The FCDO's Approach to Displaced People

Summary

1. The world faces a displacement crisis, with the number of people forcibly displaced globally rising from 42.7 million in 2012 to 123.2 million at the end of 2024—a 187% increase. This is taking place against a backdrop of catastrophic cuts to international development programming, most notably the near-total obliteration of the United States’ international development budget, but also the significant cut in UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 0.5% of gross national income to 0.3%.

2. Our report finds that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has not sufficiently considered the scale of this challenge facing the world. As a result, the Department has not devised and implemented an overarching strategy that allows it to respond effectively to the global displacement crisis. In addition to the significant cut in UK ODA, development programming intended to mitigate key drivers of displacement is receiving a declining focus. As a result, the Department is failing to implement medium to long-term mitigation and prevention programming across multiple areas in order to mitigate the drivers of displacement, including poverty reduction programming and deconfliction, conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions.

3. Furthermore, we find that the UK’s cuts to Official Development Assistance have not paid sufficient attention to the impact on women and girls, who already face disproportionate impacts from displacement. We recommend that the Department must immediately undertake such impact assessments, sharing the findings with the Committee as soon as possible.

4. We also find that the UK, largely through its development finance institution, British International Investment, has a strong and improving track record on stimulating the private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states. A stronger economy, with the improved finances and opportunities that this engenders for citizens, is a strong prevention tool against several drivers of displacement. We urge the Government to work closely with British International Investment on defining future plans to secure further progress in this vital area.

5. We further find that the FCDO has not made sufficient progress in enacting its commitments on localisation, particularly within humanitarian and displacement settings. We set out steps the Department can take to improve matters in this regard.

6. Finally, we find that, despite improvements over recent years, the Department could make better use of the data it collects in order to improve the transparency of, and accountability for, its responses to displacement, and how this data can be shared with partners and stakeholders in order to contribute to a more effective response to situations of displacement.

1 The global displacement crisis

7. At the end of 2024, the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide rose to 123.2 million, an increase of 7 million since 2023, the thirteenth consecutive annual increase.¹ This stands in contrast with 2012, when 42.7 million people were forcibly displaced—a 187% jump in the global displacement caseload in the past 13 years.² This sharp rise indicates that displacement is at crisis levels. This year’s figure includes around 31 million refugees who fall under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); a further 5.9 million Palestinian refugees under the mandate of UNRWA;³ and 73.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs), among others.⁴

Box 1: Internally displaced people

Source: UNHCR, Who we protect: Internally Displaced People

8. Displacement brings significant costs. On a human level, it uproots families, often with little warning; brings a heightened risk of poverty, exploitation and violence; and often leads to a loss of access to education, healthcare and livelihoods. As we found through our oral evidence sessions, the psychological toll can also be immense, with many displaced people experiencing trauma, grief and uncertainty about the future, while children face disruptions to their development and long-term consequences to their wellbeing. Marginalised people, including children, older people, women and girls and people with disabilities are particularly vulnerable to poverty, conflict and displacement.⁵ In addition, the challenges faced by older people, including mobility issues and noncommunicable diseases, are exacerbated in conflict situations, with older people often separated from families. Age International notes FCDO’s awareness of this, demonstrated via its Ukraine Humanitarian Response Programme, in which 46% of displaced beneficiary families in Ukraine include at least one person aged over 60.⁶

9. The economic costs of displacement are also vast. UNHCR’s financial requirements for 2025 are around $10.6 billion, highlighting the significant workload facing the organisation.⁷ Furthermore, on top of the opportunity cost of losing economically productive members of the workforce, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, part of the Norwegian Refugee Council, estimated the global cost of internal displacement at $20.5 billion in 2020, when only 55 million people were internally displaced. This figure represents the financial cost of providing every internally displaced person with housing, education, health and security, estimated at about $370 per person per year.⁸

10. The impacts of displacement are not shared equally by countries around the world: an ever-growing majority, at 59% in 2023, of forcibly displaced people are displaced within their own countries; and of refugees displaced elsewhere, 69% are displaced to countries that neighbour those from which they fled.⁹ Furthermore, low and middle-income countries host 71% of the world’s refugees and others in need of protection.¹⁰ Gideon Rabinowitz, director of policy and advocacy at Bond, told us that 1 million Rohingya still seek shelter from Myanmar in Bangladesh, and that 1 million people from South Sudan and Somalia are in Ethiopia, among millions of other people from Afghanistan, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo displaced in countries such as Uganda. These countries have not been identified as protected country programmes in the Government’s newly stated priorities for the aid budget.¹¹ This has the potential to impact the UK, if displaced people are not supported to stay close to their home countries and therefore seek shelter further afield. As Mr Rabinowitz explained:

It is hard to imagine that it will not impact migration flows around the world.¹²

Cuts to UK Official Development Assistance and the US Agency for International Development

11. In February 2025, the Government announced a reduction in UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 0.3% of gross national income (GNI). This came as a further reduction on the supposedly temporary reduction from 0.7% of GNI to 0.5% of GNI implemented by the previous Government in order to meet the economic challenges caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. The latest reductions came only months after the closing of the US Agency for International Development, which devastated the international development community. The US was the world’s largest aid donor, providing around 20% of all aid coming from the 32 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) each year from 2018 to 2023. In 2023, it was the largest single donor in areas including population, reproductive health and family planning, providing 76% of all direct bilateral aid in those areas; and humanitarian aid, providing 42%. Its contributions made up 16% of all countries’ contributions to UN agencies. The UK provided 9%.¹³

12. Non-governmental organisations, delivery partners and other stakeholders were clear on the impact that UK ODA cuts would have on the UK’s aid footprint and on people across the world who engage with UK-funded programming. Mónica Ferro, Director of the London Representation Office for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), spoke of the “devastating impact” that cuts would have on women in vulnerable situations, with services slashed.¹⁴ Similarly, Arafat Jamal, Afghanistan Country Representative for UNHCR, told us of the significant cuts his organisation was already making to programmes that assist displaced people across Afghanistan.¹⁵ Mr Jamal told us that the strength of UNHCR in Afghanistan is based on reputation and social capital, as well as finances, with which it has been able to implement programming designed to support women and girls across the country. Reductions in such programming will not only impact women now, but will reduce UNHCR’s ability to work with those elements of the Taliban who want to improve the position of women in Afghan society, endangering future progress in this regard.¹⁶

13. The Government’s initial reasoning for the further reduction in ODA was to find additional funding for UK defence at a time of shifting geopolitical tensions. However, perhaps indicating an ideological shift in the Government’s approach to aid spending, the Minister of State (International Development, Latin America and Caribbean) (The Rt Hon Baroness Chapman of Darlington) told us:

The days of viewing the UK Government as a global charity are over¹⁷

14. We find it shocking that a Government Minister should view UK international development spending as simply charity. As this report demonstrates, development spending has manifold benefits on an individual, national and global scale.

