Speaker’s Conference on the security of MPs, candidates and elections

Summary

Those of us who have campaigned to be, or been elected as, Members of Parliament know that it is an honour and privilege. The robust political discourse of the campaign and parliamentary debate remain an important part of that role. However, the abuse, intimidation and attacks that have already resulted in the murders of two of our colleagues, Jo Cox MP and Sir David Amess MP, threaten the health of our democracy.

These threats are not part of the job of being an MP. They are stifling debate and weakening democracy by dissuading candidates from standing, making it harder for MPs and candidates to engage with the public, and forcing people to weigh the public good against their own safety and the wellbeing of their colleagues, their staff and their families. Attacks on MPs are not new, but the nature of threats and abuse facing politicians today is a significant change from recent history and current trends suggest it could get worse.

Over the last ten years there has been a step change in the physical security measures available to MPs, and yet many remain concerned for their safety, as well as that of their staff and families. Introducing even more security measures would make it harder for MPs to engage with their constituents and lead to a fundamental and undesirable change in the way they carry out their roles. The priority instead must be reducing the level of threat posed to MPs and candidates.

The first place to address this is at elections. When it comes to tackling harassment, abuse and intimidation of candidates, our current electoral law is not fit for purpose. We call on the Government to undertake a full review of electoral law, in particular to ensure that no home addresses are published, candidates’ identities are properly verified, polling stations are protected, and the disinformation that can fuel abuse and intimidation of candidates is properly addressed.

Candidates and MPs also have a responsibility to lead by example in the way they engage with one another. There should be a code of conduct for all candidates, MPs and parties that defines a collectively agreed set of principles to guide behaviours and language when campaigning. The Speaker will work with the parties currently represented in Parliament and the Electoral Commission to develop this code in time for the next general election.

This report summarises the first phase of our work. The next phase will focus on three further issues that we have identified as driving the threat level and as areas where recommendations for change can be most impactful: public attitudes towards MPs and candidates; how threats against MPs and candidates are handled in the criminal justice system; and the role of social media. Our findings and recommendations will be published in a subsequent report.

Introduction

1. The 2024 General Election saw an extremely high turnover of MPs, heightened abuse in many constituencies, and new security arrangements for candidates, all of which brought the abuse MPs and candidates suffer to greater public prominence. As a result, on 14 October 2024 the House of Commons passed a Motion establishing a Speaker’s Conference. That Motion directed the Conference to investigate threats against parliamentary candidates and MPs, and the effectiveness of the response to these threats. We were also directed to make recommendations about the appropriate protection of candidates and MPs, and about securing free and fair elections.¹ We have understood the term “free and fair elections” to mean elections where all candidates are able to campaign, and all voters are able to cast their vote, without threat, intimidation or abuse. Our focus is on MPs and parliamentary candidates, but we are aware that these issues extend to all elected officials and candidates. We hope that in considering our recommendations, the operational bodies whose remit extends beyond ours consider how to ensure consistency of electoral processes and experience of candidates and elected representatives at all levels of government.

2. Threats against MPs and candidates have been a concern to many for some time and are also being considered and addressed by several other organisations. These include the frontline response from the Parliamentary Security Department (PSD), the police and criminal justice system. In addition, the Government’s Defending Democracy Taskforce has been considering the issue of intimidation and abuse at elections and how to protect those participating in the political process as part of its broader mandate.² We would like to express our gratitude to everyone who works to protect MPs and candidates for their efforts. The Conference’s work is intended to complement this ongoing work by considering the factors behind the issue, how intimidation and abuse affect the ability of MPs to represent their constituents day-to-day, and where current practices can be improved. Our intention is that our inquiry should lead to effective recommendations for these operational bodies to implement.

3. Members of the Conference were formally appointed by Mr Speaker on 18 December 2024.³ We launched a formal call for evidence in December 2024 and held four evidence sessions between February and April 2025. An anonymous survey of current and former MPs and MPs’ staff was held online between 26 February and 14 March; a summary of the findings is included at Annex 1. Mr Speaker and the members of the Conference would like to thank everyone who submitted evidence, completed the survey or shared their experience by other means, especially when this involved recounting details of distressing events.

4. This report lays out the evidence, conclusions and recommendations from the first phase of our work. Chapter One outlines the current scale and nature of threats against candidates, MPs and elections, including the impact they have on our democracy and the factors contributing to the current situation. Chapters Two and Three assess the effectiveness of the police and PSD’s response to these threats at the 2024 General Election and in the current Parliament, respectively. Finally, in Chapter Four we set out our plan for the next phase of our inquiry.

1 Threats against candidates and MPs and their impact on the democratic process

Threats to MPs and candidates

5. It is a sad reality that MPs and candidates for election face a range of threats. By far the most common is verbal abuse regularly received by email, on social media or in-person.⁴ However, more than half of candidates at the last election also reported people following them or loitering around their home or office, threatening them, touching them against their will, damaging their offices or property or physically assaulting them.⁵ In the worst cases, MPs have come to physical and fatal harm. The murders of Jo Cox MP and Sir David Amess MP weigh heavily on our minds as we undertake this inquiry. Planned attacks on other MPs were prevented only by chance and diligent work from the police, medical personnel, or security services. Many of these threats, particularly physical threats, are illegal, but unfortunately there remains broad scope for people to abuse MPs and candidates without breaking the law.

6. The broad nature of the threats involved means that people use different terminology to refer to similar activities of concern: examples include harassment, abuse, intimidation, “HAI” (as an acronym for all three), “physical, psychological or online violence”,⁶ “freedom-restricting harassment”,⁷ or “political violence and disruption”.⁸ As harassment is a specific legal offence,⁹ we have chosen to refer in this report to either “threats against candidates and MPs”, or to “abuse and intimidation”.

