Immigration: Skilled worker visas

Summary

From when the government opened the Skilled Worker visa route in December 2020 up to the end of 2024, 1.18 million people applied to enter the United Kingdom via this route, including, 630,000 as dependants of the main applicant.

The Home Office made changes to the Skilled Worker visa route without a full assessment of the risks or potential impacts, including the risks of non-compliance with visa rules and exploitation of migrant workers. It made changes to the route quickly – such as expanding the route to support the social care sector in 2022 – and with insufficient collaboration with other departments on the role that immigration should play in sectoral workforce strategies. Nearly three times more people used the route in the first three years than the Home Office expected, but it has not evaluated whether the route was meeting its objectives, or how the use of the route varied across different sectors or regions.

The Home Office has performed well when processing ‘straightforward’ applications for Skilled Worker visas, but its public reporting provides a narrow view of its performance, since it does not publish any information on how long it takes to process the nearly one in five cases that are not ‘straightforward’. It has not made sufficient use of customer feedback to improve its customer service or the efficiency of its operations.

From when the Skilled Worker route was expanded in 2022 up to the end of 2024, 648,100 people applied to enter the United Kingdom on a Health and Care Worker visa, including dependants of the main applicant. This has helped to reduce social care vacancies, but there has also been evidence of exploitation of migrant workers. In response, the Home Office has strengthened its approach to ensuring that people and sponsors comply with the terms of their visas and licences. However, there is insufficient cross-government collaboration to prevent exploitation, take enforcement action and safeguard people who are affected. Further, the Home Office does not understand what happens to people when their visas come to an end.

Shortly after we held our evidence session the Government published its Immigration White Paper, setting out a series of changes to reduce net migration. In implementing the White Paper, it will be important for the Home Office to learn from the findings of this report, particularly in developing a wider, evidence-based approach to assessing potential changes to the Skilled Worker route and learning lessons from the care sector to strengthen its risk assessment in other sectors, such as construction.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. The Home Office has not worked collaboratively with other departments to fully assess the impacts of changes to the Skilled Worker visa route on different sectors of the labour market and regions of the United Kingdom. While decisions on immigration rules are subject to collective government agreement, the Home Office is responsible for immigration policy, working with other departments to consider competing objectives. However, the government expanded the Skilled Worker visa in 2022 to include care workers without producing an impact assessment. When considering potential rule changes, there has been insufficient collaboration between the Home Office and other departments on the role of immigration in sectoral workforce strategies. As a result, the Home Office has not had a full understanding of the potential consequences of changes for different sectors of the labour market or regions of the United Kingdom. In particular, the Home Office needs an up-to-date understanding of skill shortages and salary levels across the devolved nations to understand how the route is working across the United Kingdom. The government has recently published the Immigration White Paper, which included establishing the Labour Market Evidence Group to help develop a stronger evidence base on the domestic labour market and a clearer understanding of the role that immigration should play in key sectors.

2. The Home Office has not had a full understanding of how immigration has helped to address skill shortages or the unintended consequences of the much higher than anticipated use of the Skilled Worker route. More people have used the Skilled Worker visa route than the Home Office anticipated in 2020. It forecast that it would issue 360,000 Skilled Worker visas to overseas applicants (including dependants) over the three years to April 2024, but it issued 931,000. From when the government opened the Skilled Worker visa route in December 2020 up to the end of 2024, 1.18 million people applied to enter the United Kingdom via this route, including, 630,000 as dependants of the main applicant. The route has brought benefits and enabled employers to recruit internationally to help address skill shortages. However, there have also been consequences, such as an 80% increase in people staying permanently in the United Kingdom in 2024 compared to 2021, and the number of people claiming asylum after entering on a Skilled Worker visa rising from 53 in 2022 to 5,300 in 2024. The Home Office reviewed the use of the route in 2022—before its expansion to include care workers—and the recent White Paper sets out the occupations making use of Skilled Worker visas. However, the Home Office has not yet published its evaluation of the route, including whether it is meeting its objectives, the impact on skills shortages across different sectors of the labour market or regions of the United Kingdom, and whether the route has operated as intended.

3. The Home Office opened the Skilled Worker visa route for social care workers quickly and failed to understand the risks. In 2022, the Home Office eased entry requirements for care workers to help the social care sector respond to vacancies created by the COVID-19 pandemic. It moved quickly to expand the Skilled Worker route and did not consider the risks of non-compliance with visa rules. From when the route was expanded in 2022 up to the end of 2024, 648,100 people applied for Health and Care Worker visas, including the dependants of main applicants. The Home Office identified evidence of exploitation of migrant care workers but was initially slow to respond. Since 2023, it has strengthened controls to test the genuineness of applications and increase its compliance activity, which resulted in the approval rate for Health and Care Worker visas decreasing from 99% to 81%. The Home Office acknowledges that the Skilled Worker visa route has not worked well in the care sector and that it could have done more to ensure compliance with visa rules. The government has recently announced the end of overseas recruitment for care workers, as part of its efforts to reduce net migration. We are concerned about the potential impacts of this decision for the sector, which expects demands for social care roles to increase over the next 10 years. However, the forthcoming NHS 10-year plan could address the lack of parity in pay and conditions between the NHS and social care, making it easier to recruit more domestic workers in this sector.

