Crime and Policing Bill

Written evidence submitted by International Centre of Justice for Palestinians (CPB129)

The International Centre of Justice for Palestinians (ICJP)1 is an independent organisation of lawyers, academics and politicians that works to protect and support the rights of Palestinians. ICJP was established with the objective of seeking justice and accountability for Israel’s longstanding, systematic violations of the rights of Palestinians under international law, including those which amount to international crimes.

1. Introduction

2. The Crime and Policing Bill is a wide-ranging and multifaceted bill. This briefing addresses provisions within Part 9, 10 and 14 of the Crime and Policing Bill ("the Bill"), covering ‘Public Order’, ‘Powers of the Police Etc.’ and ‘Terrorism and National Security’ respectively.

3. Background

4. The Bill has been introduced by the Government within a wider context in which civil liberties in the United Kingdom have faced erosion, through the introduction in recent years of legislation including the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (PCSCA 2022), the Public Order Act 2023. The previous Government also attempted to introduce the Criminal Justice Bill in 2024, prior to the dissolution of the previous parliament, which would also have undermined civil liberties in the UK.

5. The right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and enshrined in British law under the Human Rights Act (1998).

6. The Bill has also been introduced within a wider context of Israel’s War on Gaza. 60% of the UK public (60%) say that Israel’s military action in Gaza has gone too far. This sentiment has been reflected in large-scale demonstrations against Israel’s actions, including local demonstrations across the country and national marches with attendance figures amongst the most in British history.

7. ICJP’s investigation team, which includes expertise from former Metropolitan Police detectives, meets the evidentiary standards required by UK and international criminal courts and tribunals has been gathered over the past eighteen months. Investigative findings confirm a pattern of systematic violations, including, indiscriminate and disproportionate bombardment of civilians, deliberate and systematic targeting of vital infrastructure, attacks on designated ‘safe zones’ and intensified airstrikes on refugee camps, use of starvation as a weapon of war and enforced mass displacement policies.

8. The right to express opposition to such policies and practices is not merely protected under British and European law, but this opposition is also widespread amongst UK citizens and residents.

9. Part 9 – Public Order

10. Clause 86 - Offence of concealing identity at protests

11. Whilst Clause 86 is arguably superfluous in the context of existing provisions under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, [1] the logic of Clause 86 has serious implications on privacy and security for people exercising their right to protest.

12. Firstly, individuals who wish to exercise their freedom of expression, but fear professional consequences due to the nature of their workplace, will be deterred from attending demonstrations, if they are not legally able to prevent themselves from being identified at protests.

13. Recent reports indicate that anti-Muslim incidents of physical assault, discrimination and vandalism have increased by 72% in the last two years. [2] The report cited the ‘Israel and Gaza War’ in its foreword, indicating that it may be a contributing factor to this rise of anti-Muslim hatred and racism.

14. Individuals who demonstrate against Israel’s War on Gaza may be deterred from exercising their rights due to a fear of concern for their safety. This ‘chilling effect’ will be strengthened further if individuals are unable to anonymise themselves, meaning that they will be more vulnerable to doxing – when individuals publicly provide personally identifiable information about an individual or organization, usually via the Internet and without their consent.

15. The risk of doxing introduces the threat of violence within the UK for individuals attending protests as outlined in the paragraph above, but it will also introduce the threat of violence, detention or harassment for individuals protesting against foreign countries. This is particularly the case for dual citizens, or British residents who are citizens of foreign countries, who may with to demonstrate against that country’s policies and practices at protests taking place within the UK.

16. Subclause 86(2) puts the onus on individuals to provide proof that they would otherwise wear a facial covering for religious, health or vocational reasons. Whilst it is important that individu provisions are made within this Clause to exempt individuals in these positions, It is unacceptable to require the onus of proof to come from these individuals after they are charged with offences.

17. These are unsatisfactory provisions for an unworkable Clause. Such provisions will do little to mitigate the chilling effect that this Clause will have on individuals who would otherwise wish to attend protests, including people of the Muslim faith who choose to wear face coverings for religious and/or cultural observance and people with disabilities and health concerns.

18. Clause 90 – War Memorials

19. Section 50(1)(b) of the PSCSCA 2022 already provides that an offence is committed in the case of criminal damage of a ‘memorial.’ Clause 90 seeks to make it an offence for an individual to climb on a specified war memorial commits an offence, irrespective of whether or not criminal damage is caused. In a policy paper published in February 2025, the Ministry of Justice and Home Office factsheet said that the Clause would "[make] it clear that such disrespectful behaviour is unacceptable."

20. It is an inherently political categorisation to provide specific provisions for ‘war’ memorials compared to other monuments with the UK, especially given that the Government is using moralistic language such as ‘disrespectful’ to describe its motivation for introducing such a Clause. Given that monuments memorialise significant historic events, they are often political, and therefore, it may be the case that a monument relates to a political protest.

