The UK and the Antarctic environment

Summary

Antarctica’s growing significance in global discussions about climate change, resource management, and international cooperation highlights its vital role in regulating the global climate and its immense scientific potential. As the continent’s ecosystems influence global environmental dynamics, its unique environment offers invaluable opportunities for scientific exploration. However, with the intensification of climate change, commercial fishing, and tourism, international governance in Antarctica is increasingly crucial. The United Kingdom, with its long-standing historical and scientific ties to the region, remains a key player in shaping the future of Antarctica, particularly within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty System.

The UK’s engagement with Antarctica is multifaceted, from its role as the administering power of the British Antarctic Territory to its significant scientific presence through the British Antarctic Survey. This involvement allows the United Kingdom to contribute to critical environmental research while upholding the core principles of the Antarctic Treaty, which stands as one of the most successful examples of international cooperation since 1959. The Treaty ensures that Antarctica remains a zone of peace, scientific exploration, and environmental protection.

With rising geopolitical tensions, particularly from countries like Russia and China, the UK’s role in supporting the Antarctic Treaty System is growing in importance. As geopolitical tensions increasingly affect the Antarctic Treaty System, the UK’s role in supporting it is becoming more critical. The Government’s development of a formal Antarctic Strategy, as part of its broader foreign policy, will help define the United Kingdom’s objectives in the region. The publication of this strategy is crucial not only for guiding UK policy but also for fostering international collaboration on key Antarctic issues.

Once considered insulated from climate change, Antarctica is now experiencing profound environmental shifts. Warming temperatures and accelerated ice sheet melting threaten to disrupt the global climate system, with rising sea levels posing risks to low-lying nations, including the UK’s coastlines. These changes also raise concerns about how a warming Antarctica could affect the UK’s security, including increased risks of flooding due to rising sea levels, damage to critical infrastructure, and economic disruption from more frequent and severe extreme weather events. In light of these emerging challenges, the UK should play a key role in contributing to global efforts to combat climate change, particularly through its advocacy for carbon emissions reductions and support for scientific research to better understand the changes occurring in the Antarctic environment.

Antarctic research is central to global climate strategies. Although geoengineering solutions have been proposed, their high costs and environmental risks make them less viable compared to more effective strategies like reducing global carbon emissions. The UK’s continued support for international climate agreements and its focus on science-based, sustainable policies are vital to preserving Antarctica’s fragile ecosystems and mitigating broader climate change impacts.

Antarctic ecosystems, home to unique species and habitats, are under increasing pressure from human activities, including commercial fishing, climate change, and tourism. The Southern Ocean’s krill fishery, valued at over $200 million annually, is particularly vulnerable to overfishing and the effects of climate change. The UK’s contributions to international efforts aimed at establishing sustainable fisheries management and marine protected areas are crucial in preserving these delicate ecosystems. As sea ice retreats and new fishing grounds emerge, the need for effective regulation becomes even more urgent. The Government can continue supporting international initiatives that promote sustainable fishing practices and help shape policies to protect Antarctic marine life from overexploitation.

Tourism in Antarctica has increased in recent years, raising concerns about its environmental impact on fragile ecosystems. However, with growing numbers of visitors and work just beginning on a framework for tourism within the Antarctic Treaty System, the need for coordinated international management is becoming more pressing. As part of ongoing negotiations on this framework, the UK should press for high standards in tourism regulations to ensure that environmental protections are upheld and that the continent’s ecosystems are preserved for future generations. The Government should continue to advocate for tourism policies based on scientific research and sustainability, ensuring the environmental footprint of tourism remains minimal. By refining its own tourism policies and encouraging international cooperation, the UK will help ensure that tourism in Antarctica is responsible and sustainable, balancing exploration with preservation.

As the cradle of climate science, Antarctica plays a fundamental role in shaping our understanding of climate change, ocean systems, and global environmental processes. The UK’s scientific research community, including the British Antarctic Survey and other institutions, plays a significant role in advancing this knowledge. However, many big questions remain unanswered about Antarctica’s ecosystems and their global implications, and addressing these challenges requires large-scale scientific efforts. Such ‘big science’ demands flexible, long-term funding and robust international collaboration. To maximise the impact of its scientific efforts, the Government must continue investing in research programmes, over longer timescales, and expand access to innovative technologies, such as autonomous vehicles and satellite data. By strengthening international collaborations and ensuring sustained funding for polar research, the UK can continue to contribute to global climate strategies and enhance our understanding of the vital role Antarctica plays in the global climate system.

1 Introduction

1. The Antarctic is one of the most extreme and pristine regions on Earth. It is characterised by its vast ice sheets, sub-zero temperatures, and unique biodiversity. Despite its remote location, the Antarctic holds significant global importance in terms of climate regulation, scientific research, and environmental conservation.

2. Antarctica plays a critical role in the Earth’s climate system. Its massive ice sheets reflect solar radiation, helping to regulate global temperatures, while the Southern Ocean acts as a major carbon sink, absorbing large quantities of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Potential changes in the Antarctic environment, including ice sheet melting and alterations in ocean currents, are predicted to have far-reaching impacts on global sea levels and weather patterns.¹ A warming Antarctica could have significant consequences for the security of the UK, including threats to coastal communities, infrastructure, and economic stability through rising sea levels and increased extreme weather events.²

3. The United Kingdom has played a prominent role in the exploration, research, and governance of Antarctica. It administers the British Antarctic Territory and holds a territorial claim, though under the Antarctic Treaty System such claims are set aside and not enforced or contested while the Treaty is in effect. The UK supports the Treaty’s principles, including international scientific cooperation and environmental protection. The Antarctic Act 1994 brought these environmental protections into UK law, requiring British activities in Antarctica to meet strict environmental standards.³ A 2013 amendment to the Act strengthened these provisions by introducing civil and criminal penalties for environmental damage and enhancing permit requirements for UK nationals.⁴

4. The British Antarctic Survey, the Government funded research institute responsible for maintaining the UK’s scientific presence in Antarctica, conducts research in areas such as climate change, glaciology, marine biology, atmospheric sciences, and space weather.⁵

Our inquiry

5. In January 2023, the Environmental Audit Committee in the 2019–24 Parliament established a Sub-Committee on Polar Research, chaired by James Gray, then MP for North Wiltshire, tasked with assessing the UK’s contribution to understanding climate and environmental change in the polar regions. In July 2023, the Sub-Committee launched an inquiry into the UK’s relationship with the Antarctic and its environment. Through this inquiry the Sub-Committee sought to examine the climate and environmental changes occurring on the continent arising from global warming, the contribution of UK science to understanding these changes, the UK Government’s support for this research, and the UK’s role in the environmental governance of Antarctica.⁶

6. Shortly after the Sub-Committee held its final oral evidence session with Ministers and officials from the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, Parliament was dissolved for the July 2024 general election and it was not possible for the Committee to issue a report on the inquiry.

7. Given the importance of the topic and the substantial evidence already gathered, we decided in November 2024 to revive the inquiry with similar terms of reference.⁷ We held one additional oral evidence session where we heard from the Lord Vallance of Balham, Minister for Science, Research and Innovation at the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories at the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, to assess how the policies of the current administration aligned with those of its predecessor.⁸

8. Over the course of two Parliaments, the inquiry received 33 written submissions in response to our calls for evidence and held six public evidence sessions, hearing from 31 witnesses across 11 panels. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Mark Brandon MBE, Professor of Polar Oceanography at The Open University, who was appointed as specialist adviser to the inquiry in the last parliament, and reappointed in this Parliament. His contribution to both the inquiry and the preparation of this report was immensely appreciated.

9. As part of the initial inquiry, in January 2024 members of the Sub-Committee visited the Rothera Research Station on the Antarctic Peninsula, where they engaged with a range of stakeholders and researchers and observed the progress of infrastructure development at the station.⁹ This was the first visit to the continent by a House of Commons select committee. The party travelled to Antarctica from the Falkland Islands and onward to Chile on RRS Sir David Attenborough. While at Rothera, members also visited the Royal Navy ice patrol ship HMS Protector. Jamie Anderson, then Director of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Polar Regions, was appointed as specialist adviser to assist with the unique logistical challenges of the visit: his advice was invaluable in navigating the complexities of polar travel.

10. We extend our sincere thanks and those of the former Committee to everyone who submitted written and oral evidence and those who assisted in the inquiry, and particularly to those who helped facilitate and host the visit. Special thanks are due to the British Antarctic Survey, the crew of the RRS Sir David Attenborough, and the staff at Rothera for the assistance and hospitality they afforded to the visiting party.

11. This report examines the UK’s engagement with the Antarctic environment, focusing on the UK’s connections to the region, current scientific endeavours, and environmental stewardship.

12. Chapter 2 explores the UK’s presence in Antarctica, while Chapter 3 discusses the Antarctic Treaty System, the challenges it faces in governing the continent, and the broader geopolitical pressures threatening environmental protections. The following four chapters delve into the most pressing issues confronting the Treaty System in its efforts to safeguard Antarctica’s environment and ecosystems. Chapter 4 analyses the impact of climate change on Antarctica and its global implications. Chapter 5 examines how Antarctic ecosystems and biodiversity are responding to these changes. Chapter 6 addresses the management challenges of Southern Ocean fisheries under the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). Chapter 7 evaluates the growing pressures of Antarctic tourism and explores strategies for sustainable management. Finally, Chapter 8 highlights the UK’s contributions to Antarctic research and considers how this work can be best supported in the future.

13. This report and the report of our predecessor Committee, on the UK’s relationship with the Arctic Environment,¹⁰ should be considered collectively as a comprehensive assessment of UK policies and strategies towards environmental protection in the polar regions.

2 The UK and Antarctica

14. The United Kingdom’s interest in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica dates back to the voyages of Captain James Cook in the 1770s and the sighting of the coast of the Antarctic continent by Edward Bransfield in 1820. A permanent British presence in Antarctica was established in 1943 in a wartime survey operation which formed the basis of the modern British Antarctic Survey (BAS). BAS now leads the majority of the UK’s scientific research in Antarctica, collaborating through the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) and other international organisations.

15. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty froze competing territorial claims and established Antarctica as a zone for scientific research and international cooperation.¹¹ It was originally signed by twelve countries active in the region at the time,¹² including the UK, which was the first to ratify it in 1961. As a signatory, the UK has maintained a commitment to peaceful use, environmental protection, and scientific discovery on the continent.¹³

16. We will discuss the governance of Antarctica under the Antarctic treaty in chapter 3.

The British Antarctic Territory

17. The British Antarctic Territory (BAT) was established in 1962 to administer the lands in the Antarctic which had been claimed by the UK prior to 1961. It covers approximately 1.7 million square kilometres, roughly seven times the size of the UK, encompassing the Antarctic Peninsula and numerous islands. The territory is characterised by extreme environmental conditions: only 0.7% of its land area is ice free. Temperatures at its southern extent at the South Pole, averaging -49°C, make it one of the most inhospitable environments on Earth.¹⁴

18. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) oversees the BAT’s governance. In February 2025 Jane Rumble OBE, Head of the FCDO Polar Regions Department, was appointed its Commissioner, making her the senior authority responsible for BAT’s administration.¹⁵ The Polar Regions Department manages the UK’s strategic interests in the Antarctic: members of the department represent the UK at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) as a Consultative Party.¹⁶

19. The Royal Navy provides logistical and operational support in Antarctica through HMS Protector, an ice patrol vessel deployed during the southern summer. The ship helps support scientific missions and enables the UK to exercise its right under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty to inspect the facilities of other Parties, reinforcing a visible UK presence in the region.¹⁷

Figure 1: Map showing the British Antarctic Territory

Source: British Antarctic Territory Government, About the Territory

The UK’s presence in Antarctica

20. The UK maintains a significant presence in Antarctica, primarily through scientific research and supporting infrastructure. Annually, the UK invests approximately £95 million: around £35 million on scientific research and £60 million on infrastructure, to sustain its operations and presence on the continent.¹⁸

21. The UK has long used scientific activity as a means to demonstrate presence and influence in Antarctica, particularly given the Treaty’s provision that territorial claims are held in abeyance but not renounced. Professor Dodds described Antarctic science as “Janus faced”, representing both a commitment to international collaboration and a vehicle for advancing national interests.¹⁹ The British Antarctic Survey (BAS) plays a dual role in this context. As outlined in its memorandum of understanding with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), BAS’s mission is twofold: to deliver world-class scientific research and to support the UK’s ongoing presence in Antarctica. Professor Dame Jane Francis, Director of BAS, clarified to the Committee that the UK’s science agenda is entirely driven by the scientific community, with infrastructure, such as research ships and stations, provided for the benefit of the broader UK Antarctic research community.²⁰

22. The predecessor Committee questioned why, if maintaining a presence in Antarctica is as strategically important to the UK as scientific research, funding for that presence is provided through the DSIT and the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), rather than through the FCDO or the MoD.²¹

23. In response, the then Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology, Andrew Griffith MP, and the then Minister for the Americas, Caribbean and Overseas Territories, David Rutley MP, explained the division of responsibilities. They clarified that DSIT, through UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) and NERC, leads on science policy and funding. The BAS, a NERC-operated research institute, delivers scientific research within this framework and does not independently set science policy.²² The Ministers emphasised that decisions on individual research projects or programmes are made independently of government.²³ This approach reflects the Haldane Principle, which holds that decisions about which research to fund should be made by experts through peer review, based on scientific merit and potential impact once overall funding allocations are determined through the Comprehensive Spending Review.²⁴ The FCDO remains responsible for sovereignty and diplomatic matters in Antarctica, including representation at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) and implementation of UK domestic legislation.²⁵

24. Funding for the UK’s scientific and logistical presence in Antarctica, including BAS’s operations, comes from DSIT’s budget via UKRI and NERC. Oversight of major strategic decisions relating to BAS, such as investment in research infrastructure, the commissioning of vessels, and long-term operational planning, is provided by a cross-government review group. This group, which includes representatives from DSIT, FCDO, the MoD, and the Cabinet Office, meets twice a year.²⁶

25. In May 2024 David Rutley, then Minister for the Overseas Territories at FCDO, reaffirmed the UK’s dual focus on scientific leadership and strategic interests in Antarctica:

We have critical mass. We are well established in Antarctica. Our research is highly valued globally, particularly in understanding climate change. While science unites us, there are also geopolitical considerations around the South Pole that require our attention.²⁷

26. The outcome of the 2021 Integrated Review undertaken under the previous administration highlighted the role of science and technology in maintaining strategic advantages for the UK.²⁸ The current Government told us that it was committed to maintaining the UK’s leadership in the study of the global implications of climate change in Antarctica, and that it had been investing in Antarctic scientific stations and capabilities.²⁹

27. In May 2024, the then Minister for the Overseas Territories indicated the then Government’s commitment to developing a publicly available Antarctic strategy. Whereas the UK currently has an internal British Antarctic Territory strategy, the new document was expected to outline the UK’s long-standing interests and ambitions in the region. The Minister emphasised that the strategy was expected to be cross-governmental and led by FCDO.³⁰

28. In December 2024, the current Minister for the Overseas Territories emphasised to us the level of cross-governmental coordination on Antarctic policy. He highlighted the establishment of the Polar Regions Ministerial Group, a recommendation the Government had accepted from our predecessor Committee’s report on the ‘UK and the Arctic Environment’,³¹ as a mechanism to ensure a cohesive and comprehensive approach to the region. The Minister stated: “We take these issues extremely seriously, working across government on climate change, energy transition, and nature protection.”³²

Our view on the UK and Antarctica

3 Governing the Antarctic environment

34. The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), established in 1959, is founded on the core principle set out in Article I of the Antarctic Treaty: “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.” The Treaty’s preamble further affirms that “it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord.”³³

35. The ATS provides the legal framework for the governance of the entire region south of latitude 60° South, as outlined in Article VI. It comprises the Antarctic Treaty itself and a series of related agreements and conventions designed to regulate the activities of states with interests in Antarctica. These include:

• The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991),
• The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972),
• The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR, 1982).³⁴

36. In this chapter we set out the ATS’s structure and examine how it has shaped the governance of environmental protection in Antarctica. In the course of the inquiry we and our predecessors on the Sub-Committee identified several substantial challenges to the stability of the Antarctic climate and environment. These challenges, which include the effects of climate change, changes in biodiversity levels, pressure on natural resources and trends in tourism to the continent, all pose threats which the UK Government has a responsibility to address through its status as a state party to the Antarctic Treaty. We examine each in more detail in subsequent chapters.

The Antarctic Treaty System

The Antarctic Treaty and its associated agreements

37. The Antarctic Treaty was signed on 1 December 1959 by twelve original signatories, seven of which had existing territorial claims on the continent.³⁵ It entered into force on 23 June 1961. As of now, 58 states are parties to the Treaty, including 29 Consultative Parties that actively participate in decision-making.³⁶ A full list of Parties to the Antarctic Treaty is provided in Annex 2.

Figure 2: Map showing state claims to Antarctica

Source: Discovering Antarctica Making claims

38. The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) is the principal forum for environmental protection in Antarctica. Annually, the Consultative Parties, gather to exchange information, consult on common interests, and adopt measures to uphold the Treaty’s principles (Art. IX). The ATCM includes Consultative and Non-Consultative Parties, observers like the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), CCAMLR, and the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP), and invited experts such as the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), and the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO).³⁷

39. Measures adopted at the ATCM are legally binding on Consultative Parties, enforcing the Antarctic Treaty and its Environmental Protocol. Decisions and resolutions, while important, are non-binding and address organisational matters or provide recommendations. The ATCM is crucial in ensuring the ongoing environmental protection of Antarctica through consensus-driven governance.³⁸

Consensus-based governance

40. The structure of the ATS supports a collaborative approach to policy and decision-making across the region south of the 60th parallel. BAS has described the ATS as a successful model of international cooperation, serving as an example of peaceful governance for the wider world.³⁹ This cooperative framework is reinforced by cross-cutting organisations such as SCAR and IAATO.⁴⁰

41. However, the Sub-Committee was informed that Antarctica’s geographical isolation does not insulate it from wider global dynamics. On the contrary, environmental, diplomatic, and geopolitical developments elsewhere often find reflection in the region’s politics.⁴¹

42. The ATCM convenes annually to address matters concerning Antarctic governance. The Sub-Committee heard that the ATS’s consensus-based model has contributed significantly to its effectiveness, encouraging states to avoid escalating disagreements and to maintain a cooperative appearance. This approach has helped preserve the collaborative ethos of the system.⁴²

43. Nonetheless, this model also presents limitations. Since the adoption of the Environmental Protocol in 1998, there has been limited substantive development within the ATS. Parties have tended to avoid raising contentious issues, aware that resolving them could prove difficult without undermining the consensus principle.⁴³ As the Sub-Committee heard, many states have chosen to operate within the existing framework rather than risk “publicly punctur[ing] the principle of consensus.”⁴⁴

The Environmental Protocol

44. The Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, which came into force in 1998, establishes a comprehensive framework for safeguarding the Antarctic environment. With the exception of activities regulated by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the Protocol requires that all undertakings in Antarctica be carefully planned and assessed to minimise environmental harm. Environmental impact assessments form a central part of this framework.⁴⁵

45. The Protocol also established the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP), which is composed of representatives from Consultative Parties with relevant environmental expertise. Observers include scientific and conservation organisations such as SCAR, COMNAP, the CCAMLR Commission, and other relevant bodies.⁴⁶

46. One ongoing challenge is the delayed implementation of Annex VI of the Protocol, which addresses liability for environmental emergencies. Although agreed in 2005, this annex has yet to be enforced as of 2024, primarily due to disagreements over financial responsibility and the mechanisms for enforcement.⁴⁷

Future of the Protocol

47. The Environmental Protocol has no expiry date. However, until 2048, it may only be modified through unanimous agreement of all Consultative Parties. After 2048, any Consultative Party may call for a review conference to examine its operation.⁴⁸

48. Concerns about the potential exploitation of Antarctica’s natural resources, by actors operating in ways that may be incompatible with the Protocol, have prompted discussions around future amendments. These issues are explored in more depth in Chapter 6.

The Antarctic Treaty System and current geopolitical pressures

49. The operation and development of the ATS has, up until now, successfully preserved Antarctica as a region dedicated to peaceful activity, scientific research, and environmental sustainability. However, increasing geopolitical competition is putting significant strain on this framework. The growing willingness of states to prioritise strategic interests over ‘Antarctic exceptionalism’, the belief that Antarctica should remain insulated from geopolitical conflicts, combined with the challenges posed by environmental change, underscores the need for continued diplomatic efforts to uphold the core principles of the ATS.⁴⁹ Professor Dodds informed the Sub-Committee that the Antarctic policy environment is arguably “at its most challenging since the late 1980s and early 1990s.” Without the consensus-based approach integral to the ATS, he asserted, “polar governance simply does not work in the way intended by the Antarctic Treaty.”⁵⁰

ATS inspection regimes and the challenges of strategic competition

50. Growing strategic competition in Antarctica is becoming increasingly visible, particularly through the expansion of polar infrastructure. The rise of modern technologies such as satellites, drones, and GPS systems presents new challenges, as many of these technologies have both civilian and military applications. The dual use nature of these technologies complicates the monitoring and enforcement of the Antarctic Treaty’s prohibition on military activities. Signed in the late 1950s, the Treaty did not anticipate such advancements, raising concerns about its ability to ensure compliance and maintain oversight.⁵¹

51. The increasing presence of Chinese and Russian state-backed actors in Antarctica, coupled with their positions on proposals within the ATCM and CCAMLR, has raised concerns among environmental groups.⁵² Both countries are seen as pursuing strategic interests in the region: Russia seeks to assert its status as a polar power, while China continues to expand its Antarctic infrastructure, including the construction of a fifth research station.⁵³

52. The potential use of scientific activity to further geopolitical objectives beyond the scope of the Antarctic Treaty has raised questions about the continued effectiveness of the Treaty’s inspection regime. Under Article VII of the Treaty, all parties have the right to inspect all areas of Antarctica, including stations, installations, equipment, and ships or aircraft.⁵⁴ This right is critical for ensuring the observance of the provisions of the Treaty and promoting its objectives.

53. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 significantly impacted the operation of this regime. The initial necessity of holding inspection meetings virtually, and the ease with which these can now be held remotely, has arguably weakened the collaborative approach, which was traditionally based on face-to-face dialogue.⁵⁵ Additionally, monitoring of fishing activities under CCAMLR was affected, as public health concerns hindered the deployment of independent observers on fishing vessels, raising doubts about the effectiveness of arrangements to enforce compliance with quotas and regulations.⁵⁶

Russia

54. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has heightened tensions within the ATS, challenging the notion of Antarctic exceptionalism. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 highlighted these strains, as divisions within the ATS became apparent. At the ATCM in Berlin in May 2022, the first in-person meeting after two years of COVID-19 disruptions, tensions were visible. Although both Russian and Ukrainian delegates attended, many representatives staged walkouts in protest when the Russian delegate attempted to justify the invasion, underscoring the diplomatic rift within the ATS.⁵⁷

55. Russia has historically positioned itself as a polar power, with President Putin emphasising Antarctica as a strategic priority. In recent years, Russia has increasingly framed the continent as a resource frontier, reflecting its long-term interests in the region. Despite growing diplomatic isolation and deteriorating relations with western nations, Russia remains committed to the ATS and continues to engage in Antarctic governance. It maintains cooperative relationships with other polar actors, notably South Africa. However, its diminished influence and the deepening geopolitical rift have raised concerns about the future cohesion of the ATS and its ability to uphold the principles of peaceful cooperation and scientific research.⁵⁸

China

56. Since ratifying the Antarctic Treaty in 1983 and gaining consultative status in 1985, China has steadily expanded its Antarctic presence, establishing research stations Great Wall (1985), Zhongshan (1989), Kunlun (2009), Taishan (2014) and Qinling (2024). This growing footprint is seen as part of China’s broader ambition to become a major polar power, influencing norms and decision-making within the ATS. In addition to its research activities, China has constructed a ground station to support its National Satellite Ocean Application Service, raising concerns over potential military applications. While China asserts that its activities are consistent with the Treaty’s principles, critics remain concerned about the dual use nature of its infrastructure.⁵⁹

57. China’s increasing involvement in Antarctic fisheries has further intensified concerns about resource exploitation and the sustainability of marine ecosystems.⁶⁰ At the same time, China maintains that its Antarctic operations are peaceful and contribute to scientific research and environmental protection. As a mature polar actor with over 40 years of experience, China is determined to ensure its interests are recognised and not marginalised by the original 12 Treaty signatories, including the US, UK, and Norway.⁶¹

The United States

58. The United States has long been a significant actor in Antarctic governance. However, recent political shifts have raised concerns about its future commitment to the principles of the Antarctic Treaty. Under the current Trump administration, budget cuts to federal science agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) threatened the country’s leadership in Antarctic science.⁶² Furthermore, the US’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and restrictions on international climate research have only exacerbated these concerns. Researchers have warned that severe budget cuts could jeopardise the operation of US Antarctic research stations and halt scientific projects altogether.⁶³

Broader geopolitical tensions

59. Political conflicts in other regions increasingly influence Antarctic politics, complicating consensus-building within the ATS. Dr Daniella Portella Sampaio, Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at the Alfred Wegener Institute, highlighted how geopolitical rivalries often spill over into disagreements at ATCMs. For instance, Canada’s recent bid for consultative party status was met with objections from China and Russia, reflecting broader geopolitical tensions.⁶⁴

60. Despite these challenges, the Sub-Committee heard that the legal framework underpinning the ATS remains resilient. Dr Adrian Howkins, Reader in Environmental History at the University of Bristol, observed that the system has continued to uphold its core principles of peaceful cooperation and scientific collaboration in the face of mounting geopolitical pressures. Dr Howkins stressed that maintaining this stability will require sustained diplomatic engagement and renewed commitment to Antarctic governance from all Consultative Parties.⁶⁵

Climate change and the ATS

61. The ATS has faced increasing criticism for its slow response to climate change and growing activity in Antarctica.⁶⁶ The ATCM and the CCAMLR have been reluctant to engage directly with global emissions reduction discussions, instead deferring to the United Nations COP process.⁶⁷ Witnesses emphasised that the ATS was not designed to tackle climate issues, as the main objective of the Antarctic Treaty was to promote geopolitical stability.⁶⁸ The concept of the “paradox of protection in Antarctica” highlights a key challenge: while climate change poses the greatest environmental threat to Antarctica, it cannot be resolved solely within the ATS framework. As a global problem, it requires international action beyond the region.⁶⁹

62. Climate change is increasingly viewed as a security issue. As our predecessor Committee heard in its inquiry on climate change and security, it acts as a “threat multiplier” that can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities. While Antarctica is not currently a geopolitical flashpoint, its role in the global climate system means changes there could have wider repercussions, and our predecessor Committee was warned that the UK faces domestic risks from climate change, not only from its global impacts but from its own lack of climate adaptation.⁷⁰

The UK and the Antarctic Treaty System

63. The United Kingdom has long supported the principle of ‘Antarctic exceptionalism’, which prioritises peaceful scientific cooperation over geopolitical rivalry. This principle, enshrined in the Antarctic Treaty, has been broadly adhered to by all signatory states. Antarctic science plays a pivotal role in this exceptionalism, advancing global knowledge while also serving subtle geopolitical purposes, as noted by Professor Klaus Dodds.⁷¹

64. However, the principle of Antarctic exceptionalism, which has traditionally guided the policies of Treaty states and other states with interests in Antarctica, is increasingly under strain due to the rise in strategic competition, particularly between the United States, Russia, and China. Stephen Doughty, Minister of State for Europe, North America, and Overseas Territories in the FCDO, acknowledged this shift, stating that “where you might have once seen Antarctic exceptionalism, that is no longer accurate. Russia and China are pursuing their broader geopolitical objectives in the region, reflecting a wider geopolitical shift.” The Minister further noted that both Russia and China have expressed the view that the ATS is excessively focused on environmental protection, advocating for increased activities that would exploit Antarctic resources, including fishing and tourism.⁷²

65. Recent geopolitical tensions, particularly Russia’s response to the UK’s support for Ukraine, have added complexity to Antarctic diplomacy. Russia, a major polar operator and fishing party, maintains a scientific presence in the British Antarctic Territory. Since February 2022, the UK’s staunch defence of Ukraine’s territorial integrity has strained its relations with Russia, leading to increased friction in Antarctic forums.⁷³

66. WWF UK highlighted the need to preserve the core values of the ATS, particularly its emphasis on environmental protection, saying that as geopolitical pressures mount, the UK’s role as a promoter of consensus-building will become increasingly vital.⁷⁴ Enhanced cooperation with both traditional allies and emerging powers such as China will be essential to uphold the integrity of the ATS.⁷⁵

67. The Government confirmed the UK’s commitment to the Antarctic Treaty as a foundation for the security and management of Antarctica, ensuring the UK’s sovereign interests and peace on the continent, particularly by prohibiting military activity.⁷⁶

68. The Sub-Committee examined how the UK Government ought to operate within an ATS under challenge from geopolitical tensions. Professor Dodds recommended that the UK engage not only with its allies but also with the more challenging parties within the ATS, focusing in particular on strengthening the UK’s polar relationship with China: China’s support was vital for ocean conservation and its role as a senior polar player ought be recognised to enhance global conservation efforts.⁷⁷ This Committee heard that the European Union (EU) was currently reassessing its approach to Antarctica: one witness suggested that the UK and other Antarctic partners should collaborate with the EU to form a pan-European coalition centred on scientific research and information sharing.⁷⁸

69. Noble Caledonia, a UK based cruise company, praised the UK’s leadership within the ATS, noting that UK representatives had traditionally held positions for extended periods, gaining the respect and trust of other nations, and observing that UK contributions at ATCMs carried significant weight, even if not all nations agreed with the UK’s position. This leadership would be critical for Antarctica’s long-term protection, especially in the face of broader geopolitical challenges.⁷⁹ WWF UK stressed that the UK must continue to uphold the values of the Treaty, particularly its conservation principles, and increase diplomatic efforts to engage with countries blocking proposals.⁸⁰ Prioritising the gathering of strong scientific evidence on developments in the climate and environment of the Antarctic was essential to challenging the manoeuvring of China and Russia within the ATS.⁸¹

Our views on geopolitical issues in the Antarctic Treaty System

4 Climate change in Antarctica

76. In this chapter we examine the impacts of climate change in Antarctica and evaluate the role of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) in addressing these challenges. We discuss the effects of climate change in Antarctica, such as rising sea levels and ecosystem disruption, and examine the global implications of these effects.

The evidence for changes in Antarctica’s climate

77. Antarctica has long been perceived as a region largely insulated from the impacts of climate change. Surrounded by the Southern Ocean and encircled by the polar vortex, a high-altitude band of strong winds that help contain cold air over the continent, the extreme cold and immense size of Antarctica were once thought to protect it from climate shifts. However, this perception has been increasingly challenged by scientific evidence. As Professor Dame Jane Francis, Director of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS), has highlighted, Antarctic climate change has accelerated dramatically in recent years, with profound implications not only for the region itself but for the global climate system.⁸²

The Antarctic ice sheets: A growing source of sea level rise

78. The Antarctic Ice Sheet, covering 13.6 million square kilometres, is the largest ice mass on Earth and holds enough ice to potentially raise global sea levels by 58 metres if it melted completely.⁸³ It is divided into two main regions:

• The East Antarctic Ice Sheet (EAIS): The larger of the two, this region contains enough ice to contribute about 49 metres of potential sea level rise. Historically, the EAIS has been considered stable as the ice largely rests on land, but recent studies indicate that some areas are now losing ice, particularly those in contact with, and exposed to, warmer ocean currents.
• The West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS): The WAIS contains around 5 metres of potential sea level rise and is far more vulnerable due to its marine-based nature. Much of the WAIS sits on bedrock below sea level, making it highly susceptible to ocean-driven melting.⁸⁴

West Antarctica: rapid ice loss

79. Since the 1990s, ice loss from the WAIS has tripled, and it is now losing more than 150 gigatons of ice per year.⁸⁵ The Amundsen Sea Embayment is one of the most at-risk regions, home to some of the most unstable glaciers on Earth, including:

• Thwaites Glacier (The “Doomsday Glacier”): This glacier covers 192,000 square kilometres and is losing ice at an accelerating rate. Warm ocean water is infiltrating beneath it, melting the ice from below and detaching it from the seabed. If Thwaites collapses entirely, global sea levels could rise by over 65 cm, destabilising surrounding ice and potentially contributing several additional metres. This process is irreversible unless global temperatures significantly drop below pre-industrial levels, with a tipping point around 1°C to 1.5°C of global warming.⁸⁶
• Pine Island Glacier: Containing approximately 180 trillion tons of ice, equivalent to 0.5 meters of global sea level rise, Pine Island Glacier currently accounts for much of Antarctica’s contribution to sea level rise. It adds around one sixth of a millimetre annually, and this rate is expected to increase in the future.⁸⁷

80. Research from BAS and the Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) has shown that the primary driver of ice loss in these regions is ocean warming, rather than changes in snowfall or air temperature. The effects of these changes are profound and increasingly irreversible.⁸⁸

81. Dr Kaitlin Naughten, Ocean Modeller at BAS, explained that Antarctic ice is far more vulnerable than previously understood, with a 2°C rise in global temperatures potentially triggering catastrophic ice melt. The current rate of climate change far exceeds the warming rates observed during earlier interglacial periods, such as 120,000 years ago, when Antarctic ice loss contributed to a rise in sea levels by six metres.⁸⁹

82. Paleoclimate data from the Pliocene period (around 3.5–5 million years ago), when atmospheric CO₂ levels were similar to those today (around 400 parts per million), shows that global temperatures were 3–4°C higher and sea levels were over 20 metres above present levels. This suggests near complete deglaciation of West Antarctica, along with contributions from East Antarctica and Greenland. If global temperatures today rise by 3–4°C, both the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets are projected to undergo severe and irreversible ice loss, unlocking metres of sea level rise with profound global consequences. The Sub-Committee heard that maintaining global temperatures within the 1.5°C limit is crucial, as exceeding this threshold risks destabilising ice sheets and triggering long-term changes that would reshape coastlines worldwide. While the window to stay within 1.5°C is rapidly narrowing, with a consensus that it is likely to be breached in the mid-2030’s, every fraction of a degree still matters.⁹⁰

Ice shelves: Critical barriers at risk

83. Ice shelves are floating extensions of the Antarctic Ice Sheet that play a critical role in stabilising glaciers by slowing their flow into the ocean. However, ice shelves are under threat from rising temperatures. Since the 1990s, Antarctica has contributed around 7.5 mm to global sea level rise, with West Antarctica losing approximately 94 gigatonnes of ice per year and the Antarctic Peninsula losing 20 gigatonnes annually.⁹¹ The British Antarctic Territory, including the Antarctic Peninsula, has experienced the most significant warming and changes in ecosystems. Understanding these changes is critical to comprehending Antarctic processes and their links to global systems.⁹²

84. Recent major ice shelf losses have shown how vulnerable these critical structures are to warming:

• Larsen B Ice Shelf (2002): This 3,250 square kilometre shelf disintegrated within a matter of weeks, resulting in a 700% increase in the flow speed of glaciers that once fed into it when the shelf was absent.
• Larsen C Ice Shelf (2017–2023): A 5,800 square kilometre section broke off in 2017, forming one of the largest icebergs ever recorded (iceberg A-68). Continued thinning suggests that further losses are likely.
• Conger Ice Shelf (2022): Located in East Antarctica, this 1,200-square kilometre ice shelf collapsed, demonstrating that even regions once considered stable are now vulnerable.⁹³

85. The collapse of major ice shelves could accelerate glacier flow, directly contributing to sea level rise. While the largest remaining ice shelves, such as the Ross and Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelves, remain intact, they are beginning to show signs of thinning.⁹⁴ The collapse of major ice shelves could accelerate glacier flow, contributing several centimetres to sea level rise per decade. Professor Anna Hogg, University of Leeds, explained that warm ocean currents melt the ice from below, weakening the shelves. Once these ice shelves disappear, land-based glaciers will flow freely into the ocean, directly raising sea levels.⁹⁵

The impact of Antarctica’s ice loss on climate and sea level rise

86. Antarctica’s ice sheets are crucial in regulating global climate and ocean currents. Their freshwater release affects ocean salinity, sea ice formation, and the distribution of heat and nutrients around the globe.⁹⁶ The ice sheets also influence Earth’s albedo by reflecting sunlight, helping cool the planet. As the ice melts, darker surfaces are exposed, leading to more heat absorption and accelerating global warming in a feedback loop.⁹⁷

87. Antarctica’s ice loss is accelerating, contributing significantly to global sea level rise. Over the past 150 years, sea levels have risen by about 20 cm, with half of that increase occurring in the past 30 years. Current rates of ice loss are six times faster than three decades ago, making Antarctica the leading contributor to sea level rise, surpassing other sources. These trends align with the upper projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), indicating that earlier sea level rise estimates were too conservative.⁹⁸

88. A recent study examined four of the 27 recognised glacial basins in Antarctica, focusing on Wilkes Land in East Antarctica. While the study found a short term increase in ice mass since 2020, this recent gain is substantially outweighed by the cumulative ice loss recorded since 2002, as highlighted in the study.⁹⁹ In addition, evidence highlighted by witnesses shows clearly that the most significant current contributions over the previous decades to sea level rise are from the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.¹⁰⁰

89. While low-lying regions like Pacific island nations are particularly vulnerable, the UK faces risks too. Mean sea level around the UK has risen by about 12–16cm since 1990 and is projected to rise further, by as much as 45–78cm by 2100, driven by the contributions of ice loss from Antarctic glaciers.¹⁰¹ This rise puts coastal areas like East Anglia under increasing threat from rising seas and storm surges, putting pressure on flood defences like the Thames Barrier. Other nations with large coastal populations are experiencing similar challenges.¹⁰²

90. In written evidence the former Government acknowledged the implications of sea level rise for the UK, saying that the Marine Climate Change Impacts Partnership provides advice on adaptation to future climate impacts to the Government and pointed to the UK’s Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Policy Statement, which has measures to address future flood and coastal erosion risk. We are considering issues in relation to flood resilience in our inquiry on Flood Resilience in England.¹⁰³

The Southern Ocean: warming and impacts

The decline of Antarctica’s sea ice extent

91. Antarctic sea ice plays a critical role in regulating global temperatures by reflecting solar radiation. However, rising temperatures are significantly altering sea ice dynamics.¹⁰⁴ After reaching maximum extent in 2016, in 2022 Antarctic sea ice reached record lows, with the extent maintaining record lows to date (2025). This decline in sea ice has multiple impacts, including disruptions to biodiversity, ocean circulation, and the destabilisation of the Antarctic ice sheet system. The reduction in sea ice is accelerating the ice loss from the margins of the ice sheets, contributing further to rising sea levels.¹⁰⁵

Figure 3: Antarctic sea ice minimum extent on 25 February 2025

Source: CMEMS Antarctic Sea Ice Reaches Near-Record Low in 2025
Note: The black line represents the 1993–2010 long-term average (climatology) for the same day of the year.

92. Despite growing concern over sea ice dynamics, the variability of Antarctic sea ice remains poorly understood compared to the Arctic, complicating efforts to predict future changes. The complex interactions between sea ice, the atmosphere, and the ocean make modelling challenging. The Sub-Committee heard that ongoing research was needed to enhance understanding and improve predictive capabilities in this area of climate science.¹⁰⁶

The Southern Ocean’s role in global climate regulation

93. The Southern Ocean, which absorbs a significant portion of the excess heat from global warming, plays a crucial role in climate regulation. From 1970 to 2017, the Southern Ocean south of 30°S accounted for 35–43% of the additional heat stored in the upper 2,000 metres of the ocean, despite covering only a quarter of the Earth’s oceanic area. This proportion has risen in the past decade, underscoring the Southern Ocean’s growing importance in global climate regulation.¹⁰⁷

94. In addition to heat absorption, the Southern Ocean regulates the global carbon cycle. It is highly effective at sequestering carbon, with the biological pump further enhancing this process. Phytoplankton absorb CO₂ and release oxygen, and when consumed by marine organisms, the carbon is transported to the deep ocean. However, ocean acidification, driven by rising CO₂ levels, threatens marine ecosystems by dissolving calcium carbonate, which is crucial for shell-forming organisms.¹⁰⁸

95. The Southern Ocean is also warming rapidly, particularly in its subsurface waters. The influx of warmer Circumpolar Deep Water, which is approximately 1°C warmer than surrounding waters, has contributed to the accelerated melting of West Antarctica’s ice shelves. This warming is linked to changes in ocean currents and atmospheric circulation, further destabilising Antarctica’s ice shelves and contributing to rising sea levels.¹⁰⁹

96. Recent data from the Weddell Sea shows a 20% reduction in Antarctic Bottom Water, which plays a critical role in heat storage and carbon sequestration. Meanwhile, shallower waters in the Southern Ocean have warmed at a rate five times higher than the global ocean average, amplifying the severity of these changes.¹¹⁰ We heard that continued research is essential to improving understanding of the future of the Southern Ocean and its implications for global climate stability.¹¹¹

The Arctic Report Card

97. The Arctic Report Card (ARC), issued annually since 2006 by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), provides peer-reviewed, concise, and reliable environmental data on the Arctic system, comparing current conditions with historical records. It is designed for a broad audience, including scientists, educators, policymakers, and the general public. Each ARC, including ARC2024, involves contributions from an international team of scientists, with an independent peer review by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) Secretariat. The report is classified as a NOAA Technical Report and archived in the NOAA Library Institutional Repository. In contrast, no similar initiative exists for Antarctica, though various reports offer valuable insights into its environment.¹¹²

Our view on the evidence for changes in Antarctic climate

The UK’s role in addressing climate change in Antarctica

102. WWF UK told the Committee that the UK should ensure its climate policies are consistent across international organisations, in order to maximise the impact of its climate leadership. They highlighted that in 2021, the UK sponsored a resolution at the ATCM, which included language encouraging Antarctic Treaty Parties to press their governments for stronger action at the next UNFCCC COP. WWF UK pointed out that the Antarctic Treaty System includes many of the world’s largest carbon-emitting countries, and that to truly fulfil their obligations under the Treaty, those countries must pursue rapid reductions in global emissions to relieve pressure on Antarctica. They also suggested that the UK could play a leading role in supporting SCAR (the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research) to have a more prominent voice at UNFCCC COP negotiations, ensuring that the risks facing Antarctica are clearly understood and that Antarctic science is properly integrated into global climate discussions.¹¹³

103. The Overseas Territories and Science Ministers acknowledged the accelerating impacts of climate change on Antarctica and its global consequences, including rising sea levels and changing ocean circulation. The Science Minister acknowledged the severity of the situation in evidence to us, noting that while it was still technically possible to keep warming below 1.5°C, it was increasingly unlikely.¹¹⁴

104. The Ministers highlighted the UK’s commitment to stronger environmental protections within the Antarctic Treaty System, focusing on safeguarding climate vulnerable species and minimising human impact, saying that the UK is coordinating efforts across government through a Polar Regions Ministerial Group and actively engaging in Antarctic Treaty meetings to advocate for urgent climate action.¹¹⁵

Our view

Geoengineering in Antarctica

110. Geoengineering, large scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system designed to counteract climate change, has attracted growing attention since the Sub-Committee began taking evidence in 2023 and 2024. As the pace of ice loss in Antarctica accelerates, and with the region playing a disproportionate role in global sea level rise and feedback loops that intensify climate change, some have proposed radical interventions targeted specifically at the polar environment. These ideas are gaining traction in policy and research circles as potential tools to buy time while global emissions are brought under control.¹¹⁶

111. A range of Antarctic-specific geoengineering proposals has emerged, including artificially thickening sea ice using pumps, constructing vast underwater barriers to block warm ocean currents, and drilling beneath glaciers to remove the lubricating water that hastens their flow. The attraction of such interventions lies in their ambition: slowing or even halting ice loss from critical glaciers could reduce the threat of catastrophic sea level rise.¹¹⁷ However, evidence presented to the Committee made clear that these proposals face formidable technical, environmental, and geopolitical challenges. For example, pumping sea water to thicken ice would require millions of devices operating in extreme conditions; building a submarine barrier to protect just one region would entail an 80-kilometre-long structure in some of the harshest marine environments on Earth. Drilling beneath glaciers has also encountered repeated technical failures, exacerbated by the region’s violent storms, shifting ice, and logistical difficulties.¹¹⁸ We note the Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA) has recently invested £57 million as part of its Exploring Climate Cooling programme, funding 21 small scale projects on geoengineering technology. This includes experiments to thicken Arctic sea ice.¹¹⁹ This is a significant sum compared with the UK’s annual spend on support for Antarctic research.