2 FCDO strategy

16. Displacement is caused by a multitude of distinct but often interrelated factors, including insecurity, climate breakdown, conflict, lack of basic services and limited livelihood opportunities. There are also individual factors, such as access to sufficient resources, family protection and reunification and social networks.¹⁸ The root causes of conflict include gender inequality, economic instability and climate disasters.¹⁹

17. Cuts to UK ODA and USAID, as well as belt-tightening on aid budgets across the globe are leading to what critics label a “back to basics” approach that focuses on immediate needs and life-saving assistance, to the detriment of longer-term objectives of improving livelihoods and strengthening resilience—key aspects of any durable solution to displacement.²⁰ Achim Steiner, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, told the Committee about the painful lessons of forgoing development programming following humanitarian intervention, leading to situations of protracted displacement, and emphasised the importance of humanitarian and development programming going hand in hand:

We have all learnt over time that there is an emergency moment, when helping people simply to have a place, food, and safety for their children and families is the operative priority. Almost on the day after, however, we must begin to think about how we help people to regain their ability to earn their livelihoods […] helping people to come out of being dependent, being a humanitarian caseload, and to regaining their dignity, their ability to earn a living, and ultimately to find a permanent place that they call home.²¹

18. Over recent years, UK ODA spending on displacement has lagged significantly behind need, with a 187% increase in displacement globally since 2012 not matched by a corresponding increase in ODA directed towards the issue. Plan International UK points out that, even if a third of all UK humanitarian spending in 2023 was directed towards displacement, this would only represent £293 million in funding for displaced people overseas, or just £2.44 per displaced person globally. This is a reduction from 2019, when humanitarian spend was £1.54 billion, a third of which would represent a spend of £6.44 per displaced person.²²

19. Humanitarian programming plays a crucial role in supporting displaced people. The FCDO recognises this, and following the cuts to ODA, has repeatedly informed us of its intention to prioritise humanitarian spending going forward. As the Minister for International Development told us:

We have to sharpen our focus with our money on areas that the UK can make the biggest difference. I think that is on humanitarian²³

This is important, and the Department should be commended for its continued desire to provide humanitarian support to those most in need globally. However, although the decade to 2021 saw the share of humanitarian assistance in UK bilateral ODA consistently above 14%, this dropped to 10.3% in 2021, 11.5% in 2022, and just 8.8% (£878 million) in 2023.²⁴ Furthermore, the protection of some humanitarian funding amid significant budget cuts appears to come at the expense of longer-term funding for stabilisation and development programming, key to reducing the drivers of displacement. As Achim Steiner told us, “investing in development is ultimately a prevention tool”.²⁵

20. On entering office, the Government appeared to have a firm understanding of the drivers of displacement. On 18 July, only two weeks after the 4 July 2024 general election, the Prime Minister announced up to £84 million in funding over three years for projects across Africa and the middle east to

improve education and employment opportunities as well as initiatives that will help to build resilience to global shocks like conflict and climate change.²⁶

21. Although the announcement relates to “irregular migration”, which is distinct and separate from forced displacement, it demonstrates that the Government acknowledged the importance of development programming in making communities prosperous and viable, thereby reducing key drivers of displacement. The Minister for International Development appeared to support this approach, telling us that “development is how we strengthen and stabilise countries, we tackle poverty and we make the world safer”.²⁷

22. Additionally, the Minister told us that international development is “an essential part” of delivering the Government’s missions of: working with partners to strengthen and stabilise countries; tackling poverty; supporting growth; and making the world safer.²⁸ However, she also told us that the context of a volatile global economy, growing humanitarian crises, accelerating impacts of global health risks and the climate and nature crises “demand a reset of our approach to development outcomes”.²⁹ The apparent contradictions in the Minister’s comments are demonstrative of the FCDO’s lack of strategy for preventing and finding solutions to displacement. It is unclear how the Government will secure progress towards its missions in the light of significantly reduced funding for the kinds of development programming that mitigate the drivers of displacement.

International comparators

23. Other nations and bodies have begun to grapple with the complexity of displacement and how to positively contribute to its reduction. Several have established dedicated financial instruments in forced displacement settings or have attempted to ringfence a portion of development assistance for forced displacement. Examples include:

• Germany’s Special Initiative on Forced Displacement, established in 2014, contributes to the improvement of infrastructure; access to education and vocational education and training; employment promotion; improved access to water; health; and shelter. It also supports peace and reconciliation, mediation and mental health and psycho-social support. Special attention is paid to supporting women and girls and ensuring gender equality.³⁰
• France’s Minka Peace and Resilience Fund, established in 2024, is dedicated to peacebuilding in fragile, crisis and conflict-affected areas. It finances projects in four crisis areas—the Sahel, Lake Chad area, Central African Republic and the middle east.³¹
• The EU’s 2021–2027 funding allocation commits 10% of the financial envelope for development funding to actions supporting management and governance of migration and forced displacement.³²

The drivers of displacement

24. Witnesses were aligned on the drivers of displacement being complex, varying, context-specific and often intertwined. While not focusing on some of the drivers of displacement listed at the beginning of this chapter, including poverty, lack of basic services and limited opportunities, the FCDO cited as the drivers of displacement:

armed conflict, persecution, terrorism, human rights violations and abuses, violence, the adverse effects of climate change, disasters, or often a combination of these factors. Conflict is a primary driver.³³

While this is correct, it may indicate that the Department is overly focused on conflict at the expense of related drivers, thereby failing to comprehend the interconnectedness of the drivers of displacement.

25. Daphne Jayasinghe, director of policy in the global protracted displacement team of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), told us that “where development projects support resilience so that people can maintain their livelihoods and continue to thrive, they will prevent or defend against the key drivers of displacement”.³⁴ Listed below are some of the principal areas in which FCDO programming could assist people in maintaining their livelihoods, preventing and reducing displacement.

Poverty

26. A previous International Development Committee found that “extreme poverty drives conflict, displacement and migration”.³⁵ According to Bond, poverty can both be

a driver and result of conflict and destabilisation and as such has a key role to play in preventing displacement.³⁶

27. According to the World Bank, 33 countries that receive funding from its International Development Association are fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS), with 324 million individuals living in extreme poverty within this group.³⁷ Extreme poverty is increasingly concentrated in crisis-affected communities that face a combination of constrained Governments, protracted conflict and climate vulnerability. By 2030, 60% of people in extreme poverty will live in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence.³⁸

28. The International Development Act 2002 mandates that UK ODA prioritises poverty reduction and sustainable development, ensuring that it contributes to long-term benefits for recipient countries.³⁹ However, UK ODA has in recent years demonstrated a declining focus on poverty reduction. In 2023, only £1 billion went to least-developed countries, constituting 47% of country-allocated bilateral ODA, the lowest level for more than a decade.⁴⁰ As a result, the UK no longer meets the OECD-DAC target to deliver 0.15%–0.2% of donor country GNI as ODA to least-developed countries, with the UK providing only 0.08% of GNI to least-developed countries in 2023.⁴¹ There have also been disproportionate cuts to the sectors most directly linked to tackling poverty, including education, health and other basic services, within least-developed and low-income countries:

• humanitarian support fell to £878 million, a decrease of 21% compared with 2022, 43% since 2020 and its lowest absolute level since 2014;
• health fell to £764 million, a decrease of 21% compared with 2022, 52% since 2020 and its lowest absolute level since 2014;
• education fell to £346 million, a small decrease since 2022, but a 64% decrease since 2016, down to its lowest absolute level since 2009; and
• water and sanitation fell to just £38 million, a decrease of 17% compared with 2020, 82% since 2018 and its lowest absolute level since 2009.⁴²

Conflict, stabilisation and the missing middle

30. In communities where risks of conflict remain, Government institutions are weak or nascent, or the overall environment is not conducive to long-term investments, stabilisation programmes can elevate a community to a point where it can benefit from development programming.⁴³ Key aspects of stabilisation include:

• Security and political stability—supporting conflict resolution, peacekeeping, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants
• Governance and rule of law—strengthening state institutions, supporting inclusive political processes, promoting justice and accountability mechanisms
• Community resilience—engaging local actors to build social cohesion, preventing violence and promoting reconciliation.⁴⁴

This is separate from humanitarian assistance, which responds only to the immediate needs of displaced people. It is not intended to address drivers of displacement, nor to be sustained over the medium and long term in situations of protracted displacement.

