Energy Bills Support

Summary

Average annual household bills for gas and electricity increased from £1,277 in winter 2021–22 to over £4,000 by the start of 2023. The Department deserves credit for the speed with which it provided financial support ensuring it protected many consumers from the extremes of these price increases. The Department also designed the schemes in such a way that the levels of fraud and error were comparatively low (less than 1% of total expenditure), providing clear lessons for government more widely.

The schemes cost an estimated £44 billion in total. The largely universal nature of the schemes meant some people who did not need the support still received it. When public money is tight, better targeting of support would have helped to reduce wasteful spending. The Department is still in the early stages of considering how it could target support better in the future if similar schemes were adopted again, despite it being almost three years on from the last spike in prices. The Department is relying on its evaluation of the schemes to inform its future design of any such schemes, but the evaluation findings have been delayed until summer 2025. It is also not prioritising sufficiently designing routes for providing support to those most in need, such as those with disabilities whose energy costs can be 25% higher than those without disabilities.

Consumer debt is at a worryingly high level, with £3.7 billion owed by domestic consumers for both electricity and gas in 2024 compared with £1.8 billion in 2021. Yet people who are unable to pay their energy bill often struggle to obtain advice and support from their energy supplier.

UK domestic and industrial consumers also face very high electricity prices compared to many other countries. The Department has not set a timetable for policy decisions to reduce electricity bills by shifting the cost of levies onto gas bills. It is relying on the expansion of renewables to reduce bills over time but there is uncertainty surrounding its reforms to the market that will enable consumers to benefit from the low running costs of these technologies.

The Department also has more to do to convince Parliament that it has a robust plan for ensuring security of energy supply when it is more reliant on intermittent renewables and with increasing demand from low–carbon heating and transport, a rising number of data processing centres, and a welcome move to build new homes.

Introduction

Prices for electricity, gas and other fuels in the UK and Europe increased significantly from summer 2021, initially as economies reopened after COVID–19 and later when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine impacted global energy markets. Average annual household bills for gas and electricity increased from £1,277 in winter 2021–22 to over £4,000 by the start of 2023.

In response, the government implemented eight support schemes from 2022 to 2024 to reduce the impact of increased energy bills on homes and businesses. These schemes worked by either providing grants or by capping the wholesale energy prices suppliers could charge customers.

The Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) had overall responsibility but in February 2023, following machinery of government changes, this passed to the newly created Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (the Department). The energy regulator for Great Britain, Ofgem, was responsible for monitoring supplier compliance with the obligations of the schemes, such as ensuring that bills were reduced to specified levels.

The Department estimates the schemes cost £44 billion. It is set to complete an evaluation of the impact of its schemes by Summer 2025 and is developing its approach to protecting consumers against future volatility in energy prices, such as considering how it could provide more targeted support for those consumers that need it most. The previous Public Accounts Committee reported on the schemes in June 2023.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. The Department has been slow to learn lessons about how to respond in the event of a future spike in energy prices. The Department deserves credit for the speed at which it provided financial support during the energy crisis. The schemes protected many consumers from the extremes of these price increases and were designed in such a way that the levels of fraud and error in the schemes were comparatively low at an estimated 0.7% (£291.8 million). To inform its future interventions, the Department is relying on the findings of its evaluations of the schemes. However, the final evaluations have been delayed from an expected completion date of Spring 2025 to Summer 2025. Existing schemes like the Winter Support Commitment offer protection to some households against fluctuations in international gas prices, but they are not sufficient to shield households from the full impact should there be a price spike similar to the one during the energy crisis.

2. The Department would not yet be in a position to provide more targeted support to consumers and so reduce wasteful expenditure. Most of the £44 billion of support was provided through the schemes that were universal in nature, which means that some people who did not need the support still received it, affecting the schemes’ overall value for money. The support provided also did not match the support that was needed, as lower–income households received the same level of support as higher–income households. The non–domestic sector faced similar issues, with for example small, energy–intensive businesses struggling to access support which reflected a range of very different circumstances due to the Department’s initial poor understanding of the sector. The Department is still in the early stages of considering how combining information, such as from tax systems, which are based on individuals, and energy usage based on household consumption, might support better targeting in the future, despite it being almost three years since the spike in energy prices. Stakeholders are concerned that delays in addressing administrative challenges with data matching will affect the ability for future financial support to reach those consumers who need it most.

