, general and medical supplies—to a consortium under the Team Leidos banner28 through the Logistics and Commodities Services Transformation (LCST) contract in 2015. Managed through DE&S, this has been a successful contract overall, and as of May 2023, the MoD forecast that it would achieve financial efficiencies of £403 million by 2028, when the contract is due to come to an end.29 Through the contract, DE&S told us it has increased the agility of its supply operations, gaining greater efficiency in transporting inventory across the UK and Europe, reductions in its carbon footprint of around 28%, and reductions in commodity purchases through better forecasting. DE&S told us that this agility has also been useful in mobilising stocks for Ukraine.30

14. The MoD is looking at incorporating the learning from the LCST contract into its Future Defence Support Services (FDSS) programme, which aims to find the best inventory management arrangements when the LCST contract comes to an end.31 Recent events such as the war in Ukraine and the impact of covid-19 have also brought about a reassessment of how the MoD should manage its inventory.32 In its 2022 Supply Chain strategy, it set out that its previous approaches prioritised cost efficiency, which was appropriate for an environment of relative stability, but that these approaches are vulnerable when sudden shocks emerge.33 It is now seeking to ensure greater resilience in its inventory management, which may involve holding greater amounts of inventory in some instances. Ukraine and previous conflicts have also demonstrated the importance of protecting support networks and lines of communication. For example, the MoD stated that throughout its recent operations in Afghanistan, 60% of casualties were among personnel involved in force protection of communication lines.34

15. Future conflicts may require sudden surges in demand and industrial capacity, which industry may then need support to provide. The MoD told us that the United Kingdom and other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members have put together a NATO defence production action plan. This was designed to create a clearer signal to all of industry about the demand from across NATO, through which the UK’s contribution was the development of an overall munitions strategy. In doing so, it involved industry in classified discussions to give them a clearer understanding of demand and the issues they are planning to. The MoD told us that it plans to invest around £2.4 billion over the next couple of years to strengthen the supply chain through a combination of orders and improvement of resilience. In the longer term it intends to create an “always-on” demand pattern to create a more robust supply chain.35 The MoD accepted that it might need to pay for the increase in resilience in terms of production capacity and future surge capacity.36

Medical inventory

16. Despite the broader success of the LCST contract, since it began the needs of front-line medical personnel have not been well served. In particular, units have faced poor availability of medical inventory and been supplied with items without sufficient shelf life for longer deployments. This has meant that, in some instances, units have carried increased operational risk because they have had to proceed without the capability to test for and treat certain medical conditions. In 2022, the Royal Navy assessed that, if unresolved, the situation presented a significant risk to life for its personnel.37

17. This issue arose because the contract applied a general target across all commodity supply.38 However, this meant that lower performance in supplying medical inventory (which generally requires higher performance than other commodities) was masked by better performance elsewhere. In addition, best practice for other commodities is to bring forward stock with low shelf lives to minimise wastage, but this approach is not appropriate when deploying on a ship for three or six months. The MoD told us it has now adjusted the management software to account for the shelf-life issue.39

18. The MoD explained that the incentives for the LCST contract were intended to prioritise efficiency, but that medical supplies are a difficult area in which to achieve efficiencies. From 2019, the MoD changed the contract’s incentivisation by taking back a portion of the fee and returning it only if Team Leidos hit time targets and was able to deliver new projects and equipment faster. This did yield improvements; for example, the number of new medical equipment projects increased from six a year to around 36.40 However, performance for medical had still not improved to the required level, and in 2023, the MoD approved further improvement initiatives which will ultimately require it to pay the supplier a further £13.2 million.41 This includes bringing in 35 more people with medical experience into the Team Leidos and the introduction of a specific performance target for fast-moving commodity medical items, which the MoD stated Team Leidos was now reaching on a regular basis.42