Impact

7. Although, thankfully, not all MPs experience abuse and intimidation, it takes a heavy toll on those that do. Half of MPs responding to our survey said abuse and intimidation has made them feel anxious or depressed (49%), and a similar proportion unsafe (52%). They worry about their staff and families and adapt working practices to increase their sense of safety. What troubles us further is that when asked about the psychological impact of the abuse, one in three participating MPs said they have considered not standing for re-election, and one in six have considered resigning from public office.¹⁰

8. A quarter of MPs said they have normalised the experience of receiving abuse,¹¹ but this is not the solution. Whilst we strongly believe in protecting robust political discourse and challenge, we refuse to accept that abuse and intimidation should be par for the course in serving as an MP.

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Box 1: Quotes from survey of MPs

Source: Speaker’s Conference Survey of MPs and MPs’ staff 2025 (Annex 1)

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9. Threats against MPs also affect their staff and family. Of those who responded to the survey, one in three MPs said the abuse they receive causes their family’s mental and emotional wellbeing to suffer, and one in five said it affects their family’s own sense of safety.

10. Whilst most MPs take steps to shield their families from the abuse they receive, this is not an option for their staff, who are often the first to pick up the phone, open social media, or receive a constituent in the office. Nearly half of staff said the abuse they have experienced directly, or witnessed their MP endure, has caused them to feel anxious or depressed. Nearly half have felt unsafe.¹²

11. The situation is making it harder for MPs to adequately engage with and represent their constituents. Experiences of abuse and intimidation have caused MPs to reduce their interaction with the public, for example by changing the way they conduct surgeries or removing themselves from social media platforms.¹³ One in five of the MPs who responded to our survey even reported that they had hesitated or refrained from debating or voting on an issue as a result of the abuse they expected to receive. 2% reported having changed their voting intention.¹⁴

12. It is also damaging the democratic process by restricting the diversity and representativeness of people willing to stand for election. Some parties are already finding it harder to recruit women as candidates¹⁵ because much of the abuse and intimidation has been particularly targeted at women, with female politicians receiving more, and disproportionately more sexualised, threats and abuse.¹⁶ Evidence also highlights the disproportionate levels of abuse experienced by MPs from Black, Asian or minority ethnic backgrounds.¹⁷ MPs from Black, Asian or minority ethnic backgrounds who responded to our survey were almost twice as likely as White MPs to say they had considered resigning or not standing for re-election.¹⁸

Current threat levels

15. Attacks on MPs are not new, as we are daily reminded by the four shields in the House of Commons Chamber commemorating Airey Neave MP, Robert Bradford MP, Sir Anthony Berry MP and Ian Gow MP, murdered between 1979 and 1990, which sit alongside the shields commemorating Jo Cox MP and Sir David Amess MP, and the plaque marking where Spencer Percival was assassinated in 1812. However, witnesses told us that the current nature of threats and abuse is a significant change from recent history. We heard from Chief Inspector Bryan Duffy, the lead officer for Op Bridger (the policing initiative for security of MPs and general election candidates), that: “Over the last four to eight years, we have just seen a change in society in terms of how debate and politics are conducted. It has veered towards one end of the spectrum: something more direct, attacking, that does not expect anybody to fire back, or for justice to follow, is now an expectation”.¹⁹

16. Party representatives told us that the 2024 General Election was “very different to previous elections”.²⁰ Some political parties told us their candidates experienced less abuse at this election because they were less in the political spotlight on emotive issues than they had been previously.²¹ However other parties told us that their candidates had been the focus of threats, and that the kind of incidents they saw were significantly worse than the abuse seen in previous elections.²²

17. The Electoral Commission has expressed serious concern. Their survey of public attitudes found that a much greater percentage of younger people said verbal abuse of politicians was acceptable. They warned “if younger cohorts maintain these attitudes as they age, the problem of abuse of candidates can become worse.”²³

19. Several witnesses told us that this shift in public attitudes and behaviour “was accelerated and enabled by social media”,²⁴ with several political parties citing abuse on social media as a particular concern during the recent election.²⁵ Although fortunately, the majority of abuse and threats of violence online do not translate to real-world, physical incidents,²⁶ online activity has started to drive offline activity and for the first time issues have “spilled out of the online space and into hustings and on to the streets.”²⁷ The Electoral Commission told us that some incidents of physical intimidation and abuse have been inspired by abuse the perpetrators have seen online, and sometimes individuals will deliberately harass candidates or campaigners in-person so the incident can be filmed and shared.²⁸ There was a consensus view among our witnesses that the involvement of social media was not coincidental, and the level of abuse is in part driven by the design and decisions of social media platforms.²⁹ Professor Helen Margetts, Professor of Society and the Internet, Oxford University, stressed to us the differing impact different platforms could have, noting “all platforms are not the same; some are more civil than others”.³⁰

21. Traditional media also shapes public attitudes to MPs. Dr Sofia Collignon told us that in terms of the level of threat candidates experience “one of the most harmful things that can happen is a story explodes on traditional media, it gets covered but they never get the right to reply, or the story is not fully covered so in the end their voice is not heard.”³¹ Several respondents to our survey also noted that coverage in the press had triggered abuse against them, particularly blanket coverage that portrayed MPs as self-interested or that inflamed criticism of government policies. One noted that doorstep approaches by the media were intimidating for them and their family.

23. Others highlighted the potential impact of political culture and the behaviour of politicians on public perceptions of what is acceptable. Professor Alan Renwick of the UCL Constitution Unit warned that “the coarse and unforgiving nature of much of our political discourse may contribute to an environment in which outright abusive, threatening, and intimidatory behaviour is increasingly normalised”, and that the language used to disparage political opponents and Parliament itself “may encourage in others a sense that it is acceptable for them to hurl insults–and worse–as well.”³²

24. This is particularly true during elections. The Committee on Standards in Public Life and the Jo Cox Foundation have called for political parties to sign, or require their candidates to sign, an election code of conduct.³³

25. This idea was popular: 80% of MPs who responded to our survey said they would potentially be willing to sign a candidates’ code of conduct if the political parties were able to agree a common understanding of what constitutes acceptable campaign behaviours and activities. A poll by 50:50 Parliament³⁴ completed by 55 of its members (women considering standing or standing for elected office), indicated that a commitment to a code of conduct would be the second most effective possible action to reassure women considering running for election (the most effective was not requiring candidates to publish their home address, a topic we cover in Chapter Two).³⁵ There was also support for a candidates’ code of conduct in the evidence we heard from political parties and MPs,³⁶ with several parties confirming that they have already introduced their own internal codes of conduct or rules for candidates on campaigning.³⁷ The two independent MPs we spoke to supported a candidates’ code of conduct, noting that it should be consistent for candidates running as independents and those with party backing.³⁸ Questions were raised about how a universal code of conduct could be implemented and enforced.³⁹