3. The Department has not done enough to address the challenges of providing financial support to vulnerable consumers in the event of another crisis. The Department reported that between mid–2022 and mid–2023 the Energy Price Guarantee (EPG) and Energy Bills Support Scheme (EBSS) prevented around 289,000 households in England from going into fuel poverty. However, this was not enough to offset the wider impact of soaring energy prices, which still pushed an estimated 238,000 more households into fuel poverty overall. At the same time, take–up of the scheme supporting households without a domestic electricity supply, such as those in care homes and park homes, was low—only 18.2% in Great Britain and 19.1% in Northern Ireland (of the Department’s provisional estimate of eligible recipients). While the Department worked with local authorities on some schemes to identify vulnerable consumers, the low take–up suggests that this approach did not fully reach all those in need. The Department says it channelled funds via social landlords, but gaps in communication and data tracking meant some eligible tenants were still missed. The Warm Homes Discount, an existing support scheme that the Department expects will mitigate high energy prices this winter, excludes some groups who are more exposed to high energy costs like certain people with disabilities whose costs can be 25% higher than those without disabilities.

4. The Department and Ofgem are not doing enough to ensure people falling into debt with their energy bills receive the advice and support they need from their energy supplier. At the same time as energy prices have risen significantly so has the extent to which people have fallen into debt with their energy bills. Consumer energy debt is at a worryingly high level, with £3.7 billion owed by domestic consumers for both electricity and gas in 2024 compared with £1.8 billion in 2021. Millions of people are living in cold conditions and cutting back on essential costs such as food. Many people who are unable to pay their energy bill struggle to receive good, accurate and helpful advice or support from their energy supplier. The Department accepts this is a serious issue and is working with Citizens Advice to look at what can be done to provide a stronger debt advice service to support customers. Ofgem has recently launched a review of service standards and support for people in debt; and the Department has initiated a wider review of Ofgem to ensure that it has the powers to address any poor outcomes for energy consumers. These reviews provide an opportunity to ensure consumers receive better support from their energy suppliers when they face difficulty paying their bills.

5. We remain concerned that even after the crisis has subsided, UK electricity bills are the highest of the countries providing comparable data to the International Energy Agency. The UK had the highest electricity price out of 25 countries reporting both domestic and industrial electricity prices in 2023, (including taxes and levies) and electricity is currently four–times more expensive than gas. Despite repeated promises, the Department has delayed taking action to rebalance energy prices by shifting the cost of environmental levies from electricity to gas. In addition, the Department is reviewing how electricity prices are set for households so that they can benefit from cheaper rates if demand is low or when the weather means more energy is produced. But this review has been running for three years and remains on an uncertain timetable, meaning it is unclear when consumers will start to see the benefits through reductions to their bills.

6. The Department has more to do to convince Parliament that it has a robust plan for ensuring security of energy supply to meet increasing demand. The security of energy supply is the highest priority for the Department. Energy demand is set to rise from increasing numbers of electric vehicles and heat pumps, data processing centres, as well as the move to building homes. The stability of the energy grid might be affected by the Department’s plans to move towards cleaner power by 2030, because intermittent renewable energy from wind and solar vary according to the weather conditions. Intermittent energy sources will therefore need to be complemented by flexible and baseload power. Nuclear is an important low–carbon form of baseload generation but there are questions around the life and capacity of the existing plants and the time needed to get small modular nuclear reactors up and running. In January 2025, the National Energy Systems Operator issued a routine notification to energy providers to increase supply, after energy generation briefly fell below a margin set to make sure demand in the days ahead was met. It acknowledged, however, that there had been some speculation about the seriousness of the situation. The Department indicated that supply levels had been lower in the past and the system responded effectively to the potential supply issues. But such interventions are not cost free–this response cost £21 million. DESNZ needs to make sure its public reporting of such incidents meets the highest standards of transparency.