31. Louis Hoffmann, senior co-ordinator for peace, recovery and solutions at the International Organization for Migration, told us that IOM’s community stabilisation portfolio is designed to keep people in place and to absorb people when they return, through better services and governance. He described such programming as “critical investments” for medium-term to long-term stability. However, he noted that, between humanitarian assistance and the longer-term development work, “there is a tremendous missing middle”—the space where investment is required in local governance and service delivery, the absence of which, owing to conflict, climate pressures or other factors, has led to people being forcibly displaced.⁴⁵

32. Witnesses were clear on the importance of conflict prevention, deconfliction, peacebuilding and stabilisation to preventing and reducing displacement, arguing that such programming reduces violence and mitigates its worst consequences, and reduces humanitarian need in the longer term.⁴⁶ Daphne Jayasinghe revealed that the World Bank estimates that, by 2030, two thirds of the world’s extreme poor will be living in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence—all drivers of displacement. She further shared that 82% of people in humanitarian need are concentrated in countries that feature in the IRC’s “Emergency Watchlist” of the 20 countries most at risk of new or worsened humanitarian emergencies, and that in many instances those countries are also climate-vulnerable.⁴⁷

The Integrated Security Fund

33. The UK’s primary funding for peacebuilding, deconfliction and stabilisation comes via the Integrated Security Fund (ISF). The fund’s precursor, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), was a cross-government fund that ran from 2015 to April 2024, operating across 80 countries and combining both ODA and non-ODA funding to address national security challenges such as conflict, organised crime and threats from state and non-state actors.⁴⁸ In 2023–24, around 40% of CSSF spending came from the ODA budget.⁴⁹

34. In 2024, the CSSF was replaced by the ISF. ISF programmes support a wider range of activities, including countering transnational threats linked to conflict, such as serious organised crime, terrorism, state threat activity and climate security. This change in scope raises concerns of a reduced emphasis on traditional conflict prevention and stabilisation efforts. Given that 60% of conflicts that ended in the 2000s relapsed into violence within five years, it is important that FCDO maintains focus on utilising ODA for peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts.⁵⁰ This is supported by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, which found in 2022 that:

The UK government’s peacebuilding efforts are largely relevant and coherent, and achieve results at local and national levels, but these results would be even more significant if its funding were more reliable and patient.⁵¹

35. There are questions over the extent to which these areas of work have remained a priority since the July 2024 general election. In May 2025, the Minister for International Development told us that preventing conflict was still a priority for the Government, but that Government needs to “challenge” itself on how to do that, which is likely a reference to finding efficiencies ahead of pending budget cuts.⁵² The ISF will receive only £233 million of ODA in 2025–26, down from £350 million in 2024–25, alongside significant cuts to other stabilisation and peacebuilding programmes, which Save the Children UK believes will impact the UK’s ability to prevent and resolve conflict.⁵³

36. According to Mines Advisory Group (MAG), the uncontrolled circulation of firearms and ammunition fuels and sustains conflicts and violence, driving displacement. Additionally, it undermines attempts to strengthen governance, democracy, and socio-economic development. Armed violence reduction programmes that reduce the spread of weapons and ammunition in conflict-affected and fragile contexts can disrupt the cycle of armed violence and foster peace and stability, thus enabling people to safely remain in, or return to, their homes if they choose to do so. The UK currently funds MAG’s work to reduce gun violence in the Caribbean, which deserves credit.⁵⁴ However, MAG found that, although the UK provides significant support for mine action in Sri Lanka and for emergency humanitarian support on the outbreak of conflict, recent cuts to ODA affecting conflict prevention and peacebuilding have limited the scope and scale of support that can be provided to displaced populations.⁵⁵

37. The Government acknowledges the importance of deconfliction and stabilisation funding as part of ISF spending.⁵⁶ However, it confirmed that ODA reductions announced in February 2025 necessitated “a more prioritised approach” to the work of the ISF, meaning that, unlike the CSSF, the ISF will only deliver “conflict and instability activity where there is a direct link to UK national security”.⁵⁷ This narrow focus on UK national security is misguided, as the indirect effects of faraway conflicts can directly affect the UK.

38. For example, the Sudan Transition programme, funded with £2.6 million from the CSSF, sought a better understanding of emerging conflicts in Sudan. The programme was closed in March 2021. Internal analysis of the decision concluded that the UK had not grasped the risk of civil war when the decision was taken, despite being the penholder for Sudan at the United Nations.⁵⁸ The Completion Review Summary concluded that the closure “severely limited the outcomes delivered.” Médecins Sans Frontières estimated that 60% of asylum seekers in Calais in 2024 were displaced Sudanese people fleeing the civil war that began in 2023.⁵⁹ The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Rolfe, the then Cabinet Office Minister responsible for CSSF, said:

Sometimes you close things down because you believe the money will be better spent elsewhere—and sometimes that is not the right decision.⁶⁰

39. In June 2025, our Chair, Sarah Champion MP, and others—including the former UK special representative on peacebuilding; several former Secretaries of State for Defence; and the former United Kingdom National Security Adviser—called on the Prime Minister to reinstate aid spending on deconfliction and peacebuilding, calling the cuts

a false economy, as conflicts left to escalate and spread will lead to further insecurity, forced displacement and humanitarian crises to which the armed forces and aid agencies must respond.⁶¹

Climate

41. Climate change and related disasters are causing an ever-higher level of displacement. 2024 was the hottest year on record, but the climate finance gap—the difference between the money available for climate adaptation programmes to ensure that countries remain liveable and the total amount required, estimated to be $2.7 trillion annually by 2030—means that the countries and communities most vulnerable to climate change are unable to adapt to its impacts.⁶² Over the past 10 years, an average of 24 million displacements were caused by climate disasters every year, with 92% triggered by weather-related hazards—floods accounted for nearly half of these—and the rest by geophysical hazards, including earthquakes. In 2023, floods caused 9.8 million displacements.⁶³ Some 26.4 million people were displaced by climate last year, while 60% of refugees and IDPs live in countries that are among the most vulnerable to climate change.⁶⁴

42. According to UNHCR, the latest models show that, by 2040, the number of countries experiencing extreme climate-related hazards, including floods, droughts and/or dangerous heat, is expected to rise from three to 65, the vast majority of which currently host displaced people. Increasing prevalence of extreme weather events and worsening environmental conditions will contribute to multiple and overlapping crises and complex and recurrent patterns of displacement, threatening human rights, increasing poverty and loss of livelihoods and straining peaceful relations between communities.⁶⁵

