Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Written evidence submitted by David Coleman, Emeritus Professor of Demography, University of Oxford (BSAIB13)

‘First catch your gangs’

Notes for meeting with the Public Bill Committee

General comments

1. The Bill offers better control by policing of an illegal process already in full swing, supplying a highly desirable commodity – residence in the UK – in demand by hundreds of thousands of ‘customers’ supplied by complex networks run by experienced criminals. In that respect it resembles the War on Drugs; both likely to be difficult, perpetual and indecisive. It proposes few measures likely to deflate demand by making the destination seem less desirable, unlike the Ruanda Bill recently abandoned. Its proposed extensions of criminal law seem a little underwhelming. While skeptical concerning the ability of the bill to have much effect, I agree that its aims are commendable. One advantage is to make the government hold itself to account to implement measures some of which do not actually seem to require legislation.

First catch your gangs.

2. The immediate objection is practical. How to identify and arrest organisers and recruiters of the crossings. This is likely to be difficult, if not impossible. Most of the trail of gangs are abroad, stretched over several countries –that’s where their customers are. UK police have no jurisdiction there. Foreign co-operation is essential. What must we offer in return? International goodwill and solidarity apart, it is not rational for foreign countries to restrict smuggling gangs to the UK. They serve the useful purpose of removing asylum seekers from transit countries Britain, however, has no neighbour in this particular pass the parcel game, One task of the Bill must be to offer benefits or concessions in compensation for co-operation.

3. Recent BBC investigative journalism has highlighted the difficulty of getting to gang leaders. As with drugs’ gangs, there are plenty of eager recruits available if one gang is taken down – the market remains untouched.

4. Root causes of small boat crossings are well known: Push factors are obvious, Pull factors to Britain is are particularly strong: the low chance of intervention by France and other source countries. Coastguards who do not ‘guard the coast’ but the security of the migrants; interception means safety. The English language, the high proportion of asylum claims accepted, weak regulation of illegal working, absence of a population register, ineffectual removal of failed claimants ,existing large immigrant communities ,

5. Several accredited and publicly funded immigrant charities,, an abundance of immigration lawyers, layers of appeal process, all militate against ‘stopping the boats’. Some public sympathy, although a majority of the public see the crossings as unfair and would welcome speedy return or removal. There is some support for ‘open borders’.

What measures are on offer or might be considered:

6. Improved co-ordination, intelligence and bureaucratic arrangements within government

7. More tech – drones, phone and wireless interception, satellite observation. Can only detect the crossings at the final stage of the journey, in the Channel. That benefits the migrant by maximizing chances of rescue. Interception and pushing back at sea is too dangerous.

8. Definitions of crimes. The abolition of most of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 decriminalised irregular migration. The Bill proposes new offences relating to endangering life, the facilitation of unauthorized migration through the possession and supply of equipment , documents and information, and extra powers for the authorities for the seizure of goods. The maximum penalty for some of these offences would be 14 years imprisonment. None could be considered draconian.

9. Make Britain unattractive again. The aim of the Ruanda policy, delayed to death by objections on Human Rights grounds and now scrapped, was intended to deflate demand by denying UK residence to some. The current Bill has some lesser measures which might make Britain unattractive. They would include limited powers of enforcement and detention, which have already encountered human rights objections. Only a minority would be subject to removal so deterrent effect small.

10. However, Home Office guidance, changed in February 2025, establishes a default provision that ‘a person who entered the UK illegally will be presumed to have their citizenship application refused unless they can bring forward specific, mitigating circumstances’ That is not part of the Bill., Critics insist that it will not deter migrants just keen to get their feet safely on a British beach.

11. Wish-list of more co-operation with neighbouring countries – intelligence sharing, extradition arrangements This is happening already. Would require a quid-pro-quo.

12. Deterrent factors include interception by French authorities. Return by UK authorities, Death at sea. Although the crossing looks and doubtless is terrifying the objective risks are not huge. The statistical risk of death on the crossing is 0.00093, about one in a thousand, the same as the chance of a man aged 32 not reaching his 33rd birthday or a woman of 38 not reaching her 39th.. The reward is the prospect, over 90 percent, of potentially permanent residence in Britain

13. Other possible responses, outside the proposed legislation, which might help the aims of the Bill have been suggested. They will only be noted:

14. Introduction of a Population Register https://davidcoleman.website/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/The-case-for-a-population-register-3-2.pdf . Overdue – since 1753!.

13 Intensive employment checks and enforcement.. Overdue but underway

14 Review of asylum criteria and appeals, leading to international initiatives.

15 Review of judicial activism.

16 UNHCR withdrawal

26 February 2025