112. Witnesses warned that such projects could harm marine wildlife, disrupt ecosystems, and potentially breach the Antarctic Treaty, which enshrines principles of environmental protection and peaceful cooperation. The financial costs are equally daunting: protecting just two glaciers could require an estimated $80 billion, with annual maintenance exceeding $1 billion. We were told that the full suite of proposed geoengineering solutions could cost hundreds of billions of dollars, and that securing such funding in the limited time available to avoid severe climate tipping points is unlikely. Moreover, the energy required to deploy and maintain these interventions would itself contribute to carbon emissions, potentially worsening the very problem they aim to solve.¹²⁰

113. Crucially, we also heard that geoengineering does not address the root cause of Antarctic climate change: rising greenhouse gas emissions. There was strong consensus in the evidence we received that investing in extreme and uncertain technological solutions could distract from more effective and immediate priorities, such as reducing global emissions and strengthening climate resilience. Witnesses emphasised that achieving net zero emissions remains the most practical, cost-effective, and impactful way to protect Antarctica and reduce sea level rise. They also argued that, as a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty, the UK should play a leading role in shaping the global governance of geoengineering, ensuring that environmental safeguards are paramount, and that climate mitigation, not climate manipulation, remains the central focus of international cooperation.¹²¹

5 Environmental protection and Antarctic biodiversity

117. In this chapter we examine the current state of environmental protection in Antarctica, including the current role of the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, the ongoing challenges, and the need for a more comprehensive approach to managing and safeguarding the continent’s fragile ecosystems.

Governance of environmental protection

118. The 1998 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty remains the cornerstone of environmental governance in Antarctica. Designating the continent as a “natural reserve devoted to peace and science,” the Protocol enforces stringent regulations to minimise human impact. These include comprehensive environmental impact assessments (EIAs), conservation measures for flora and fauna, waste disposal restrictions, and the establishment of Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) to safeguard regions of exceptional scientific, environmental, or historical significance.¹²² The Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) provides guidance to ensure activities are planned and conducted with minimal environmental harm. However, significant gaps persist in understanding the cumulative effects of human activities on Antarctica’s biodiversity, complicating decision-making for necessary conservation actions.¹²³

Antarctica’s biodiversity

119. Antarctica hosts a unique array of endemic species and rich marine biodiversity, including over 20,000 seabed species, diverse plankton, fish, and vertebrates adapted to its extreme environment.¹²⁴ While terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity is lower, it includes highly specialised organisms, underscoring the importance of the region’s conservation. Microbial and viral diversity, while less documented, is believed to be extensive, playing crucial roles in ecosystem functioning and offering insights into life in extreme environments, with potential medical and biotechnological applications.¹²⁵

120. Many Antarctic species are specially adapted to the extreme cold, such as icefish, which lack red blood cells to survive in frigid waters. Antarctic marine invertebrates, including sponges and jellyfish, often exhibit adaptations like gigantism. The unique adaptations that allow them to thrive in cold environments also make them particularly vulnerable to the impacts of ocean warming and climate change.¹²⁶ Beyond their ecological importance, Antarctic species have contributed to scientific and economic advancements: enzymes from krill have been used in medical treatments, and compounds like astromelanin from Antarctic black yeast have therapeutic applications.¹²⁷

The impacts of climate change on Antarctic biodiversity

121. Climate change is the most significant and far reaching threat to Antarctic biodiversity. Warming temperatures, habitat loss, species displacement, pollution and increased biological invasions are all altering ecosystems. On the Antarctic Peninsula, plant cover has increased more than tenfold since 1986, with warming identified as the principal driver. Shifts in temperature and ice conditions are affecting population dynamics, species distribution, physiological traits, and food webs, placing highly specialised organisms at particular risk.¹²⁸

122. For example, a 2020 Greenpeace survey reported a 60% decline in chinstrap penguin numbers on Elephant Island since 1971. Meanwhile, gentoo penguin colonies have been found further south than previously recorded, signalling a shift in species ranges.¹²⁹ Even a one-degree Celsius change can have major consequences, altering sea ice and access to breeding and feeding grounds for species such as Emperor and Adélie penguins. Generalist species are more likely to thrive under new conditions, while specialists decline. These changes are not uniform and can vary widely across the continent.¹³⁰

123. The iconic Emperor penguin, the tallest and heaviest of all penguin species, is found only in Antarctica and has become emblematic of the threats climate change poses to the region’s unique biodiversity. Emperor penguins are a vital part of the Antarctic food chain, they eat creatures like squid and small fish, and are an important source of food for predators like leopard seals and sharks.¹³¹ Their survival depends on stable sea ice, which is rapidly disappearing. Although scientists strongly support designating the species as specially protected, proposals have been repeatedly blocked by China, underscoring the challenges of securing consensus within the Antarctic Treaty system. Experts warned that the Emperor penguin’s decline is not just a conservation concern, but a stark signal of the broader ecological disruptions caused by climate change.¹³²

124. Marine biodiversity is also under pressure. Icefish, which lack red blood cells, are vulnerable to warming seas, while many invertebrates, including giant sponges and jellyfish, are sensitive to small changes in temperature. Antarctic microorganisms are of particular scientific interest and have already contributed to medical and technological advancements. For instance, enzymes from Antarctic krill are used to prevent immune rejection in transplant patients, and compounds from fungi show promise in biotechnology.¹³³

Invasive and non-native species

125. Invasive and non-native species are among the most urgent and preventable threats to Antarctic biodiversity. As ice retreats and temperatures rise, non-native species are increasingly able to establish themselves, competing with native flora and fauna. Only two vascular plants are native to Antarctica, Antarctic hair grass and Antarctic pearlwort, and both are under threat from hardier, introduced species.¹³⁴ For instance, annual meadow grass has colonised glacial moraines on King George Island, posing a risk to native plant communities.¹³⁵

126. Some invasive species also disrupt ecological processes.¹³⁶ A flightless midge introduced to the South Shetlands in the 1960s has significantly altered soil chemical cycles. Human activity remains the principal vector, with seeds and organisms carried via ship hulls, cargo, footwear, food, and clothing. We heard that robust biosecurity measures are essential in mitigating this threat.¹³⁷ Witnesses before the Sub-Committee emphasised that preventing introduction is far more effective and economical than attempting to eradicate established invaders.¹³⁸

Avian influenza

127. Avian influenza has now been recorded in sub-Antarctic regions and the Falkland Islands, and has reached South Georgia. BAS teams are monitoring the spread of the virus. Though its current impact is limited, it has reached mainland Antarctica via migratory birds and could pose a significant future threat to penguin and seal populations.¹³⁹ Breeding colonies provide ideal conditions for transmission.¹⁴⁰

128. Biosecurity protocols are in place at key sites such as Rothera Research Station, where staff undergo rigorous training and are forbidden from approaching wildlife without scientific need. Tour operators are also expected to ensure that visitors follow strict hygiene procedures. However, because of the scale of wildlife movements across regions, the risk of widespread transmission cannot be eliminated entirely.¹⁴¹

Plastic and chemical pollution

129. Despite its remoteness, Antarctica is not immune to pollution. Microplastics and chemical contaminants are increasingly found in its marine and terrestrial environments.¹⁴² These pollutants arrive via long-range atmospheric and oceanic transport, and are exacerbated by local human activity, such as research, fishing, and tourism. Plastic debris has been recorded in the waters surrounding the Antarctic Peninsula, the Weddell Sea, and even in snow and ice cores.¹⁴³

130. Microplastics can carry toxic substances including heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants, making them especially harmful. Krill, a key species in the Antarctic food web, can ingest these plastics, facilitating the transfer of toxins up the food chain.¹⁴⁴ Effective waste management is essential, but logistical challenges persist, particularly for smaller research operations.¹⁴⁵ WWF UK stressed that once plastics enter the marine environment, they are virtually impossible to remove, highlighting the importance of prevention.¹⁴⁶

131. In 2019, the UK successfully secured a resolution under the Antarctic Treaty System aimed at reducing plastic pollution.¹⁴⁷ However, progress has been slow. BAS notes a lack of baseline monitoring data, making it difficult to assess impact or develop effective policy responses.¹⁴⁸ The National Oceanography Centre (NOC) has called for action at the global level, including disincentivising plastic production, promoting a circular economy, and showing leadership in negotiations for a legally binding treaty on plastic pollution.¹⁴⁹

Tools for environmental protection under the Environment Protocol

132. Environmental protection under the Protocol relies principally on Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and the designation of Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs), which aim to safeguard sites of exceptional ecological, scientific, or historical value.¹⁵⁰ The Sub-Committee heard that the current network of ASPAs remains inadequate, covering less than 2% of the continent’s ice-free areas. Although efforts have been made to adopt a more systematic approach to conservation planning, progress has been slow, largely due to the consensus-based decision-making process and the requirement for detailed management plans for each site.¹⁵¹

133. The Committee for Environmental Protection has acknowledged the serious threat posed by invasive species and developed biosecurity guidelines to address it.¹⁵² However, inconsistent compliance across regions continues to pose a risk to Antarctic ecosystems. Witnesses stressed the need for the UK to prioritise biosecurity across its Antarctic operations. This includes improving facilities across the BAS supply chain and ensuring robust biosecurity measures are in place at gateway ports such as Punta Arenas in Chile and the Falkland Islands, as well as on UK research stations. Strengthening these measures would support compliance with the Antarctic Act 1994 and contribute to international efforts to prevent biological contamination.¹⁵³

134. Experts also emphasised the importance of identifying areas that may become more vulnerable or resilient to climate change.¹⁵⁴ While environmental impact assessments are mandatory for all activities and are generally well implemented through national permitting systems, there is scope for improvement. Witnesses suggested that greater collaboration, particularly between parties with shared regional interests or expertise, could enhance the identification and designation of protected areas. Broader participation in the EIA process could help ensure emerging vulnerable regions are recognised and appropriately safeguarded.¹⁵⁵

The UK and Antarctic biodiversity

135. The Sub-Committee heard that additional measures are needed to strengthen the UK’s role in Antarctic environmental governance. Biosecurity, particularly in preventing the introduction and spread of non-native species, requires improvement. Enhancing biosecurity infrastructure across UK operations, including at Antarctic gateway ports and research stations, will ensure better compliance with the Antarctic Act 1994 and reduce ecological risks. Witnesses stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to monitoring and mitigating environmental impacts, recommending enhanced research capacity, stronger international collaboration, and more robust conservation policies within the Antarctic Treaty framework.¹⁵⁶

The Blue Belt Programme

136. Launched in 2016 with £25 million in funding, the Blue Belt Programme aims to safeguard 4 million km² of marine areas across the UK Overseas Territories, nearly 60% of the UK’s entire marine estate. The initiative focuses on protecting biodiversity, supporting sustainable economic development, and enhancing climate resilience. Between 2022 and 2025, it is supported by the FCDO through the International Programme Fund, which contributes to Marine Protected Area (MPA) management, enforcement, and monitoring.

137. Witnesses praised the Programme’s tangible environmental and scientific impacts, particularly in the South Atlantic. Research expeditions have enabled the mapping of previously unexplored seabeds, assessments of fishing activity and its ecological impacts, and enhanced krill fisheries science through CCAMLR. The use of cameras on toothfish fishing lines has also generated valuable data on interactions between fishing gear and the seafloor, contributing to more informed, evidence-based fisheries management.¹⁵⁷

138. Giving evidence to us recently as part of our Governing the Marine Environment inquiry, Baroness Chapman of Darlington, Minister of State for International Development, responded to concerns about the future of the Blue Belt and Darwin Plus programmes in light of cuts to Official Development Assistance (ODA). She acknowledged that funding pressures required difficult prioritisation, with an emphasis on value for money and efficiency. While decisions on future allocations are ongoing, she said it was hard to imagine a scenario in which climate and biodiversity would not remain central priorities.¹⁵⁸

Research and conservation expertise

139. Antarctica remains one of the most remote and least understood environments, with limited research capacity, particularly for long-term biological monitoring.¹⁵⁹ While technological advancements, such as remote sensing, help track large-scale environmental trends, direct field research remains essential for understanding species interactions and climate change responses. However, the UK’s capacity to provide this expertise has diminished: the number of terrestrial biologists at BAS has fallen from between 25 and 30 over the course of the last twenty years, to just two, both nearing retirement.¹⁶⁰ Dr Hughes said that this was a concern to him in his role as Environment Manager at BAS, as soon he would not have access to the expertise he needs on conservation issues.¹⁶¹

Commitment to Antarctic conservation

140. The Government told the Committee that the UK has played a leading role in advocating for Antarctic conservation. It has championed the designation of 15 Antarctic Specially Protected Areas and 32 Historic Sites and Monuments, while also leading international efforts to mitigate climate change impacts, control non-native species, and regulate tourism. The UK has called for enhanced protection for Emperor penguins, which are particularly vulnerable to climate change.¹⁶²

6 Natural resources in the Antarctic

148. This chapter will consider the role of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) within the Antarctic Treaty System, examining its ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management and the ongoing challenges in establishing Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and sustainable catch limits.

Ecosystem based management and CCAMLR

149. Established in 1982, CCAMLR manages all marine life south of the Antarctic Convergence. Its ecosystem-based fishery management approach prioritises conservation while permitting sustainable harvesting under strict conditions. Together with the Protocol on Environmental Protection, CCAMLR supports international efforts to reduce environmental harm and protect biodiversity.¹⁶³

Pressures on Antarctic marine systems

150. Climate change is driving ecological shifts. Cold-adapted species are their habitats, and warming seas are promoting range expansions of temperate species. Up to 80% of seafloor invertebrates could face range contractions by 2100.¹⁶⁴ Antarctic krill, a cornerstone of the ecosystem, is showing signs of a poleward distribution shift. This affects krill-dependent predators, including penguins, especially during breeding seasons when their foraging range is limited.¹⁶⁵

151. Fishing activities further stress these ecosystems. Three primary fisheries operate in Antarctica: icefish, toothfish, and krill:

• The icefish fishery, once overexploited, was significantly reduced following a moratorium imposed by CCAMLR in the 1989–1990 season.
• The toothfish fishery, concentrated around South Georgia and East Antarctica, is managed using precautionary catch limits informed by regular stock assessments.
• Krill fishing, the largest fishery in the Southern Ocean, is also regulated by CCAMLR. Strict management measures apply to management Area 48, which encompasses the Antarctic Peninsula and South Georgia. Krill stocks, estimated at around 380 million tonnes annually, fluctuate in response to environmental factors like sea ice conditions, with approximately half consumed by marine life.¹⁶⁶

Krill and sustainability challenges

152. Krill fishing has been active since the 1960s, initially led by Japanese and Soviet fleets. Today, it is primarily dominated by five CCAMLR member states: Chile, China, Norway, South Korea, and Ukraine.¹⁶⁷ The commercial krill fishery is valued at over $200 million per year.¹⁶⁸ However, climate change, pollution, and growing fishing effort threaten its long-term viability.¹⁶⁹

153. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing continues to pose a significant threat to marine biodiversity. To ensure sustainable fisheries management in Antarctic waters, enhanced monitoring, stricter enforcement, and international cooperation are crucial. CCAMLR’s ecosystem-based approach is essential to mitigating the risks posed by both climate change and industrial fishing.¹⁷⁰

Box 1: What are Antarctic krill?

Antarctic krill, small, shrimp-like crustaceans, are a cornerstone of the Antarctic marine ecosystem, providing essential food for whales, fish, invertebrates, and birds. They also play a key role in ocean biogeochemical systems and the carbon cycle by feeding on phytoplankton and excreting carbon-rich pellets. Around 70% of the global krill population resides in and around Antarctica, with the southwest Atlantic sector being the primary focus of krill fishing. Krill accounts for 85% of the total fishery catch by weight in the Southern Ocean.

Krill live in large swarms and can live up to 10 years. They rely on sea ice for shelter, especially for their larvae, making them highly vulnerable to changes in ice cover. The fishery, regulated by CCAMLR, has steadily grown since 2010. However, there are concerns that increasing fishing pressure, sea ice loss, and shifting krill populations could lead to declines in the future. Studies on krill population trends remain inconclusive, as krill are known for their boom-and-bust cycles.

Projections suggest that krill distribution may shift southward towards areas with more sea ice, moving away from warming waters. This could lead to losses in regions where krill are heavily consumed by marine life and targeted by fisheries. To mitigate these risks, Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) have been proposed to limit fishing in key areas. While some countries support MPAs for conservation, others argue that existing measures are adequate.

Source: Australia Antarctic Program Krill matters

The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources

154. CCAMLR regulates all marine life south of the Polar Front (previously termed the Antarctic Convergence), a zone that separates the cold waters surrounding Antarctica from the relatively warmer waters of the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. CCAMLR focuses on the conservation of finfish, molluscs, crustaceans, and seabirds. Its primary objective is to conserve marine life while permitting sustainable harvesting under strict conditions. The Convention uses an ecosystem-based management approach, which takes into account the broader impacts of fishing on dependent species and overall ecosystem health.¹⁷¹

155. The primary objective of CCAMLR is the conservation of marine life, while enabling sustainable harvesting under specific conditions. The Convention defines conservation broadly, covering both ecosystem protection and the sustainable use of marine resources. It establishes the Commission and a Scientific Committee to oversee the management of Southern Ocean marine life and assess ecosystem health. The Polar Front effectively encloses the Southern Ocean, creating a relatively closed system where conservation efforts can be concentrated.¹⁷²

156. CCAMLR is widely recognised for its pioneering “ecosystem approach” to fisheries management. This approach goes beyond managing individual species by considering the broader impacts of harvesting on dependent and related species, as well as assessing overall ecosystem health.¹⁷³ CCAMLR’s management strategy includes specialised scientific working groups, such as those focused on krill assessments and stock evaluations. These groups collect data and provide recommendations to the Commission, which then makes regulatory decisions.¹⁷⁴

The UK and CCAMLR

158. The UK plays a significant leadership role within CCAMLR, contributing to the protection and sustainable management of the Southern Ocean. Through the BAS and the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas), the UK provides robust scientific evidence to inform decision-making at CCAMLR meetings.¹⁷⁵

159. The UK has championed stronger consideration of climate change within CCAMLR. Following its advocacy, a climate change resolution was adopted in 2009 and updated in 2022, calling on member states to integrate climate considerations into decision-making processes.¹⁷⁶

Challenges for CCAMLR

160. CCAMLR’s progress has been impeded by geopolitical tensions and conflicting economic interests, and the absence of consensus on key conservation measures highlights the need for enhanced diplomatic efforts.¹⁷⁷ The UK has a pivotal opportunity to address these challenges as it assumes the role of Chair of CCAMLR for the 2025 and 2026 meetings.¹⁷⁸

161. CCAMLR operates under a consensus-based decision-making system, requiring agreement from all member parties for decisions to pass. While intended to foster cooperative governance, this structure has increasingly become a barrier to progress, with key conservation initiatives obstructed by a minority of dissenting nations, particularly as geopolitical tensions spill over into the platform.¹⁷⁹

Fisheries conservation

162. Since its establishment in 1982, CCAMLR’s conservation approach has been guided by the principle of ‘Rational Use’. In 2024, scientific assessments indicated that around 5.5 million tonnes of krill could be harvested sustainably. However, the actual catch quota was set at 620,000 tonnes to safeguard krill-dependent predators. In practice, annual catches have remained well below this, typically ranging from 350,000 to 450,000 tonnes.¹⁸⁰

163. CCAMLR’s effectiveness stems from its ecosystem-based, precautionary approach, which prioritises preventing overharvesting and maintaining ecological balance. This stands in contrast to conventional fisheries management, which often focuses solely on individual species. CCAMLR has achieved significant progress in reducing seabird bycatch in toothfish fisheries and combating illegal fishing.¹⁸¹

164. However, tensions have emerged as some members push for higher fishing quotas. While the precautionary principle once underpinned decision-making, there is now increasing emphasis on the “right to fish.” Some states demand concrete evidence of environmental harm before supporting conservation measures, undermining the proactive, precautionary stance that has historically defined CCAMLR.¹⁸²

165. The expansion of the krill fishery is a particular concern, especially in the Antarctic Peninsula region, where catch limits have been reached in recent years. The UK played a leading role in developing a revised management plan to ensure sustainable fishing and minimise impacts on krill dependent species like penguins, seals, and whales. Although the plan was endorsed by CCAMLR’s Scientific Committee, it was not implemented at the October 2024 CCAMLR meeting in Hobart.¹⁸³

166. The failure to adopt the new management plan at the 43rd CCAMLR meeting at Hobart, in October 2024, was a significant setback. Additionally, a crucial conservation measure, which distributed the krill catch across four zones to reduce the overlap between fishing and sensitive wildlife areas, was not renewed.¹⁸⁴ Without this measure, the full 620,000-tonne catch limit could now be concentrated in the biodiverse Antarctic Peninsula, exacerbating existing pressures from climate change and fishing. Indeed, in the Antarctic summer of 2024–25, many krill fishing ships operated close to shore in known whale and penguin ‘hot spots’.¹⁸⁵

167. WWF UK said that there is evidence that concentrated krill fishing, coupled with climate change, negatively impacts whales, penguins, and seal populations, with reduced krill supplies leading to fewer pregnancies in humpback whales.¹⁸⁶ With the Hobart meeting criticised for failing to agree stronger protections for key ecological areas, krill fishing has continued this year close to shore and within known whale feeding grounds. Reports of humpback whales being killed or injured in krill fishing nets around Antarctica have intensified concerns that CCAMLR’s by-catch mitigation measures are insufficient and require both strengthening and more effective enforcement.¹⁸⁷

Marine Protected Areas

168. Parallel to its work on fisheries, CCAMLR has established a framework for Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), aiming to create a representative network across the Southern Ocean. Key milestones include the designation of the South Orkneys MPA in 2009 and the Ross Sea MPA in 2016, the world’s first high seas MPAs, covering 94,000 km² and 1.55 million km² respectively.¹⁸⁸ However, progress towards a wider MPA network has stalled, with just 5% of Antarctic waters currently protected, falling short of the targets agreed in 2012.¹⁸⁹

169. Proposals to establish new MPAs in East Antarctica, the Weddell Sea, and the Antarctic Peninsula have faced repeated obstruction, primarily from Russia and China. These countries have been accused of applying a disproportionately high burden of proof to conservation proposals compared to those concerning fishing expansion. This inconsistency directly undermines the precautionary foundation of the Convention and impedes broader global commitments to protect 30% of the ocean by 2030.¹⁹⁰

170. The UK has consistently acted as a co-sponsor of these MPA proposals and has demonstrated leadership within CCAMLR, scientifically, diplomatically, and through initiatives such as bycatch mitigation, plastic reduction on vessels, and the promotion of remote electronic monitoring. Despite this, the failure of the 2024 Hobart meeting to deliver progress, either on MPAs or krill fishery management, has raised serious concerns.¹⁹¹ We heard that this stagnation risks eroding the legitimacy and efficacy of CCAMLR’s consensus-based governance model.¹⁹²

171. Witnesses emphasised that diplomatic efforts should not focus solely on Russian and Chinese obstructionism. The commercial value of fisheries to countries like the UK and Norway must also be acknowledged, as perceived Western double standards can fuel mistrust internationally.¹⁹³ Experts urged the UK to engage more deeply with regional specialists and foreign policy analysts, particularly those with expertise in Chinese diplomacy and Antarctic geopolitics, to shape more informed and strategic dialogue with obstructive parties.¹⁹⁴ Some witnesses also argued that the UK should intensify diplomatic efforts to reform the decision-making structures of CCAMLR or, alternatively, acknowledge that the organisation may no longer be fit for purpose.¹⁹⁵

172. There were calls for the UK to strengthen intersessional engagement, especially as it assumes the CCAMLR Chair for two years. Expanding both formal and informal discussions with member states was seen as vital for building trust and identifying shared priorities. Some witnesses went further, suggesting that the UK should press for institutional reform to ensure CCAMLR remains fit for purpose in the face of rising geopolitical tensions and climate-related challenges.¹⁹⁶

173. The UK Government reaffirmed its commitment to an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management, aiming to ensure the sustainable harvesting of species such as krill, toothfish, and icefish. It has taken a leading role in developing bycatch mitigation measures, pioneering video monitoring of fishing gear, and introducing regulations to reduce plastic pollution from fishing vessels.¹⁹⁷ Discussing the 2024 CCAMLR meeting in Hobart, Jane Rumble, Head of the Polar Regions Department, FCDO, assured us that most krill fishers are members of the Association of Responsible Krill Operators, who have pledged to maintain buffer zones to prevent fishing near penguin colonies. However, she also highlighted that the Hobart outcome was disappointing from a CCAMLR perspective, noting that, while not an immediate catastrophe, it raised significant conservation concerns.¹⁹⁸

174. Jane Rumble told us that the UK advocates very strongly for marine protected areas, saying “we would like to have them enshrined and established in this consensus mechanism.” She added that the Government had made clear in interventions at CCAMLR to Russia and China that “we are not going to be in a position to agree to any development of fishery in areas that we think are worthy of protection”, pointing to an impasse that needs to be overcome before progress can be made. Jane Rumble added that the Government can use other mechanisms to enact marine protection, and that the Government was pursuing stronger protections for the marine environment.¹⁹⁹

175. The Overseas Territories Minister told us that he was not confident, but that progress on conservation measures can be made at CCAMLR, saying that it would depend on circumstances. He added that “Russia’s disregard for the international rules-based order and system at the moment is apparent for all to see”, pointing to Russia’s actions in other institutions, including at the United Nations Security Council.²⁰⁰

Commercial mining

183. Article 7 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty explicitly prohibits “any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research.” This includes prospecting, exploration, and exploitation for commercial purposes.²⁰¹

184. Reports that the Russian state-owned vessel Alexander Karpinsky has conducted seismic surveys in Antarctic waters, identifying potential hydrocarbon reserves estimated at 70 billion tonnes, have therefore raised serious concerns. Although Russia has maintained that the activity forms part of a scientific programme, the nature and intent of these surveys cast doubt on compliance with the Protocol’s prohibition and risk undermining its authority.²⁰²

185. In light of the significant strategic and environmental implications, it is vital that the international community maintains close scrutiny of such activities. Any efforts to circumvent the ban could erode trust in the ATS and compromise the fragile ecosystems the Protocol was designed to protect. The long-term value of Antarctica’s natural resources must not override the commitment to environmental preservation.²⁰³

186. The potential for mineral exploitation remains a long-term risk. Antarctica is believed to hold deposits of oil, coal, and iron ore, resources that, if accessed, could lead to geopolitical tensions and irreversible environmental harm.