26. Two previous inquiries into political abuse and intimidation concluded that parties have a duty of care to their candidates when it comes to protecting them from abuse and intimidation as part of their campaigning.⁴⁰ When we spoke to the parties about the support they offered to candidates standing for them, all the parties told us that they do offer some support and guidance to their candidates on how to keep themselves safe. However, it was stressed to us that the nature of the support offered would vary depending on the party: while a larger party might be able to establish a formal mechanism for reporting incidents through them,⁴¹ for smaller parties who do not have in-house security expertise, it might be more appropriate to pass on official guidance.⁴² Some parties fielding a small number of candidates told us they were able to personally engage with and get to know each candidate which could be an advantage in managing threats and providing tailored support.⁴³

2 Effectiveness of the response: Elections

Management of elections

New arrangements for the 2024 General Election

31. In February 2024, the then-Government announced that the Home Office, National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC), Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and College of Policing had agreed the new Defending Democracy Policing Protocol. This led to an additional £31 million of funding, refreshed guidance on policing democratic events, and undertakings on how the police would engage with protests and the election.⁴⁴ It also introduced new arrangements for specified elected officials and candidates to engage with the police: since 2016, MPs have had a named point of contact in their local force to facilitate police support under the Op Bridger programme; the protocol built on this idea so that not only sitting MPs, but also candidates at general elections, as well as other elected representatives and candidates for those roles were given a named point of contact within their local police force.⁴⁵ This was facilitated through the introduction of Force Elected Official Advisers (FEOA): full time employees tasked with liaising with and advising elected representatives on security issues.

32. Most of the provisions of the protocol were in place for the 2024 General Election, meaning that the election saw significant additional resources dedicated to the protection of candidates. The main provision not implemented by the election was the recruitment of FEOAs, although the Government has informed us that they are now all in place.⁴⁶

33. Security arrangements for MPs are managed by the Parliamentary Security Department (PSD).⁴⁷ However once Parliament is dissolved for a general election, all current MPs cease to be MPs and any that wish to return must stand for re-election. They are therefore no longer covered by PSD’s security measures. Reflecting the heightened threat some incumbents continued to be under, new measures were implemented at the 2024 General Election to ensure the security of individuals running for re-election, as well as other candidates. The Home Office implemented the Op Regency programme to provide Home Office funded private security for candidates, if the Department judged it necessary based on the level of risk and threat. This programme was based on collaboration with PSD and replicated many of the security measures they had been providing to MPs: the Government “worked closely with PSD right up until the election was called, and then all the protective security that Parliament offers was handed over to Government” for the period of the election.⁴⁸

34. This was also the first general election where the disqualification orders introduced by the Elections Act 2022 applied.⁴⁹ These can be imposed on people convicted of existing intimidatory offences, which include assault, public order and sexual offences, and harassment, if they can be shown to have been motivated by the fact the victim was an election candidate or campaigner. If convicted, the perpetrator is barred from holding elected office for five years.⁵⁰ However, as the new provisions only came into force in November 2023 it is not yet clear how effective the threat of disqualification is at addressing intimidation. The Government has said it will take time to see the impact but has also admitted it does not hold data on the number of people disqualified.⁵¹

Experience of candidates

38. Despite these measures, Dan Jarvis MBE MP, Minister for Security, told us that the 2024 General Election “saw completely unacceptable harassment and intimidation”.⁵² Too many candidates reported situations where, in the words of Rushanara Ali MP, Minister for Homelessness and Democracy, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, “we could not conduct our campaigns safely and securely.”⁵³

39. Incumbent candidates generally reported facing more threats: in our survey, 42% of respondents who had been MPs prior to the election said they were worried about personal risk, compared to 25% of those who were elected for the first time. Incumbent candidates were also more likely to have reported an incident to the police. This greater threat is likely due to their existing profile, as there is strong evidence that the more prominent a figure is, the more abuse they are likely to receive.⁵⁴

40. The response from police and officials was inconsistent, as the Government acknowledged in its written evidence.⁵⁵ Dr Sofia Collignon said that:

Another key issue is the regional disparities in police resources and the professionalisation of election security measures. In some areas, police forces already collaborate with local councils and political parties to protect candidates, and officers have received specialised training on election security, candidate risks, and the legal nuances of political harassment. However, the level of implementation and professionalism varies significantly across regions.⁵⁶

41. The police have well-established procedures for policing during elections, but these have not historically focused on abuse and intimidation. Each police force has an officer designated as its elections single point of contact (SPOC), who DCI Kevin Ives, National Co-ordinator for Election Crime, City of London Police, told us will be primarily trained and focused on managing crimes like bribery and electoral fraud.⁵⁷ Typically, elections SPOCs have a professional background in investigating these sorts of crimes; the officers are generally economic crime officers and are trained by the UK’s national lead police force for fraud, City of London Police, who also hold the national portfolio lead for elections.⁵⁸

42. However, the Electoral Commission’s review of the 2024 General Election reported that there had been fewer offences related to fraud and other administrative malpractices and more complaints of abuse and intimidation.⁵⁹ These issues are dealt with separately by Op Bridger officers and the newly introduced FEOAs, although DCI Ives noted that the two teams do speak regularly.⁶⁰

46. Candidates, especially independents, also told us that they lacked information about security matters. Becca Crosier, Deputy Director for Elections Strategy, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, told us that the Government’s Joint Election Security and Preparedness (JESP) Unit, which sits between the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Cabinet Office, “put a lot of [their] energy into making sure that all the guidance from the agencies, including the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority, was in one place and updated” and worked with the Electoral Commission to push this to candidates.⁶¹ Iqbal Mohamed MP told us that as an independent candidate he was not aware of this guidance, but he had hoped a pack like this would come from his returning officer, along with appropriate local contacts and information.⁶²