Excess and unserviceable stock

19. When we last examined the MoD’s inventory management, we found that it was not consistently disposing of inventory it no longer needed and was purchasing items for which it already held sufficient stock.43 The MoD told us that from 2011 to 2023, it achieved a 25% reduction in the net book value of its inventory, which it reduced from £16 billion to £12 billion. It has also removed the financial incentives which encouraged Front Line Commands to over-purchase consumable commodities. However, it is still holding substantial amounts of inventory that is unserviceable, overstocked or beyond the service date of its related platform.44

20. The MoD argues that there are many complex reasons for these build-ups of stock. For example, unserviceable inventory may still be useful if repaired, and may be being held because the manufacturer no longer makes these items, or because a certain amount may be needed before a repair contractor will take them. Other items appear as excess stock, but are deliberately overstocked for contingency scenarios, for example, anthrax vaccines or other critical medical supplies. Items beyond their service date may be useable on other platforms or have sale opportunities to other governments, so will be held until other governments confirm they no longer wish to buy them.45 The MoD also stated that activity supporting the front line will always take priority over managing disposals, and the move towards building resilience will increase the level of inventory being held in future.

21. Nonetheless, the MoD acknowledged that its decision-making needs to be informed by better data; for example, missing data within its Navy base inventory system on why inventory is unserviceable makes it difficult to understand what should be disposed of. The MoD would like to reach a situation in which it better understands what unserviceable stock is repairable and what may be overstocked but is worth keeping for contingencies.46 The MoD has now put in place another set of projects to target disposals, but these are disparate and some areas, particularly the Royal Air Force, have achieved more than others. DE&S intends to place all the resource associated with disposals under one owner to ensure that a consistent pace is achieved across all areas.47

Formal minutes

Wednesday 10 January 2024

Members present

Dame Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Olivia Blake

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown

Mr Jonathan Djanogly

Mrs Flick Drummond

Peter Grant

Ben Lake

Anne Marie Morris

Improving Defence Inventory Management

Draft Report (Improving Defence Inventory Management), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 21 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Eighth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Monday 15 January at 3.30 p.m.


Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Monday 13 November 2023

David Williams CB, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence; Andy Start, Chief Executive Officer, Defence Equipment and Support; John Farrow, Director of the Logistics and Support Operating Centre, Defence Equipment and Support; Vice Admiral Andy Kyte CB, Chief of Defence Logistics and Support, Ministry of DefenceQ1–105


Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

DIM numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 Hibbert, Dylan (DIM0002)


List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

Session 2023–24

Number

Title

Reference

1st

The New Hospital Programme

HC 77

2nd

The condition of school buildings

HC 78

3rd

Revising health assessments for disability benefits

HC 79

4th

The Department for Work & Pensions Annual Report and Accounts 2022–23

HC 290

5th

Government’s programme of waste reforms

HC 333

6th

Competition in public procurement

HC 385

7th

Resilience to flooding

HC 71

Session 2022–23

Number

Title

Reference

1st

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Annual Report and Accounts 2020–21

HC 59

2nd

Lessons from implementing IR35 reforms

HC 60

3rd

The future of the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors

HC 118

4th

Use of evaluation and modelling in government

HC 254

5th

Local economic growth

HC 252

6th

Department of Health and Social Care 2020–21 Annual Report and Accounts

HC 253

7th

Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme

HC 259

8th

Financial sustainability of the higher education sector in England

HC 257

9th

Child Maintenance

HC 255

10th

Restoration and Renewal of Parliament

HC 49

11th

The rollout of the COVID-19 vaccine programme in England

HC 258

12th

Management of PPE contracts

HC 260

13th

Secure training centres and secure schools

HC 30

14th

Investigation into the British Steel Pension Scheme

HC 251

15th

The Police Uplift Programme

HC 261

16th

Managing cross-border travel during the COVID-19 pandemic

HC 29

17th

Government’s contracts with Randox Laboratories Ltd

HC 28

18th

Government actions to combat waste crime

HC 33

19th

Regulating after EU Exit

HC 32

20th

Whole of Government Accounts 2019–20

HC 31

21st

Transforming electronic monitoring services

HC 34

22nd

Tackling local air quality breaches

HC 37

23rd

Measuring and reporting public sector greenhouse gas emissions

HC 39

24th

Redevelopment of Defra’s animal health infrastructure

HC 42

25th

Regulation of energy suppliers

HC 41

26th

The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2021–22 – Fraud and error in the benefits system