21. In such instances, it is a politically partisan decision to specifically ‘protect’ war memorials, as opposed to other monuments. For instance, this introduces more significant and targeted restrictions on pacifist and anti-war demonstrations than it does on demonstrations relating to other issues. It is inappropriate for the Government of the day to dictate which demonstrations are considered politically or moralistically palatable. Rather, the freedom of expression and assembly are enshrined under UK law, as detailed earlier in this submission.

22. Part 10 – Power of Police Etc.

23. Clause 95 – Access to driver licensing information

24. Clause 95 allows the Home Secretary to grant police automatic access to drivers licensing information for "purposes relating to policing or law enforcement." Currently, such access is only granted in relation to road traffic offences. The new provisions could allow authorities to use driving licence photographs for biometric matching, significantly expanding police powers to identify and track citizens without their knowledge or consent. While Clause 95 does not explicitly mention facial recognition, its lacks safeguards or limitations to prevent such use. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has confirmed that police are seeking DVLA access for this purpose, [3] and when similar powers were proposed under Clause 27 of the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill (2023), then-Policing Minister Chris Philip MP said the intention was to enable facial recognition searches. [4]

25. The use of DVLA records in this way would not only violate the right to privacy but could also disproportionately impact pro-Palestinian protestors. These demonstrations have been overwhelmingly peaceful, yet protestors have consistently faced excessive policing and surveillance. Clause 95 could enable biometric monitoring and retrospective identification of protestors, further entrenching over-policing and deterring lawful protest. The clause must be amended to explicitly prohibit its use for facial recognition and protest surveillance.

26. Clause 101 – Cautions given to persons having limited leave to enter or remain in UK

27. Clause 101 relates to foreign national conditional cautions, a form of out-of-court disposal requiring a person to leave the UK and not return for a specified period, as an alternative to prosecution. Currently, these cautions only apply to individuals without existing leave to enter or remain. Clause 101 would expand their use to include those with  limited leave , including international students, refugees and others with humanitarian protection.

28. This provision blurs the line between criminal justice and immigration enforcement, exposing people with lawful but temporary status to removal for minor offences. International students and others with limited leave make up a significant proportion of pro-Palestinian protestors. Given the disproportionate policing of pro-Palestinian protests, Clause 101 means that attending a protest could potentially lead to negative immigration consequences, discouraging participation by those with limited leave.

29. Part 14 – Terrorism and National Security

30. Clauses 110 to 121, which include provisions for the creation of new ‘Youth Diversion Orders’ (YDOs) require careful consideration on two counts: the framework into which they will be embedded, and the intended mechanisms through which they will operate.

31. There is a natural economic and equity interest in avoiding the unnecessary attribution of "terrorist" labels to young persons, which the government has identified as having a disproportionately negative effect on their life chances. [5] What is concerning specifically is degree of discretion available under existing counter-terrorism frameworks and definitions of terrorism which, overly broad, risk encompassing and criminalising acts which are not genuinely terrorist in nature. Before engaging this same definition (or one even broader) in its provisions for YDOs, the government should critically assess the efficacy of this framework as-currently-applied.

32. Specifically, we are concerned with YDO’s reliance on a Court assessment that, on the balance of probabilities, the person has i) committed a terrorism offence, or ii) an offence with a terrorism connection, or iii) engaged in conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The UK’s use of the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006 during the arrest and detention of pro-Palestine activists, and the assertion of a ‘terrorist connection’ in the criminal offences they were eventually charged with, has been challenged by United Nations Special Rapporteurs, who state that "the overbroad definition of terrorism in UK law potentially enables the application of counter-terrorism powers to violent political protest that is not genuinely terrorist in nature". [6]

33. Such concerns appear to apply for intended YDO application to (ii) ‘terrorism connected’ offences, while the (iii) criteria regarding ‘conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence’ does not appear to have a basis in existing Terrorism legislation, and is insufficiently defined within this Bill itself, thus appears to propose an even further widening of the definition. The concerns regarding the increasing application of the ‘terrorism connection’ within UK statutes applies similarly to proposals to extend the use of polygraph testing for those convicted of terrorism-connected offences [Clause 104] which, apropos of nothing as regards the reliability of polygraph testing in this instance, should be considered thoroughly before the application of this ‘connection’ is expanded.

34. Secondarily, as regards the mechanism of the YDO as-proposed, concerns should be taken seriously that the monitoring, conditions, and requirements appear to be primarily coercive and punitive measures with little by-way of supportive or preventative application. While the consequences of a terrorism conviction are, as noted, disproportionately harmful for young persons, there is reason to query whether the YDO proposals will provide an effective redress – or if they are likely to fall into the same pattern of coercive control, and may push these young persons even further towards the criminal justice system, stigmatising them, and counter-productively reducing their trust in policing and justice mechanisms.

35. Recommendations

36. Page 97, line 30, leave out Clause 86

37. Page 100, line 23, leave out Clause 90

38. Page 115, line 2, leave out Clause 101

39. Page 128, line 20, leave out Clauses 110 - 121.

May 2025