47. Despite the work that has gone into producing security advice, it is not clear that the efforts to share it with candidates were effective. Becca Crosier told us that the Government’s communication was more successful than in previous years, but was only able to reach 25% of candidates, partly because returning officers often only have access to agents’ details, not the candidates’.⁶³ 53% of those MPs who responded to our survey said that they were not offered the security briefing which all candidates were supposed to be offered during the election period under the Defending Democracy Policing Protocol.⁶⁴ Part of the reason for this was that some returning officers believed they were not permitted to share candidates’ contact details with the police.⁶⁵ The Government told us that returning officers can share candidate information with the police for security reasons,⁶⁶ and the Electoral Commission updated its guidance to returning officers for the May 2025 local elections to confirm this.⁶⁷ The Electoral Commission suggested that they and the police should have access to candidates’ contact details to share security information, particularly in the context of a fast-rising security threat, and also proposed establishing an information sharing gateway that would allow them to share relevant information with other public bodies.⁶⁸

Weaknesses in Electoral Law

49. We have been told that part of the challenge for police and election officials is that, in many cases, the electoral law they are required to implement is unclear. The Electoral Commission said that they produced guidance for returning officers on addressing abuse and intimidation but that “we can go further” in ensuring officials are clear on how to uphold “extremely robust but respectful political debate”.⁶⁹

50. Witnesses also identified specific examples of electoral laws that they considered to be unclear or insufficient in dealing with modern elections:

• Section 97 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 makes it an offence to act “in a disorderly manner” at election meetings, but there is no definition of “disorderly” in the legislation, and determining its scope is difficult in a modern context.⁷⁰
• We heard that addressing disinformation is a necessary step for reducing abuse and intimidation against MPs and candidates, as many cases are triggered by disinformation about the victim.⁷¹ Under section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, an offence may be committed if “any false statement of fact in relation to the candidate’s personal character or conduct” is made or published “before or during an election”.⁷² However, we were told that this provision is rarely prosecuted; three specific issues were highlighted. First, section 106 only protects candidates from mis/disinformation about their personal character or conduct; false statements of a political nature are not covered by section 106, though the boundary between what is personal and what is political can be hard to define.⁷³ Second, it is challenging to disprove the statutory defence of section 106, which is that the defendant “had reasonable grounds for believing, and did believe, that statement to be true”.⁷⁴ And third, complaints are generally only dealt with after the election campaign has concluded.⁷⁵ Concerns have also been raised that it is not clear section 106 could cover deepfakes,⁷⁶ which is concerning as witnesses have told us AI has the power to “turbocharge the online harms”.⁷⁷ We were therefore surprised by the Minister for Democracy’s contention that “section 106 of the Representation of the People Act provides a reasonable check and balance against defamation in an electoral context.”⁷⁸
• Despite the fact that the Government confirmed there have been a growing number of incidents of intimidatory behaviour at polling stations, there is currently no specific legislation on intimidation at polling stations.⁷⁹ The Electoral Commission told us they considered it was worth looking at whether returning officers or the police should have the power to set a perimeter around their polling station.⁸⁰ The Minister for Democracy confirmed that the Government was reviewing the possibility, although warned there was a risk of just moving the problem on.⁸¹
• Paragraph 42 of Schedule 1 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 makes provision for the suspension of polling in the case of “riot or open violence”. However, Becca Crosier told us that how this is defined “is a bit of an open question. … We would want to have a look at that because it is not a very helpful provision … .But that goes to illustrate that perhaps the law is a little outdated.”⁸²

51. We asked Ministers what, if any, action the Government was taking to address gaps like these and were encouraged to hear that a process is already underway in Government to identify gaps in legislation.⁸³

Candidates’ personal information

52. We heard concerns that when it comes to personal data, some current election rules not only make it harder to address threats but require candidates to make difficult decisions that may compromise their security. In particular, we were told that making a candidate’s home address publicly available can put them and their family at risk.⁸⁴ Under current rules, candidates are invited, but not required, to publish their home address, although candidates in England acting as their own agent must still publish an address.⁸⁵ However, publishing a home address is one of the most effective ways of demonstrating a local connection to a constituency, and therefore many candidates feel under pressure to do so.⁸⁶

53. The Electoral Commission has already recommended changing electoral law so no personal addresses are published at future elections.⁸⁷ The Association of Electoral Administrators noted this would be a simple administrative process to implement but recommended providing an alternative means of sending the notice for an election to candidates, such as a PO Box or email address, if agents’ addresses were no longer published.⁸⁸

54. However, we were warned that any system to improve candidate security should not make it easier to mislead the public in an election. Returning officers are required “to take at face value what is presented to them … Even if [they] know it is a false address”.⁸⁹ “Fake candidates” were highlighted as an issue in the Electoral Commission’s 2024 post-poll report, which warned that some “were intended to confuse or mislead voters”.⁹⁰

55. Vijay Rangarajan, Chief Executive, Electoral Commission, warned that when it came to candidate data: “What we would like to see is … returning officers being able to check that a candidate is the right person. We are not looking to make this massively burdensome, but we have had allegations, which damage trust in the system, so … trying to check that they are the right person is the core of the issue.”⁹¹ The Association of Electoral Administrators suggested that for general elections, candidates may be able to provide ID,⁹² a proposal supported by the Electoral Commission.⁹³ When we raised these issues with the Minister for Democracy, we were encouraged to hear that the Government was looking into these points⁹⁴ and look forward to confirmation of plans in the Government’s response to this report.