43. Meanwhile, the World Bank estimates that, by 2050, climate change could create more than 216 million internally displaced people.⁶⁶ Achim Steiner told the Committee that 70% of refugees and IDPs come from climate-vulnerable countries, and that not investing to ensure that global temperature rises remain below the 1.5° pathway will leave the world with an increasingly unmanageable number of people who have to find another place to live.⁶⁷ Arafat Jamal told us that the hazardous effects of climate change become an exacerbating factor, amplifying forced displacement and forcing people to compete for scarcer resources, which can lead to further conflict.⁶⁸ While climate change does not directly cause conflict, it is seen as a risk multiplier for other drivers of displacement.⁶⁹

44. A recent UNHCR report set out that three quarters of forcibly displaced people live in countries heavily impacted by climate change, with half of these especially vulnerable as they are in countries affected by both conflict and serious climate hazards, including Ethiopia, Haiti, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan and Syria.⁷⁰

45. The FCDO has a strong track record on investing in climate adaptation. For example, the Climate Adaptation and Resilience—CLARE—programme is a £110-million research programme that supports partner Governments and the private sector to implement solutions to climate change. CLARE links short and long-term issues to enable sustainable economic and social development in a changing climate, through long-term commitments and partnerships worldwide.⁷¹ The 2023 international development White Paper, published under the previous Government, announced that the FCDO would scope a separate fund of up to 15% of FCDO core humanitarian spending to allow it to build in climate resilience and adaptation alongside delivery of humanitarian relief, reducing the impact of future disasters.⁷² Gideon Rabinowitz, director of policy and advocacy at Bond, told us of the importance of such funding as an anticipatory response to emerging indicators of where crises are becoming apparent, helping to fund support for communities to remain resilient and to have the best chance of being able to stay in their homes or stay locally.⁷³

46. Since the recent ODA cuts, the Minister repeated to the Committee that the new priorities of the Government will be humanitarian work, health and climate.⁷⁴ The Minister acknowledged the exacerbating impact of climate change on displacement:

Climate is making it harder. In some places, it is making it harder to make a living; in other places, it is making it harder for host communities to do what they want to do, and it is putting pressure on resources.⁷⁵

47. However, when asked about the utilisation of modelling to assess potential climate-induced displacement, the Department did not answer satisfactorily, instead pointing to interventions that did not make use of climate modelling.⁷⁶ This is important, because if the numbers cited earlier in this section are close to accurate, forced displacement as a result of climate change will be significant within the near future and will require a policy response.

Working within the multilateral system

50. The Minister told us that the updated ODA settlement will prioritise investment in multilateral institutions across issues where the international system needs to deliver at scale: the climate and nature crisis, global health and humanitarian emergencies. She continued:

No nation can tackle global challenges alone, and the multilateral system offers legitimacy and scale […] We will continue to support multilateral development banks, including the World Bank’s International Development Association, where every £1 invested generates £4 for developing countries—but it must become more efficient and responsive.⁷⁷

The Minister also told us that “everyone agrees” on the need to find efficiencies within the multilateral system, and that the UK needs to use its influence, as a major donor, to lead that change.⁷⁸

51. The Committee received evidence that the UK’s ability to influence bilateral partners and multilateral institutions has been undermined following policy decisions by the previous Government, including the implementation of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which critics suggest are inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under international law.⁷⁹ Similarly, reduced UK ODA risks precipitating a decline in UK soft power among bilateral and multilateral partners, with Gideon Rabinowitz telling us that “it is hard to imagine a policy or a set of actions that could harm that trust even more right now”.⁸⁰

52. However, there is cause for optimism. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) told us that the Government’s significant contribution to the 21st replenishment of the World Bank’s International Development Association was “highly welcome”, as was its decision to double aid to Sudan in November 2024.⁸¹ Daphne Jayasinghe told us that these moves contribute to the influence that the UK has, as a shareholder on the World Bank board, to continue to push to reform the World Bank and drive efficiencies. This power would be at stake if the UK’s IDA contribution is reduced.⁸² Similarly, Gideon Rabinowitz told us that the more ambitious the Government’s support for the World Bank, the more leverage it will have in the organisation.⁸³

53. The Minister stated that UK funding cuts to multilateral institutions will not impact its ability to influence those institutions, saying that reductions in funding across the board reflect that everybody she meets internationally agrees on the need for reform.⁸⁴

54. The FCDO has a plan to leverage its influence at the World Bank to positive effect. Matthew Wyatt, director of humanitarian, migration and food security at the FCDO, told us that, as a board member, the Department is engaging closely with the World Bank as it updates its fragility, conflict and violence strategy. He believes that the updated strategy will contribute to reducing displacement by building climate resilience and stimulating the private sector within fragile and conflict-affected states, among other outcomes.⁸⁵

55. The IRC suggested that the Department should further utilise its influence as a board member to call on the World Bank to systematise partnerships with NGOs and civil society organisations in fragile, conflict and violence-affected countries, to ensure continuity of service delivery even in the most complex settings and ensure that marginalised communities are not left behind.⁸⁶

3 Displaced women and girls

61. The gendered impacts of displacement disproportionately affect women and girls, who often bear the brunt of its social and economic disruptions. They are more likely to experience the economic instability and marginalisation related to loss of income and livelihoods and are less likely to be able to access economic opportunities.⁸⁷ The burden of unequal unpaid care work placed on women, and especially younger girls, increases when families are displaced and when men die or leave the household.⁸⁸

62. These are experiences echoed by Belinda, Fatimah and Zohal, three displaced women who told us of the harassment they faced at the hands of locals and the authorities in their host communities.⁸⁹ Zohal spoke of being unable to access basic goods and services, such as food and healthcare, on account of being a single woman; and Fatimah recounted how she was threatened by an officer with deportation despite having the correct documentation—a threat that could only be alleviated on the condition she went on a date with the officer.⁹⁰ Experiences such as those of Belinda, Fatimah and Zohal highlight the exploitation, including sexual exploitation, and abuse of vulnerable groups.

63. ActionAid told us that women displaced by wars often find themselves in displacement camps, which can lack privacy, depriving women of dignity. Displacement camps do not offer safe spaces for women to speak and offer psychosocial support to each other, and because women often need to stand in long queues to access aid, such as water and hot meals, they are in any case unable to receive such services, as both tend to operate during the same hours.⁹¹

64. For displaced girls, these social and economic inequalities are often compounded by age and gender discrimination. According to Plan International UK:

displaced girls are among the most vulnerable and are at particular risk of exclusion from education, healthcare, and protection services.⁹²

Additional risks described by Plan International UK include eating less and last, and experiencing sexual and gender-based violence (GBV). The nature of displacement can also drive families to adopt extreme survival mechanisms, such as increased child, early and forced marriages and unions for girls.⁹³ According to Women for Women, one in five refugee women have experienced sexual violence, and nine out of 10 countries with the highest rates of child marriage are considered either fragile or extremely fragile states.⁹⁴ This is driven by pre-existing inequalities and the lack of age and gender-sensitive refugee responses, with adolescent girl refugees particularly overlooked and rendered invisible in humanitarian and integration efforts.⁹⁵

65. The FCDO told us:

Women and girls are disproportionately affected by crises because of pre-existing inequalities, increased violence, and barriers to accessing essential services, yet their specific needs and meaningful participation is often overlooked.⁹⁶