187. The Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty clearly state:

It is sometimes publicly reported that the Protocol ‘expires’ in 2048. This is a misinterpretation and is not correct. Neither the Protocol, nor the Antarctic Treaty, have a termination date. For the first fifty years from the Protocol’s entry into force (1998), it can only be modified by the unanimous agreement of all Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty. After this point (from 2048), any of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties can call for a review conference into the Protocol’s operation.²⁰⁴

188. Professor Klaus Dodds addressed the issue in the context of concerns that the Protocol’s provisions prohibiting mining activity could be challenged, and potentially quashed, after 2048. He explained that at present, amending the Protocol to establish a legal regime for mineral extraction activities would require a decision reached by consensus between each of the 1998 signatories to the Protocol. While a review conference to address the mining issue could in theory be convened after 2048, he cautioned against the assumption that any conference would automatically lead to amendments to the Protocol, particularly given the stringent requirements for its amendment.²⁰⁵

189. The UK and its ATS partners have called on Russia to reaffirm its adherence to the Protocol and to provide full transparency regarding the objectives and future use of data collected by the Karpinsky. Jane Rumble, Head of the Polar Regions Department at the FCDO, noted:

There isn’t any evidence that would point to a breach of the treaty. You would need different equipment between surveying and actual exploitation. There is not a shift to it, but yes, we are watching it very closely. Russia has been tackled on this before and has assured the ATCM on multiple occasions that this is a science programme. We will keep it under review.²⁰⁶

Our views on the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and the prohibition of commercial mineral exploitation

7 Tourism in Antarctica

194. In this chapter we examine the development, influence, and governance of tourism in Antarctica, with particular focus on the UK’s role and contributions. It considers how tourism, if well managed, can support wider goals of environmental awareness and stewardship, while also addressing the increasing pressures on Antarctica’s ecosystems. It concludes with recommendations to ensure that Antarctic tourism remains sustainable, aligned with the UK’s environmental commitments and polar governance responsibilities.

The growth of Antarctic tourism

195. Tourism in Antarctica has grown significantly in recent decades. What began as a niche activity involving a few hundred visitors annually has become a highly organised industry with over 100,000 people visiting during the 2022–23 season.²⁰⁷ This rapid growth has raised concerns among the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), especially due to the concentration of tourism in sensitive areas of the Antarctic Peninsula, including within the British Antarctic Territory. While the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) has long coordinated industry practices, the regulatory framework has largely relied on voluntary, non-binding guidelines, and was last updated in 2021.²⁰⁸

196. In response to mounting concerns in May 2024, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) adopted a new measure to strengthen the regulation of tourism, marking a shift towards a more formal, coordinated framework for managing visitor activities.²⁰⁹

Evolving patterns and emerging opportunities

197. Antarctic tourism has diversified beyond traditional seaborne tours. IAATO data shows growing popularity in activities such as kayaking, camping, polar plunges, citizen science, and even scuba diving and helicopter flights. Although rare, extreme sports like heli-skiing and base jumping have occurred. In the 2019–20 season, 58% of tourists participated in small boat cruises and landings. Activities like kayaking and the polar plunge made up about 9% of off-ship experiences.²¹⁰ Deep-field tourism, such as ski expeditions to the South Pole or visits to emperor penguin colonies, has also expanded. The high-cost “ski the last degree” experience, involving a 69-mile trek to the South Pole, tripled in popularity by 2019. The UK Antarctic Heritage Trust (UKAHT) has raised safety and environmental concerns about these more intensive forms of tourism.²¹¹

198. Other areas of tourism in Antarctica have evolved from niche expedition-style visits to a broad array of experiences that bring visitors closer to the continent’s unique environment. These experiences, when responsibly delivered, can deepen public engagement with Antarctic conservation. Many visitors return with a heightened appreciation of the continent’s fragility and act as advocates for its protection.²¹² As one source put it, “any pair of feet that visits Antarctica must have a beneficial purpose for Antarctica.”²¹³ This dynamic has been described as creating “Antarctic ambassadors”—travellers who share their experience and raise awareness of polar science, environmental challenges, and climate change. The General Principles of Antarctic Tourism encourage this educational dimension, stating that visits should inspire conservation values.²¹⁴

199. Additionally, tourism supports citizen science projects, with travellers helping gather data on biodiversity, ice conditions, and species behaviour. Such participation fosters direct involvement in scientific inquiry, bridging the gap between public engagement and academic research.²¹⁵

200. In some cases, tourism has also prompted improvements in environmental standards. The USA’s McMurdo Station cleaned up its waste following visitor criticism and HMS Protector’s response to a reported pollution site demonstrate how tourism can act as a catalyst for environmental responsibility.²¹⁶

Environmental pressures from growing tourism

201. The surge in visitor numbers and the diversification of activities have heightened concerns about Antarctica’s ecosystems. Tourism is heavily concentrated in the ice-free coastal zones of the Antarctic Peninsula. In 2019–20, 90% of 313 visited sites were in this region, with two-thirds of visits occurring at just 31 sites. Notably, 77% of landings occurred within a 2 km² area, intensifying the risk of ecological degradation.²¹⁷

Figure 4: Location of tourist sites in Antarctica

Source: ResearchGate Antarctica locations most often visited by tourists

202. The tourism season coincides with the breeding periods of many native species. While Antarctic wildlife may seem indifferent to human presence, research shows altered behaviour among some species, such as Gentoo penguins. During the pandemic, Gentoo populations relocated to tourist-frequented areas like Port Lockroy, suggesting that human activity influences breeding patterns.²¹⁸

203. The inadvertent introduction of non-native species remains a serious concern. Seeds carried by tourists or scientists can disrupt local ecosystems, while physical trampling can damage both terrain and biodiversity. Calls for stronger biosecurity measures and improved local management are growing to mitigate these risks.²¹⁹

204. Maritime tourism also poses particular risks: increased vessel traffic raises the likelihood of non-native species introductions (via ballast water or hulls), collisions with marine animals, and waste discharge, including food waste and sewage. These discharges can lead to nutrient imbalances and eutrophication in marine ecosystems.²²⁰

205. Carbon emissions are another concern. Between 2016 and 2020, it has been estimated that each Antarctic tourist contributed to the melting of an estimated 83 tonnes of snow through black carbon emissions, which reduce the albedo of snow and accelerate melting.²²¹ The IMO is expected to adopt regulations on black carbon emissions and ‘polar fuels’ by 2026.²²² Some operators are taking steps to reduce emissions or offset environmental impacts. However, we heard from the industry that wider availability of alternative fuels and clear government guidance are needed to support a transition to low-emission operations,²²³ a message also delivered to our predecessor Committee during it’s inquiry into net zero and UK shipping.²²⁴

The UK’s role in managing tourism to support environmental stewardship

206. The UK plays a significant role in Antarctic tourism. UK visitors represented 7% of total visitors in the 2023–24 season,²²⁵ with prominent UK-based tour operators such as Noble Caledonia and Hurtigruten Expeditions offering expeditions to the Antarctic Peninsula.²²⁶ The UKAHT also plays a crucial role in maintaining historic sites like Port Lockroy, ensuring the conservation of both cultural and environmental heritage.²²⁷

207. The UK’s approach is guided by the Antarctic Act 1994 and its Regulations, which have been updated to meet evolving environmental standards. UK-based expeditions must secure authorisation from the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) to ensure compliance with the Antarctic Treaty System. Activities that may impact flora, fauna, or protected areas require specialist permits and detailed environmental impact assessments.²²⁸ The UK’s permitting system seeks to ensure British expeditions meet high safety and environmental standards, supporting responsible tourism through measures such as restricting drone use and helicopter flights, and permit holders must submit Post Visit Reports for compliance review. The Government also encourages travellers to choose IAATO-affiliated operators.²²⁹

208. We heard suggestions for the UK to enhance its leadership in the Antarctic Treaty System on tourism. While the UK’s permitting regime is highly regarded, there is scope to advocate for more rigorous environmental impact assessments and a consistent, treaty wide framework for managing visitor sites. Developing a strategic approach to manage tourist numbers at key landing sites, assess site capacity, and implement dynamic site management would contribute to long-term sustainability.²³⁰ Witnesses also told us that the UK is well-placed to help build consensus among treaty members, and by drawing on its experience and leadership, the UK could promote comprehensive, data driven policies and foster closer cooperation within the system.²³¹

209. The Minister for the Overseas Territories affirmed the UK’s commitment to sustainable Antarctic tourism through active participation in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. He stated that the Government would continue to advocate for a precautionary approach to minimise environmental harm while promoting greater public understanding of Antarctica’s global importance. The Minister also highlighted efforts to strengthen protections, engage stakeholders, and refine the UK’s priorities for the June 2025 ATCM negotiations.²³²

The legal and policy framework for the management of Antarctic tourism

214. The ATS implements various measures and resolutions to regulate tourism, including Visitor Site Guidelines and a Manual of Regulations.²³³ Nonetheless, several key measures remain unratified due to lack of consensus—such as Measure 4 (2004) on insurance and contingency planning, and Measure 15 (2009) on landings. IAATO supports their implementation, but compliance varies, particularly among non-member operators.²³⁴ The ATCM also compiles relevant regulations and guidelines in the ‘Manual of Regulations and Guidelines Relevant to Tourism and Non-Governmental Activities in the Antarctic Treaty Area’.²³⁵ As noted by Professor Dodds, “these remain guidelines rather than regulations per se.”²³⁶

Management Measures for Antarctic Tourism

215. The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) have implemented a number of practical measures aimed at managing tourism and preventing over-visitation:

• Large Vessel Restrictions: Since 2007, ships with over 500 passengers are banned from landings. Smaller vessels (500 or fewer passengers) are limited to one per site, with a maximum of 100 passengers ashore at a time and a 1:20 guide-to-passenger ratio.
• Protected Areas: Tourist access is prohibited in Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) and Specially Protected Areas (SPAs) unless a permit is granted for specific purposes, such as visiting historic sites.
• Zoning and ASMAs: Antarctic Specially Managed Areas (ASMAs) provide for the zoning of activities to regulate tourism and protect sensitive environments.
• Site-Specific Guidelines: Since 2005, site-specific guidelines have been developed for 42 locations—including 17 of the 20 most visited—setting clear protocols to minimise environmental impacts.²³⁷

216. Witnesses to our inquiry consistently stressed the need for improved tourism management. The UKAHT raised concerns about the expansion of leisure-oriented tourism, while WWF UK called for stronger regulation and long-term environmental monitoring.²³⁸

217. Scientists recommended adopting a science-led approach, incorporating robust monitoring and international best practices. Establishing site capacity thresholds, implementing visitor limits, and, where necessary, closing sites to tourism altogether were seen as essential steps to protect vulnerable ecosystems.²³⁹ Camilla Nichol, Chief Executive of the UK Antarctic Heritage Trust, noted the UK’s leadership within the ATS provides a platform for promoting such reforms.²⁴⁰

The role of IAATO

218. Established in 1991, IAATO promotes responsible tourism with minimal environmental impact. Membership to IAATO is voluntary. It sets non-binding operational standards on visitor limits, staff ratios, and environmental protocols.²⁴¹ With over 100 members, IAATO plays a key role in the implementation of responsible tourism practices.²⁴²

219. Despite its strengths, IAATO’s self-regulatory model has faced criticism due to uneven enforcement and inconsistent compliance, particularly as tourism expands. The growing presence of non-IAATO operators presents a significant challenge to maintaining environmental standards.²⁴³ A notable example was the 2011 Berserk incident, in which a Norwegian yacht conducted an unauthorised expedition, breaching Antarctic regulations. The captain was later fined for violating environmental protocols.²⁴⁴ Furthermore, in late 2024 the aircraft hangar at the former British Base at Deception Island (Base B - Antarctic historic site 71) was vandalised with paint by persons currently unknown. It was cleaned by a ship’s crew from an IAATO member company with FCDO support in February 2025.²⁴⁵ Dr Crosbie told us that in cases such as this illustrate the need for more robust and enforceable sanctions under the ATS.²⁴⁶

220. These cases highlight the challenges both IAATO and the ATCM face in ensuring compliance as tourism grows.²⁴⁷ While IAATO members generally adhere to high standards, the growing scale of tourism and reliance on voluntary reporting increasingly strain the system’s capacity to ensure effective compliance and environmental protection.²⁴⁸

8 UK scientific research in Antarctica

229. This chapter explores the scope, significance, and policy relevance of UK-led scientific research in Antarctica, highlighting key areas of contribution and its role in advancing broader environmental governance and fostering international collaboration in the region. Antarctica remains largely unexplored, with limited datasets available to address critical questions about the effects of a warming Antarctica on the global environment. Research is crucial to unlocking these answers.²⁴⁹

UK scientific research in Antarctica

230. The United Kingdom has a longstanding scientific presence in Antarctica, led by the British Antarctic Survey (BAS), a research institute funded by the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC). There is also extensive research being undertaken within the UK’s university sector.

231. BAS underpins UK Antarctic research, contributing to global science and environmental conservation.²⁵⁰ BAS operates an extensive research infrastructure, including advanced research stations, the specialised research vessel RRS Sir David Attenborough, and a fleet of aircraft, enabling year-round data collection in extreme environments. These resources support UK research on climate change impacts and Antarctic ecosystem protection.²⁵¹

232. British researchers conduct fieldwork and employ remote sensing technologies, including satellites, to monitor ice sheets, model sea-level rise, build understanding of ecosystems, investigate space weather and develop long-term climate records.²⁵² This expertise enables a diverse approach to Antarctic research, crucial for understanding how environmental changes there affect the global climate. The UK contributes around 15% of global scientific output on Antarctica, ranking third after the USA and China.²⁵³

233. The evidence gathered during our inquiry and the work undertaken by the Sub-Committee made it clear that the UK possesses extensive expertise in Antarctic science, with a particularly strong contribution to global understanding of how climate change is affecting the region’s unique ecosystems. UK-led research has had significant policy impacts, including discoveries such as ice sheet thinning in the Amundsen Sea and rapid climate shifts in the British Antarctic Territory. British scientists also played a pivotal role in identifying the ozone hole in the 1980s, a groundbreaking discovery that directly contributed to the development of the Montreal Protocol.²⁵⁴ This international treaty, which successfully phased out the use of ozone-depleting substances, has been widely regarded as one of the most effective environmental agreements in history. The UK’s work in this area not only helped protect the ozone layer but also set a precedent for global environmental cooperation. Additionally, UK research has been instrumental in understanding the Antarctic Ice Sheet’s contribution to sea-level rise, a development with profound implications for coastal communities worldwide.²⁵⁵

The UK’s Antarctic infrastructure

235. The UK’s Antarctic infrastructure is essential to its scientific ambitions, supporting cutting edge research across multiple disciplines. Researchers highlighted the critical role of research stations, vessels, and aircraft in maintaining the UK’s leadership in Antarctic science.²⁵⁶

236. BAS operates five research stations in Antarctica, including Rothera, the UK’s largest Antarctica research station, which supports biological, geological, and climate studies. It plays a crucial role in sea level rise and biodiversity research, with advanced labs and aircraft. The Halley VI research station, built on a floating ice shelf, provides vital climate and space weather data.²⁵⁷

Figure 5: UK research stations in Antarctica

Source: British Antarctic Survey British Antarctic Survey Research Stations

237. The RRS Sir David Attenborough enables marine and atmospheric research with advanced icebreaking and oceanographic capabilities. BAS’s aircraft fleet, including Twin Otter and DASH-7 aircraft, supports field research in extreme conditions.²⁵⁸ The Sub-Committee heard that researchers faced challenges such as infrastructure delays and equipment maintenance: Government investment in the UK’s polar research facilities, announced in 2022 as part of the Antarctic Infrastructure Modernisation Project (AIMP) was expected to address these issues.²⁵⁹

238. The FCDO reaffirmed the UK Government’s commitment to Antarctic science outlined in the 2021 Integrated Review.²⁶⁰ The Review underscored the UK’s crucial role in studying Antarctica’s global climate impact. The previous Government told us it had made significant investments in Antarctic scientific stations and capabilities to maintain the UK’s leadership position in Antarctic science.²⁶¹

239. Lord Vallance of Balham KCB, the current Minister for Science, Research and Innovation, emphasised the UK’s long history in Antarctic research, citing the discovery of the ozone hole as a key achievement that led to the Montreal Agreement. He drew attention to the high citation rate of UK-funded research in IPCC reports and stressed the UK’s influential role in global climate science, emphasising the importance of the British Antarctic Survey to research and international scientific collaboration.²⁶²

The Antarctic Infrastructure Modernisation Programme (AIMP)

240. The £670 million multi-year Antarctic Infrastructure Modernisation Programme (AIMP) is a major investment in the UK’s polar research capabilities. UKRI stated that this investment acknowledges Antarctica’s critical role in climate change and reinforces the UK’s leadership in polar science.²⁶³

241. The programme aims to modernise key facilities, including:

• The RRS Sir David Attenborough research vessel
• Upgraded wharves at Rothera, King Edward Point, and Bird Island
• Modernisation of Signy and Bird Island research stations to enhance storage, living spaces, and energy efficiency
• The Discovery Building at Rothera and the introduction of carbon-reducing technology
• Upgraded aircraft facilities

242. Dr Iain Williams, Director of Strategic Partnerships at NERC, outlined the AIMP’s key objectives: advancing scientific capabilities, enhancing safety, and reducing environmental impact. This includes efforts to lower carbon emissions while supporting world class research.²⁶⁴

243. Despite these investments, challenges remain, particularly in respect of transport infrastructure and overall strains on resources. The replacement of the ageing DASH-7 aircraft which is used for flights from Chile to Rothera with the larger De Havilland DASH-8 calls into question the adequacy of the length of the current runway at Rothera. Extending the runway to take a DASH-8 would require significant investment and could disrupt local ecosystems, highlighting the balance between development and environmental preservation.²⁶⁵

244. Nigel Bird, the Director of Major Programmes and Resources at NERC, told the Sub-Committee that UKRI and DSIT had met the requirements of Antarctic infrastructure through the AIMP in a ‘value for money way’.²⁶⁶ The previous Government argued that the level of funding of AIMP funding underscored the importance of national research infrastructure in both polar regions and would ensure the continuation of polar science for the next 25 years.²⁶⁷

245. Lord Vallance, the current Science Minister, emphasised AIMP’s role in strengthening UK research. Phase 1 had already delivered key improvements, including a new research ship and modern docking facilities, allowing multiple programmes to run simultaneously for the first time. Phase 2, focused on new laboratories and facilities at Rothera, was expected to further enhance research capabilities. While the full impact was yet to be realised, the Minister expected these developments to solidify the UK’s position as a leader in Antarctic science.²⁶⁸ Phase 3 aimed to expand air services and continue infrastructure upgrades. The Minister assured us that NERC would conduct reviews between 2026 and 2032 to assess the programme’s success. He reaffirmed that these investments were expected to provide world-class research facilities for both UK and international scientists for years to come.²⁶⁹

Challenges to the delivery of UK polar research

249. The Committee received extensive evidence from polar researchers about the challenges facing UK research activity in Antarctica. This section explores key difficulties, including funding constraints, logistical barriers, and access to advanced technology.