4. The cross-government response to tackling the exploitation of migrant workers has been insufficient and, within this, the Home Office’s response has been slow and ineffective. Concerns about the exploitation of migrant workers are well understood and have been raised previously by the Committee. Tackling this exploitation needs a cross-government response to prevent and detect abuses, and take enforcement action when exploitation is identified. The Home Office works with other bodies including the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which focuses on exploitation and labour market abuses, sector regulators and departments such as HM Revenue and Customs. Within this, the Home Office has not done enough to fulfil its responsibilities. It has not taken sufficient action to prevent exploitation in applicants’ home countries and identify bogus agents, relying on sponsors complying with immigration rules. Further, it is not clear whether arrangements to safeguard care workers whose employers’ sponsor licence has been revoked—around 34,000 people—are working effectively. The Home Office works with local authorities but was unaware of how arrangements were working in practice or the adequacy of support provided. We are also not convinced by the Home Office’s approach to meeting its responsibility for preventing modern slavery, illustrated by it not knowing how many people with Skilled Worker visas had been referred as potential victims.

5. The Home Office does not understand the extent to which people are complying with the terms of their visa and leaving the United Kingdom when they should. The Home Office did not assess how the risks of non-compliance with visa rules would change when the Skilled Worker route was introduced in 2020, or after care workers were added in 2022. It accepts that it could have done more to put appropriate controls in place. As evidence of exploitation of migrant workers emerged, the Home Office strengthened its response, establishing a Risk Hub to centralise risk identification, introducing new compliance interventions and conducting more detailed checks to test the genuineness of applications. However, there are still areas of weakness. For example, we are concerned that the Home Office did not understand the practical challenges of applying controls in the care sector. It referred just 1% of sponsors for enhanced compliance checks in 2024, with significant numbers of sponsors who obtained licences before the Home Office strengthened controls not subject to checks. Further, it does not understand whether those who have lost their sponsorship are taken on by other sponsors or what happens to people at the end of their visa, including whether they leave the United Kingdom after their visa expires or remain without a valid visa and work illegally.

6. The Home Office has not done enough to understand the experience of customers and improve the service they receive. The Home Office has achieved good performance in managing ‘straightforward’ applications – processing 94% of these within its service standards in 2023 and 2024 (970,000 cases). However, it takes much longer to process applications on which the applicant has not provided all of the information and further checks are needed to make a decision – which represented 18% of applications between the end of 2021 and 2024 (330,000 cases). The Home Office refers to these as ‘complex’ applications, it removes these from its public reporting and has no target processing time. Further, the Home Office does not have reliable data on the processing times for ‘complex’ cases and sponsor licence applications, which means it does not fully understand its performance. The Home Office’s target of 80% of applicants being satisfied with the application service illustrates a lack of ambition, suggesting it is content with one in five of its customers being dissatisfied. It is not doing enough to understand the customer perspective and make improvements to its service, including addressing concerns from applicants and sponsors about complicated guidance and poor customer support. Applicants and sponsors are also unable to track the progress of their applications, which is the cause of many complaints about the service. The Home Office’s planned transformation of its sponsorship system has also been delayed and it needs to address operational issues with the IT system used for processing visa applications.

1 Introduction

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office on its management and operation of the Skilled Worker visa route.¹

2. The Skilled Worker visa route is the main immigration route for people to apply to work in the United Kingdom. The government opened the route in December 2020 following the UK’s exit from the European Union, which ended European free movement rights. Its aims were to deliver a fair and flexible visa system which enables the United Kingdom to attract the skills it needs and supports wider plans for economic growth. The government aimed to support employers to recruit skilled workers from overseas, alongside developing wider initiatives to encourage them to train and invest in the domestic workforce.²

3. From the start of 2021 up to the end of 2024, the Home Office received 1.78 million applications across all work visas, of which 1.18 million were for Skilled Worker visas. The number of people applying has increased from 127,300 in 2021 to 256,300 in 2024, with a peak of 509,100 applications in 2023. The increase in the number of applications has been driven by the expansion of the route to include care workers in 2022. At the end of 2024, 648,100 people, including dependants, had applied for Health and Care Worker visas since the route was expanded, making up 65% of applications received for Skilled Worker visas over this period.³

4. The Home Office is responsible for immigration policy, including controlling immigration, and considering applications to enter the United Kingdom. Its UK Visas and Immigration Directorate is responsible for managing the Skilled Worker visa route, making decisions on applications, and ensuring people and employers remain compliant with visa requirements.⁴

5. The Skilled Worker visa route is designed to offer flexibility to respond to changes in government policy and economic needs. We held our evidence session on 8 May 2025, shortly after which the government published its Immigration White Paper, setting out changes intended to reduce net migration.⁵

6. We also received written submissions from a range of sources, including charity organisations, professional membership bodies and sector representatives, as well as academic researchers. A full list of the written evidence we received is available on the inquiry page of the Committee’s website.⁶ Particular issues and concerns drawn to our attention included:

• the care sector’s reliance on international recruitment and problems applying the Home Office’s genuine vacancy test, which seeks to establish whether the job offer is genuine;
• exploitation in the care sector, including the power imbalance that comes with sponsorship, and the financial crimes that take place;
• the inadequate level of support provided to workers whose sponsor has had their licence revoked;
• the impact of the Spring 2024 rule changes on recruitment in different sectors, including the disproportionate impact of the salary threshold in regions outside of London and the South East; and
• the prohibitive costs, complex guidance, delays and poor customer service encountered by applicants and sponsors trying to use the system.