66. This is problematic. The evidence we received emphasises the importance of including women’s voices in addressing the inequalities they face, as being embedded within the community means they are best placed to understand the complexity of the issues and respond to them accordingly. This evidence also highlights how inclusion can lead to better monitoring, reporting and accountability, and how it can evolve support models from one that relies on dependency to one that thrives on sustainability and self-sufficiency.⁹⁷

67. The FCDO’s attention to women and girls in its displacement programming has been noted as a key strength by partners.⁹⁸ In August, the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds, the former Minister for Development and for Women and Equalities, announced an £86-million package to reduce the drivers of famine, to protect women and girls in displaced communities and to prevent GBV and support survivors in South Sudan. In Sudan, the UK provided technical and diplomatic support to establish an anti-war, pro-democracy Taqaddam coalition and worked with 200 women to shape the national conference to find a political solution to end the hostilities. Additionally, through the FCDO’s £33-million partnership with the Equality Fund, a global women’s fund, and its “Prepare, Respond, Care” grant-making stream, regional and national women’s and feminist funds have been supported with core and flexible funding to meet the needs of displaced and refugee populations, such as during the Ukraine regional refugee response.⁹⁹

68. Tinebeb Berhane, Ethiopia country director for ActionAid, told us that ActionAid receives “good support” from FCDO, which helps to fund projects on female genital mutilation.¹⁰⁰ However, the positive change that the UK has been able to effect is being undermined by the cuts to ODA. Tinebeb called the cuts “shocking and disappointing”,¹⁰¹ adding:

We are panicking because the UK Government is a good donor for my country, and a good supporter of our work in general, both in development and humanitarian areas, and also supporting bilaterally the Government and UN agencies.¹⁰²

69. Despite women and girls being disproportionately affected, ActionAid research shows that women’s rights programming is underfunded, and that even when funding is secured, it is not flexible, sufficient or long term.¹⁰³ Katy Nembe Katonda, deputy country representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo for CAFOD, whose organisation undertakes a significant amount of work with displaced women and girls, told us:

In DRC as well, many of our partners are receiving funding through the humanitarian funds which are funded by FCDO. The cuts—even if this has not been mentioned directly for DRC yet—will be putting more pressure on the access to funding for particularly these local organisations that do not have much flexibility.¹⁰⁴

70. Despite the FCDO’s submission and the volume of evidence detailing the devastating impacts of these cuts, when appearing before the Committee, the Minister for International Development outlined the Government’s plan to cut gender-specific programming as a result of the reduction in aid spending, without impact assessments having been undertaken:

Yes—we will have to do impact assessments on our decisions, for sure, because they do affect marginalised groups and vulnerable people. We have not done those yet.¹⁰⁵

71. On impact assessments for cutting programming for women and girls, the Minister said, “We are making some very broad-brush decisions at the moment”, later adding, “We have not been able to do the consultation that I would like”.¹⁰⁶ Past ODA cuts have been branded as “devastating” for women and girls and criticised by civil society as demonstrating a siloed and short-sighted approach to displacement.¹⁰⁷ It is unclear how these cuts were prioritised without impact assessments.

72. In contexts where services and support are already scarce, the impact of these cuts is likely to put the lives of millions of women and girls in jeopardy.¹⁰⁸ Mónica Ferro told the Committee how the UNFPA is often the sole provider of GBV and sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services and that no organisations can assume UNFPA’s place and provide a similar level of support.¹⁰⁹

73. In an attempt to mitigate the impact of reductions in women and girls-specific programming, the Minister unveiled plans to mainstream and integrate gender across more general programming.¹¹⁰ However, witnesses told us that this would not be effective, and that mainstreaming has to take place in parallel with gender-specific programming. Eva Tabbasam, director of Gender Action for Peace and Security, said:

We need stand-alone gender and women, peace and security programming in addition to mainstreaming. We cannot get to effective mainstreaming if we are not doing the stand-alone work first. We need to build up towards that.¹¹¹

74. Recounting her own experiences of working in local government, the Minister mentioned how mainstreaming was the “worst thing you could say” to her.¹¹² However, her justification for mainstreaming and integration seems to stem from conversations with those working in “gender themes” who expressed a desire to divert from stand-alone programming:

I have had people who work specifically in gender themes say before all this came about that that is the approach they want. They do not necessarily want stand-alone programming all the time.¹¹³

Despite this, witnesses called the Minister’s remarks “concerning” for the gender network and for the sector as a whole.¹¹⁴

75. Furthermore, we received evidence that directly refutes the Minister’s claims. ActionAid says some of the challenges uniquely faced by women and girls, such as a lack of access to adequate SRH services, sanitary kits and contraception, highlight an urgent need for targeted and gender-specific interventions.¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, Plan International UK notes that women and girls are often overlooked in integration efforts, while ActionAid UK suggests that progress on mitigating the drivers of displacement will not be possible without the FCDO taking a holistic and gender-sensitive approach.¹¹⁶

76. Effective mainstreaming and integration requires sophisticated infrastructure, including but not limited to: gender expertise; sound analysis; supportive cultures; a shift in culture; budgets; and the mobilisation of social forces.¹¹⁷ However, the Minister revealed that the Government does not have a comprehensive strategy to successfully implement its plans:

the thinking is that we can integrate and mainstream our work and make sure that when we are doing work on health, women and girls run all the way through it. I want that to be the case. What I cannot do is sit here and tell you today how that happens.¹¹⁸

Moreover, effective and robust gender programming requires access to data and a high level of transparency, and as most of the evidence we have received suggests, the FCDO does not have access to adequate datasets.¹¹⁹

4 Working with the private sector

82. Louis Hoffmann of the International Organization for Migration told us of the importance of private sector investment in stimulating local economies, saying that no UN agency or aid programme can meet the scale of the challenge:

To address this at scale, no UN agency, no aid programme will beat that. It is about having the private sector step in with investment and with some security to create these jobs.¹²¹

83. British International Investment, the UK’s development finance institution, provides capital to support inclusive economic development in partner countries, with a strong focus on fragile and conflict-affected states. Colin Buckley, managing director and general counsel at British International Investment, told us that BII has especially prioritised investing in poverty reduction, conflict and climate change programmes, but acknowledged that a reduction in displacement was not a particular aim. However, on whether BII can contribute to preventing displacement, Mr Buckley told us:

We have a role to play. It is not our principal aim, but I think that we are a significant player in the prevention of displacement.¹²²

84. Mr Buckley told us that BII has three primary tools relating to investment in fragile and conflict-affected states: the Oxford Fragility Forum, the pre-eminent forum for co-ordination among investment partners and for generating and sharing learning; the ARIA Fragility Initiative, designed to overcome exceptional barriers in the enabling environment and to unlock investment opportunities in fragile and conflict-affected states; and £50 million of new concessional finance that can be used to reach businesses and markets in such states. He added that BII now has the largest fragile and conflict-affected states portfolio of any European development finance institution, and 30% more than the second best.¹²³

85. ARIA gives technical assistance to “proto-businesses” to make them investment-ready. When it was established in 2021, it was generally accepted that the countries that it targets were “uninvestable”. However, through the forum, 144 opportunities have been discovered, totalling $3.3 billion, with seven deals approved, totalling $67 million. As a result, BII in 2023 invested £650 million in the poorest of the countries in which it operates, of which £268 million is invested within the most challenging “alpha” markets.¹²⁴