HC 44

27th

Evaluating innovation projects in children’s social care

HC 38

28th

Improving the Accounting Officer Assessment process

HC 43

29th

The Affordable Homes Programme since 2015

HC 684

30th

Developing workforce skills for a strong economy

HC 685

31st

Managing central government property

HC 48

32nd

Grassroots participation in sport and physical activity

HC 46

33rd

HMRC performance in 2021–22

HC 686

34th

The Creation of the UK Infrastructure Bank

HC 45

35th

Introducing Integrated Care Systems

HC 47

36th

The Defence digital strategy

HC 727

37th

Support for vulnerable adolescents

HC 730

38th

Managing NHS backlogs and waiting times in England

HC 729

39th

Excess Votes 2021–22

HC 1132

40th

COVID employment support schemes

HC 810

41st

Driving licence backlogs at the DVLA

HC 735

42nd

The Restart Scheme for long-term unemployed people

HC 733

43rd

Progress combatting fraud

HC 40

44th

The Digital Services Tax

HC 732

45th

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Annual Report and Accounts 2021–22

HC 1254

46th

BBC Digital

HC 736

47th

Investigation into the UK Passport Office

HC 738

48th

MoD Equipment Plan 2022–2032

HC 731

49th

Managing tax compliance following the pandemic

HC 739

50th

Government Shared Services

HC 734

51st

Tackling Defra’s ageing digital services

HC 737

52nd

Restoration & Renewal of the Palace of Westminster – 2023 Recall

HC 1021

53rd

The performance of UK Security Vetting

HC 994

54th

Alcohol treatment services

HC 1001

55th

Education recovery in schools in England

HC 998

56th

Supporting investment into the UK

HC 996

57th

AEA Technology Pension Case

HC 1005

58th

Energy bills support

HC 1074

59th

Decarbonising the power sector

HC 1003

60th

Timeliness of local auditor reporting

HC 995

61st

Progress on the courts and tribunals reform programme

HC 1002

62nd

Department of Health and Social Care 2021–22 Annual Report and Accounts

HC 997

63rd

HS2 Euston

HC 1004

64th

The Emergency Services Network

HC 1006

65th

Progress in improving NHS mental health services

HC 1000

66th

PPE Medpro: awarding of contracts during the pandemic

HC 1590

67th

Child Trust Funds

HC 1231

68th

Local authority administered COVID support schemes in England

HC 1234

69th

Tackling fraud and corruption against government

HC 1230

70th

Digital transformation in government: addressing the barriers to efficiency

HC 1229

71st

Resetting government programmes

HC 1231

72nd

Update on the rollout of smart meters

HC 1332

73rd

Access to urgent and emergency care

HC 1336

74th

Bulb Energy

HC 1232

75th

Active travel in England

HC 1335

76th

The Asylum Transformation Programme

HC 1334

77th

Supported housing

HC 1330

78th

Resettlement support for prison leavers

HC 1329

79th

Support for innovation to deliver net zero

HC 1331

80th

Progress with Making Tax Digital

HC 1333

1st Special Report

Sixth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts

HC 50

2nd Special Report

Seventh Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts

HC 1055

Session 2021–22

Number

Title

Reference

1st

Low emission cars

HC 186

2nd

BBC strategic financial management

HC 187

3rd

COVID-19: Support for children’s education

HC 240

4th

COVID-19: Local government finance

HC 239

5th

COVID-19: Government Support for Charities

HC 250

6th

Public Sector Pensions

HC 289

7th

Adult Social Care Markets

HC 252

8th

COVID 19: Culture Recovery Fund

HC 340

9th

Fraud and Error

HC 253

10th

Overview of the English rail system

HC 170

11th

Local auditor reporting on local government in England

HC 171

12th

COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update

HC 173

13th

Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic

HC 175

14th

Windrush Compensation Scheme