2 Development of the Skilled Worker visa route

Assessing the impact of changes to entry requirements

7. Since 2021, the government has made a series of changes to entry requirements for Skilled Worker visas. In 2022, it expanded the route to respond to the needs of the care sector.⁷ In Spring 2024, the government tightened entry requirements for Skilled Worker visas to help reduce net migration.⁸ The government’s Immigration White Paper, published shortly after our evidence session, proposes further changes to Skilled Worker visas to reduce net migration, including increasing the skill threshold back to degree level and above; raising English language requirements for applicants and their dependants; and increasing the qualifying period for citizenship from 5 to 10 years.⁹

8. While changes to immigration rules are subject to collective government agreement, the Home Office is responsible for designing and implementing immigration policy.¹⁰ We asked the Home Office what work it had done to assess the impacts of changes to the route ahead of their implementation.¹¹ It told us that it balances government policy with the priorities of other departments, and seeks to ensure that views of all sectors are represented.¹² However, it did not publish an impact assessment before expanding the Skilled Worker route to include care workers in 2022 and only published its impact assessment on the Spring 2024 changes in September 2024. The National Audit Office also found that the Home Office’s impact assessments could be improved by including success criteria and evaluation plans, and assessing compliance risks.¹³

9. When considering the design of the Skilled Worker visa route, the Home Office told us it is important to have the best sectoral workforce analysis and get the balance right between the domestic labour market and migration. It also acknowledged the need to reflect government policy on net migration.¹⁴ The Home Office has drawn on the work of the Migration Advisory Committee, which undertakes independent labour market analysis, when considering the need for potential changes to Skilled Worker visas.¹⁵ It has also engaged with departments to try to understand the likely levels of demand and skill needs across different sectors.¹⁶

10. Despite this, we were concerned that collaboration was not effective and that there had been insufficient consideration of the impacts of rule changes. In particular, we were not convinced that there had been sufficient collaboration between the Home Office and departments on the role of immigration in sectoral workforce strategies.¹⁷ One result of this is that the Home Office has not had a full understanding of how the Skilled Worker route works for different regions of the United Kingdom, including the devolved nations.¹⁸ For example, we highlighted a mismatch between the needs of the care sector—which has skill shortages in rural areas—and where most migrant workers are brought in to work.¹⁹ We urged the Home Office to better understand how the route is working across the whole of the United Kingdom, working with departments, and relevant bodies, to develop an up-to-date understanding of the skill shortages and salary levels across the devolved nations. The Home Office accepted that there was more it could do to join-up across government and identified the need to formalise processes for cross-government working at an official level to improve the effectiveness of collaboration.²⁰

11. In July 2024, the government announced plans to develop closer links between immigration policy and sectoral labour market policies.²¹ The Home Office said this would lead to a better understanding of how to flex Skilled Worker visas.²² This includes bringing together bodies such as Skills England and equivalent organisations in devolved nations, the Industrial Strategy Advisory Council, Department of Work and Pensions and Migration Advisory Committee.²³ Shortly after our evidence session, the government published its Immigration White Paper, which formalised these arrangements by establishing the Labour Market Evidence Group. The aim is to strengthen the evidence base on the state of the labour market and the role that different policies should play, rather than always relying on migration.²⁴ The Home Office told us that it had begun to consider how this body will operate, and hoped to get the necessary processes and structures in place in a matter of months.²⁵

Understanding how the Skilled Worker visa route is operating

12. The number of people who have used the Skilled Worker visa route is much higher than the Home Office originally expected, driven by large increases in the number of Health and Care Worker visas.²⁶ The Home Office forecast that it would issue 360,000 Skilled Worker visas to people entering the country over the period 2021 to 2024 but issued 931,000 visas over this period.²⁷ The Home Office told us that the Skilled Worker visa route has been used flexibly to successfully target skill shortages and pressures that have arisen across the labour market. It also pointed to analysis which showed the benefits of bringing workers, particularly higher-skilled workers, into the economy.²⁸

13. We asked the Home Office what actions it was taking to address some of the unintended consequences of the higher than expected use of the route, such as an 80% increase in people staying permanently in the United Kingdom in 2024 compared to 2021 and the number of people claiming asylum after entering the United Kingdom on a Skilled Worker visa, rising from 53 in 2022 to 5,300 in 2024. The Home Office told us it had taken steps to address the number of people entering on a visa and claiming asylum, such as the requirement for applicants to demonstrate they can support themselves when entering the United Kingdom and that they have a genuine role to come to. The Home Office also pointed to its wider work with countries where there is a higher prevalence of people coming into the asylum system.²⁹