3 Effectiveness of the response: security of MPs

Parliamentary Security Department (PSD)

Recent changes in parliamentary security

58. The reforms that established the current security arrangements in Parliament began a decade ago. The Consultative Panel on Parliamentary Security (CPoPS) was set up in 2015 under the chairmanship of the then-Chairman of Ways and Means, Sir Lindsay Hoyle MP. PSD was established the next year, based on the results of a multi-year review into the security of Parliament. It was given responsibility for all aspects of security management and the oversight of security operations, although armed and unarmed policing continued to be provided by the Metropolitan Police.⁹⁵ Within six months, Parliament was faced with the murder of Jo Cox MP. CPoPS galvanised political support for the scale and scope of measures required in response to the attack. As part of that response, PSD set up its Members’ Security Support Service (MSSS) to deliver, through commercial contractors, physical security measures at MPs’ homes and constituency offices⁹⁶ (the police responded at the same time by setting up Op Bridger,⁹⁷ which we cover elsewhere in this report).

59. In March 2017 a terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge and the Houses of Parliament killed six people and injured at least 50. One of those killed was PC Keith Palmer: we would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to him and express our condolences to his family. Following this attack there were extensive reforms to onsite security of the parliamentary estate.

60. The murder of Sir David Amess MP in 2021 triggered an expansion of MPs’ security arrangements. The most visible and tangible change was introduced in the days after the attack: for the first time MPs were offered private security guards to attend surgeries, managed by PSD and delivered by commercial contract. In addition, PSD and the Home Office commissioned and implemented a review of MPs’ security.⁹⁸ These reforms have included establishing the new Security Information and Risk Analysis Service (SIRAS) team to receive, store, analyse and disseminate information about threats to MPs and Parliament, and the new Joint Parliamentary Risk Assessment (JoPRA) process, which is coordinated by PSD in collaboration with the Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team (PLaIT) in the Metropolitan Police. We would like to place on record our gratitude to Alison Giles, Director, Parliamentary Security Department, Oliver Davis, Deputy Director (Members’ Security and Risk), and their colleagues in PSD for their dedication and professionalism towards ensuring the safety of MPs.

Impact on MPs’ sense of safety

62. Whilst these new security measures are well-received and widely used by MPs, they are not always effective at reducing their sense of being under threat. Our survey found high levels of awareness of the security measures available to MPs, and the vast majority of those responding (94%) had taken up one or more of those measures. Nevertheless, two in five (39%) said they feel unsafe in their role as an MP. This may be because MPs’ sense of safety is being significantly undermined by online abuse, which was the most common response to the free text question “what makes you feel most at risk?”, and the effectiveness of physical security measures in mitigating that impact is minimal.⁹⁹

63. MPs’ sense of safety is further undermined by issues with the delivery and installation of security measures. One MP told us that delays to the installation of security measures at their home caused them “a lot of unnecessary stress”.¹⁰⁰ We have also heard, and discussed with PSD in confidence, other issues with the contractors responsible for security measures in homes and offices and the provision of private security personnel. Although cases of failure appear to be rare, each one undermines MPs’ confidence in the system that is meant to protect them.

64. Where security measures do increase MPs’ sense of safety, they are also effective in making their staff feel safer. The MPs’ and Peers’ Staff Association (MAPSA) told us in written evidence that many security measures, such as those installed in constituency offices, also “inherently protect staff through the very nature of our relationship working for MPs”.¹⁰¹ MAPSA therefore strongly advocated for MPs and others to consider the value of security measures for staff sense of safety when deciding whether to take up the measures on offer from PSD.¹⁰²

Further reforms to parliamentary security

65. It is not clear that a further step change in parliamentary security would be effective. The additional close protection afforded by security operatives would do little to deter the verbal or online abuse that undermines MPs’ sense of safety.¹⁰³ In addition, PSD noted that the potential for greater security measures would be limited by the number of available private security operatives in the UK, although they explained that they were working with the Home Office to encourage more people to enter the sector.¹⁰⁴

66. Many MPs and candidates also indicated that they would not welcome another significant increase in security measures because it would restrict their engagement with the public. In opinion polls, general election candidates “expressed concerns about security measures distancing candidates from voters, suggesting that overly rigid protections could harm democratic engagement”.¹⁰⁵ Jeremy Corbyn MP told us “I personally do not like being surrounded by security people all the time. It makes me feel uncomfortable; it is not what politics should be. We should not have to have a couple of heavies walking around with us whenever we walk down the street—I absolutely hate that.”¹⁰⁶

68. PSD continues to review and reform security provision both at a strategic and an operational level. New strategic initiatives include piloting software to remove abusive posts from MPs’ social media feeds¹⁰⁷ and developing security guidance for families of MPs.¹⁰⁸ Operationally, we have also been told that PSD and the police are alive to and regularly assess the security implications of overseas events, which in recent years have been a significant driver of threats against MPs.¹⁰⁹

Current issues

72. We have identified three specific areas where current PSD security provisions and IPSA’s support for MPs could be improved. These are covered in Annex 2, which will be shared directly with PSD and IPSA and made available to MPs upon request, but which, for security reasons, will not be published.

Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team (PLaIT) and the Police

Policing of threats against MPs and candidates

73. Criminal cases of abuse and harassment of MPs or candidates are responded to and, where appropriate, investigated by the local police force in line with other crimes (in the case of abusive messages, investigative responsibility lies with the force where the perpetrator is located).¹¹⁰

74. In addition, in 2016 the police established two initiatives to improve the response to these sorts of crimes: Op Bridger, a network of police officers who act as both a point of contact for MPs and their force’s expert on the context in which MPs are operating and the threats they may experience; and PLaIT, a team in the Metropolitan Police which handles all crimes against MPs committed in London, monitors nationally the level of abuse individual MPs are receiving and can put pressure on local forces to act to deliver consistency in the police response. The police told us that these programmes have been successful: “The creation of Operation Bridger demonstrates what policing can do when it is resourced and shows the continuous work that is keeping democratically elected individuals safe.”¹¹¹ Ellie Reeves MP agreed that it was “helpful to have a single point of contact”¹¹² and Samantha Dixon MP, a member of the Conference, noted “One of the reasons why I asked Mr Speaker to come on to the Conference is that, shortly after I was elected two years ago, I was a victim of stalking. I live in Cheshire police’s area. They handled it really well. The Bridger contact referred me into the stalking unit of the constabulary, which was superb.”¹¹³