Funding

250. UK Antarctic research plays a crucial role in studying climate change, ecosystems, and glaciology. Despite government support from the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), and international collaborations, access to adequate funding remains a major obstacle. Professor Dame Jane Francis described funding, rather than capability, as the chief ‘limiting factor’ in Antarctic research.²⁷⁰

Primary funding sources

251. Antarctic research in the UK is primarily financed through NERC and UKRI. NERC allocates over £10 million annually to Antarctic science, primarily divided into:

• Discovery Science: Competitive funding for innovative research.
• Strategic Programmes: Large-scale research projects tackling key challenges like climate change.²⁷¹

252. Researchers emphasised that competition for grants is intense, and securing long-term financial support is often uncertain with very highly ranked proposals often unfunded. Limited funding can also lead to project delays, staffing challenges, and gaps in research continuity.²⁷²

253. BAS receives National Capability funding from NERC to support its essential research infrastructure and operations in Antarctica. The Antarctic Logistics and Infrastructure (ALI) partition separates this funding from direct science funding, ensuring that logistical and infrastructure needs, such as maintaining research stations, ships, and field operations, are met independently of specific research projects. This distinction helps sustain long-term Antarctic research capabilities while allowing science funding to focus on specific studies and discoveries.²⁷³

Short term funding cycles

254. UK research is heavily reliant on short-term grant funding (typically three to five years), which is insufficient for long-term studies like climate and ecosystem monitoring.²⁷⁴ A key message heard during the inquiry was that “Antarctic science demands much bigger scale, more ambitious funding to support bigger research teams over longer periods of time.”²⁷⁵ Delays due to logistical issues, such as unpredictable weather and infrequent resupply opportunities, further exacerbate the problem.²⁷⁶ The National Oceanography Centre highlighted how funding models have disrupted long term studies like the Southern Ocean GO-SHIP programme, leading to gaps in crucial climate data.²⁷⁷ The Sub-Committee heard about the “ramp up and ramp down” effect caused by short term funding. Researchers described scenarios where projects experience a brief period of intense research activity, followed by a sharp decline once funding ends. This approach was criticised for its inefficiency, as projects experience bursts of activity followed by abrupt declines.²⁷⁸

255. Professor Dame Jane Francis argued the case for longer-term funding cycles, noting that for large projects, five to ten years of funding would provide much needed stability to research projects.²⁷⁹ However, Dr Iain Williams explained the challenge of forward-committing budgets, saying that “it reduces our flexibility into the future because it forward commits [NERC’s] budget” and “[NERC] have to balance very carefully between long-term science to make an impact while also ensuring that we maintain flexibility to react to the latest technologies, policy positions and, of course, scientific investigations.”²⁸⁰

Funding for large-scale projects

256. Antarctic research is costly, due to the continent’s remoteness and the extreme conditions encountered there.²⁸¹ Dr Joanne Johnson, BAS, observed that the maximum amount a researcher can apply for from NERC was typically £4–5 million, which was often insufficient to cover the costs of complex, long-term initiatives. The substantial costs involved in supporting research projects in Antarctic, such as the construction of research infrastructure, transportation, and staffing, require greater financial support and longer time frames to fully deliver them. Many projects in Antarctica necessitate years of planning and preparation, yet researchers have highlighted that the available funding does not currently match the scale of these projects.²⁸² Projects such as those focusing on the Thwaites Glacier or the BEAMISH drilling initiative require a decade or more of planning and execution. Dr Johnson noted that securing long-term funding remains difficult, creating uncertainty for researchers. Short term funding cycles can cause premature project conclusions, undermining scientific progress. More flexible funding models could maximise the use of existing infrastructure and resources, ensuring that long-term research goals are not compromised by financial limitations.²⁸³

Competitive funding

257. The competitive nature of funding particularly affects long-term monitoring projects. Research essential for tracking ecological changes, such as penguin populations, may be overlooked in favour of novel studies. Professor Mike Bentley, Durham University, called for NERC to adopt a more balanced approach that values continuity alongside innovation. There was also discussion about the need for dedicated funding streams to ensure that critical long-term research is maintained.²⁸⁴

Funding for BAS

258. Professor Dame Jane Francis observed that since 2005 BAS had experienced a reduction in its science budget due to flat cash settlements, which had led to a reduction in the number of scientists working within BAS. This reduction in capacity was limiting the UK’s ability to conduct cutting edge research in Antarctica.²⁸⁵ The current funding model does not fully cover the costs associated with research projects. Professor Dame Jane Francis highlighted a significant issue in the way UK research organisations were funded by UKRI under the Full Economic Cost (FEC) model, which she described as a ‘major flaw’: grants typically covered only 80% of the costs, leaving institutions to subsidise the remaining 20%. While universities can use funding from other sources to fill this gap, BAS does not have this option: this practice placed further strain on its resources.²⁸⁶

The Government’s view on funding for Antarctic research

259. Lord Vallance emphasised the need to maintain the UK’s strength in Antarctic science.²⁸⁷ He supported a move to longer-term funding cycles, ideally 10 years or more, to provide stability while allowing for adaptability as research needs evolve: such funding cycles should be seen as a minimum, not a ceiling, to accommodate the evolving needs of Antarctic research.²⁸⁸

Access to fieldwork and technology

263. Modernisation projects, including the Discovery Building and the RRS Sir David Attenborough, have temporarily limited fieldwork opportunities due to construction priorities.²⁸⁹ We heard that, at times, infrastructure development has taken priority over researchers’ immediate needs, resulting in limited bed space and logistical difficulties. These issues have delayed fieldwork and restricted access to essential facilities.²⁹⁰ Researchers complained that it can be difficult to schedule time on the RRS Sir David Attenborough even years in advance, and obtaining support for planned fieldwork is challenging due to logistical constraints.²⁹¹

264. These challenges are expected to ease once infrastructure projects are complete, but careful planning will be needed to optimise expanded capacity. The high demand for research slots continues to create pressure on available resources. Witnesses cautioned that, when Rothera is fully open again, NERC and BAS should give careful consideration to making the best use of the increase in capacity.²⁹²

Access to technologies

265. Advancements in autonomous vehicles, sensors, and engineering could enhance Antarctic research. However, researchers often struggle to access these tools due to technical skill gaps or the need to establish engineering partnerships.²⁹³ Our predecessor Committee heard calls for the Government to prioritise efforts to simplify access to cutting-edge technologies as they become available, enabling researchers to efficiently incorporate these tools into their work and accelerate scientific progress.²⁹⁴

Satellite observations

266. Satellite observations are essential for monitoring Antarctica’s sea ice, icebergs, and biodiversity. Given the region’s remoteness and limited in situ infrastructure, satellite data is the primary tool for year-round environmental monitoring, providing crucial insights into climate change and ecosystem shifts.²⁹⁵

267. Witnesses told us that the UK’s continued involvement in the European Space Agency (ESA) ensures access to high-quality satellite data and influence over collection strategies. However, the cost of commercial satellite imagery remains a barrier for early career researchers. The Copernicus programme is the UK’s most reliable data source, and researchers stressed the importance of continued UK participation. Expanding data sharing agreements could further enhance research capabilities.²⁹⁶

Support for early career researchers

268. Expanding Antarctic research has increased demand for skilled scientists, creating opportunities for early career researchers (ECRs). Programmes like the Collaborative Antarctic Science Scheme (CAS) provide valuable fieldwork experience. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and infrastructure delays have restricted ECRs’ access to fieldwork. Without adequate exposure to the polar environment, the next generation of researchers risk being underprepared for high level research. Witnesses advocated for targeted funding, training, and logistical support to enable ECRs to participate in fieldwork and develop the necessary skills. Expanding the CAS Scheme and increasing funding for both short-term and long-term research initiatives were suggested as key measures to support this.²⁹⁷

International collaboration

273. International collaboration is essential for Antarctic science. The region’s harsh environment, logistical complexity, and scale of scientific questions demand long-term partnerships. As Professor Dame Jane Francis stated, “the best science is done in collaboration”, a sentiment echoed across the evidence received.²⁹⁸

274. Antarctic research depends on coordinated international effort. Major scientific questions—such as those concerning ice sheet stability, ocean circulation, and biodiversity—require sustained investment, advanced infrastructure, and multidisciplinary expertise. Structures like the Antarctic Treaty System, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), and the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP) provide a framework for cooperation through regular meetings and joint planning.²⁹⁹

275. The success of initiatives such as the NSF-NERC Thwaites Glacier Collaboration demonstrates the value of shared funding and logistical support. Remote regions, particularly in East Antarctica, are often only accessible through international partnerships.³⁰⁰ The UK’s cooperation with countries such as the US, New Zealand, and Chile extends the reach of its research and supports joint scientific goals. The New Zealand High Commission highlighted the UK–New Zealand relationship as an example of like-minded collaboration, noting their joint climate change workshop for CCAMLR as a recent success.³⁰¹

276. Projects like Thwaites have benefitted from UK leadership as well as contributions from Germany, Sweden, South Korea, and the logistical infrastructure of the US military.³⁰² The Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) underlined the importance of international cooperation for delivering large-scale Antarctic research. It also identified opportunities for deeper collaboration with nations geographically closer to Antarctica, including Peru, Argentina, and South Africa.³⁰³

Logistical Inefficiencies and Cost-Share Barriers

277. Despite the advantages, multilateral research projects face structural challenges. Professor Bentley described the issue of “double, triple, or quadruple jeopardy,” where researchers must secure approval from multiple national funders, each with separate timelines, criteria, and processes, to enable successful Antarctic collaborations. This can result in significant delays or missed opportunities. While bilateral arrangements such as with the US National Science Foundation have been successful, further improving, simplifying, and harmonising multilateral funding systems would increase the effectiveness of international collaboration.³⁰⁴ The UK’s modern Antarctic infrastructure and scientific leadership make it a strong partner for global research initiatives. Programmes led by the BAS, such as Thwaites, demonstrate the mutual benefits of shared resources and coordinated science.³⁰⁵

278. We heard that funding challenges in ensuring effective collaboration included access to funding and the timing of grant rounds.³⁰⁶ Dr Williams advocated for a more integrated approach to funding, including joint peer review processes and coordinated grant rounds. He noted that international research is increasingly limited not by ambition, but by fragmented systems and insufficient coordination. Organisations such as NERC play a central role in building these joint frameworks and should continue to drive efforts to streamline funding access across borders.³⁰⁷

Antarctica InSync

279. Antarctica InSync is a proposed international initiative to align national Antarctic programmes for synchronised research from 2027 to 2030. It aims to address gaps in understanding ice dynamics, oceanography, and biodiversity by coordinating simultaneous data collection using icebreakers. Extending research into the Antarctic winter will provide comprehensive insights into seasonal environmental changes.³⁰⁸ The initiative is currently in the planning phase, with oversight from a steering group of national and international stakeholders. A major Antarctic coordination meeting later this year is expected to finalise the scientific and logistical framework, with fieldwork beginning in 2028–29.³⁰⁹ NERC has confirmed its support through national capability funding, with additional competitive research grants expected to contribute.³¹⁰

280. The results of Antarctica InSync are expected to feed into the International Polar Year (IPY) 2032–33, a major global science campaign that will consolidate findings and set future priorities for polar research. Witnesses stressed that the UK’s involvement in InSync and the IPY will help strengthen international partnerships, reinforce leadership in polar science, and contribute to significant global research outcomes.³¹¹

Our views on international collaboration in Antarctic research

Marine science and the RRS Sir David Attenborough

285. The RRS Sir David Attenborough (SDA) is a state-of-the-art research vessel owned by NERC and operated by BAS. It was introduced to replace two earlier vessels, the RRS James Clark Ross and RRS Ernest Shackleton, with the aim of supporting both scientific research and logistical operations in the Antarctic.³¹²

286. The Committee received multiple submissions expressing concern about the transition to a single-ship operational model. Stakeholders reported that this has created significant pressures on the vessel’s capacity, with logistical tasks such as resupplying Antarctic stations reducing the number of science-focused days.³¹³ The resulting scheduling constraints have led to delays in funded projects and increased reliance on alternative platforms such as tourist vessels and charter yachts for scientific access.³¹⁴ Evidence from Durham University and others identified a backlog of research due to compounded factors including the retirement of previous ships, the commissioning gap before the SDA entered service, the COVID-19 pandemic, and an overall rise in high quality research proposals.³¹⁵

287. Despite these challenges, the SDA offers notable advantages in terms of scientific capabilities. The vessel is equipped with 11 laboratories and can accommodate multiple scientific programmes simultaneously. This expanded capacity enables new types of research that were previously not feasible, enhancing the scope of scientific investigations in the Antarctic region.³¹⁶

288. The SDA’s dual role as both a research platform and a logistics vessel creates inherent tensions. Professor Karen Heywood and Dr Otosaka noted that UKRI’s independent assessment panel had flagged concerns about this tension, with specific impacts cited on projects such as DEFIANT.³¹⁷ Professor Bentley also highlighted that, unlike its two predecessors, the SDA can only be in one place at a time—limiting operational flexibility.³¹⁸

289. NERC has implemented a “One Ship Plus” model, chartering supplementary ships and aircraft to support peak logistical demands. While this has increased flexibility, it comes with substantial costs and does not fully address capacity constraints. The long-term effectiveness of this model remains under review, with some stakeholders suggesting the SDA’s scientific potential will only be fully realised once scheduling challenges and the research backlog are addressed.³¹⁹

290. NERC informed the Committee that the decision to move from two vessels to one was driven by the need for long-term financial sustainability. Replacing one owned and one leased ship with the SDA was a strategic choice, with the aim of balancing logistical and scientific priorities under a constrained resource envelope. Nigel Bird, then Director of Major Programmes and Resources at NERC, explained that while the intention was to operate a single icebreaker, BAS retained funding to charter additional capacity as needed—hence the description of the current model as “One Ship Plus.”³²⁰

291. The costs associated with chartering additional capacity under this model are significant—averaging £1.5 million per mission—with five ships hired across the current programme. In one case, NERC entered a shared arrangement with the German Antarctic Programme at a cost of £1.8 million to support joint logistics. However, NERC told us that that all logistics undertaken serve scientific purposes, whether enabling marine research or delivering equipment to remote inland stations.³²¹

292. Lord Vallance KCB, Minister for Science, Research and Innovation, told the Committee that there are “no proposals for a second ship” and noted that many other countries are also moving to single-ship models. While acknowledging the challenges, he indicated that optimisation efforts are ongoing to improve the SDA’s operational efficiency.³²²

HMS Protector

296. HMS Protector is the UK’s Ice Patrol Ship, managed by the Royal Navy. Each year, she conducts an Antarctic patrol during the austral summer. The Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) tasks HMS Protector with supporting the UK’s rights and responsibilities under the Antarctic Treaty.³²³

Support for UK Antarctic Science

297. HMS Protector plays a vital role in UK Antarctic research, deploying and recovering science field parties in the northern Antarctic Peninsula. However, we heard that she could provide more consistent support for the logistical and supply needs of Antarctic research stations.³²⁴ A key challenge is the short-term nature of HMS Protector’s programming, which is planned annually. This lack of long-term scheduling makes it difficult for scientists to develop large-scale research programmes, as they cannot reliably count on the vessel’s availability years in advance.³²⁵

298. To enhance her scientific contributions, the National Oceanography Centre recommended consulting ocean science and technology experts on upgrading onboard sensor systems and establishing protocols for data collection, storage, and usage. In written evidence to the Committee, BAS suggested further maximising HMS Protector’s contribution by:

• Committing to early, mid, and late Antarctic summer season activities long-term.
• Enhancing her ice-operating capability for deeper voyages south of the Antarctic Peninsula, supporting operations at Halley VI Research Station and facilitating deep-field logistics in regions.³²⁶

Conclusions and recommendations

The UK and Antarctica

1. The United Kingdom has a long-standing presence in Antarctica, underpinned by its historical exploration, scientific leadership, and commitment to international cooperation. Through its active role in the Antarctic Treaty System and ongoing scientific research, the UK continues to contribute to the peaceful and sustainable management of the region. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)

2. We welcome the former Minister’s announcement that the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office is developing an Antarctic Strategy to define the UK’s interests and ambitions in the region. A publicly available strategy will enhance transparency of the UK’s interests in Antarctica, and promote greater parliamentary interest and debate on Antarctic issues. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)

3. We recommend that the current Government follow through on this commitment and ensure the strategy is delivered as planned. The Government should consider this report, including its conclusions and recommendations, as a valuable guide highlighting key areas the strategy should contain. (Recommendation, Paragraph 31)

4. We recommend that the Government more clearly articulates the rationale for the UK’s significant physical presence in Antarctica, outlining the strategic and scientific objectives behind this commitment. Transparency in funding and expenditure for Antarctic activities is also essential. The strategy should include a mechanism for regular reviews to assess whether the UK’s activities are effectively achieving its ambitions in Antarctica. (Recommendation, Paragraph 32)

5. We commend the establishment of the Polar Regions Ministerial Group as recommended in our predecessor Committee’s report on The UK and the Arctic environment, and welcome its expansion to include Antarctic issues. Our predecessor Committee hoped that this ministerial group would address the complexities of polar issues, spanning environmental protection, scientific research, and geopolitical interests, and break down silos in the Government’s approach to polar matters. We recommend that the Government continues to convene the Polar Regions Ministerial Group regularly to maintain a strategic focus on these critical regions, ensuring that emerging challenges and opportunities are addressed in a timely and co-ordinated manner. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)

Governing the Antarctic environment

6. The Antarctic Treaty System remains a model of international cooperation and the primary forum for environmental protection in Antarctica. The UK must continue to engage constructively within this framework to support peaceful collaboration and uphold the principles of the Treaty. (Conclusion, Paragraph 70)

7. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has disrupted the consensus-based operation of the Antarctic Treaty System, complicating international cooperation. While the Antarctic Treaty System has largely insulated Antarctica from geopolitical tensions, they clearly have an effect. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)

8. We recommend that the UK continues to lead global efforts to protect Antarctica by reinforcing partnerships within the Antarctic Treaty System. This includes fostering dialogue with all treaty members, including China, and ensuring that UK actions align with broader foreign policy objectives. Promoting consensus through evidence-based proposals focused on environmental protection and scientific cooperation must remain central to the UK’s approach. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)

9. The UK’s expertise in polar science presents a valuable opportunity for strengthening international collaboration. We recommend expanding joint research efforts, particularly in areas such as marine conservation, land ecology, and ice sheet modelling. By contributing robust scientific data, the UK can play a pivotal role in shaping informed decisions on climate change and environmental protection within the Antarctic Treaty System. (Recommendation, Paragraph 73)

10. Maintaining a rigorous inspection regime is essential for upholding the Antarctic Treaty System’s environmental and scientific standards. Current concerns highlight the need for active engagement in strengthening these mechanisms so that mutual confidence is ensured. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)

11. We recommend that the UK work with other parties in the Antarctic Treaty System to review and enhance the effectiveness of inspection processes. By taking a leading role in this effort, the UK can help ensure greater transparency and accountability, furthering the protection of Antarctica’s environment and scientific integrity. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75)

Climate change in Antarctica

12. Antarctica is warming at a rate up to twice that of the global average, disrupting its ecosystems, ocean dynamics, atmospheric processes, and ice systems. Despite its crucial role in regulating Earth’s heat balance and influencing global climate, the continent remains under-observed. The far-reaching implications of climate change in Antarctica necessitate immediate, coordinated, and sustained action at both national and international levels to mitigate these impacts and adapt to future changes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 98)

13. We recommend that the Government work with international partners through the Antarctic Treaty System to improve coordination of long-term climate monitoring in Antarctica, ensuring that the data outputs from such monitoring is openly shared and feeds directly into global climate assessments and decision-making processes. This is critical given the current US administration’s potential budget cuts to their science programmes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 99)

14. The accelerated melting of Antarctic ice is becoming one of the most significant drivers of global sea level rise, which poses an increasing threat to coastal communities worldwide, including in the UK. To enhance the accuracy of sea level rise projections and develop more effective climate adaptation and risk management strategies, it is imperative for the UK to significantly expand its research efforts in Antarctica. This should include targeted studies on glaciers and ice sheets, focusing on their current and future contributions to sea level rise. The data derived from these research efforts should inform the formulation of the Government’s policies and protective measures for vulnerable UK coastal areas and provide a scientific foundation for long-term adaptation strategies. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100)

15. The British Antarctic Territory and South Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands are among the UK Overseas Territories most exposed to climate change. Yet regular, integrated reporting of their environmental status is lacking. We recommend that the British Antarctic Survey publish a five-yearly climate report for the British Antarctic Territory and associated South Atlantic territories, covering glaciology, oceanography, and biodiversity. This should contribute to an Antarctic-wide ‘report card’, aligned with ATS processes and modelled on the successful Arctic Report Card, to support transparent tracking and international cooperation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 101)

16. Evidence presented during the course of this inquiry highlights the critical importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Achieving this target is essential for preventing further destabilisation of Antarctica’s ice sheets and glaciers, which are already experiencing significant changes due to rising temperatures. Maintaining this limit is key to safeguarding the integrity of the Antarctic environment and mitigating the global consequences of rising sea levels and climate disruption. (Conclusion, Paragraph 105)

17. These environmental changes are accelerating and have global consequences for climate stability and biodiversity. While the Antarctic Treaty System provides important protections, it cannot address climate change and biodiversity loss in isolation. Antarctica’s scientific and environmental significance must be better integrated into international climate and nature negotiations. The UK has a key role in ensuring that Antarctic issues, including the protection of its fragile biodiversity, are consistently represented in global forums such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity processes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 106)

18. To safeguard Antarctica’s environment, it is crucial to integrate Antarctic research and preservation into broader international climate strategies. Rising sea levels, driven by climate change in Antarctica, pose an existential risk to the UK, making it imperative to act now to protect both the Antarctic ecosystem and the UK’s coastlines. (Conclusion, Paragraph 107)

19. We recommend that the Government strengthen its domestic climate and nature policies to meet its legally binding targets. Achieving these targets is crucial for making a fair and proportionate contribution to global emissions reduction efforts and for lending authority to the UK’s leadership role on climate and biodiversity on the international stage. (Recommendation, Paragraph 108)

20. The UK must continue to take a leading role within the Antarctic Treaty System and the UN’s COP process to strengthen global efforts to mitigate climate change, particularly in reducing carbon emissions. The Government should advocate for the inclusion of Antarctic climate science in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties negotiations and push for stronger global action on carbon emissions reduction. This includes ensuring that Antarctic issues are consistently represented in these discussions, helping to drive international collaboration and strengthen efforts to mitigate climate change. Highlighting Antarctic science will further inform action, accelerate progress in addressing the twin crises of climate change and nature loss, and support coordinated international efforts on emissions reduction and biodiversity protection. (Recommendation, Paragraph 109)

21. Geoengineering proposals which seek engineered approaches to avert or mitigate the effects of climate change in polar regions appear to us to be impractical owing to high costs, technical challenges, and environmental risks. Relying on such interventions rather than seeking to address the causes of Antarctic ice loss risks delay to the implementation of actions necessary to reduce carbon emissions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 114)