14. The Home Office has not completed an evaluation of the use of Skilled Worker visas since 2022, which was too early to provide a full view of impacts and pre-dated the significant changes to the route in 2022 and 2024.³⁰ As a result, it does not have a full understanding of how the route is being used, its contribution to the economy or impact on skill shortages across different sectors and regions.³¹ The Home Office began an evaluation in 2024 looking at how salary thresholds are set, how changes to the route have worked and its collaboration with other government bodies. It told us this would be published later in 2025.³² The Immigration White Paper contained data on the use of the route across different occupations, but this focused on inflows and did not assess the impact of the route on different sectors, regions of the United Kingdom or the wider economy.³³

The expansion of the Skilled Worker visa route to the social care sector

15. In 2022, the government eased entry requirements for care workers to help the social care sector address skill shortages and respond to the demands created by the COVID-19 pandemic.³⁴ By the end of 2024, 648,100 people, including 389,600 dependants, had applied for a Health and Care Worker visa since the route was expanded, making up 65% of all applications for Skilled Worker visas over this period.³⁵

16. The Home Office told us it had to respond quickly to the acute needs in the care sector workforce in the wake of the pandemic.³⁶ Reflecting a report from the Migration Advisory Committee, which highlighted the need to temporarily develop the route to bring more care workers into the country, the Home Office worked with the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) to introduce two new job codes for care workers. The Home Office said it had to move at pace to implement the government’s decision, which meant that it did not produce an impact assessment before making the changes.³⁷

17. The Home Office acknowledged that it could have done more to understand the way the care sector is structured and assess the potential risks, given that it was extending a model designed for highly skilled workers to a different demographic.³⁸ The Home Office said it quickly identified significant issues with Health and Care Worker visas, with some sponsors applying for volumes of visas that exceeded their capacity to employ workers.³⁹ It increased its compliance activity in 2023 and refused significantly more Health and Care Worker visa applications in 2023 and 2024, with the approval rate of 81% at the end of 2024, compared to over 99% in 2021.⁴⁰ The Home Office also revoked the licences of 470 care providers over the period July 2022 to December 2024, out of 9,000 sponsors in the adult social care sector.⁴¹

18. We remain concerned, however, that the Home Office has not done enough to tackle unethical practices and the exploitation of migrant workers in the social care sector.⁴² Evidence provided by UNISON highlighted that some employers were exploiting workers’ vulnerability, making them work excessive hours and remain on call during their time off.⁴³ We also covered these issues in our report on reforming adult social care in England.⁴⁴ The Home Office accepted that the route had not worked well in the social care sector and had led to some bad practices, including evidence that the route has been used for trafficking.⁴⁵ The Home Office said it had learned lessons, but could have established time limits or review points, or had more tests and conditions for compliance and safeguarding.⁴⁶

19. We highlighted that expanding the Skilled Worker visa route had helped the social care sector to reduce vacancy rates to around 131,000. We were concerned that the Home Office had now turned the tap off and asked what analysis it had undertaken on the impact of the Spring 2024 changes to tighten entry requirements. These changes, and the Home Office’s increased focus on compliance, saw the number of Health and Care Worker visa applications for main applicants reduce significantly in 2024, with just 8,000 applications in April to June 2024 compared to 41,500 in the same period in 2023. The Home Office said that it was important to have a long-term sectoral workforce strategy that gets the balance right between using the domestic labour market and migration where it is needed.⁴⁷ It needs to liaise with DHSC to understand the extent to which domestic workforce plans, are addressing skills shortages.

20. In the Immigration White Paper, which was published shortly after our evidence session, the government announced that it would end overseas recruitment for social care, closing care worker visas to new applications from abroad. The Paper references the need to move the United Kingdom away from a dependence on overseas workers to fulfil care needs and reflects concerns over the abuse and exploitation of workers.⁴⁸

3 Dealing with the risks of exploitation and non-compliance

Tackling the exploitation of migrant workers

21. The Skilled Worker visa system is based on a sponsorship model where a migrant’s right to remain in the United Kingdom is dependent on their employer.⁴⁹ This reliance makes migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation, and there is widespread evidence of workers suffering debt bondage, working excessive hours and exploitative conditions.⁵⁰ Concerns about exploitation of migrant workers are widely documented, although there is no reliable data on the extent of abuses.⁵¹ Written submissions from the Work Rights Centre, Homecare Association, UNISON, Care England, Central England Law Centre and the Cavendish Coalition highlighted the problems in the current system, as well as the need to address the exploitation of migrant workers.⁵²

22. We asked the Home Office what steps it was taking to reduce the risks of exploitation of migrant workers.⁵³ The Home Office said exploitation was a systemic problem that cannot be tackled through enforcement of immigration rules alone, although it accepted that it had a role to play. The Home Office is responsible for ensuring people comply with visa rules and safeguarding migrants, but works with other bodies, including the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA), which focuses on exploitation and labour market abuses, sector regulators and other departments such as HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC).⁵⁴ The Home Office said that it routinely shares information and works with these bodies, as well as the Border Force and police. It also works with agencies under the forum of the Director of Labour Market Enforcement, which includes the GLAA and HMRC.⁵⁵