1 Supporting energy consumers

Introduction

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (the Department) on its work to provide financial support to consumers in the light of significant increases in their energy bills.¹

2. Prices for electricity, gas and other fuels in the UK and Europe increased significantly from summer 2021, initially as economies reopened after COVID–19 and later when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine impacted on global energy markets. Average annual household bills for gas and electricity increased from £1,277 in winter 2021–22 to over £4,000 by the start of 2023. In response, the government introduced eight support schemes from 2022 to 2024 to reduce the impact of increased energy bills on domestic and non–domestic customers.²

3. The main schemes were the Energy Price Guarantee (EPG), which capped the average domestic bill at £2,500 from October 2022 to June 2023 (for a typical household) and £3,000 from July 2023 to March 2024; and the Energy Bills Relief Scheme (EBRS) which provided equivalent support for the non–domestic sector until March 2023. These schemes were supplemented by other interventions to provide financial support to households which, for example, used alternative fuels such as oil.³

4. The Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) had overall responsibility for the schemes until February 2023 when, following machinery of government changes, this passed to the newly created Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (the Department).⁴ The energy regulator for Great Britain, Ofgem, was responsible for monitoring supplier compliance with the obligations of the schemes, such as ensuring that bills were reduced to specified levels.⁵

5. The Department estimated that the schemes cost £44 billion and had a comparatively low level of fraud and error (less than 1% of total expenditure).⁶ It expects to complete its evaluations of the schemes by Summer 2025, through which it expects to identify lessons learned from the schemes’ effectiveness and ways to provide support in the future if there was another spike in prices.⁷ The price cap for the period October to December 2024 was £1,717, which is higher than the level before the energy crisis.⁸

Preparedness for future interventions

6. The Department acted at pace to design and implement the schemes, and ensure they were in place for winter 2022–23.⁹ For example, it started to provide financial support to households three weeks after it announced the domestic Energy Price Guarantee and introduced the non–domestic Energy Bills Relief Scheme in three months.¹⁰ The NAO concluded that the Department was undoubtedly successful at protecting many consumers from the extremes of price increases.¹¹

7. In designing the energy bills support schemes, the Department drew on lessons learned from support schemes during the pandemic, such as reducing opportunities for fraud by using information from energy suppliers to limit the need to apply for support and verify energy usage. It also worked with fraud experts in government, including the Public Sector Fraud Authority. Fraud and error levels in the energy support schemes were lower than for other schemes implemented during the pandemic.¹² The Department estimated a fraud and error rate of 0.7% of scheme payments, worth £291.8 million.¹³ This is compared to 11% for Bounce Back Loans and an estimate by the Public Sector Fraud Authority of government fraud and error levels ranging from 0.5% to 5%.¹⁴

8. The Department has commissioned independent evaluations of all of its domestic and non–domestic financial support schemes.¹⁵ As part of these evaluations, the Department is reviewing whether approaches like universal support were effective, or if the cost of providing support to homes and businesses that did not necessarily need it (known as ‘deadweight’) was justified by the broader economic benefits.¹⁶

9. Despite it being nearly three years since the energy crisis, the Department has yet to complete all of these evaluations. However, it told us it would be relying on the findings it does have to inform any possible future interventions.¹⁷ An interim evaluation of the domestic schemes is delayed from the initial target of August 2024 to Spring 2025, while final evaluations of both the domestic and non–domestic schemes are delayed from spring 2025 to Summer 2025, partly due to the General Election in July 2024.¹⁸

10. The Department said it was frustrated that the results of the evaluations would not be available to it sooner.¹⁹ Even so, it told us it was confident that it was “ready to deal with whatever happens in international energy markets”, but stressed that “there is no evidence that there will be a further price spike”. It pointed to schemes like the Winter Support Commitment, which offers some households an extra £25 to support them with their energy bills, as a way of keeping bills affordable. However, these schemes would not be sufficient to shield households from the full impact of price rises should there be another energy crisis.²⁰