86. The FCDO acknowledges the important role that BII can play in mitigating key drivers of displacement by providing long-term, “patient” capital in places where investment may appear difficult, driving job creation and supporting stable, inclusive economic growth.¹²⁵ Furthermore, the FCDO told us that its strategy to stimulate the private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states “focuses on promoting productive, job-rich sectors that contribute to peace and stability”.¹²⁶ Alongside BII, key programming to stimulate the private sector in target countries includes the Private Infrastructure Development Group, to which the UK contributes, which supports private sector expansion in fragile and conflict-affected states. Between 2019 and 2024, 79% of the group’s projects that reached completion were in least-developed countries or fragile and conflict-affected states; while in 2024, the group committed $166 million to nine projects in fragile and conflict-affected states.¹²⁷ Similarly, the UK is the fifth largest shareholder in the International Finance Corporation, the investments of which in fragile and conflict-affected states have nearly doubled since 2018, from $2.4 billion in 2018 to $4.6 billion in financial year 2024–25.¹²⁸

5 Localisation

89. The UK is a signatory to the Grand Bargain 2.0, which includes commitments to engage with local civil society organisations—particularly women’s rights organisations and women-led organisations—in humanitarian response settings, with a target for 25% of funding to be shared with local actors.¹²⁹ However, in 2023, only 4.5% of all trackable humanitarian funding went directly to local and national actors.¹³⁰

90. Witnesses were clear on the benefits that such engagement can have for the UK and for displaced communities. ActionAid told us that local organisations have a deeper understanding of their communities’ needs during humanitarian emergencies.¹³¹ Dr Jessica Hagen-Zanker, head of the Migration and Displacement Hub at the Overseas Development Institute, told us that local organisations are more accountable, because they are closer to the people to whom they provide services and possess greater legitimacy among local populations.¹³² Daphne Jayasinghe told us that local organisations may have access to communities that are outside the reach or control of the Government.¹³³ The Institute of Development Studies noted the strengths of local organisations as having “cadres of volunteers”.¹³⁴ Furthermore, local organisations can act as cultural mediators within host communities and can develop bespoke cultural resources to promote better engagement between displaced groups, local authorities and healthcare professionals.¹³⁵

91. However, these organisations often do not have the personnel or administrative capacity to meet the due diligence and other demands that aid and humanitarian bureaucracies require of them.¹³⁶ Bethan Lewis, head of the Humanitarian Unit at Plan International UK, told us of the importance of ensuring ease of access to sustainable funding for local organisations by reducing administrative hurdles and by making sure that small organisations can access funding for running costs.¹³⁷ CAFOD also cites a lack of provision for core costs, as well as a lack of risk sharing between partners, as reasons why the FCDO is struggling to meet its localisation targets.¹³⁸

92. In 2023, 85% of UNHCR’s funded partners were local and national actors, with 21% being women-led organisations. In total, these organisations received 57% of UNHCR’s partnership expenditure. To achieve this, the organisation cites its simplifying of partnerships and reducing demands on partners, including due diligence, in a spirit of risk sharing and capacity strengthening.¹³⁹

93. When asked about progress on Grand Bargain commitments, the FCDO failed to offer a satisfactory response. For example, the Department told us that it “strongly supports the role of national and local organisations” in meeting humanitarian needs and building resilience, and that it is

committed to supporting initiatives which have a strong focus on supporting local responders, including ensuring that partnerships take an equitable approach to administrative costs for local actors.¹⁴⁰

94. These appear to be a restating of the commitments, as opposed to data on progress towards meeting those commitments. Furthermore, instead of answering questions on the appropriateness of its funding arrangements of local actors, the Department referenced its funding of multilateral institutions and international NGOs.¹⁴¹

Global Compact on Refugees—Multi-stakeholder Pledge: Advancing Localisation in Displacement and Statelessness Responses

95. Many criticisms levelled at the FCDO’s approach to localisation in its responses to displacement are common across the international development sector and are faced by other stakeholders engaged in similar work. In response to these shortcomings, states and agencies that engaged on the Global Compact on Refugees collaborated to find solutions to the obstructions that prevent greater localisation in responses to displacement.¹⁴² The Multi-stakeholder Pledge on Advancing Localisation in Displacement and Statelessness Responses aims to transform the way local and national actors work in displacement situations by developing stronger and more equitable partnerships with them and by strengthening their capacity. The pledge contributes towards whole-of-society approaches and comprehensive responses that are central to the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees. The pledge’s specific aim is to address challenges that local and national actors face when responding to displacement, relating to funding, participation in decision-making, two-way capacity-sharing and recognition.

6 FCDO’s use of data on displacement

99. It became clear during our inquiry that the FCDO could better utilise the data it collects for the benefit of displaced people. Plan International UK recommends that the UK should report transparently on its support to displaced people overseas, such as through an annual report detailing its work and approaches, with the report specifically setting out how the UK is helping displaced women and children.¹⁴³ However, Dr Hagen-Zanker told us that partner organisation in ODA-recipient countries often lack the management capacity to fulfil specific grant requirements, including monitoring requirements that ensure that programmes are inclusive.¹⁴⁴

100. Melinda Bohannon, director-general of Humanitarian and Development at the Department, told us that all FCDO programmes are required to collect data disaggregated by gender, ability and, where possible, religion, but not ethnicity or geographic location.¹⁴⁵ This is an improvement on the Department’s previous poor practice in collecting disaggregated data.¹⁴⁶ However, the Department acknowledged the difficulty in collecting disaggregated data from displaced people, because such data is often taken from governmental administrative systems, which may be incomplete or absent in situations of displacement.¹⁴⁷

101. Bethan Lewis of Plan International UK shared that it can be difficult to disaggregate data that is shared publicly by age, gender and inclusion status, and how money is spent in displaced settings; and that DevTracker does not have that full disaggregation of data on how displaced populations are supported, including by “refugee” or “displacement” spend.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, Age International points out that older refugees are often overlooked in data collection, aid distribution, and programme design, compounding barriers to healthcare, psychosocial support and livelihood opportunities.¹⁴⁹

Conclusions and recommendations

The global displacement crisis

1. There is a global displacement crisis. The UK cannot solve it alone, and nor should it be expected to. However, significant cuts to UK ODA and development programming indicate a United Kingdom that is stepping back from the world stage at a time when engagement and collaboration are most needed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)

FCDO strategy

2. Programming to reduce poverty, which drives displacement and exacerbates other drivers, has received a declining share of ODA in recent years. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)

3. The Department has failed to learn the lessons from previous cuts to stabilisation, peacebuilding and deconfliction programming, which likely contributed to the escalation of conflict in Sudan going unchallenged. We are concerned that the recent cuts to the Integrated Security Fund will lead to escalating conflict, with unpredictable ramifications for the UK both at home and abroad. (Conclusion, Paragraph 40)

4. Climate change is a current and growing driver of displacement, and the Department must better integrate the modelling of climate threats into its planning for its displacement work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48)

5. In its response to this report, the FCDO should set out the measures it is taking to increase the data available to policy teams when planning medium to long-term climate adaptation investments; and whether prevention of climate-induced displacement is one of the criteria that these teams must remain cognisant of. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)