22. We strongly recommend that the Government firmly prioritise decarbonisation as the most effective, affordable, and sustainable response to climate change in Antarctica. Ministers should use international fora, including the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and the UNFCCC COP process, to advocate for rapid emissions cuts and the protection of fragile polar environments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 115)

23. The Government should clearly articulate its position on geoengineering in Antarctica and lead efforts to develop precautionary governance measures under the Antarctic Treaty System, ensuring that any future discussions on geoengineering uphold the Treaty’s core principles of environmental protection and international cooperation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 116)

Environmental protection and Antarctic biodiversity

24. The accelerating environmental changes in Antarctica, driven by climate change, sea ice loss, and increasing human activity, are having serious and compounding impacts on the continent’s biodiversity. These changes demand urgent, science led responses. (Conclusion, Paragraph 141)

25. We are concerned that the decline in UK based terrestrial biodiversity research capacity is significantly weakening the UK’s ability to monitor, understand, and respond to ecological changes in Antarctica. This loss of expertise risks undermining both the UK’s scientific leadership and its ability to meet its environmental responsibilities under the Antarctic Treaty System. (Conclusion, Paragraph 142)

26. To address this urgent gap, the Government should increase long-term core funding to the British Antarctic Survey to support its terrestrial biodiversity research. Investment should prioritise the recruitment, training, and retention of ecological specialists, ensuring sustained expertise in Antarctic terrestrial ecosystems. (Recommendation, Paragraph 143)

27. Biosecurity must continue to be a central pillar of UK Antarctic operations. The Government should ensure biosecurity facilities and protocols are in place across the BAS supply chain, including at key gateway ports such as Punta Arenas and the Falkland Islands, as well as on all UK research stations. This is essential to ensure full compliance with the Antarctic Act 1994 and to reduce the risk of non-native species introductions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 144)

28. The Government should safeguard the long-term future of the Blue Belt Programme by committing to sustained funding through the Official Development Assistance budget or alternative mechanisms. Particular focus should be given to supporting science, monitoring, and enforcement in the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands Marine Protected Area. Given its ecological significance within the Southern Ocean, continued investment is essential to uphold the UK’s role in Antarctic marine protection and sustainable fisheries management. (Recommendation, Paragraph 145)

29. The UK should play a more active leadership role in promoting Antarctic biodiversity protection at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. (Conclusion, Paragraph 146)

30. This should be reflected in the UK Antarctic Strategy with particular regard to:

• Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs): The Government should continue to advocate for a representative and well-connected network of ASPAs, underpinned by the latest ecological and climate science, and should support efforts to streamline and strengthen the ASPA designation process and ensure that critical and vulnerable habitats are prioritised.
• Emperor Penguins: The Government should support enhanced scientific collaboration and interdisciplinary research to improve understanding and modelling of emperor penguin populations, with a focus on the impacts of climate change and sea ice loss. The Government should push for consensus to designate the species as requiring special protection under the Environmental Protocol.
• The Government should lead efforts to assess and mitigate plastic pollution in the British Antarctic Territory. This includes advocating at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting for stricter waste management regulations and encouraging the use of biodegradable materials. (Recommendation, Paragraph 147)

Natural resources in the Antarctic

31. Receding sea ice levels will make Antarctica more accessible for longer periods, enabling greater exploitation of fisheries. We are concerned that certain fisheries in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean risk being overexploited, disrupting the marine food web, and damaging global ocean health. Krill depletion affects species populations across ecosystems and influences ocean circulation and the carbon cycle, which can have broader climate impacts. Stronger protections under the Antarctic Treaty are essential to safeguard this vital region and prevent wider environmental consequences. (Conclusion, Paragraph 157)

32. The failure of negotiations at CCAMLR in 2024 exposed significant vulnerabilities in the governance of Southern Ocean fisheries. As diminishing sea ice makes Antarctica more accessible, effective regulation, particularly of krill fishing, is becoming increasingly urgent. CCAMLR’s consensus-based decision-making has proven inadequate in moments of political tension, undermining its ability to maintain precautionary fishing limits. Without reform, the risk of future deadlock will grow, leaving key marine ecosystems exposed to overexploitation. (Conclusion, Paragraph 176)

33. The UK should work to prevent a recurrence of this regulatory stalemate. In recognition of the challenges of achieving unanimity, the Government should promote a pragmatic, compromise-based approach that enables interim conservation measures to be adopted while longer-term agreements are negotiated. This would help safeguard marine ecosystems while maintaining CCAMLR’s credibility. (Recommendation, Paragraph 177)

34. The Government must also continue to support the adoption of a precautionary krill fishery management strategy, which remains essential to protect marine ecosystems in Antarctica. Scientific evidence underpins the need for stricter spatial and temporal management, especially in ecologically sensitive areas like the Western Antarctic Peninsula. Strengthened regulation and monitoring will be vital to protect biodiversity and ensure the fishery’s long-term sustainability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 178)

35. The need to establish new Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) has become increasingly urgent, as pressures from fishing, tourism, research activity, and climate change intensify. Proposals for MPAs in East Antarctica, the Weddell Sea, and the Antarctic Peninsula have repeatedly been blocked by China and Russia, despite strong scientific backing and widespread international support. Breaking this impasse must now be a diplomatic priority. (Conclusion, Paragraph 179)

36. The Government should intensify its diplomatic engagement, using both bilateral and multilateral channels to address the concerns of China and Russia and to highlight the global and regional benefits of marine protection. It should also strengthen coordination with like-minded CCAMLR members such as the EU, Australia, and the United States to maximise collective influence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 180)

37. Trust-building through collaborative science may help pave the way for consensus. The UK should champion joint scientific initiatives, particularly involving Chinese and Russian researchers, to demonstrate the ecological significance of proposed Marine Protected Areas and reduce political resistance to conservation measures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 181)

38. The Government should advocate procedural changes within CCAMLR, such as time-limited objections or consensus-building mechanisms, to reduce the ability of a single nation to exercise an indefinite veto over conservation measures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 182)

39. Antarctica’s potential reserves of commercial mineral resources, including oil, coal, and iron ore, present a risk of future conflicts and environmental harm. While the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty enforces an indefinite mining ban, recent reports of Russian seismic surveys in Antarctic waters raise concerns that prospecting activities may be taking place. If substantiated, such actions would compromise the Protocol and endanger the fragile Antarctic environment. Failure to address these concerns could set a dangerous precedent, opening the door for future exploitation, and threatening the environmental protections that the Antarctic Treaty System was designed to uphold. (Conclusion, Paragraph 190)

40. It is crucial that the international community acts decisively to ensure that any attempts to bypass or erode the Protocol’s safeguards are promptly thwarted. We recommend that the UK and other Antarctic Treaty parties maintain robust oversight and collaboration to ensure strict adherence to the Protocol. Continuous monitoring and transparent reporting will be essential to prevent any unauthorised activities that could breach the mining ban or degrade Antarctica’s ecosystems. (Recommendation, Paragraph 191)

41. The Government should actively engage with allies during Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings to press Russia to reaffirm its commitment to the Protocol’s mining prohibition. Additionally, Russia should be encouraged to provide comprehensive data on its seismic surveys in accordance with the Treaty’s open science principles. (Recommendation, Paragraph 192)

42. Furthermore, we recommend that the Government articulate clear measures in its forthcoming Antarctic strategy to reinforce the UK’s role in safeguarding the Treaty’s provisions. This should include enhanced diplomatic engagement, strengthened environmental monitoring mechanisms, and collaboration with international partners to uphold the integrity of the mining ban. (Recommendation, Paragraph 193)

Tourism in Antarctica

43. The UK’s efforts in steering a framework for sustainable management of tourism in Antarctica are commendable and helpful in ensuring the long-term viability of tourism activities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 210)

44. The UK should strengthen its leadership role in promoting a coordinated, treaty-wide framework for sustainable tourism management in Antarctica. Drawing on its well-regarded permitting regime and experience in environmental oversight, the UK is well positioned to champion more rigorous environmental impact assessments and advocate for consistent, high standards across all Treaty Parties. (Recommendation, Paragraph 211)

45. The Government should actively foster international collaboration and stakeholder engagement by building consensus among Treaty Parties. As a trusted and experienced actor, the UK could play a pivotal role in Antarctic Treaty forums, facilitating dialogue to align visitor management practices and environmental safeguards. (Recommendation, Paragraph 212)

46. The UK should lead by example through continued refinement of its own permitting processes, ensuring thorough environmental scrutiny, transparent reporting, and dynamic site management approaches. It should also support the development of a strategic framework for assessing site capacity and limiting visitor numbers at sensitive landing sites. (Recommendation, Paragraph 213)

47. Tourism in Antarctica can have positive outcomes, including enhancing public understanding of environmental and scientific issues and fostering a community of informed ambassadors for polar conservation. However, these benefits depend on effective governance. To minimise environmental risks and support small-scale scientific operations, visitor numbers and activities must be carefully regulated. (Conclusion, Paragraph 221)

48. The tourism sector has historically relied on self-regulation through bodies such as the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. While this has helped establish high operational standards, increasing tourist numbers and the emergence of non-member operators now challenge the effectiveness of this model. A more robust, proactive regulatory approach is required to safeguard environmental integrity. (Conclusion, Paragraph 222)

49. To protect Antarctica’s fragile ecosystems and ensure tourism supports environmental and scientific priorities, a consistent, science-led approach to managing visitor access is essential. The UK Government should advocate for a clear and enforceable regime that ensures each visit contributes meaningfully to conservation and education. (Recommendation, Paragraph 223)

50. A comprehensive and coherent framework for managing the environmental impacts of tourism is overdue. We welcome the decision by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting to develop such a framework by 2028. The Government should actively advocate within the ATCM for a treaty-wide system that includes limits on landings, visitor numbers, and access to sensitive sites, under the guidance of the Committee for Environmental Protection. (Recommendation, Paragraph 224)

51. Long-term, systematic monitoring of visitor activities is vital to assess the cumulative impact of tourism. The UK should promote the establishment of a coordinated monitoring programme across the Antarctic Treaty System. Data gathered should underpin adaptive management strategies, including the possibility of introducing caps on tourist numbers or restricting access to particularly vulnerable areas. (Recommendation, Paragraph 225)

52. The UK should encourage all Parties to the Antarctic Treaty System to ratify unimplemented measures critical to tourism regulation, including Measure 4 (2004) on insurance and contingency planning, and Measure 15 (2009) on landings. Their adoption would significantly strengthen the regulatory framework and ensure greater consistency across operators. (Recommendation, Paragraph 226)

53. The Government should advocate for the harmonisation of permitting processes among treaty parties, preventing operators from circumventing national restrictions by seeking approval from multiple authorities would enhance regulatory coherence and close potential loopholes in environmental oversight. (Recommendation, Paragraph 227)

54. Stronger enforcement mechanisms are necessary to address non-compliance. The UK should advocate for enforceable sanctions within the Antarctic Treaty System framework to deter breaches of permit conditions and ensure that tourism is conducted responsibly and in line with international standards. (Recommendation, Paragraph 228)

UK scientific research in Antarctica

55. A full understanding of Antarctica is critical to the development of climate change knowledge, as conditions below the 60th parallel influence global weather patterns, ocean circulation, and sea-level rise. The UK, a leader in Antarctic science, contributes around 15% of global research on the region and ranks third worldwide in scientific output. This expertise supports the UK’s ambition to be a “science superpower”, as articulated in the 2021 Integrated Review. Maintaining UK leadership in polar science is essential for addressing climate challenges and enhancing the UK’s global scientific presence. (Conclusion, Paragraph 234)

56. Continued investment and international collaboration will be essential for maintaining the UK’s leading role in Antarctic research. By addressing infrastructure challenges and leveraging its scientific expertise, the UK can further its contributions to understanding and mitigating the effects of climate change and environmental change in Antarctica. (Conclusion, Paragraph 246)

57. We commend Government investment in polar infrastructure, which strengthens UK research capabilities. We nevertheless note that the capital expenditure has yet to translate into measurable scientific outcomes. Given the unparalleled logistical gateway and facilities provided by the Antarctic Infrastructure Modernisation Project, the Government should outline, in its forthcoming Antarctic Strategy, how these opportunities can be maximised to advance an understanding of Antarctica’s response to a changing climate. This will ensure the UK is well-prepared to address the likely consequences, including sea level rise and climatic shifts. (Recommendation, Paragraph 247)

58. To quantify the value for money and scientific impact of the Antarctic Infrastructure Modernisation Project, we recommend that the Natural Environment Research Council establish long-term monitoring to assess the effects of infrastructure upgrades. This should focus on key metrics, such as research output and citations of Antarctic fieldwork, to gauge the long-term benefits these improvements bring to UK Antarctic science. We recommend that the Natural Environment Research Council publish a comprehensive report on the outcomes of these upgrades, with the aim of releasing it by 2030. (Recommendation, Paragraph 248)

59. The UK must be properly equipped to address the major research priorities in the polar regions. Antarctic research plays a critical role in advancing global understanding of climate change, ocean systems, and polar ecosystems, issues that affect lives and economies far beyond the region. Despite the UK’s world-leading capabilities, the Committee heard clear and consistent evidence that insufficient and uncertain funding is the chief limiting factor to delivering impactful science. Without increased investment, the UK risks undermining its ability to contribute to global environmental monitoring and decision-making at a time when such leadership is urgently needed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 260)

60. We recommend that the Natural Environment Research Council and UK Research and Innovation establish dedicated funding mechanisms to support transformative Antarctic research, with substantial time commitments extending to at least ten years for large-scale projects. The current reliance on short-term funding cycles (typically three to five years) is ill-suited to the logistical realities of Antarctic research and contributes to inefficiencies. Longer funding horizons would not only improve the delivery of complex science programmes but would also make better use of infrastructure and personnel, reducing waste and increasing impact. (Recommendation, Paragraph 261)

61. We note that the British Antarctic Survey (BAS), in common with other UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) research institutes, currently receives only 80% of its grant costs, compared to universities which receive full funding based on the Full Economic Cost model, covering 100% of their costs. This funding gap hinders BAS’s and other research institutes’ ability to fully support their research activities. We recommend the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and UKRI increase the overall funding envelope to cover this additional 20%, without reducing support for non BAS researchers. This would correct a long-standing structural inequity and ensure that the UK’s core Antarctic research institution remains fully resourced to support national and international scientific priorities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 262)

62. As infrastructure projects near completion, the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) and Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) should implement a long-term strategy to maximise fieldwork opportunities, ensuring fair and efficient access for researchers. This should include improved scheduling, better logistical coordination, and contingency plans to prevent future disruptions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 269)

63. Recognising the evolving landscape of Antarctic science and the growing significance of advanced technologies, we recommend that the Government prioritise enhancing scientists’ access to cutting-edge tools such as autonomous vehicles, sensors, and robotic data collection systems. The expanded use of these technologies will facilitate more efficient and comprehensive data collection in remote regions, thereby supporting more robust and timely scientific research in Antarctica. The Natural Environment Research Council should increase investment in remote sensing platforms and autonomous systems to broaden research capabilities, with a particular focus on climate change and ecosystem monitoring. (Recommendation, Paragraph 270)

64. The UK Government should secure long-term access to high-quality satellite data by maintaining participation in European programmes beyond 2027 and expanding data-sharing agreements. Additionally, funding mechanisms should be established to support researchers in accessing commercial satellite imagery, ensuring equitable use of remote sensing technology in Antarctic research. (Recommendation, Paragraph 271)

65. Given the disruptions caused by COVID-19 and delays due to the Antarctic Infrastructure Modernisation Programme, many early career researchers missed vital fieldwork opportunities, which has hindered their development and leadership potential in Antarctic research. To support both the growth of early career researchers and attract new talent into the field, we recommend targeted investments in training and career development. This should include additional fieldwork opportunities, mentorship, and grants for early career researchers, as well as efforts to attract talented scientists, particularly in data science and engineering, who may not traditionally consider polar research. By doing so, we can ensure the continued success and leadership of UK Antarctic science in the 2030s and beyond. (Recommendation, Paragraph 272)

66. The UK’s strength in polar science reflects its ability to lead and influence at both national and international levels. Through collaborative research and reciprocal partnerships, the UK has advanced global scientific understanding while reinforcing its reputation for excellence in innovation and logistics. (Conclusion, Paragraph 281)

67. Given the demonstrated success of bilateral funding agreements, such as those between UKRI-NERC and partners in the US, Brazil, Luxembourg, and Norway, we recommend that the Government work with the Natural Environment Research Council to expand these reciprocal arrangements. In particular, new partnerships should be developed with key polar research nations including Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Sweden, and South Korea. These countries offer complementary expertise, operational capabilities, and scientific priorities that align with the UK’s research interests in Antarctica. Broader collaboration will strengthen the UK’s leadership in polar science and maximise the impact of its scientific contributions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 282

68. We further recommend that the Natural Environment Research Council strengthen its successful support for multilateral research initiatives by developing mechanisms to coordinate international funding more effectively. This includes reducing the burden of “double jeopardy” where researchers must apply for and secure multiple streams of funding from different national agencies—often facing incompatible timelines or processes. More integrated funding approaches, including shared peer review and harmonised grant rounds, would support high-impact collaborative science and ensure that promising international projects are not lost due to administrative barriers. (Recommendation, Paragraph 283)

69. We recognise the importance of the Antarctica InSync programme, where 26 nations will collaborate during the 2028–29 Antarctic season to conduct synchronous climate measurements across land, sea, air, and space, with results presented during the International Polar Year in 2032–33. To ensure full UK participation and leadership in Antarctica InSync, we recommend that the Government and the Natural Environment Research Council establish long-term funding mechanisms for the project that extend beyond annual or short-term spending reviews. Stable, multi-year funding will allow UK researchers to contribute effectively to planning, fieldwork, and data analysis, and will help maintain the UK’s global standing in Antarctic science during this landmark international initiative. (Recommendation, Paragraph 284)

70. The RRS Sir David Attenborough is an exceptional research vessel, offering world-class facilities that are crucial for advancing polar marine science. Its capabilities significantly enhance the UK’s ability to conduct cutting-edge research in both the Arctic and Antarctic, positioning it as a key asset in marine science. (Conclusion, Paragraph 293)

71. We have heard strong concerns from the Antarctic research community about the Natural Environment Research Council’s (NERC) shift to a “one ship plus” model and the reduction of the research fleet from two vessels to one. This has already led to substantial delays to Antarctic marine research projects, and we are concerned about the longer-term implications for UK polar science. While we recognise that the RRS Sir David Attenborough may at times undertake logistical tasks, particularly when aligned with research voyages, we do not consider its routine use as a supply vessel to be the most effective deployment of such a highly advanced scientific platform. Within NERC’s “one vessel plus” model, many vessels can support cargo transport in Antarctica, but very few offer the specialist research capabilities of the RRS Sir David Attenborough. We therefore consider it more scientifically effective to charter logistics vessels where possible, and to prioritise the use of the RRS Sir David Attenborough for dedicated research. (Recommendation, Paragraph 294)

72. By 2030, the Natural Environment Research Council should conduct a comprehensive review of the “single vessel plus” policy, evaluating its impact on Antarctic and Arctic marine science, particularly regarding the delays to approved research projects. The review should focus on optimising the use of the RRS Sir David Attenborough, assessing the need for additional vessels, and addressing scheduling conflicts that impede research. Additionally, it should consider the costs and logistics of chartering additional ships since the introduction of the policy and offer recommendations to improve scheduling efficiency, resource allocation, and overall productivity in Antarctic and Arctic missions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 295)

73. HMS Protector should be utilised more effectively to support the logistical needs of Antarctic research bases, similar to the role of US military and Coast Guard support for US stations. This could allow the RRS Sir David Attenborough to focus on scientific research, improving the overall productivity of Antarctic missions. The Ministry of Defence should collaborate with the British Antarctic Survey to enhance planning and coordination, ensuring HMS Protector consistently supports logistics and research programmes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 299)

74. Additionally, HMS Protector’s role in logistics should be expanded, by upgrading her sensor systems with potential for collecting valuable data such as sea ice observations and oceanographic data. The Ministry of Defence should consult experts on expanding its onboard sensor capabilities and consider equipping Protector with a helicopter to increase the UK’s response capacity in the region and enhance research capabilities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 300)

Annex 1: Visit of the Polar Research Sub-Committee to the Falkland Islands, Antarctica and Chile, December 2023-January 2024

From 26 December 2023 to 15 January 2024, members of the Sub-Committee undertook a visit to Antarctica in connection with its inquiry into The UK and the Antarctic environment.

Five members of the Sub-Committee (James Gray, Clive Lewis, Jerome Mayhew, Anna McMorrin and Matthew Offord) and two staff visited:

• The Falkland Islands
• RRS Sir David Attenborough (SDA)
• Rothera Research Station, British Antarctic Territory
• HMS Protector
• Punta Areas, Chile

The Sub-Committee travelled on board the RRS Sir David Attenborough (SDA), departing from the Falkland Islands to Punta Arenas via Rothera, where the Sub-Committee spent four days.

The Sub-Committee’s principal interlocutors included:

• The Governor of the Falkland Islands
• Government of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
• Legislative Assembly of the Falkland Islands
• Falkland Islands Government
• Natural Environment Research Council and British Antarctic Survey colleagues on board the SDA
• Scientists and crew on board the SDA
• The then-Minister for Americas, Caribbean and the Overseas Territories, the Commissioner of the British Antarctic Territory, and the Head of the Polar Regions Department, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
• Staff and scientists at Rothera, including those working on the Antarctic Infrastructure Modernisation Programme
• Personnel and scientists on board HMS Protector
• Instituto Chileno Antártico
• Governor of Magallanes
• Universidad de Magallanes

1. The Sub-Committee’s activities included participation in Operation Coldstare (RAF reconnaissance flight over South Georgia); tours of the facilities on the SDA and at Rothera, including those under construction; a transfer to HMS Protector at Rothera; and a visit to the Bosque Antártico (“Antarctic Forest”) in Punta Arenas.

2. The detailed conversations that the Sub-Committee held with such a wide range of experts over an extended period greatly enriched our thinking, and played a significant role in shaping our evidence sessions and questioning of witnesses. We are extremely grateful to all the hosts for their generosity and hospitality, to those who gave up their time to speak to the Sub-Committee, and to all those who helped to arrange such an extensive programme in this unique region: the first Select Committee visit of its kind.