Targeting support

11. Most of the £44 billion of support was provided through schemes that were universal in nature, which means that some people who did not need the support still received it, affecting the schemes’ overall value for money.²¹ Written evidence we received from Octopus Energy, for example, said that while the decision to provide universal support was necessary for the Department to move at pace, it resulted in higher than necessary costs.²² The support provided also did not match the support that was needed, as lower–income households received the same level of support as higher–income households.²³ The Department told us that there were advantages in having broad–based schemes, as the “sheer scale of the price rises” meant that the number of households affected was so high that a universal intervention was required.²⁴ But the Department acknowledged that it had to accept the risk of ‘deadweight’ in the schemes in order to introduce the schemes quickly.²⁵

12. The Department said that even if it had wanted to, it would not have been able to target support at the time of introducing the schemes due to challenges with identifying household income to determine an appropriate level of support.²⁶ Written evidence from the Energy Systems Catapult and Fair by Design highlighted a need for targeted support.²⁷ To do this, the Department told us that it is now working with the Department for Work and Pensions to make best use of employment benefits data.²⁸ It added that it is also working with the health service and local government to identify individuals in particular need of support alongside energy suppliers. The Department recognised that targeting support requires data linking to be effective, but highlighted “very significant technical and practical challenges” in doing so. It told us the “most difficult nut to crack” is still income data, which is collected on an individual level while energy usage is based on household consumption.²⁹ The income data for self–employed individuals is also lagged, so it is “quite a long way out of date by the time it is fully organised”.³⁰

13. The Department acknowledged that it does not have “a full answer at this stage” to the issues with matching income data with energy supplier data, despite it being almost three years since the spike in energy prices.³¹ Fair by Design highlighted that combining wider data from different departments alongside supplier data to target money to those who need it the most is not happening.³²

14. The Department acknowledged that it knew less about the non–domestic sector than the domestic sector at the time of the interventions and that this “threw up a number of issues and complexities”.³³ It told us that targeting the non–domestic sector was a challenge because of “level of data to allow us to categorise non–domestic suppliers into particular groups”. Although it used standard classifications of industry to understand which sectors were particularly exposed to high energy costs, and which were more energy–intensive, the Department said there were “limitations around that data in the way it groups different sets of customers”.³⁴ The Department’s poor understanding of the non–domestic sector led to it providing identical support for all businesses.³⁵ Small businesses, however, do not have the buying power of some of the larger non–domestic customers to get good deals, and have a variety of contracts and arrangements.³⁶ Some small businesses with high energy usage such as hospitality may have also missed out on additional support that they needed before the government began to target businesses deemed to be energy and trade intensive in March 2024.³⁷ The Department said that it would want to target a future scheme more precisely using its “understanding of the different exposure that different parts of the sector had” to high energy prices.³⁸

Identifying consumers most in need

15. The Department reported that from mid–2022 to mid–2023, the Energy Price Guarantee (EPG) and Energy Bills Support Scheme (EBSS) prevented around 289,000 households in England from going into fuel poverty.³⁹ However, this was not enough to offset the wider impact of soaring energy prices, which still pushed an estimated 238,000 more households into fuel poverty overall.⁴⁰

16. Take–up of the energy bills support schemes was lower among harder–to–reach households that did not receive a payment directly from their energy supplier; ⁴¹ and may have been affected disproportionately by energy price fluctuations.⁴² These households did not receive an automatic payment because, for example, they did not have a domestic electricity contract with a supplier, such as those living in park homes and on boats. They instead needed to apply for eligible support through schemes like the EBSS Alternative Funding (EBSS AF). Take–up of the EBSS AF in Great Britain was 18.2% of a provisional estimate of 798,700 potentially eligible households; and in Northern Ireland take–up of the same scheme was 19.1% of a provisional estimate of 28,000 potentially eligible households.⁴³

17. Although the Department worked with local authorities on some of the schemes aimed at households who were harder to reach,⁴⁴ the low take–up suggests that this approach did not identify all those in need.⁴⁵ The Department said that it attempted to use intermediaries such as social landlords, providing funds directly to landlords with a requirement to pass them on to tenants. However, the Department acknowledged that it “did not track the right people,” and there were “places where communication did not work”, adding that “absolutely, there were lessons to learn” in how it can do this.⁴⁶