6. The Government appears to have devised a strategy for influencing multilateral institutions, most notably the World Bank. This is a welcome effort to reinvigorate UK engagement at the multilateral level, given the significant cuts to other parts of the UK ODA budget. (Conclusion, Paragraph 56)

7. Engagement with the World Bank’s fragility, conflict and violence strategy update is positive, but the Government should not assume that it can outsource to multilateral institutions the need to also formulate strategy on preventing and reducing displacement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 57)

8. The Department lacks a holistic view of the drivers of and solutions to displacement, and therefore lacks an overarching strategy to establish solutions and prevention mechanisms. This means that UK impact in this area is constrained, reducing value for money of relevant spending and resulting in a wasted opportunity to assist displaced people. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)

9. The FCDO should commission a holistic review of the drivers of and solutions to displacement, reporting its findings to the Committee within one year of the publication of this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59)

10. The Department should appoint a new Special Envoy for Displacement who can oversee the discrete policy teams that work on mitigating the drivers of displacement, facilitating policy co-ordination between teams and ensuring consistency of outputs. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60)

Displaced women and girls

11. Funding cuts to gender-specific programming will be devastating for women and girls, starving them of vital support and services. The Government has not learned lessons from the previous Government about the severe impacts of funding cuts to programming for women and girls. (Conclusion, Paragraph 77)

12. The policy of gender mainstreaming refers to a strategic approach to achieving gender equality through integrating women’s experiences and concerns in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes. However, while gender mainstreaming is part of the correct goal, the Government does not have the appropriate infrastructure in place to make it work. This gender mainstreaming will therefore reduce the impact of UK programming, as the problems faced by women and girls require gender-specific interventions. It is uncertain whether the Government will be able to mitigate the impacts of aid cuts to women and girls as it intends. (Conclusion, Paragraph 78)

13. It is astonishing that the Government has made cuts to gender-specific programming without seemingly understanding the impacts on women and girls. The Government must publish impact assessments, as promised by the Minister, as soon as possible and no later than the response to this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 79)

14. In the light of these impact assessments, the Government must reconsider the cuts to women and girls-specific programming announced by the Minister and should consider ringfencing funding for this programming. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)

15. The Government must develop a robust strategy and a consistent, data-led methodology for mainstreaming and integration, to ensure that its efforts to mainstream and integrate gender take place in tandem with stand-alone programming (Recommendation, Paragraph 81)

Working with the private sector

16. The private sector can play a pivotal role in stimulating the economies of fragile and conflict-affected states. British International Investment has a strong track record of investing in difficult environments, particularly within fragile and conflict-affected states, helping to mitigate the drivers of displacement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 87)

17. The FCDO should work alongside British International Investment ahead of its 2026 strategy refresh, including on how BII can place more emphasis on, and better target investment at, mitigating the drivers of displacement across fragile and conflict-affected states. (Recommendation, Paragraph 88)

Localisation

18. Despite long-standing commitments, the Government is not making sufficient progress in meeting its commitments to localisation in humanitarian programming. The steps taken by the UNHCR on improving localisation in its partnerships should serve as a blueprint for how the Government can make progress in this regard. (Conclusion, Paragraph 96)

19. In response to this report, the Government must explain its reasoning for not signing up to the Global Compact on Refugees’ multi-stakeholder pledge on advancing localisation in displacement and statelessness responses. (Recommendation, Paragraph 97)

20. In response to this report, the Department must set out how it will make rapid progress in meeting commitments made, principally via the Grand Bargain and Global Compact on Refugees, to increase its engagement with and utilisation of local and national actors in humanitarian and development settings. (Recommendation, Paragraph 98)

FCDO’s use of data on displacement

21. The FCDO may be limited in its ability to accurately target displacement-related humanitarian and development spending owing to its sub-optimal data collection. (Conclusion, Paragraph 102)

22. To help determine a baseline and future targets, the FCDO should start systematically tracking and publishing official data on how much it spends on supporting refugees and internally displaced people overseas. (Recommendation, Paragraph 103)

23. The FCDO should ensure that the UK and partners disaggregate monitoring and programme data by age, gender, ability and displacement status at a minimum; do so systematically; and make this data available publicly. (Recommendation, Paragraph 104)

Formal minutes

Tuesday 2 September 2025

Members present

Sarah Champion, in the Chair

Tracy Gilbert

Monica Harding

Alice Macdonald

Brian Mathew

James Naish

Sam Rushworth

David Taylor

The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People

Draft Report (The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 104 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Tuesday 16 September at 1.30 p.m.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Tuesday 4 March 2025

Zohal, Community World Service Asia; Belinda, Centre Olame; Fatimah, Community World Service AsiaQ1–7

Tinebeb Berhane, Country Director, ActionAid Ethiopia; Katy Nembe Katonda, Deputy Country Representative - Democratic Republic of the Congo, CAFODQ8–22

Tuesday 1 April 2025

Daphne Jayasinghe, Director of Policy – Global Protracted Displacement Team, International Rescue Committee; Bethan Lewis, Head of humanitarian unit, Plan International UK; Gideon Rabinowitz, Director of policy and advocacy, BondQ23–57

Dr Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Head of the migration and displacement hub, ODI Global; Louis Hoffmann, Senior Coordinator for Peace, Recovery and Solutions, International Organization for Migration; Hélène Kuperman-Le-Bihan, Head of MAG Europe, Mines Advisory GroupQ58–90

Tuesday 29 April 2025

Mónica Ferro, Director of London Representation Office, UNFPA; Arafat Jamal, Afghanistan Country Representative, UNHCRQ91–107

Colin Buckley, Managing Director and General Counsel, British International Investment; Achim Steiner, Administrator, United Nations Development ProgrammeQ108–127

Tuesday 3 June 2025

The Rt Hon. the Baroness Chapman of Darlington, Minister of State for International Development, Latin America and the Caribbean, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office; Matthew Wyatt, Director for Humanitarian, Food Security and Resilience Directorate, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development OfficeQ128–179

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

ADP numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 ActionAid UK ADP0013

2 Age International ADP0004

3 Bond ADP0003

4 CAFOD ADP0006

5 Dolea, Dr Alina E. (Associate Professor, Bournemouth University) ADP0016

6 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office ADP0018

7 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office ADP0009

8 Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) ADP0011

9 Institute of Development Studies ADP0008

10 International Rescue Committee UK ADP0017

11 MAG (Mines Advisory Group) ADP0005

12 MÈdecins Sans FrontiËres (MSF) / Doctors without Borders ADP0010

13 ODI Global ADP0014

14 Plan International UK ADP0001

15 Save the Children UK ADP0015

16 UNHCR ADP0012

17 World Vision UK ADP0007

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

Session 2024–25

Number	Title	Reference
5th	Protection not permission: The UK’s role in upholding international humanitarian law and supporting the safe delivery of humanitarian aid	HC 526
4th	The ‘In Development’ process	HC 333
3rd	The Government’s efforts to achieve SDG2: Zero Hunger	HC 515
2nd	Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory	HC 373
1st	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact	HC 448
4th Special	The Government’s efforts to achieve SDG2: Zero Hunger: Government Response	HC 923
3rd Special	Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Government Response	HC 797
2nd Special	The UK Small Island Developing States Strategy: Government Response	HC 597
1st Special	FCDO and disability-inclusive development: Government Response	HC 568

---

Footnotes

1 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024, June 2025; This figure encompasses refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, Palestine refugees under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’s (UNRWA) mandate, asylum-seekers, internally displaced people (IDPs) and other people in need of international protection.