Inconsistent police response to threats

75. Several pieces of evidence and witnesses have noted inconsistencies both between and within police forces in the response to incidents of abuse and intimidation against MPs and candidates. This has been acknowledged by Ministers and the police themselves. In oral evidence, police officers told us that “getting consistency on how that may be dealt with is a little difficult with the 46 forces, each with a chief constable responsible for their own area.”¹¹⁴ Commander Simon Messinger, Commander, Protection, Metropolitan Police, noted that it had been even harder to ensure consistency through the Op Bridger network at the 2024 General Election as the requirement to support candidates for the first time was a significant jump in the number of individuals covered.¹¹⁵

76. The Committee on Standards in Public Life suggested that another possible cause of the inconsistent response may be “some police forces not fully understanding the context in which MPs and candidates operate, especially during elections.”¹¹⁶ In particular, some police officers seem to regard abuse as something MPs should expect for “putting themselves in the public domain”.¹¹⁷ Senior police officers agreed that some people in the police did expect MPs to be able to put up with more threats and abuse than other people, and noted that this false impression seemed to be held across the criminal justice system and society more generally (including sometimes even by individuals within some MPs’ offices).¹¹⁸ Colin McGrath MLA expressed the concern that even politicians themselves “have almost become acclimatised, certainly as politicians, to being insulted, berated and harassed to the point where that is almost acceptable behaviour. The reality is that if that were in any other job or any other sphere, it would just not be tolerated.”¹¹⁹ Commander Messinger told us that he, and the Op Bridger and PLaIT teams would actively challenge any impression that threats should be tolerated.¹²⁰

77. The inconsistency of responses to threats against MPs and candidates is not confined to the police; it is a problem across the criminal justice system. Commander Messinger warned of “inconsistency that you will see between force areas, different court areas and so forth.”¹²¹ He also advised “We need that consistent approach from UK policing and the criminal justice process when dealing with some of these offences, but I wholeheartedly agree that there is more to be done.”¹²² Inconsistency in the criminal justice response is particularly concerning, as the Sentencing Council told us that the most important factor in deterring crime is the certainty of punishment.¹²³

78. The Government agreed on the importance of ensuring consistency in investigations of threats against MPs and candidates. Shaun Hipgrave, Director Protect and Prepare, Home Office, told us “Now we have to work with police chiefs to ensure that the top-down strategic lead and the bottom-up support for MPs are consistent.”¹²⁴ The police said that they are working hard to ensure a more consistent response to these sorts of incidents between forces and “continue to drive that consistency through increased training, advice, guidance and good practice”.¹²⁵

Other policing challenges

81. As well as the broad structural issues there may be with how threats against MPs and candidates are policed, which we will return to in the next phase of our inquiry, the evidence has also identified three practical issues that undermine the police response: the clarity of offences, the response to non-criminal incidents and communication with victims.

Clarity of offences

82. We have been told that one of the main policing challenges is that when an incident occurs, the responding officers must first know the provisions of complex and rarely used legislation, and are then often required to make very difficult decisions about whether an action crosses the line from robust political debate to abuse and intimidation. Commander Messinger noted that police officers have to consider a wide range of legislation from different sources that may be relevant to threats against candidates and MPs. Some of it he described as “day-to-day business”, but other legislation is “more bespoke” and “far less understood across policing because it is infrequently used”.¹²⁶

83. In addition, DCI Ives and Commander Messinger both told us that police officers are sometimes hesitant to act on incidents related to elections or political activity because they want to avoid any perception of political bias, a risk also highlighted by Dr Sofia Collignon.¹²⁷

84. The officer’s position is even more difficult if the interpretation and guidance around legislation is unclear. As well as the electoral law examples identified in Chapter Two, this is a particular issue for the Malicious Communications Act 1988. This legislation criminalises the sending of “grossly offensive” messages and is used to prosecute the majority of offences against MPs.¹²⁸ However, Detective Inspector Lee Barnard, Operational Lead, PLaIT, told us “whether something is ‘grossly offensive’ could be open to interpretation, so we see variations in whether people record something as crime or intelligence, based upon their assessment of ‘grossly offensive’.”¹²⁹

85. As a result, the police officers we spoke to called for more training for officers, noting this would also require specialist legal input from the Crown Prosecution Service.¹³⁰ The Minister for Democracy agreed that more guidance for police officers on the “delicate balance” of policing electoral events was required.¹³¹

Responding to non-criminal incidents

88. Whilst the threshold for criminal prosecution is not reached in the majority of incidents of abuse or intimidation against MPs or candidates,¹³² such incidents still significantly reduce their sense of safety and willingness to stand for public office, especially when considered cumulatively.¹³³ The Electoral Commission has advocated for greater police engagement with perpetrators before their behaviour reaches a criminal threshold to try and dissuade them from continuing or escalating this “‘lawful but awful’ behaviour”.¹³⁴ The Jo Cox Foundation noted that many UK police forces already work to address and deter crimes by visiting perpetrators even if it does not result in prosecution, and that although this can be effective on an individual level, the ongoing problem shows that it is not effectively deterring other people.¹³⁵

89. DI Barnard has suggested that another approach the police may consider is the use of anti-social behaviour legislation to address cases where people repeatedly send offensive communications that do not meet the level of “grossly offensive” required by the Malicious Communications Act 1988, but have a harmful effect on the recipient. The police have taken legal advice on this approach and used it successfully in one case. He described this as “a softer approach, including community protection warnings and community protection notices, and then we can move up that scale.”¹³⁶ If, following this, a perpetrator continues to abuse the MP, the response could be escalated to impose a criminal behaviour order, a civil injunction, community resolutions or restorative justice.¹³⁷

90. Non-criminal incidents can also be used by police and PSD to build a picture of current threats and to identify and track offenders, something the police have told us in written evidence they are working hard to do. It is partly for this reason that the police have strongly recommended that MPs and their offices should share any incidents or abusive communications they receive with the police, and not try to decide for themselves which ones warrant reporting.¹³⁸ This approach was supported by the Association of European Threat Assessment Professionals, who stressed that individuals should not make their own risk assessments and all incidents, even potentially benign ones, should be reported to, and handled by professionals.¹³⁹

Communication

93. We have also heard frustration from some candidates and MPs that the police fail to communicate the steps taken following a report, or outcome of an investigation. Not having been informed of action or outcome following the reporting of an incident was one of the most cited reasons for dissatisfaction in that process by MPs and staff participating in our survey.¹⁴⁰

Legislative tools

95. Some witnesses have said that current legislation and criminal justice processes do not adequately empower the police to account for the full impact of threats to individual MPs, particularly given the compounding effect such crimes have on our democracy. For example, DI Barnard told us that technical investigative resources are allocated based on the crime not the victim, and Optica checks to identify people who had abused MPs or candidates on social media can take up to six months to be dealt with, as such cases are generally breaches of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and are regarded as low priority.¹⁴¹ Such processes do not therefore reflect the significant cumulative impact that many small incidents of abuse and harassment have on democracy as a whole.