23. The Home Office seeks to identify sponsors not behaving appropriately. In 2023, it began to apply its genuine vacancy test more rigorously, scrutinising employers to ensure they had guaranteed work for applicants.⁵⁶ The Home Office also said every employer is expected to do their own compliance checks when they are employing someone.⁵⁷ Despite this, we were not convinced by the Home Office’s approach, highlighting that sponsors who may be involved in illegal practices are less likely to comply with the necessary checks and that many sponsors had received licences before the Home Office strengthened its controls. The Home Office was unable to tell us how many of these sponsors had been subject to its compliance checks.⁵⁸

24. There is evidence that applicants have been charged extortionate fees for Skilled Worker visas in their home countries, before they come to the United Kingdom. UNISON provided us with details of its survey, which found that, of 3,000 people who came to work in the care sector, 15% had paid money to an employer and 9% had paid money to a recruiter or agency before coming to the United Kingdom.⁵⁹ We asked the Home Office how it ensures people are not exploited before they come to the United Kingdom. It acknowledged that it could not control sponsors’ use of agents. Sponsors are responsible for meeting obligations on the use of overseas agents and the Home Office said that it relies on their self-compliance with sponsorship guidance. The Home Office has created a brochure to support applicants in their home countries, providing information at all visa application centres on visa fees and what people can expect from their sponsor.⁶⁰ It told us that it also takes action when it receives intelligence referrals, including from the Foreign Office, suspending or revoking sponsor licences where appropriate.⁶¹

25. If an applicant loses their employment with a sponsor, or their sponsor’s licence is revoked, their visa is limited to 60 days to find employment with a new sponsor.⁶² After this, they are not legally entitled to stay in the United Kingdom unless they find an alternative employer to sponsor their stay or obtain another type of leave to remain in the country.⁶³ The GLAA has estimated that 34,000 people in the care sector have been affected by the Home Office revoking sponsor licences.⁶⁴ We asked the Home Office about arrangements for these workers. The Home Office told us it has not been cancelling care workers’ visas since late 2023.⁶⁵ However, in written evidence submissions, FLEX and the Work Rights Centre said that the Home Office has been known to delay issuing curtailment letters, which can create uncertainty, with workers lacking clear information on this policy.⁶⁶

26. The Home Office has been working with 15 regional partnerships—established by DHSC—to support care workers who lose their employment if their sponsor’s licence is revoked.⁶⁷ These arrangements seek to enable care workers to find new employers by matching them to genuine care providers with vacancies in their local area.⁶⁸ The Home Office writes to affected people to direct them towards these hubs and provides a list of licensed employers.⁶⁹ We were concerned, however, that these arrangements were not working effectively, with only small numbers being successfully placed into new employment, and many workers left displaced and fearing deportation. The Home Office told us that DHSC run the regional partnerships and that it could not provide any detail on how these arrangements were working.⁷⁰ A Freedom of Information request from the Royal College of Nursing indicates that only 3.5% of workers who approached regional partnerships were successfully supported into new positions.⁷¹ While the White Paper states the government will close care worker visas to new applications from abroad, migrant workers already in the United Kingdom—who are able to extend or switch visas—may still be affected if their sponsor’s licence is revoked.⁷²

27. UNISON, Central England Law Centre, the Cavendish Coalition and FLEX provided written evidence which raised concerns about the risks of migrant workers becoming victims of modern slavery.⁷³ The Home Office told us that it has modern slavery provisions in place to support affected people, and provides displaced workers with details of helplines.⁷⁴ However, the National Audit Office report found the Home Office was not able to provide data on the number of referrals relating to people with a Skilled Worker visa. UNISON stated that immigration enforcement and lack of firewalls between departments has damaged the government’s work to tackle modern slavery, leaving victims facing deportation rather than receiving appropriate support.⁷⁵

Tackling non-compliance with visa rules

28. The Home Office did not conduct a thorough assessment of compliance risks when the Skilled Worker route was introduced in 2020 and did not re-assess risks when the route was expanded to include care workers in 2022.⁷⁶ We asked why the Home Office seemed to have shown little curiosity about how the route was operating, and the extent to which people were exploiting loopholes and flaws in the system. The Home Office acknowledged that it did not have experience of dealing with care in the immigration system but said it had to respond quickly to expand the route to include care workers and was busy with other priorities, including the new Ukraine schemes. The Home Office said that if it had had more time, it could have done more to foresee the challenges and put appropriate controls in place.⁷⁷

29. After the route’s expansion to include care workers in 2022, the Home Office began to identify concerns with the use of the route, including intelligence referrals from Border Force that people arriving in the UK with a Health and Care Worker visa didn’t speak English or were not aware where they were going.⁷⁸ In response, the Home Office strengthened its compliance activity. For example, in 2023, it introduced a Risk Hub to centralise risk identification and safeguarding and more rigorously applied checks to test that vacancies are genuine.⁷⁹ It has also worked closely with DHSC to tackle exploitation in the care sector, such as introducing the requirement for sponsors to be registered with the Care Quality Commission, although it acknowledged that this focused more on patient care than employment regulation issues.⁸⁰