Annex 2: Parties to the Antarctic Treaty

1. The original Signatories of the Antarctic Treaty were the 12 nations active in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year (1957–58), who accepted an invitation from the United States to join the 1959 Washington conference where the Treaty was negotiated. These countries are entitled to take part in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM).³²⁷

2. Since the Treaty’s adoption in 1959, an additional 46 countries have joined. These nations may participate in the Consultative Meetings if they demonstrate a strong interest in Antarctica by carrying out significant scientific research there. 17 of these acceding states have met that condition and are now recognised as Consultative Parties. The remaining 29 countries hold Non-Consultative Party status; while they may attend the meetings, they do not take part in the decision-making process.³²⁸

Country	Date on which the Treaty entered into force for the Party	Date Consultative Status was granted (if applicable)	Date the Party joined the Environment Protocol (if applicable)	Party to the Convention of the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Life (X if applicable)
Argentina	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Australia	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Austria	25 Aug 1987		26 Aug 2021
Belarus	27 Dec 2006		15 Aug 2008
Belgium	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Brazil	16 May 1975	12 Sep 1983	14 Jan 1998	X
Bulgaria	11 Sep 1978	5 Jun 1998	21 May 1998	X
Canada	4 May 1988		13 Dec 2003	X
Chile	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
China	8 Jun 1983	7 Oct 1985	14 Jan 1998	X
Colombia	31 Jan 1989		14 Mar 2020
Costa Rica	11 Aug 2022
Cuba	16 Aug 1984
Czechia	1 Jan 1993	1 Apr 2014	24 Sep 2004
Denmark	20 May 1965
Ecuador	15 Sep 1987	19 Nov 1990	14 Jan 1998
Estonia	17 May 2001
Finland	15 May 1984	20 Oct 1989	14 Jan 1998	X
France	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Germany	5 Feb 1979	3 Mar 1981	14 Jan 1998	X
Greece	8 Jan 1987		14 Jan 1998	X
Guatemala	31 Jul 1991
Hungary	27 Jan 1984
Iceland	13 Oct 2015
India	19 Aug 1983	12 Sep 1983	14 Jan 1998	X
Italy	18 Mar 1981	5 Oct 1987	14 Jan 1998	X
Japan	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Kazakhstan	27 Jan 2015
Korea (DPRK)	21 Jan 1987
Korea (ROK)	28 Nov 1986	9 Oct 1989	14 Jan 1998	X
Malaysia	31 Oct 2011		14 Sep 2016
Monaco	31 May 2008		31 Jul 2009
Mongolia	23 Mar 2015
Netherlands	30 Mar 1967	19 Nov 1990	14 Jan 1998	X
New Zealand	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Norway	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Pakistan	1 Mar 2012		31 Mar 2012	X
Papua New Guinea	16 Mar 1981
Peru	10 Apr 1981	9 Oct 1989	14 Jan 1998	X
Poland	23 Jun 1961	29 Jul 1977	14 Jan 1998	X
Portugal	29 Jan 2010		10 Oct 2014
Romania	15 Sep 1971		5 Mar 2003
Russian Federation	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
San Marino	14 Feb 2023
Saudi Arabia	22 May 2024
Slovakia	1 Jan 1993
Slovenia	22 Apr 2019
South Africa	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Spain	31 Mar 1982	21 Sep 1988	14 Jan 1998	X
Sweden	24 Apr 1984	21 Sep 1988	14 Jan 1998	X
Switzerland	15 Nov 1990		1 Jun 2017
Türkiye	24 Jan 1996		27 Oct 2017
Ukraine	28 Oct 1992	4 Jun 2004	24 Jun 2001	X
United Arab Emirates	11 Dec 2024
United Kingdom	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
United States	23 Jun 1961	23 Jun 1961	14 Jan 1998	X
Uruguay	11 Jan 1980	7 Oct 1985	14 Jan 1998	X
Venezuela	24 Mar 1999		31 Aug 2014

Formal minutes

Monday 19 May 2025

Members present

Mr Toby Perkins, in the Chair

Julia Buckley

Ellie Chowns

Barry Gardiner

Sarah Gibson

Alison Griffiths

Chris Hinchliff

Cameron Thomas

John Whitby

Sammy Wilson

[…]

The Committee deliberated

Draft Report (The UK and the Antarctic environment), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Paragraphs 1 to 300 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to

Annexes agreed to.

[…]

Adjournment

Adjourned till Wednesday 2 June 2025 at 4.30 pm.

Monday 2 June 2025

Members present

Mr Toby Perkins, in the Chair

Olivia Blake

Barry Gardiner

Alison Griffiths

Pippa Heylings

Blake Stephenson

John Whitby

Sammy Wilson

[…]

The Comittee deliberated

Resolved, That the Report be the Third Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[…]

Adjournment

Adjourned till Wednesday 4 June 2025 at 2.00 pm

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence to the predecessor committee’s inquiry. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website, The UK and the Antarctic Environment (HC 381, Session 2023–24).

Monday 4 December 2023

Professor Anna Hogg, Associate Professor, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds; Dr Kaitlin Naughten, Ocean Modeller Amundsen Sea, British Antarctic Survey; Professor Martin Siegert FRSE, Deputy Vice Chancellor (Cornwall), and Professor of Geosciences, University of Exeter, Chair, UK Arctic and Antarctic Partnerships Committee; Professor Karen Heywood OBE FRS, Professor, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East AngliaQ1–31

Dr Tom Hart, Senior Lecturer, Oxford Brookes University; Dr Jasmine Lee, 1851 Research Fellow, Biodiversity, Evolution and Adaptation Team, British Antarctic Survey; Dr Kevin Hughes, Environmental Research and Monitoring Manager, British Antarctic SurveyQ32–69

Monday 5 February 2024

Professor Klaus Dodds, Executive Dean for the School of Life Sciences and Environment, Royal Holloway, University of London; Dr Adrian Howkins, Reader in Environmental History, University of Bristol; Dr Daniela Portello Sampaio, Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow, Alfred Wegener InstituteQ70–100

Dr Susie Grant, Chief Officer, UK, Standing Committee on the Antarctic Treaty System, SCAR (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research), Marine Biogeographer, British Antarctic Survey; Dr Oliver Hogg, Senior Ocean Scientist, Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS); Matt Spencer, Polar Oceans Specialist, WWF UKQ101–139

Monday 26 February 2024

Dr Kim Crosbie, Chair, Noble Caledonia Ltd; Camilla Nichol, Chief Executive, UK Antarctic Heritage Trust; Dr Christy Hehir, Senior Lecturer, School of Hospitality and Tourism Management, University of Surrey; Amanda Lynnes, Director of Environment and Science Coordination, International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO)Q140–173

Mark Brownlow, Creative Director, Natural History, Plimsoll Productions; Dr Elizabeth White, Executive Producer, BBC Studios The Natural History UnitQ174–197

Monday 18 March 2024

Dr Joanne Johnson, Geochemist, British Antarctic Survey; Dr Ines Otosaka, Co-Director of Science, Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM), Lecturer, Department of Geography and Environmental Sciences, Northumbria University; Professor Michael Bentley, Professor, Department of Geography, Durham University; Professor Ian Willis, Professor of Glaciology, Scott Polar Research Institute, Department of Geography, University of CambridgeQ198–233

Professor Dame Jane Francis DCMG, Director, British Antarctic Survey; Dr Iain Williams, Director of Strategic Partnerships, Natural Environment Research Council (NERC); Nigel Bird, Director of Major Programmes and Resources, Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)Q234–312

Wednesday 8 May 2024

David Rutley, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Americas, Caribbean and the Overseas Territories), Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Jane Rumble OBE, Head of the Polar Regions Department, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Andrew Griffith MP, Minister of State (Minister for Science, Research and Innovation), Department for Science, Innovation and TechnologyQ313–407

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website (HC 499, Session 2024–25).

Wednesday 11 December 2024

James Gray, Former Chair, Environmental Audit Sub-Committee on Polar Research (2023–24)Q408–417

Professor Dame Jane Francis DCMG, Director, British Antarctic Survey; Dr Iain Williams, Director of Strategic Partnerships, Natural Environment Research CouncilQ418–448

The Lord Vallance of Balham KCB, Minister of State for Science, Research and Innovation, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office; Jane Rumble OBE, Head of the Polar Regions Department, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development OfficeQ449–477

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received by the predecessor committee and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website, The UK and the Antarctic Environment (HC 381, Session 2023–24).

ANT numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 Bentley, Professor Mike (Professor, Durham University); Stokes, Professor Chris (Professor, Durham University); Jamieson, Professor Stewart (Professor, Durham University); Small, Dr David (Research Fellow, Durham University); and Chudley, Dr Thomas (Research Fellow, Durham University)ANT0012

2 Bentley, Professor Michael (Professor, Department of Geography, Durham University); Johnson, Dr Joanne (Geochemist, British Antarctic Survey); Otosaka, Dr Inès (Co-Director of Science, Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM); and Lecturer, Department of Geography and Environmental Sciences, Northumbria University); and Willis, Professor Ian (Professor of Glaciology, Scott Polar Research Institute, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge)ANT0027

3 British Antarctic SurveyANT0022

4 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM)ANT0021

5 Crosbie, Dr Kim (Director, Noble Caledonia Ltd)ANT0024

6 Dodds, Professor Klaus (Professor of Geopolitics, Royal Holloway University of London)ANT0003

7 FCDOANT0017

8 Great Blue Ocean coalitionANT0010

9 Green AllianceANT0007

10 Greenpeace InternationalANT0023

11 Hehir, Dr Christy (Senior Lecturer, University of Surrey)ANT0019

12 Hogg, Professor Anna E. (Professor of Earth Observation, Institute for Climate and Atmospheric Science, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, UK); and Wallis, Mr Benjamin J. (Postgraduate Researcher, Institute for Climate and Atmospheric Science, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, UK)ANT0020

13 Lee, Dr Jasmine (1851 Research Fellow, British Antarctic Survey); Lynch, Professor Heather (Institute for Advanced Computational Sciences Endowed Chair for Ecology & Evolution , Stony Brook University); and Hart, Dr Tom (Senior Lecturer in Ecology and Evolution, Oxford Brookes University)ANT0008

14 Lee, Dr Jasmine (1851 Research Fellow, Biodiversity, Evolution and Adaptation Team, British Antarctic Survey); Hart, Dr Tom (Senior Lecturer, Oxford Brookes University); and Hughes, Dr Kevin (Environmental Research and Monitoring Manager, British Antarctic Survey)ANT0028

15 Met OfficeANT0014

16 National Oceanography CentreANT0005

17 New Zealand High CommissionANT0029

18 Parkes, Dr David (Senior Research Associate, Lancaster University); Maddalena, Dr Jennifer (Senior Research Associate, Lancaster University); Grefe, Dr Imke (International Lecturer (BJTU), Lancaster University); Miles, Dr Katie (Associate Lecturer, Aberystwyth University); Halsall, Prof Crispin (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences, Lancaster University); and Sweetman, Dr Andrew (Reader of Environmental Chemistry, Lancaster University)ANT0016

19 Penny, Miss Claire (PhD Student, Durham University) ANT0001

20 Renfrew, Professor Ian (Professor of Meteorology , University of East Anglia); Bakker, Professor Dorothee (Associate Professor of Marine Sciences, University of East Anglia); Heywood, Professor Karen (Professor of Physical Oceanography , University of East Anglia); and Le Quere, Professor Corinne (Royal Society Research Professor of Climate Change Science, University of East Anglia)ANT0013

21 Royal Geographical SocietyANT0002

22 Stringer, Mr Christopher (PhD student in Antarctic Science, School of Geography, University of Leeds); Kerr, Ms Nicky (PhD student in Polar and Alpine Ecology, and Ice Club Chair, School of Geography, University of Leeds); Colson, Mr Daniel (PhD student in Earth Observation, School of Geography, University of Leeds); Harpur, Ms Connie (PhD student in Polar Science, School of Geography, University of Leeds); Izzard, Mr Jamie (PhD student in Glaciology and Remote Sensing, School of Geography, University of Leeds); Smith, Dr Emma (Research Fellow in Antarctic Seismology, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds); and Taylor, Dr Liam (Lecturer in Glaciology and Remote Sensing, School of Geography, University of Leeds)ANT0006

23 The Government of South Georgia and the South Sandwich islandsANT0026

24 The Pew Charitable TrustsANT0011

25 UK Antarctic Heritage TrustANT0018

26 WWF-UK; and Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC)ANT0025

27 Waller, Dr Alexander (Visiting Professor, American University of Sovereign Nations)ANT0009

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website (HC 499, Session 2024–25).

RAT numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

28 Bailes, Imogen (PhD researcher, Lancaster University); Thorpe, Isla (PhD researcher, University of York); Mason, Francesca (PhD researcher, Cardiff University); Robison-Smith, Charlotte (PhD researcher, Cardiff University); Jones, Lowenna (PhD researcher, University of Sheffield); Tarring, Eve (PhD researcher, Cardiff University); Hart, Lucy (PhD researcher, Lancaster University); Dosunmu, Ola (PhD researcher, Lancaster University); Hulme, Holly (PhD researcher, Cardiff University); and D’Souza, Joseph (PhD researcher, Cardiff University)RAT0005

29 Buzzard, Dr Sammie (Assistant Professor- Geography and Environmental Sciences, Northumbria University); Siegert, Professor Martin (Deputy Vice Chancellor (Cornwall), University of Exeter); Sevestre, Dr Heïdi (Glaciologist, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Council); Bentley, Professor Michael (Professor in the Department of Geography, Durham University); Fricker, Professor Helen Amanda (Professor/ Lead (Scripps Polar Centre), Scripps Institution of Oceanography, UC San Diego/ Swansea University); Henley, Dr Sian (Reader in Marine Science, University of Edinburgh); and Larter, Dr Robert (Dep Science Leader of Palaeo Environments, British Antarctic Survey)RAT0006

30 Davies, Dr Bethan (Professor of Glaciology, Newcastle University)RAT0001

31 International Thwaites Glacier CollaborationRAT0004

32 National Oceanography CentreRAT0003

33 The Pew Charitable TrustsRAT0009

34 UK Centre for Polar Observation and ModellingRAT0008

35 UK Polar NetworkRAT0007

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

Session 2024–25

Number	Title	Reference
2nd	Governing the marine environment	HC 551
1st	The role of natural capital in the UK’s green economy	HC 501
2nd Special	Net zero and UK shipping: Government Response	HC 705
1st Special	Enabling sustainable electrification of the economy: Government Response	HC 564

---

Footnotes

1 Antarctica refers specifically to the continent itself, while the Antarctic describes the broader region, including the Southern Ocean and nearby islands.

2 World Economic Forum, Sea level rise is a global threat – here’s why, March 2025

3 Antarctic Act 1994

4 Antarctic Act 2013

5 British Antarctic Survey, About British Antarctic Survey, accessed 9 May 2025

6 The terms of reference for this inquiry are available at Call for Evidence - Committees - UK Parliament

7 Environmental Audit Committee, Call for Evidence - Committees - UK Parliament, 5 December 2024

8 The oral and written evidence taken during the initial and revived inquiries is listed at pages 121 and 123 respectively. The evidence taken in the 2023–24 session was reported to the House as HC 381 (Session 2023–24); the evidence taken in the current session has been reported as HC 499 (Session 2024–25).

9 The itinerary of the visit is set out at Annex 2.

10 Environmental Audit Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2022–23, The UK and the Arctic Environment, HC 1141

11 British Antarctic Territory Government History of the Territory, (accessed 29 April 2025)

12 The original signatories were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

13 House of Lords Library Discovery of Antarctica: 200th Anniversary, parliament.uk, 15 May 2020

14 British Antarctic Territory Government, About the Territory, (accessed 29 April 2025)

15 British Antarctic Territory Government, Who We Are, (accessed 29 April 2025)

16 British Antarctic Territory Government, New Commissioner for the British Antarctic Territory, (accessed 29 April 2025)

17 FCDO (ANT0017)

18 Q328 (HC 381 (2023–24))

19 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

20 Q235 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Q327 (HC 381 (2023–24))

21 Q328 (HC 381 (2023–24))

22 Q328 (HC 381 (2023–24))

23 Q328 (HC 381 (2023–24))

24 FCDO (ANT0017)

25 Q328 (HC 381 (2023–24))

26 Q328 (HC 381 (2023–24))

27 Q323 (HC 381 (2023–24))

28 Cabinet Office, The Integrated Review 2021, gov.uk, 16 March 2021

29 FCDO (ANT0017)

30 Qq363–365 (HC 381 (2023–24))

31 Environmental Audit Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2022–23, The UK and the Arctic Environment, HC 1141

32 Q453 (HC 499 (2024–25))

33 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, The Antarctic Treaty, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

34 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, The Antarctic Treaty, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

35 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, The Antarctic Treaty, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025); The signatories with territorial claims were Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom; the other signatories were Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the USA and the USSR. The USA and the USSR reserved the right to make territorial claims in the future.

36 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Parties, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

37 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, ATCM and Other Meetings, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

38 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, ATCM and Other Meetings, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

39 British Antarctic Survey The Antarctic Treaty Explained, (accessed 29 April 2025)

40 UK Antarctic Heritage Trust (ANT0018)

41 Q74 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

42 Q77 (HC 381 (2023–24))

43 Q77 (HC 381 (2023–24))

44 Q77 (HC 381 (2023–24))

45 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty Environmental Impact Assessment, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

46 FCDO (ANT0017); Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty CEP Handbook, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

47 Ferrada, Luis V., and Diego A. Caldera. “Negotiation, Adoption and Domestic Implementation of the Annex on Liability to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.” Antarctic Science 36, no. 5, 2024: pp. 419–38

48 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

49 Library of Congress Antarctica: Overview of Geopolitical and Environmental Issues, October 2021

50 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

51 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

52 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

53 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

54 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

55 Q98 (HC 381 (2023–24))

56 Q98 (HC 381 (2023–24))

57 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

58 Q77 (HC 381 (2023–24))

59 Library of Congress Antarctica: Overview of Geopolitical and Environmental Issues, October 2021

60 Library of Congress Antarctica: Overview of Geopolitical and Environmental Issues, October 2021

61 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

62 BBC News, Hundreds in US climate agency NOAA fired in latest cuts, February 2025

63 Forbes, Trump Research Cuts Hit The National Weather Service–And Antarctica, February 2025; The Atlantic, The Golden Age of Antarctic Science May Be Ending, February 2025; Wired DOGE’s Chaos Reaches Antarctica, February 2025

64 Q96 (HC 381 (2023–24))

65 Q75 (HC 381 (2023–24))

66 Georgetown University, Antarctic Geopolitics: Emerging Cracks in the Ice?, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, February 2021

67 Georgetown University, Antarctic Geopolitics: Emerging Cracks in the Ice?, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs February 2021

68 Q80 (HC 381 (2023–24))

69 Q81 (HC 381 (2023–24))

70 Oral Evidence taken by the Environmental Audit Committee on 14 May 2024, Qq4,5,

71 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

72 Q468 (HC 499 (2024–25))

73 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

74 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

75 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

76 FCDO (ANT0017)

77 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

78 Dr Bethan Davies (Professor of Glaciology at Newcastle University) (RAT0001)

79 Dr Kim Crosbie (Director at Noble Caledonia Ltd) (ANT0024)

80 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

81 Dr Bethan Davies (Professor of Glaciology at Newcastle University) (RAT0001)

82 Q419 (HC 499 (2024–25))

83 Mr Christopher Stringer (PhD student in Antarctic Science at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Ms Nicky Kerr (PhD student in Polar and Alpine Ecology, and Ice Club Chair at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Mr Daniel Colson (PhD student in Earth Observation at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Ms Connie Harpur (PhD student in Polar Science at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Mr Jamie Izzard (PhD student in Glaciology and Remote Sensing at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Dr Emma Smith (Research Fellow in Antarctic Seismology at School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds); Dr Liam Taylor (Lecturer in Glaciology and Remote Sensing at School of Geography, University of Leeds) (ANT0006)

84 Library of Congress Antarctica: Overview of Geopolitical and Environmental Issues, October 2021

85 NASA Scientific Visualization Studio, Antarctic Ice Mass Loss 2002–2023, March 2024

86 Dr Bethan Davies (Professor of Glaciology at Newcastle University) (RAT0001); International Thwaites Glacier Collaboration (RAT0004); Q20 (HC 381 (2023–24))

87 University of Washington, Edge of Pine Island Glacier’s ice shelf is ripping apart, causing key Antarctic glacier to gain speed, ScienceDaily, June 2021

88 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021); British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

89 Q19 (HC 381 (2023–24))

90 Q454 (HC 499 (2024–25))

91 Q18 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021)

92 Professor Mike Bentley (Professor at Durham University); Professor Chris Stokes (Professor at Durham University); Professor Stewart Jamieson (Professor at Durham University); Dr David Small (Research Fellow at Durham University); Dr Thomas Chudley (Research Fellow at Durham University) (ANT0012)

93 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022); BBC Future, Iceberg A-68: The story of how a mega-berg transformed the ocean, October 2024

94 Q18 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021)

95 Q31 (HC 381 (2023–24))

96 Q2 (HC 381 (2023–24))

97 Miss Claire Penny (PhD Student at Durham University) (ANT0001)

98 Q19 (HC 381 (2023–24))

99 Wei Wang, Yunzhong Shen, Qiujie Chen, Fengwei Wang and Yangkang Yu, Spatiotemporal mass change rate analysis from 2002 to 2023 over the Antarctic Ice Sheet and four glacier basins in Wilkes-Queen Mary Land, Science China Earth Sciences, 19 March 2025,

100 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021); British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

101 FCDO (ANT0017)

102 Q23 (HC 381 (2023–24))

103 Environmental Audit Committee, Flood resilience in England, opened 10 December 2025

104 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021)

105 Q6 (HC 381 (2023–24)); NASA Earth Observatory Antarctica on Thin Ice: Satellite Data Reveals 2025’s Stunning Sea Ice Collapse, SciTechDaily, April 2025; Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021)

106 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021)

107 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

108 Q26 (HC 381 (2023–24)); British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

109 Q26 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Williams, Richard G., et al, Asymmetries in the Southern Ocean Contribution to Global Heat and Carbon Uptake, Nature Climate Change, July 2024; Among the substantial literature discussing warming activity in the Southern Ocean, see Camp, J. W., ‘The Southern Ocean and global warming: an evaluation of the importance of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current: A Report submitted as the examined component of the Project Module S810 within The Open University’s Master of Science Degree in Science’, September 2022 [unpublished]

110 University of Southampton, Shrinking and Warming of Antarctic Deep Ocean Waters Has ‘Far Reaching Consequences’ For Global Climate, June 2023

111 Q26 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Professor Ian Renfrew (Professor of Meteorology at University of East Anglia); Professor Dorothee Bakker (Associate Professor of Marine Sciences at University of East Anglia); Professor Karen Heywood (Professor of Physical Oceanography at University of East Anglia); Professor Corinne Le Quere (Royal Society Research Professor of Climate Change Science at University of East Anglia) (ANT0013)

112 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Arctic Report Card, (accessed 29 April 2025)