96. Oliver Davis agreed that “In fact, it strikes me that PLaIT and the Bridger network are the only parts of the system that do genuinely consider the corrosive effects of some of these what have been called “low-level” crimes. They are not low-level, not cumulatively.”¹⁴²

4 The Conference’s next phase of work

98. The first stage of our inquiry and this report have examined what the operational bodies responsible for the safety of candidates and MPs can do by way of security provision. This phase has identified some potential improvements to current operations that should reduce the vulnerability of MPs and candidates. It has also highlighted that because this approach does not address the factors driving and enabling threats against candidates and MPs, it has limited impact on their sense of safety and the day-to-day abuse that is deterring people from standing for office.

100. We look forward to building on our work in the second phase of our inquiry, and to engaging with witnesses to understand in greater depth the challenges of, and opportunities for reducing, the threats faced by MPs and candidates.

Annex 1: Survey Findings

1 Methodological information

To help understand the nature of threats to MPs and their staff and the impact they have had, the Speaker’s Conference surveyed MPs¹⁴³ and MPs’ staff between 26 February and 14 March 2025. The survey asked about their experiences of threatening behaviour and the security measures on offer.

Data collection and analysis was carried out by the House of Commons Insight Team and Scrutiny Unit. All responses were anonymous; any identifying information was redacted in the open text data and the findings were reported on in an aggregated format of group sizes of ten people or more. All questions were optional, and some questions were routed depending on the answer given, so response rates varied with each question. The Insight Team used a statistical method called significance testing to determine whether the differences between survey results for different demographic groups are significant, rather than coincidental.¹⁴⁴

224 MPs (34%) and 346 MPs’ staff (7.7%) engaged with the survey. 20 former MPs answered the survey, which did not provide enough data to report on every question or show demographic differences for this group. Therefore, the data summarised in this report comes from the current cohort of MPs and their staff and reflects a high percentage of new MPs’ experiences. Surveys are susceptible to self-selection bias and the results of this survey should not be interpreted as representative of all MPs and MPs’ staff. However, they do indicate some areas of concern.

We would like to thank all those who participated in the survey, particularly when this involved reliving distressing events.

2 Survey Findings

Sense of safety

Overall, the majority of MPs and MPs’ staff who responded to the survey said they feel safe.

• 61% of MPs said they felt safe whilst campaigning for the 2024 General Election (31% felt unsafe).
• 52% said they feel safe since becoming an MP in 2024 (39% feel unsafe).
• 86% of MPs’ staff said they feel safe at work (9% feel unsafe).¹⁴⁵

Security during the 2024 general election period

Reflecting on the experience of campaigning for the 2024 General Election, most new MPs said they felt safe (64% felt safe, 25% felt unsafe), but returning MPs had a more mixed experience (55% felt safe, 42% felt unsafe).

Worryingly, more than half (56%) of Black, Asian and minority ethnic MPs, and almost two thirds (65%) of disabled MPs said they felt unsafe. However, there was no significant difference in perceived safety between men and women.

The majority of MPs (69%) said they felt informed (well-informed or somewhat informed) about security measures available to them during the general election period.

73% of MPs took up one or more security measure, but returning MPs were significantly more likely to have taken up security measures (90%) than those who were subsequently elected for the first time (64%). However, a higher percentage of new MPs (27%) took up security training offered by their party compared to returning MPs (11%), which suggests that new candidates may have lacked awareness of what was on offer beyond what their parties provided. Returning MPs (26%) were more likely to request a security operative or close protection officer at campaign events and hustings compared to new MPs (3%), as were Black, Asian and minority ethnic MPs (38%) compared to White MPs (9%).

Among the 27% of MPs who did not take up any security measures during the general election period, the most commonly cited reasons were that they: had not been offered a security briefing from the police (53%) or their party (44%), were not aware there was an election single point of contact (SPOC) in their local police force (51%), or did not know how to contact them (42%). Several MPs said they were late candidates and there was not time to consider security measures.

Most MPs agreed that the measures they took up were effective in increasing their sense of safety.

Internal party processes

Just under half (44%) of MPs said they did not know if their party has formal processes in place to deal with intimidation, harassment and abuse of its candidates and MPs.

Nevertheless, most MPs said their party sets clear expectations for acceptable conduct (67%) and would support them if they experienced abuse from an external source (61%) or from within their party (66%), or sanction them if they engaged in misconduct (84%).

When it comes to party support, new MPs were more likely than returning MPs to agree that their party would support them if they experienced intimidatory behaviour, harassment or abuse from sources internal or external to their party (internal source 75% vs 51%; and external source 66% vs 46%).

Around three in four men agreed that their party would support them in both instances (internal source 77% and external source 73%), compared to just half of women (internal source 55% and external source 47%).

When it comes to role-modelling behaviours, new MPs were more likely to agree that their party models the behaviour it expects of other parties compared to returning MPs (72% vs 47%).

Again, women were less likely to agree with this statement compared to men (67% vs 73%). Disabled MPs were also less likely to agree than non-disabled MPs (42% vs 66%), as were Black, Asian and minority ethnic MPs compared to White MPs (35% vs 67%).

Around half of MPs (48%) thought their party should do more to improve its candidates’ and campaigners’ conduct during election campaigns.