30. We were concerned, however, that the Home Office did not fully understand commissioning arrangements in the care sector, which means it can be difficult for care providers to prove that they have guaranteed vacancies. In written evidence, the Homecare Association said that the disconnect between commissioning practices and visa requirements creates an unrealistic burden on care providers and that the High Court had ruled that the Home Office’s approach was irrational.⁸¹ The Home Office said that it works closely with the sector but would like to see stronger arrangements between local authorities and care providers to demonstrate vacancies exist.⁸²

31. We asked the Home Office whether there was sufficient scrutiny to tackle the level of non-compliance with visa rules. In particular, we noted the decrease in the number of full-time equivalent compliance officers in the Home Office, which fell from 65.5 in 2021 to 46 in 2024, and asked whether referring just 1% of sponsors for enhanced compliance checks was enough.⁸³ The Home Office said it had introduced new practices, such as digital audits, and that it seeks to target resources to the highest risk cases, including potential trafficking or sponsors exploiting migrant workers.⁸⁴ It told us it had reacted to fix problems that it identified and was seeking to be more productive and agile.⁸⁵ Despite this, we were concerned that the Home Office is still reacting to problems rather than fixing the system.⁸⁶ For example, we asked the Home Office about progress made in removing sponsors who may have already taken advantage of the system. It told us that it was tightening up the sponsor register and had increased the number of sponsor licence revocations, from 337 in 2023 to 1,494 in 2024.⁸⁷

32. We asked the Home Office whether it knows if people leave the country when their visa expires. The Home Office told us the only way that it can tell if people are still in the country is to match the data it holds on individuals with the passenger data it receives on people using airlines.⁸⁸ The Home Office has not analysed exit checks since the route was introduced and does not know what proportion of people return to their home country after their visa has expired, and how many may be working illegally in the United Kingdom.⁸⁹ The Home Office was also unable to say how effectively regional ‘hubs’, which match individuals working in the care sector whose employers have lost their sponsor licence with a new sponsor, were working to facilitate visa holders finding new employment.⁹⁰ The Home Office said there was scope to strengthen exit checks as part of its wider digital transformation of border security systems and introduction of eVisas. The Home Office acknowledged that this problem was not solved and said that it seeks to tackle illegal working by requiring employers to carry out ‘right to work’ checks, working with other bodies which have a role, such as HMRC and local authorities, and using its immigration enforcement services to visit illegal workplaces on an intelligence-led basis.⁹¹

4 Customer service

Providing a good customer service

33. The Home Office has performed well when processing ‘straightforward’ skilled worker visa applications.⁹² These are applications where the applicant has met all obligations and provided the necessary information.⁹³ In 2023 and 2024, it processed 94% of these cases (970,200 out of 1,033,500) within its service standard times of three weeks for out-of-country applications and Health and Care Worker applications, and eight weeks for in-country extensions. This is below its target of 98.5% but, when we took evidence in early May, the Department claimed that it was now meeting this target.⁹⁴

34. The Home Office marks cases as ‘complex’ for reasons such as the customer not supplying the correct information, third party checks being required or the applicant having a pending prosecution. The times taken to process these cases are not included in the Home Office’s published processing statistics.⁹⁵ The Home Office said it was not possible to determine a service standard for ‘complex’ cases as there are a wide range of factors that are outside of its control.⁹⁶ Analysis of management information on Skilled Worker visa extensions showed that, between the start of 2021 and the end of 2024, it took the Home Office over 100 days to make a decision on 6,500 ‘complex’ applications.⁹⁷

35. We asked the Home Office why the proportion of ‘complex’ cases increased during periods when it received large numbers of visa applications.⁹⁸ Between the end of 2021 and 2024, it has marked 18% of applications (330,000 cases) as ‘complex’, but this increased to 31% between July and September 2023, which is the period when applications peaked.⁹⁹ The Home Office told us this was due to it applying more scrutiny to applications, which required more information from applicants. It said it was not “gaming” its published performance statistics by marking cases as ‘complex’ when they were not.¹⁰⁰

36. We asked the Home Office whether there was a need for greater transparency and improvement targets, for ‘complex’ cases. This is important as the absence of a service level agreement for ‘complex’ cases creates a risk that the Home Office will prioritise ‘straightforward’ cases, which do have a public target. The Home Office said it aims to resolve all cases as quickly as possible by monitoring workflow and moving resources when necessary, but did not provide assurance that ‘complex’ cases are not de-prioritised.¹⁰¹ It publishes processing statistics in its transparency data but this only provides data on the number of ‘complex’ cases, and not its performance is processing them.¹⁰² The Home Office said it has no plans to change the way its transparency statistics are reported.¹⁰³

37. The Home Office has met its service standards for processing sponsor licences within eight weeks, with the average processing time falling from 44 days in 2023 to 34 days in 2024.¹⁰⁴ However, the Home Office does not have reliable data on the distribution of processing times, which means it does not fully understand its performance.¹⁰⁵ Written evidence from the Homecare Association, Care England, the Confederation of British Industry and ILPA indicates that sponsors face major problems with delays, impacting their ability to recruit efficiently. ¹⁰⁶