113 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

114 Qq456–457 (HC 499 (2024–25))

115 Q453

116 ScienceNews, Can geoengineering plans save glaciers and slow sea level rise?, February 2025

117 ScienceNews, Can geoengineering plans save glaciers and slow sea level rise?, February 2025

118 Dr Sammie Buzzard (Assistant Professor- Geography and Environmental Sciences at Northumbria University); Professor Martin Siegert (Deputy Vice Chancellor (Cornwall) at University of Exeter); Dr Heïdi Sevestre (Glaciologist at Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Council); Professor Michael Bentley (Professor in the Department of Geography at Durham University); Professor Helen Amanda Fricker (Professor/ Lead (Scripps Polar Centre) at Scripps Institution of Oceanography, UC San Diego/ Swansea University); Dr Sian Henley (Reader in Marine Science at University of Edinburgh); Dr Robert Larter (Dep Science Leader of Palaeo Environments at British Antarctic Survey) (RAT0006)

119 ARIA, Exploring Climate Cooling, accessed 9 May 2025; Nature, Controversial geoengineering projects to test Earth-cooling tech funded by UK agency, 7 May 2025

120 Dr Bethan Davies (Professor of Glaciology at Newcastle University) (RAT0001)

121 Dr Sammie Buzzard (Assistant Professor- Geography and Environmental Sciences at Northumbria University); Professor Martin Siegert (Deputy Vice Chancellor (Cornwall) at University of Exeter); Dr Heïdi Sevestre (Glaciologist at Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Council); Professor Michael Bentley (Professor in the Department of Geography at Durham University); Professor Helen Amanda Fricker (Professor/ Lead (Scripps Polar Centre) at Scripps Institution of Oceanography, UC San Diego/ Swansea University); Dr Sian Henley (Reader in Marine Science at University of Edinburgh); Dr Robert Larter (Dep Science Leader of Palaeo Environments at British Antarctic Survey) (RAT0006)

122 FCDO (ANT0017)

123 Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow, Biodiversity, Evolution and Adaptation Team at British Antarctic Survey); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer at Oxford Brookes University); Dr Kevin Hughes (Environmental Research and Monitoring Manager at British Antarctic Survey) (ANT0028)

124 Q32 (HC 381 (2023–24))

125 Q35 (HC 381 (2023–24))

126 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

127 Dr Alexander Waller (Visiting Professor at American University of Sovereign Nations) (ANT0009)

128 Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow, Biodiversity, Evolution and Adaptation Team at British Antarctic Survey); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer at Oxford Brookes University); Dr Kevin Hughes (Environmental Research and Monitoring Manager at British Antarctic Survey) (ANT0028); Miss Claire Penny (PhD Student at Durham University) (ANT0001)

129 Greenpeace International (ANT0023)

130 Q33 (HC 381 (2023–24))

131 WWF UK, Emperor penguins: the icons of the Antarctic, (accessed 29 April 2025)

132 Qq133–137 (HC 381 (2023–24))

133 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

134 Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow at British Antarctic Survey); Professor Heather Lynch (Institute for Advanced Computational Sciences Endowed Chair for Ecology & Evolution at Stony Brook University); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer in Ecology and Evolution at Oxford Brookes University) (ANT0008), Q35 (HC 381 (2023–24))

135 Mr Christopher Stringer (PhD student in Antarctic Science at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Ms Nicky Kerr (PhD student in Polar and Alpine Ecology, and Ice Club Chair at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Mr Daniel Colson (PhD student in Earth Observation at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Ms Connie Harpur (PhD student in Polar Science at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Mr Jamie Izzard (PhD student in Glaciology and Remote Sensing at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Dr Emma Smith (Research Fellow in Antarctic Seismology at School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds); Dr Liam Taylor (Lecturer in Glaciology and Remote Sensing at School of Geography, University of Leeds) (ANT0006)

136 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

137 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

138 Q35 (HC 381 (2023–24))

139 Qq422–424 (HC 499 (2024–25)); New Scientist, H5N1 flu is now killing birds on the continent of Antarctica, March 2025

140 Science Adviser, Deadly avian flu strain is spreading rapidly in Antarctica, March 2025

141 Qq422–424 (HC 499 (2024–25))

142 Imogen Bailes (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Isla Thorpe (PhD researcher at University of York); Francesca Mason (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Charlotte Robison-Smith (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Lowenna Jones (PhD researcher at University of Sheffield); Eve Tarring (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Lucy Hart (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Ola Dosunmu (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Holly Hulme (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Joseph D’Souza (PhD researcher at Cardiff University) (RAT0005)

143 Imogen Bailes (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Isla Thorpe (PhD researcher at University of York); Francesca Mason (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Charlotte Robison-Smith (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Lowenna Jones (PhD researcher at University of Sheffield); Eve Tarring (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Lucy Hart (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Ola Dosunmu (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Holly Hulme (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Joseph D’Souza (PhD researcher at Cardiff University) (RAT0005)

144 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

145 ANT0006 University of Leeds; Imogen Bailes (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Isla Thorpe (PhD researcher at University of York); Francesca Mason (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Charlotte Robison-Smith (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Lowenna Jones (PhD researcher at University of Sheffield); Eve Tarring (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Lucy Hart (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Ola Dosunmu (PhD researcher at Lancaster University); Holly Hulme (PhD researcher at Cardiff University); Joseph D’Souza (PhD researcher at Cardiff University) (RAT0005)

146 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

147 FCDO (ANT0017)

148 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

149 National Oceanography Centre (ANT0005)

150 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

151 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

152 Q170 (HC 381 (2023–24))

153 Q55 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow, Biodiversity, Evolution and Adaptation Team at British Antarctic Survey); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer at Oxford Brookes University); Dr Kevin Hughes (Environmental Research and Monitoring Manager at British Antarctic Survey) (ANT0028)

154 Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow at British Antarctic Survey); Professor Heather Lynch (Institute for Advanced Computational Sciences Endowed Chair for Ecology & Evolution at Stony Brook University); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer in Ecology and Evolution at Oxford Brookes University) (ANT0008); Q40 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Q103 (HC 381 (2023–24)), Qq105–107 (HC 381 (2023–24))

155 Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow at British Antarctic Survey); Professor Heather Lynch (Institute for Advanced Computational Sciences Endowed Chair for Ecology & Evolution at Stony Brook University); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer in Ecology and Evolution at Oxford Brookes University) (ANT0008); Q40 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Q103 (HC 381 (2023–24)), Qq105–107 (HC 381 (2023–24))

156 Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow, Biodiversity, Evolution and Adaptation Team at British Antarctic Survey); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer at Oxford Brookes University); Dr Kevin Hughes (Environmental Research and Monitoring Manager at British Antarctic Survey) (ANT0028)

157 Qq110–111 (HC 381 (2023–24))

158 Oral evidence taken on 2 April 2025, Q238

159 Q51 (HC 381 (2023–24))

160 Q51 (HC 381 (2023–24))

161 Q52 (HC 381 (2023–24))

162 FCDO (ANT0017)

163 Australian Antarctic Program, Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (The Madrid Protocol), gov.au, (accessed 29 April 2025); FCDO (ANT0017)

164 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

165 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

166 Q116 (HC 381 (2023–24))

167 Great Blue Ocean coalition (ANT0010)

168 Dr Bethan Davies (Professor of Glaciology at Newcastle University) (RAT0001)

169 Library of Congress Antarctica: Overview of Geopolitical and Environmental Issues, October 2021

170 Mr Christopher Stringer (PhD student in Antarctic Science at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Ms Nicky Kerr (PhD student in Polar and Alpine Ecology, and Ice Club Chair at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Mr Daniel Colson (PhD student in Earth Observation at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Ms Connie Harpur (PhD student in Polar Science at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Mr Jamie Izzard (PhD student in Glaciology and Remote Sensing at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Dr Emma Smith (Research Fellow in Antarctic Seismology at School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds); Dr Liam Taylor (Lecturer in Glaciology and Remote Sensing at School of Geography, University of Leeds) (ANT0006)

171 Library of Congress Antarctica: Overview of Geopolitical and Environmental Issues, October 2021; British Antarctic Survey, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, (accessed 29 April 2025)

172 British Antarctic Survey, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, (accessed 29 April 2025)

173 British Antarctic Survey, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, (accessed 29 April 2025)

174 Q117 (HC 381 (2023–24))

175 FCDO (ANT0017)

176 FCDO (ANT0017)

177 The Pew Charitable Trusts (RAT0009)

178 Q468 (HC 499 (2024–25))

179 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

180 Q117 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Greenpeace International (ANT0023)

181 Q112 (HC 381 (2023–24)); Greenpeace International (ANT0023)

182 Great Blue Ocean coalition (ANT0010); Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow at British Antarctic Survey); Professor Heather Lynch (Institute for Advanced Computational Sciences Endowed Chair for Ecology & Evolution at Stony Brook University); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer in Ecology and Evolution at Oxford Brookes University) (ANT0008)

183 ANT0022; WWF Australia, Antarctic conservation takes a backward step, October 2024; The Pew Charitable Trusts (RAT0009); The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of the Forty-Third Meeting of the Commission, October 2024

184 The Pew Charitable Trusts (RAT0009)

185 ABC News, Dead and injured humpback whales found in krill fishing nets near Antarctica, report reveals, November 2024

186 WWF Australia, Antarctic conservation takes a backward step, October 2024

187 ABC News, Dead and injured humpback whales found in krill fishing nets near Antarctica, report reveals, November 2024

188 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025); Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow at British Antarctic Survey); Professor Heather Lynch (Institute for Advanced Computational Sciences Endowed Chair for Ecology & Evolution at Stony Brook University); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer in Ecology and Evolution at Oxford Brookes University) (ANT0008)

189 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022), Royal Geographical Society (ANT0002)

190 Q95 (HC 381 (2023–24)); The Pew Charitable Trusts (RAT0009) WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025): British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

191 The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of the Forty-Third Meeting of the Commission, October 2024

192 Greenpeace International (ANT0023)

193 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

194 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

195 Greenpeace International (ANT0023)

196 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

197 FCDO (ANT0017)

198 Q468 (HC 499 (2024–25))

199 Q463 (HC 499 (2024–25))

200 Q470 (HC 499 (2024–25))

201 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Environmental Protocol, (accessed 29 April 2025)

202 Dr Bethan Davies (Professor of Glaciology at Newcastle University) (RAT0001)

203 Dr Bethan Davies (Professor of Glaciology at Newcastle University) (RAT0001)

204 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Environmental Protocol, (accessed 29 April 2025)

205 Q82 (HC 381 (2023–24))

206 Q349 (HC 381 (2023–24))

207 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

208 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty Development of a Framework for the Regulation of Tourism and Other Non-Governmental Activities in Antarctica, May 2024

209 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty Development of a Framework for the Regulation of Tourism and Other Non-Governmental Activities in Antarctica, May 2024

210 IAATO, Overview of Antarctic Tourism: A Historical Review of Growth, the 2020-21 Season, and Preliminary Estimates for 2021-22, May 2021

211 UK Antarctic Heritage Trust (ANT0018)

212 Q149 (HC 381 (2023–24))

213 Dr Kim Crosbie (Director at Noble Caledonia Ltd) (ANT0024); Q154 (HC 381 (2023–24))

214 ATCM XLII, IP26 Proactive Management of Antarctic Tourism: Time for a Fresh Approach, ats.aq, 2019; Dr Christy Hehir (Senior Lecturer at University of Surrey) (ANT0019)

215 Dr Kim Crosbie (Director at Noble Caledonia Ltd) (ANT0024); Q154 (HC 381 (2023–24))

216 Q156 (HC 381 (2023–24))

217 Antarctic Environments Portal, Tourism in Antarctica: facts, concerns, and challenges, November 2024; ATCM XLII, IP26 Proactive Management of Antarctic Tourism: Time for a Fresh Approach, ats.aq, 2019

218 WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

219 Sustainability Journal, Adaptive Management of Sustainable Tourism in Antarctica: A Rhetoric or Working Progress?, mdpi.com, July 2021, 13, 7649; Dr Alexander Waller (Visiting Professor at American University of Sovereign Nations) (ANT0009); British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

220 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Imke Grefe (International Lecturer (BJTU) at Lancaster University); Dr Katie Miles (Associate Lecturer at Aberystwyth University); Prof Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Andrew Sweetman (Reader of Environmental Chemistry at Lancaster University) (ANT0016)

221 Nature Communications, Black carbon footprint of human presence in Antarctica, February 2022

222 The Maritime Executive, The IMO’s Black Carbon Rules Are Coming, and Shipping Must Be Ready, October 2024

223 Dr Kim Crosbie (Director at Noble Caledonia Ltd) (ANT0024)

224 Environmental Audit Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2023–23, Net zero and UK shipping, HC 509

225 IAATO, IAATO Overview of Antarctic Vessel Tourism: The 2023–24 Season, and preliminary Estimates for 2024–25, May 2024

226 FCDO Visiting Antarctica, gov.uk, (accessed 29 April 2025)

227 UK Antarctic Heritage Trust (ANT0018)

228 FCDO (ANT0017)

229 Letter from the Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office), relating to Antarctic tourism, dated 17 January 2025

230 Q172 (HC 381 (2023–24))

231 Q173 (HC 381 (2023–24))

232 Letter from the Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office), relating to Antarctic tourism, dated 17 January 2025

233 FCDO (ANT0017)

234 Q147 (HC 381 (2023–24))

235 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Tourism and non-Governmental Activities, ats.aq, (accessed 29 April 2025)

236 Professor Klaus Dodds (Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway University of London) (ANT0003)

237 ATCM XLII, IP26 Proactive Management of Antarctic Tourism: Time for a Fresh Approach, ats.aq, 2019

238 UK Antarctic Heritage Trust (ANT0018) : WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025)

239 National Oceanography Centre (ANT0005); Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow, Biodiversity, Evolution and Adaptation Team at British Antarctic Survey); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer at Oxford Brookes University); Dr Kevin Hughes (Environmental Research and Monitoring Manager at British Antarctic Survey) (ANT0028)

240 Q173 (HC 381 (2023–24)), Q172 (HC 381 (2023–24))

241 IAATO, Objectives, (accessed 29 April 2025)

242 IAATO, Objectives, (accessed 29 April 2025)

243 Dr Kim Crosbie (Director at Noble Caledonia Ltd) (ANT0024); UK Antarctic Heritage Trust (ANT0018); WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025); FCDO (ANT0017)

244 Maritime Executive, Skipper Convicted for Entering Antarctica Without Permit, July 2016; Q169 (HC 381 (2023–24))

245 UK Antarctic Heritage Trust, Historic building at Whalers Bay successfully restored after graffiti incident, February 2025

246 Q170 (HC 381 (2023–24))

247 ATCM XLII, IP26 Proactive Management of Antarctic Tourism: Time for a Fresh Approach, ats.aq, 2019

248 Dr Alexander Waller (Visiting Professor at American University of Sovereign Nations) (ANT0009); WWF-UK, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (ANT0025), The Government of South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands (ANT0026)

249 Q10 (HC 381 (2023–24))

250 HM Government, UK Science in Antarctica 2014–2020, July 2014

251 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

252 Q202 (HC 381 (2023–24))

253 Qq199–200 (HC 381 (2023–24))

254 The Montreal Protocol, agreed in 1987, is a global treaty to phase out ozone depleting substances, which have been linked to severe seasonal ozone loss over Antarctica and the formation of the ozone hole.

255 Qq199–200 (HC 381 (2023–24))

256 Professor Mike Bentley (Professor at Durham University); Professor Chris Stokes (Professor at Durham University); Professor Stewart Jamieson (Professor at Durham University); Dr David Small (Research Fellow at Durham University); Dr Thomas Chudley (Research Fellow at Durham University) (ANT0012)

257 ANT0022 British Antarctic Survey; British Antarctic Survey, Halley VI Research Station , (accessed 29 April 2025)

258 British Antarctic Survey, Research ship, (accessed 29 April 2024); British Antarctic Survey, Aircraft capability, (accessed 29 April 2024)

259 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Imke Grefe (International Lecturer (BJTU) at Lancaster University); Dr Katie Miles (Associate Lecturer at Aberystwyth University); Prof Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Andrew Sweetman (Reader of Environmental Chemistry at Lancaster University) (ANT0016)

260 FCDO (ANT0017)

261 Cabinet Office Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world, gov.uk, March 2023

262 Q461 (HC 499 (2024–25))

263 UK Research and Innovation UK invests to modernise polar science, April 2022

264 Q432 (HC 499 (2024–25))

265 Q246 (HC 381 (2023–24))

266 Q246 (HC 381 (2023–24))

267 FCDO (ANT0017)

268 Q464 (HC499 (2024–25))

269 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Research and Innovation (Department for Science, Innovation & Technology), relating to the Antarctic Infrastructure Modernisation Programme, dated January 2025; Q464 (HC 499 (2024–25))

270 Q441 (HC 499 (2025–25))

271 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

272 Q216 (HC 381 (2023–24))

273 Q297 (HC 381 (2023–24))

274 Q216 (HC 381 (2023–24)), National Oceanography Centre (ANT0005)

275 National Oceanography Centre (ANT0005)

276 Q216 (HC 381 (2023–24))

277 National Oceanography Centre (ANT0005)

278 Q219 (HC 381 (2023–24))

279 Q446 (HC 499 (2024–25))

280 Q444 (HC 499 (2024–25))

281 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021); Q329 (HC 381 (2023–24))

282 Q216 (HC 381 (2023–24))

283 Q216 (HC 381 (2023–24))

284 Q219 (HC 381 (2023–24))

285 Q307 (HC 381 (2023–24))

286 Q307 (HC 381 (2023–24))

287 Q477 (HC 499 (2024–25))

288 Q466 (HC 499 (2024–25))

289 Professor Mike Bentley (Professor at Durham University); Professor Chris Stokes (Professor at Durham University); Professor Stewart Jamieson (Professor at Durham University); Dr David Small (Research Fellow at Durham University); Dr Thomas Chudley (Research Fellow at Durham University) (ANT0012); Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Imke Grefe (International Lecturer (BJTU) at Lancaster University); Dr Katie Miles (Associate Lecturer at Aberystwyth University); Prof Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Andrew Sweetman (Reader of Environmental Chemistry at Lancaster University) (ANT0016)

290 Qq211–212 (HC 381 (2023–24))

291 Dr Bethan Davies (Professor of Glaciology at Newcastle University) (RAT0001)

292 Qq211–212 (HC 381 (2023–24))

293 Q206 (HC 381 (2023–24))

294 Q206 (HC 381 (2023–24))

295 Met Office (ANT0014); Professor Anna E. Hogg (Professor of Earth Observation at Institute for Climate and Atmospheric Science, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, UK); Mr Benjamin J. Wallis (Postgraduate Researcher at Institute for Climate and Atmospheric Science, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, UK) (ANT0020)

296 Mr Christopher Stringer (PhD student in Antarctic Science at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Ms Nicky Kerr (PhD student in Polar and Alpine Ecology, and Ice Club Chair at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Mr Daniel Colson (PhD student in Earth Observation at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Ms Connie Harpur (PhD student in Polar Science at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Mr Jamie Izzard (PhD student in Glaciology and Remote Sensing at School of Geography, University of Leeds); Dr Emma Smith (Research Fellow in Antarctic Seismology at School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds); Dr Liam Taylor (Lecturer in Glaciology and Remote Sensing at School of Geography, University of Leeds) (ANT0006); Professor Anna E. Hogg (Professor of Earth Observation at Institute for Climate and Atmospheric Science, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, UK); Mr Benjamin J. Wallis (Postgraduate Researcher at Institute for Climate and Atmospheric Science, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, UK) (ANT0020)

297 Qq217–218 (HC 381 (2023–24))

298 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022); Q441 (HC 499 (2024–25))

299 Q255 (HC 381 (2023–24))

300 International Thwaites Glacier Collaboration, Thwaites Glacier, (accessed 29 April 2025); Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021))

301 New Zealand High Commission (ANT0029)

302 Qq224–227 (HC 381 (2023–24))

303 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ANT0021)

304 Q206 (HC 381 (2023–24))

305 Q210 (HC 381 (2023–24))

306 Q442 (HC 499 (2024–25))

307 Q277 (HC 381 (2023–24))

308 Antarctica InSync, Antarctica InSync: Antarctica International Science & Infrastructure for Synchronous Observation, (accessed 29 April 2024)

309 Q285 (HC 381 (2023–24))

310 Q285 (HC 381 (2023–24))

311 Q285 (HC 381 (2023–24))

312 Professor Mike Bentley (Professor at Durham University); Professor Chris Stokes (Professor at Durham University); Professor Stewart Jamieson (Professor at Durham University); Dr David Small (Research Fellow at Durham University); Dr Thomas Chudley (Research Fellow at Durham University) (ANT0012)

313 Professor Mike Bentley (Professor at Durham University); Professor Chris Stokes (Professor at Durham University); Professor Stewart Jamieson (Professor at Durham University); Dr David Small (Research Fellow at Durham University); Dr Thomas Chudley (Research Fellow at Durham University) (ANT0012)

314 Dr Jasmine Lee (1851 Research Fellow at British Antarctic Survey); Professor Heather Lynch (Institute for Advanced Computational Sciences Endowed Chair for Ecology & Evolution at Stony Brook University); Dr Tom Hart (Senior Lecturer in Ecology and Evolution at Oxford Brookes University) (ANT0008)

315 Professor Mike Bentley (Professor at Durham University); Professor Chris Stokes (Professor at Durham University); Professor Stewart Jamieson (Professor at Durham University); Dr David Small (Research Fellow at Durham University); Dr Thomas Chudley (Research Fellow at Durham University) (ANT0012)

316 Q247 (HC 381 (2023–24))

317 Professor Ian Renfrew (Professor of Meteorology at University of East Anglia); Professor Dorothee Bakker (Associate Professor of Marine Sciences at University of East Anglia); Professor Karen Heywood (Professor of Physical Oceanography at University of East Anglia); Professor Corinne Le Quere (Royal Society Research Professor of Climate Change Science at University of East Anglia) (ANT0013); Oral evidence taken by the Environmental Audit Sub-Committee on Polar Research on 18 March 2024, Qq207–209 (HC 381 (2023–24))

318 Qq212–215 (HC 381 (2023–24))

319 Qq212–215 (HC 381 (2023–24))

320 Qq260–274 (HC 381 (2023–24))

321 Qq260–274 (HC 381 (2023–24))

322 Q467 (HC 499 (2024–25))

323 Royal Navy, HMS Protector, mod.uk, (accessed 29 April 2025)

324 National Oceanography Centre (ANT0005); Q275 (HC 381 (2023–24))

325 Q275 (HC 381 (2023–24))

326 British Antarctic Survey (ANT0022)

327 Parties

328 Parties