18. The Department said that the “biggest item of support” available to mitigate high energy prices this winter for vulnerable consumers, mainly those on benefits such as pension credit, is the Warm Home Discount scheme,⁴⁷ which provides a £150 discount to eligible consumers.⁴⁸ But certain vulnerable individuals like those with chronic conditions or disabilities that mean they are higher energy users are excluded from receiving this support because they are not included in the category of means–tested benefits.⁴⁹ Written evidence we received from Sense showed that, on average, disabled households face energy bills 25% higher than non–disabled households; and, as of May 2024, 37% of disabled people on benefits were behind on energy bills.⁵⁰

Consumer debt advice and support

19. Alongside a rise in energy prices, Ofgem statistics from June 2024 show the total owed by domestic consumers for both electricity and gas was over £3.7 billion compared with £1.8 billion at the end of 2021.⁵¹ A report by Clear Consultancy Services suggested that millions of people are living in cold conditions and cutting back on essential costs such as food; and concluded that “energy is the fastest growing type of debt presenting at debt advice services”.⁵² The same report also concluded that the value of energy debts rose by 33% between 2022–23 and 2023–24.⁵³ It also suggested that “the majority of debt advisers said that energy suppliers are the worst, or one of the worst, categories of creditors that they deal with.”

20. The Department recognised this as a serious issue. It made clear that, because in the first instance consumers facing energy debts should contact their energy supplier, the regulatory regime should that require suppliers to offer “good, accurate and helpful advice” and that the Department was expecting this of Ofgem. It told us that it was exploring options around the issues of the support and advice [that energy suppliers] offer consumers. ⁵⁴ The Department said it has started a review of Ofgem which is looking to make sure it has the powers and capabilities it needs to address any poor outcomes for consumers.⁵⁵ It is also working with Citizens Advice on whether more could be done to provide a “stronger debt advice service” for consumers.⁵⁶ It also told us that it was working closely with Ofgem as it is consulting on and preparing its new consumer debt strategy.⁵⁷ Written evidence we received from Fair by Design highlighted concerns, however, that a debt relief scheme proposed by Ofgem will not implemented until winter 2025.⁵⁸

2 Responding to future energy price volatility

Reducing electricity bills

21. The United Kingdom has the highest price (including taxes and levies) for domestic electricity out of 25 International Energy Agency (IEA) countries reporting in 2023. Similarly, the UK has the highest price (including taxes and levies) for industrial electricity out of 24 IEA countries, again reporting in 2023.⁵⁹ The price of the UK’s electricity is almost four times that of its gas. This is partly because the government’s levy for environmental policy costs (such as schemes to support renewable energy development) accounts for over 10% of an electricity bill.⁶⁰

22. The Department recognised that rebalancing was an important issue, given the ratio of electricity to gas prices was “high compared to many comparative countries” as a “lot of the policy [ … ] and network costs in this country are placed on electricity rather than on gas”.⁶¹ But it has delayed addressing this issue for three years.⁶² The Department told us that it is important to address this issue in a way which is affordable and fair.⁶³ This is because some households cannot avoid using gas and might see their bills increase if levies were moved from electricity to gas bills.⁶⁴ The Department provided assurances that it was taking this issue seriously, but could not provide a timetable for completing its planned work on rebalancing.⁶⁵

23. Three years ago, in April 2022, the previous government launched its Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (REMA) as part of its British Energy Security Strategy. This was the government’s flagship policy to enable a net zero power sector by 2035, subject to security of supply, while ensuring a fair deal for consumers.⁶⁶ The Department aims to review how electricity prices are set for households so that they can benefit from cheaper rates if demand is low or when the weather means more energy is produced by intermittent renewable generation. The Department explained that decoupling electricity bills from fossil fuel prices would make them more stable and less exposed to international risks.⁶⁷ The Department told us that it has “narrow[ed] down on a set of key decisions [it thinks] are important for shaping the market of the future”. The Department told us that it is committed to setting out its proposals “later this year”.⁶⁸

Ensuring security of energy supply

24. Analysis from the Office for Budget Responsibility concluded that the size of the government’s financial support for energy bills (relative to Gross Domestic Product) was one of the highest in Europe because of the UK’s reliance on natural gas.⁶⁹ The Department highlighted to us the importance of its clean power mission in “getting us off the rollercoaster” of international fossil fuel markets and volatile prices.⁷⁰ It told us the deployment of, for example, low carbon renewable electricity will reduce the UK’s reliance on gas.⁷¹