38. We were concerned that the Home Office lacked ambition in improving its customer service. Its target of 80% of customers being satisfied with the application process implies it is content with one in five of its customers being dissatisfied. The Home Office told us that it tries to exceed this score and also has an internal net experience score.¹⁰⁷ It receives customer feedback from a range of sources and told us it works to improve the customer experience and end-to-end ‘customer journey’.¹⁰⁸ However, the National Audit Office found that it had not made effective use of its management information to develop a full understanding of its customer service, which limits its ability to understand the causes of problems and improve the service it offers.¹⁰⁹

39. Written evidence from the Homecare Association, ILPA, British Future and Kings College London, the Cavendish Coalition, the Confederation of British Industry, the Law Society and Care England sets out concerns with the application process. They highlighted issues such as complicated and lengthy guidance, the complex sponsorship system and poor customer service.¹¹⁰ Applicants and sponsors are also unable to receive real-time updates on progress with their applications, with 58% of customer complaints received by the Home Office relating to applicants being unable to track the progress of their application.¹¹¹

40. We asked the Home Office about progress with efforts to transform the sponsorship system, which include the development of IT systems. The Home Office has delayed replacement of the sponsorship system from 2023 to 2028 and accepted that its existing system is not as good as it should be.¹¹² The Home Office told us that the planned transformation was delayed due to the lack of basic infrastructure, the large amount of transformation taking place across the department, and its prioritisation of competing demands, such as eVisas and launch of the Ukraine visa routes. It hopes to roll-out the sponsorship system over the next two to three years.¹¹³ The Home Office also needs to address operational issues with the IT system used for processing visa applications and make further changes to provide full functionality and management information.¹¹⁴

Formal minutes

Thursday 26 June 2025

Members present

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, in the Chair

Mr Clive Betts

Sarah Green

Chris Kane

Sarah Olney

Declaration of interests

The following declarations of interest relating to the inquiry were made:

8 May 2025

Anna Dixon declared the following interest: pre-existing relationship with Simon Ridley.

Immigration: Skilled worker visas

Draft Report (Immigration: Skilled worker visas), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 40 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Thirty-Seventh Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Monday 30 June at 3.00 p.m.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Thursday 8 May 2025

Dame Antonia Romeo DCB, Permanent Secretary, Home Office; Simon Ridley, Second Permanent Secretary, Home Office; Dan Hobbs, Director General, Migration and Borders Group, Home Office; Marc Owen CBE, Director for Visa, Status and Information Services, Home OfficeQ1-82

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Imm numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 Adetunji, Mr Ademol (Director, NobleArise CIC); Dolezalova, Dr Marketa (Research Fellow in Labour Migration, University of Leeds); Lunga, Mr Mackenzi (Director, Meshebah CIC); and Takura, Ms Sipiwe (Director, Oasis Training and Consultancy)Imm0021

2 AGCASImm0013

3 Arshad, JunaidImm0002

4 Care EnglandImm0006

5 Cavendish CoalitionImm0009

6 Central England Law CentreImm0007

7 Confederation of British Industry (CBI)Imm0010

8 Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX)Imm0024

9 Fragomen LLP; and Talent Beyond BoundariesImm0008

10 Homecare AssociationImm0004

11 Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA)Imm0019

12 King’s College London; and British FutureImm0020

13 Kingsley Napley LLPImm0015

14 Make UKImm0018

15 National Partnership in Early Learning and ChildcareImm0016

16 Nuffield TrustImm0025

17 Royal College of NursingImm0014

18 The Law SocietyImm0023

19 The Scottish Tourism Alliance (STA)Imm0012

20 The Unity Project (TUP)Imm0011

21 UNISONImm0005

22 Universities and Colleges Employers Association (UCEA); and Universities UK (UUK)Imm0017

23 Work Rights CentreImm0003

24 techUKImm0022

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

Session 2024–25

Number	Title	Reference
36th	Jobcentres	HC 823
35th	Introducing T Levels	HC 822
34th	Department for Business and Trade Annual Report and Accounts 2023-24	HC 818
33rd	Supporting the UK’s priority industry sectors	HC 1070
32nd	The Future of the Equipment Plan	HC 716
31st	Local Government Financial Sustainability	HC 647
30th	Antimicrobial resistance: addressing the risks	HC 646
29th	Condition of Government property	HC 641
28th	Decommissioning Sellafield	HC 363
27th	Government’s relationship with digital technology suppliers	HC 640
26th	Tackling Violence against Women and Girls	HC 644
25th	DHSC Annual Report and Accounts 2023-24	HC 639
24th	Government cyber resilience	HC 643
23rd	The cost of the tax system	HC 645
22nd	Government’s support for biomass	HC 715
21st	Fixing NHS Dentistry	HC 648
20th	DCMS management of COVID-19 loans	HC 364
19th	Energy Bills Support	HC 511
18th	Use of AI in Government	HC 356
17th	The Remediation of Dangerous Cladding	HC 362
16th	Whole of Government Accounts 2022-23	HC 367
15th	Prison estate capacity	HC 366
14th	Public charge points for electric vehicles	HC 512
13th	Improving educational outcomes for disadvantaged children	HC 365
12th	Crown Court backlogs	HC 348
11th	Excess votes 2023-24	HC 719
10th	HS2: Update following the Northern leg cancellation	HC 357
9th	Tax evasion in the retail sector	HC 355
8th	Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage	HC 351
7th	Asylum accommodation: Home Office acquisition of former HMP Northeye	HC 361
6th	DWP Customer Service and Accounts 2023-24	HC 354
5th	NHS financial sustainability	HC 350
4th	Tackling homelessness	HC 352
3rd	HMRC Customer Service and Accounts	HC 347
2nd	Condition and maintenance of Local Roads in England	HC 349
1st	Support for children and young people with special educational needs	HC 353