2 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024, June 2025

3 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

4 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024, June 2025

5 Bond (ADP0003)

6 Age International (ADP0004)

7 UNHCR, Update on budgets and funding (2024 and 2025), February 2025

8 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Unveiling the cost of internal displacement, 2021

9 Plan International UK (ADP0001)

10 UNHCR (ADP0012)

11 Q31

12 Q31

13 House of Commons Library, US aid, the UK, and funding for multilateral aid bodies in 2025, June 2025

14 Q91

15 Q94

16 Q94

17 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q1

18 ODI Global (ADP0014)

19 ActionAid UK (ADP0013)

20 ODI Global (ADP0014)

21 Q108

22 Plan International UK (ADP0001)

23 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q1

24 Bond (ADP0003)

25 Q114

26 UK Government, UK steps up work to reduce illegal migration, 18 July 2024

27 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q1

28 Correspondence from the Minister of State for International Development, Latin America and the Caribbean relating to the Spending Review 2025: Official Development Assistance (ODA) - 12 June 2025

29 Correspondence from the Minister of State for International Development, Latin America and the Caribbean relating to the Spending Review 2025: Official Development Assistance (ODA) - 12 June 2025

30 Global Compact on Refugees, Special Initiative on Forced Displacement

31 Agence Française de Développement, Minka: a fund for peace and resilience

32 UNHCR (ADP0012)

33 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0009)

34 Q32

35 Fifth Report - Extreme poverty and the Sustainable Development Goals

36 Bond (ADP0003); Bond is a network of more than 350 UK organisations working in international development, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance. Membership ranges from large organisations with a worldwide presence to small and specialist charities working on specific programme issues or in specific locations.

37 World Bank, The Great Reversal: Prospects, Risks and Policies in International Development Association (IDA) countries, 2024

38 International Rescue Committee UK (ADP0017)

39 International Development Act 2002

40 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Statistics on International Development: final UK ODA spend 2023, 26 September 2024

41 Bond (ADP0003); Least-developed countries are low-income countries confronting severe structural impediments to sustainable development. They are highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks and have low levels of human assets. There are currently 44 countries on the list of LDCs, which is reviewed every three years by the United Nations Committee for Development Policy. (source: United Nations, The least developed countries (LDC) category)

42 Q30; Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Statistics on International Development: Final UK aid spend 2011–2023

43 International Organization for Migration, Operational Guide: Community Stabilization Programmes and Approaches, 2022

44 International Organization for Migration, Operational Guide: Community Stabilization Programmes and Approaches, 2022

45 Q85

46 ODI Global (ADP0014)

47 Q31

48 UK Government, The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund

49 UK Government, The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024, December 2024

50 Save the Children UK (ADP0015)

51 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, The UK’s approaches to peacebuilding, December 2022

52 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q67

53 Save the Children UK (ADP0015)

54 MAG (Mines Advisory Group) (ADP0005)

55 MAG (Mines Advisory Group) (ADP0005)

56 Cabinet Office (ISF0001)

57 Cabinet Office (ISF0001)

58 Devex, Minister hints UK blundered by axing Sudan peace work before civil war, February 2024

59 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) / Doctors without Borders, Long read: The human cost of outsourcing Europe’s borders, August 2024

60 Devex, Minister hints UK blundered by axing Sudan peace work before civil war, February 2024

61 Halo Trust, Prevention of conflict is better than having to rely on emergency aid, 17 June 2025

62 UNDP, Annual Report 2024, 2024

63 UNHCR, Climate Change & Disaster-Related Displacement

64 Plan International UK (ADP0001)

65 UNHCR (ADP0012)

66 World Bank, Climate Change Could Force 216 Million People to Migrate Within Their Own Countries by 2050, 2021

67 Q114; Q124; Q109

68 Q102

69 UNHCR, Climate Change & Disaster-Related Displacement

70 UNHCR (ADP0012)

71 UK Government, Climate Adaptation and Resilience (CLARE) programme, November 2024

72 UK Government, International Development in a Contested World, 2023

73 Q34

74 Q147

75 Q157

76 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0018)

77 Correspondence from the Minister of State for International Development, Latin America and Caribbean relating to Initial 2025/26 Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocations and the Spring Statement - 27 March 2025

78 Q168

79 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) / Doctors without Borders (ADP0010)

80 Q36

81 International Rescue Committee UK (ADP0017)

82 Q38

83 Q51

84 Q167

85 Q168

86 International Rescue Committee UK (ADP0017)

87 Q39

88 ActionAid, Costs of climate inaction: displacement and distress migration, December 2020

89 Q7

90 Q2

91 ActionAid UK (ADP0013)

92 Plan International UK (ADP0001)

93 Women’s Refugee Commission, Child Marriage in Humanitarian Settings in the Arab States Region, December 2020

94 United Nations Security Council, Women and peace and security- Report of the Secretary General, October 2019

95 Plan International UK (ADP0001)

96 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0009)

97 Q10

98 UNHCR (ADP0012)

99 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0009)

100 Q21

101 Q21

102 Q20

103 ActionAid, Bargaining for Better, April 2023

104 Q21

105 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q10

106 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q13; Oral evidence taken on 3 June 2025, Q139

107 ActionAid UK (ADP0013)

108 Q91

109 Q92; Q93

110 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q8

111 Oral evidence taken on 20 May 2025, Q42

112 Oral Evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q8

113 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q8

114 Oral evidence taken on 20 May 2025, Q42

115 ActionAid UK (ADP0013)

116 Plan International UK (ADP0001); ActionAid UK (ADP0013)

117 UN Women, Gender Mainstreaming in Development Programming, November 2014

118 Oral evidence taken on 13 May 2025, Q14

119 UN Women, Gender Mainstreaming in Development Programming, November 2014; Q39; Q103

120 UN Women, Gender Mainstreaming in Development Programming, November 2014

121 Q76

122 Q110

123 Q110

124 Q119

125 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0018)

126 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0018)

127 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0009)

128 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0018)

129 ActionAid UK (ADP0013)

130 CAFOD (ADP0006)

131 ActionAid UK (ADP0013)

132 Q82

133 Q44

134 Institute of Development Studies (ADP0008)

135 Dr Alina E. Dolea (Associate Professor at Bournemouth University) (ADP0016)

136 Institute of Development Studies (ADP0008)

137 Q43

138 CAFOD (ADP0006)

139 UNHCR (ADP0012)

140 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0018)

141 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0018)

142 Global Compact on Refugees, Multi-stakeholder Pledge: Advancing Localisation in Displacement and Statelessness Responses, 2023; The Global Compact on Refugees is a framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing. Its four key objectives are to: ease the pressures on host countries; enhance refugee self-reliance; expand access to third-country solutions; support conditions in countries of origin for safe and dignified returns.

143 Plan International UK (ADP0001)

144 Q84

145 Qq170–171

146 Third Report - FCDO and disability-inclusive development

147 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (ADP0018)

148 Q55; Plan International UK (ADP0001)

149 Age International (ADP0004)