25. The Department described energy security and the security of supply as its highest priority. We asked the Department what it thought about concerns, set out in a document published by Net Zero Watch called “Blackout Risk in the GB Grid”, that events such as certain weather conditions, or interruption to a few power stations, led to a situation in early January where the level of supply in the grid to meet energy demand fell to what it described as “worryingly low levels”; with a risk of “cutting off certain areas of electricity or even a blackout”.⁷² Indeed, on 8 January 2025, the National Energy Systems Operator (NESO) issued to energy providers an energy margin notice, one of a range of tools it uses to make sure there is a healthy margin between the demand for energy and the available supply.⁷³ It cost NESO £21 million to achieve this (a similar intervention on 14 January 2022 cost £25 million).⁷⁴ The Department assured us this was a “normal part” of the system’s operation. It explained that such notices are “routine signals to the market about supply needing to be available”.⁷⁵ It also told us that it “did not agree with the analysis” in the document from which we drew our concerns.⁷⁶ NESO acknowledged, however, that there had been some speculation about the seriousness of the situation. In response, it published an article setting out the actions it took and shared the publicly available data that informed its actions.⁷⁷

26. Demand on the grid is likely to grow due to the increased demand for electric cars and heat pumps and a rising number of data processing centres, as well as the move to building more new homes.⁷⁸ In addition, the Department also has plans to achieve a decarbonised, or clean, energy system by 2030, which might impact on the stability of the grid because of the increased reliance on intermittent renewable sources of energy, such as wind and solar power. The Department recognised that it needs to make sure that, across the grid, it has sufficient flexible generation to accommodate variations in supply from intermittent renewables which vary according to weather conditions. It also noted the need to ensure that the grid can sustain a consistent pace of operation.⁷⁹

27. In December 2024, the government published its pathway to a clean power system by 2030.⁸⁰ We asked the Department what part it expects nuclear to play in the mix of low–carbon energy.⁸¹ Given the timescales involved to build new nuclear infrastructure versus ambitions for clean power by 2030, the government’s focus is mainly on existing nuclear plants.⁸² The Department said, however, there are questions around the exact life of the remaining nuclear plants in this country.⁸³ Looking to what comes next, the Department told us that there will be more sites for nuclear power stations, particularly small modular nuclear reactors, a “new technology” for which Great British Nuclear is running a competition, concluding by spring 2025.⁸⁴

28. We asked the Department why it was taking so long to get small modular nuclear reactors “up and going”.⁸⁵ We also asked how it was going to make sure that a high percentage of the content of a modular nuclear reactor was from the UK (which was not the case with offshore wind farms).⁸⁶ The Department told us that there was nowhere in the world with an operating small modular nuclear reactor, and that it needed to make sure the procurement exercise for this technology was run appropriately.⁸⁷

Formal minutes

Thursday 20 March 2025

Members present

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, in the Chair

Mr Clive Betts

Luke Charters

Anna Dixon

Peter Fortune

Rachel Gilmour

Sarah Hall

Chris Kane

Sarah Olney

Declaration of interests

The following declarations of interest relating to the inquiry were made:

6 February 2025

The Chair declared the following interest: Business is part of a government energy generation scheme.

Energy Bills Support

Draft Report (Energy Bills Support), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 28 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Nineteenth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Thursday 27 March at 9.30 a.m.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Thursday 6 February 2025

Jeremy Pocklington CB, Permanent Secretary, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; Jonathan Mills, Director General, Energy Market and Supply, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; Ben Golding, Director of the Clean Power 2030 Unit, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Q1-71

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

EBS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 Centre for Energy Policy, University of Strathclyde EBS0004