---

Footnotes

1 C&AG’s Report, Immigration: Skilled Worker visas, Session 2024–25, HC 745, 17 March 2025

2 C&AG’s Report, para 1

3 C&AG’s Report, paras 1.8-1.9

4 C&AG’s Report, paras 3

5 Home Office, Restoring Control over the Immigration System, May 2025

6 Committee of Public Accounts, Immigration: Skilled worker visas Written evidence

7 Qq 5, 9, 10

8 Q 9; C&AG’s Report, para 2.1

9 Home Office, Restoring Control over the Immigration System, May 2025

10 Q 16; C&AG’s Report, para 2.4

11 Q 9

12 Q 27; C&AG’s Report, para 2.4

13 Q 9

14 Q 10

15 Q 21

16 Q 12

17 Qq 16, 18

18 Qq 19-25

19 Q 14

20 Qq 5, 12, 16

21 C&AG’s Report, para 2.10

22 Q 6

23 Qq 13, 16, 18, 24

24 Home Office, Restoring Control over the Immigration System, May 2025

25 Q 17

26 Qq 9, 15

27 C&AG’s Report, para 8

28 Qq 5, 10

29 Q 16; C&AG’s Report, para 8

30 Q 8; C&AG’s Report, para 2.11

31 C&AG’s Report, para 8

32 Qq 6, 8

33 Home Office, Restoring Control over the Immigration System, May 2025

34 C&AG’s Report, para 6

35 C&AG’s Report, paras 1.9, 1.10

36 Qq 5, 9, 33

37 Q 9; C&AG’s Report, para 7

38 Qq 9, 11, 13, 35

39 Q 33; IMM0021

40 C&AG’s Report, para 3.19

41 Qq 40, 51

42 Q 62; C&AG’s Report, para 15

43 Q 61; IMM0005

44 Committee of Public Accounts, Reforming adult social care in England, Twenty-Second Report of Session 2023–24, HC 427, 20 March 2024

45 Qq 10, 63, 71

46 Qq 9, 64

47 Q 10

48 Home Office, Restoring Control over the Immigration System, May 2025, paras 79-81

49 C&AG’s Report, footnote 32

50 Q 61; C&AG’s Report, para 3.23

51 Q 1; C&AG’s Report, para 15

52 IMM0003; IMM0004; IMM0005; IMM0006; IMM0007; IMM0009

53 Q 61

54 C&AG’s Report, para 3.24

55 Q 61

56 Qq 34, 61, 62

57 Q 44

58 Qq 40-43, 45

59 Qq 61, 66; IMM0005

60 Qq 65-68

61 Qq 69-70

62 Q 43

63 Q 60

64 C&AG’s Report, para 15

65 Q 51

66 IMM003; IMM0024

67 Qq 43, 60

68 Qq 10, 51

69 Q 60

70 Q 59

71 IMM0014

72 Home Office, Restoring Control over the Immigration System, May 2025, para 81

73 IMM0005, IMM0007, IMM0009, IMM0024

74 Qq 59-61

75 IMM0005

76 C&AG’s Report, para 3.16

77 Qq 33, 63

78 Q 69

79 C&AG’s Report, para 3.17

80 Qq 11, 61

81 Q 62; IMM0004

82 Qq 62-63

83 Qq 35-39, 54; C&AG’s report, para 3.20

84 Qq 36-38, 70

85 Qq 35, 54

86 Qq 34-35

87 Qq 40-42, 51-52; C&AG’s Report, para 3.19

88 Qq 46-48

89 Qq 50-51; C&AG’s report, para 2.14

90 Q 60

91 Qq 49-51

92 Q 72

93 C&AG’s Report, footnote 15

94 Q 73

95 Qq 74, 76; C&AG’s Report, para 3.2

96 Qq 74, 78

97 C&AG’s Report, para 3.3

98 Q 75

99 C&AG’s Report, para 3.3, fig. 7

100 Q 75

101 Qq 78-79

102 C&AG’s report, para 3.3

103 Qq 74, 78

104 Q 72; C&AG’s Report, para 3.5

105 C&AG’s report, para 3.5

106 IMM0004; IMM0006; IMM0010; IMM0019

107 Q 82

108 Qq 80-81

109 C&AG’s Report, para 11

110 IMM0004; IMM0019; IMM0020; IMM0009; IMM0010

111 Q58; C&AG’s report, para 3.9

112 Qq 55-57; C&AG’s Report, para 3.12

113 Q 57

114 C&AG’s Report, para 12