HC 174

15th

DWP Employment support

HC 177

16th

Principles of effective regulation

HC 176

17th

High Speed 2: Progress at Summer 2021

HC 329

18th

Government’s delivery through arm’s-length bodies

HC 181

19th

Protecting consumers from unsafe products

HC 180

20th

Optimising the defence estate

HC 179

21st

School Funding

HC 183

22nd

Improving the performance of major defence equipment contracts

HC 185

23rd

Test and Trace update

HC 182

24th

Crossrail: A progress update

HC 184

25th

The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2020–21 – Fraud and error in the benefits system

HC 633

26th

Lessons from Greensill Capital: accreditation to business support schemes

HC 169

27th

Green Homes Grant Voucher Scheme

HC 635

28th

Efficiency in government

HC 636

29th

The National Law Enforcement Data Programme

HC 638

30th

Challenges in implementing digital change

HC 637

31st

Environmental Land Management Scheme

HC 639

32nd

Delivering gigabitcapable broadband

HC 743

33rd

Underpayments of the State Pension

HC 654

34th

Local Government Finance System: Overview and Challenges

HC 646

35th

The pharmacy early payment and salary advance schemes in the NHS

HC 745

36th

EU Exit: UK Border post transition

HC 746

37th

HMRC Performance in 2020–21

HC 641

38th

COVID-19 cost tracker update

HC 640

39th

DWP Employment Support: Kickstart Scheme

HC 655

40th

Excess votes 2020–21: Serious Fraud Office

HC 1099

41st

Achieving Net Zero: Follow up

HC 642

42nd

Financial sustainability of schools in England

HC 650

43rd

Reducing the backlog in criminal courts

HC 643

44th

NHS backlogs and waiting times in England

HC 747

45th

Progress with trade negotiations

HC 993

46th

Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk

HC 952

47th

Academies Sector Annual Report and Accounts 2019/20

HC 994

48th

HMRC’s management of tax debt

HC 953

49th

Regulation of private renting

HC 996

50th

Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up

HC 951

51st

Improving outcomes for women in the criminal justice system

HC 997

52nd

Ministry of Defence Equipment Plan 2021–31

HC 1164

1st Special Report

Fifth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts

HC 222

Session 2019–21

Number

Title

Reference

1st

Support for children with special educational needs and disabilities

HC 85

2nd

Defence Nuclear Infrastructure

HC 86

3rd

High Speed 2: Spring 2020 Update

HC 84

4th

EU Exit: Get ready for Brexit Campaign

HC 131

5th

University technical colleges

HC 87

6th

Excess votes 2018–19

HC 243

7th

Gambling regulation: problem gambling and protecting vulnerable people

HC 134

8th

NHS capital expenditure and financial management

HC 344

9th

Water supply and demand management

HC 378

10th

Defence capability and the Equipment Plan

HC 247

11th

Local authority investment in commercial property

HC 312

12th

Management of tax reliefs

HC 379

13th

Whole of Government Response to COVID-19

HC 404

14th

Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak

HC 405

15th

Improving the prison estate

HC 244

16th

Progress in remediating dangerous cladding

HC 406

17th

Immigration enforcement

HC 407

18th

NHS nursing workforce

HC 408

19th

Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster

HC 549

20th

Tackling the tax gap

HC 650

21st

Government support for UK exporters

HC 679

22nd

Digital transformation in the NHS

HC 680

23rd

Delivering carrier strike

HC 684

24th

Selecting towns for the Towns Fund

HC 651

25th

Asylum accommodation and support transformation programme

HC 683

26th

Department of Work and Pensions Accounts 2019–20

HC 681

27th

Covid-19: Supply of ventilators

HC 685

28th

The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s management of the Magnox contract