2 Energy Systems Catapult EBS0001

3 Fair By Design EBS0008

4 Octopus Energy EBS0003

5 Sense EBS0002

6 The Energy Efficiency Infrastructure Group EBS0006

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

Session 2024–25

Number	Title	Reference
18th	Use of AI in Government	HC 356
17th	The remediation of dangerous cladding	HC 362
16th	Whole of Government Accounts 2022-23	HC 367
15th	Prison estate capacity	HC 366
14th	Public charge points for electric vehicles	HC 512
13th	Improving educational outcomes for disadvantaged children	HC 365
12th	Crown Court backlogs	HC 348
11th	Excess votes 2023-24	HC 719
10th	HS2: Update following the Northern leg cancellation	HC 357
9th	Tax evasion in the retail sector	HC 355
8th	Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage	HC 351
7th	Asylum accommodation: Home Office acquisition of former HMP Northeye	HC 361
6th	DWP Customer Service and Accounts 2023-24	HC 354
5th	NHS financial sustainability	HC 350
4th	Tackling homelessness	HC 352
3rd	HMRC Customer Service and Accounts	HC 347
2nd	Condition and maintenance of Local Roads in England	HC 349
1st	Support for children and young people with special educational needs	HC 353

---

Footnotes

1 C&AG’s Report, Energy bills support: an update, Session 2023–24, HC 232, 14 November 2024

2 C&AG’s Report, para 1

3 C&AG’s Report, infographic on page 6

4 C&AG’s Report, para 2

5 C&AG’s Report, para 1.6

6 C&AG’s Report, para 10

7 Qq 16, 18

8 C&AG’s Report, para 1.3

9 Q 9

10 C&AG’s Report, para 9

11 C&AG’s Report, para 17

12 Q 34

13 C&AG’s Report, para 10

14 C&AG’s Report, para 10

15 Q 16; C&AG’s Report, para 3.3

16 Qq 12, 16

17 Q 20

18 Q 17; C&AG’s Report, para 3.3

19 Q 17

20 Q 9

21 Q 12; C&AG’s Report, para 12, 4.2

22 EBS0003

23 C&AG’s Report, para 12, 4.2

24 Q 12

25 Q 30

26 Q 13

27 EBS0001; EBS0008

28 Qq 13, 17

29 Q 13

30 Q 13

31 Q 31

32 EBS0008

33 Q 46

34 Q 48

35 Q 46; C&AG’s Report, para 15

36 Qq 46, 48, 50

37 Q 46; C&AG’s Report, para 4.8

38 Q 48

39 C&AG’s Report, para 12

40 Q 28; C&AG’s Report, para 12

41 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.14, 3.14

42 EBS0006

43 C&AG’s Report, para 3.14, infographic on page 6

44 Q 32; C&AG’s Report, infographic on page 6

45 C&AG’s Report, para 9; Q 28

46 Qq 32, 33

47 Qq 42, 43

48 C&AG’s Report, para 4.7

49 Qq 44, 45

50 EBS0002

51 C&AG’s Report, para 4.6

52 Clear Consultancy Services, Supporting households in energy debt, February 2025

53 Clear Consultancy Services, Supporting households in energy debt, February 2025

54 Q 52

55 Qq 53, 67

56 Q 52

57 Q 53

58 EBS0008

59 Q 68; Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Quarterly Energy Prices UK April to June 2024, September 2024

60 Committee of Public Accounts, Decarbonising home heating, Thirty-Seventh Report of Session 2023–24, HC 653, May 2024, paragraph 10; Qq 21, 22, 65

61 Q 21

62 Committee of Public Accounts, Decarbonising home heating, Thirty-Seventh Report of Session 2023–24, HC 653, May 2024, paragraph 11; Qq 21, 22

63 Q 21

64 Q 21

65 Q 22

66 Q 11; C&AG’s Report, para 4.14

67 Q 66

68 Q 54

69 C&AG’s Report, para 4.12

70 Q 9

71 Qq 9, 71

72 Q 5

73 Qq 5, 6, 8

74 National Energy Systems Operator, What happened with margins on 8 January?, 14 January 2025

75 Q 6

76 Q 8

77 National Energy Systems Operator, What happened with margins on 8 January?, 14 January 2025

78 Qq 6, 67

79 Q 7

80 Clean Power 2030 Action Plan: A new era of clean electricity, December 2024

81 Q 61

82 Qq 55, 61

83 Q 61

84 Qq, 61, 62

85 Q 62

86 Q 64

87 Qq 62, 64