HC 653

29th

Whitehall preparations for EU Exit

HC 682

30th

The production and distribution of cash

HC 654

31st

Starter Homes

HC 88

32nd

Specialist Skills in the civil service

HC 686

33rd

Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme

HC 687

34th

Covid-19: Support for jobs

HC 920

35th

Improving Broadband

HC 688

36th

HMRC performance 2019–20

HC 690

37th

Whole of Government Accounts 2018–19

HC 655

38th

Managing colleges’ financial sustainability

HC 692

39th

Lessons from major projects and programmes

HC 694

40th

Achieving government’s long-term environmental goals

HC 927

41st

COVID 19: the free school meals voucher scheme

HC 689

42nd

COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal Protective Equipment

HC 928

43rd

COVID-19: Planning for a vaccine Part 1

HC 930

44th

Excess Votes 2019–20

HC 1205

45th

Managing flood risk

HC 931

46th

Achieving Net Zero

HC 935

47th

COVID-19: Test, track and trace (part 1)

HC 932

48th

Digital Services at the Border

HC 936

49th

COVID-19: housing people sleeping rough

HC 934

50th

Defence Equipment Plan 2020–2030

HC 693

51st

Managing the expiry of PFI contracts

HC 1114

52nd

Key challenges facing the Ministry of Justice

HC 1190

53rd

Covid 19: supporting the vulnerable during lockdown

HC 938

54th

Improving single living accommodation for service personnel

HC 940

55th

Environmental tax measures

HC 937

56th

Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund

HC 941


Footnotes

1 WMS 3 December 2010 cc95WS-96WS

2 Q27

3 Tenders Electronic Daily, Ministry of Defence, ISTAR, SCIS, 11 December 2020

4 Q86

5 Q88

6 Qq 88, 97, C&AG’s report para 2.7

7 C&AG’s Report, Defence Inventory Management, Session 2022–23, HC 1793, 13 September 2023

8 C&AG’s Report, para 1

9 C&AG’s Report, para 2

10 Qq 2; C&AG’s Report, para 2

11 Qq 2–4; C&AG’s Report para 1.11

12 Qq 4–5; C&AG’s Report para 1.12

13 Qq 4, 6, 10–11

14 Qq 5–6, 10–11, 20

15 Qq 12–13 ; C&AG’s Report para 9

16 Qq 24, 34–36

17 Qq 24–25, 34–36, 64

18 Q 34

19 Q 27

20 WMS 3 December 2010 cc95WS-96WS

21 Tenders Electronic Daily, Ministry of Defence, ISTAR, SCIS, 11 December 2020

22 Qq 16, 29, 37–38, 43

23 Q13; C&AG’s Report para 17

24 Q 44, C&AG’s Report para 17

25 Qq 14–16, 46; Committee of Public Accounts, The Defence Digital Strategy, Thirty-Sixth Report of Session 2022–23, HC 727, 3 February 2023, paras 3–4

26 Qq 15, 17

27 Qq 15, 17, 104–105

28 Team Leidos is a consortium composed principally of Leidos Europe, Leidos Supply, Kuehne and Nagel and TVS Supply Chain Solutions.

29 Qq 73–74 ; C&AG’s Report para 10

30 Q74

31 Qq 75–77

32 Qq 60, 100–103 ; C&AG’s Report para 3

33 Ministry of Defence, Defence Supply Chain Strategy, 15 November 2022

34 Qq 60, 100, 103

35 Q 103

36 Q 102

37 Q 92; C&AG’s report para 2.5

38 Q 86; C&AG’s report para 11

39 Q 91

40 Qq 86–88

41 Qq 88, 97, C&AG’s report para 2.7

42 Qq 88, 97

43 Committee of Public Accounts, Managing the Defence Inventory, Thirty-Second Report of Session 2012–13, HC 745, 28 February 2013, Part Two para 7

44 Q 58 ; C&AG’s Report paras 12, 14

45 Qq 59–66, 68

46 Qq 64, 71–72

47 Q 67