Four in five MPs (81%) said they would potentially be willing to sign a candidates’ code of conduct, if the parties could agree a common understanding of what constitutes acceptable campaign behaviours and activities.

Going one step further, around two in three MPs (69%) said that they would support their party only nominating candidates who had signed up to such a code of conduct – women (81%) were more in favour of this than men (59%).

Security as an MP

Just over half (52%) of MPs said they feel safe in their role.

However, new MPs reported feeling safer (61%) than returning MPs (44%), which was also the case whilst campaigning. There were also differences in perceptions of safety based on MPs’ disability status; only 20% of disabled MPs said they feel safe in their role, compared to 63% of non-disabled MPs. There were no significant differences between other demographic groups such as the MPs’ party, gender or ethnicity.

98% of MPs said they feel informed (either well-informed or somewhat informed) about the security measures available to them from the Parliamentary Security Department (PSD).

At the time of responding to the survey, 94% of MPs had taken up one or more of the security measures on offer. Women (99%) were more likely to have taken up security measures than men (90%). MPs said having security officers at surgeries increased their sense of safety the most, followed by security measures at home.

The most common response to the free text question “what makes you feel most at risk whilst serving as an MP” was online abuse.

Security of MPs’ staff

Overall, 86% of MPs’ staff said they feel safe at work.

Staff were more likely to report feeling safe if they were based in Westminster, compared to the constituency. 92% of staff felt informed (either well-informed or somewhat informed) about security measures. Like MPs, staff¹⁴⁶ said security officers at surgeries most increased their sense of safety, followed by security measures in the constituency office.

MPs’ experience of abuse

Chart 1: Which, if any, of the following incidents of threatening behaviour or communication have you personally experienced since you began working as an MP? (Please select any that apply)

Base: 197 MPs. The chart shows the top ten incidents, plus those who have experienced no incidents.

96% of MPs have personally experienced one or more incidents of threatening behaviour or communication since they began working as an MP.

Two in five MPs (46%) said they experience one or more forms of abuse at least monthly, meanwhile almost one in ten (7%) said they experience it daily. Two in five MPs (43%) said most of the abuse they had experienced came from constituents, nearly a quarter (23%) said members of the public, and almost one in five (17%) said the source of abuse was anonymous/unknown.

Most of these incidents have happened online. For example, among MPs who have experienced abusive language and insults, 93% have experienced this online (compared to 67% in-person). Similarly, 95% of those who have experienced unwanted or persistent communication/contact have experienced this online (compared to 41% in-person) and 98% of those who have experienced having malicious or false information spread about them have experienced this online (compared to 33% in-person).

Among those who have experienced in-person incidents, half (49%) said these incidents had mostly occurred in a public place or whilst travelling between locations, and only a small percentage said at a constituency office (10%) or surgery (5%). Some MPs also noted in the free text comments that they had experienced abuse whilst canvassing and door-knocking.

Sexual harassment and threats of sexual violence disproportionately affect women and disabled MPs. 14% of women reported having experienced threats of sexual violence, compared to no men. Additionally, 26% of women report experiencing sexual harassment, receiving sexually explicit messages, or facing unwanted sexual advances, compared to just 5% of men. Disabled MPs also reported significantly higher rates of sexual abuse; 20% experienced threats of sexual violence, compared to 5% of non-disabled MPs. Furthermore, 40% reported experiencing sexual harassment or receiving sexually explicit messages or unwanted sexual advances, compared to just 12% of non-disabled MPs.

Threats of harm are significantly more common among Black, Asian or minority ethnic MPs and disabled MPs. 81% of Black, Asian or minority ethnic MPs reported receiving threats to harm them, compared to 34% of White MPs. Similarly, 65% of disabled MPs reported such threats, compared to 33% of non-disabled MPs. The pattern is similar for threats directed at family members. 31% of Black, Asian or minority ethnic MPs reported receiving threats to harm their family, compared to 9% of White MPs. Among disabled MPs 40% reported such threats, compared to just 8% of non-disabled MPs.

MPs’ staff experience of abuse

Chart 2: Which, if any, of the following incidents of threatening behaviour or communication have you personally experienced since you began working for an MP? (Select any that apply)

Base = 287 members of staff. The chart shows the top ten incidents, plus those who have experienced no incidents.

69% of MPs’ staff indicated that they have experienced one or more forms of abuse in their role. As with MPs, the most common incidents of threatening behaviour that staff have experienced were abusive language/insults and unwanted or persistent communication/contact.

However, staff reported experiencing a higher proportion of some forms of abuse in-person than online, compared to MPs. For example, of those who had experienced abusive language/insults, 58% had experienced it in-person (compared to 58% online). For comments on appearance, 67% had experienced them in-person (compared to 41% online). And of those who reported having received threats of harm, 62% had experienced such threats in-person (compared to 52% online). In comparison, over 90% of MPs who reported having experienced the same incidents of abuse did so online.

Staff were most likely to experience in-person incidents of abuse at constituency offices, followed by public places or whilst travelling. Half of staff (50%) who had experienced threatening behaviour themselves had experienced it less than once a month but when talking about threatening behaviour they had witnessed their MP experience, around two in three (64%) said it occurred once a month or more. The survey’s findings indicate that staff are very much on the frontline, both experiencing and witnessing threatening and abusive behaviour and communications.

Whether in-person or online, 71% of staff said most of the abuse came from constituents.

Reporting incidents

Just under a third (28%) of MPs who responded to the survey said they had reported an incident to the police during the general election period.

Some demographic groups were more likely to have reported an incident to the police, such as: MPs who had served for less than five years (53%) compared to long-serving MPs (16+ years: 10%), Black, Asian and minority ethnic MPs (56%) compared to White MPs (24%), and MPs from the smaller parties or Independent MPs (73%) compared to Conservative (12%), Labour (29%) and Liberal Democrat (9%) MPs. There was no significant difference in reporting patterns during the general election period between men and women, based on survey feedback.

Since the General Election, 77% of MPs said they have reported an incident to their party, the police, PSD or the Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team (PLaIT) (see chart 3 below).¹⁴⁷

Chart 3: Since becoming an MP, have you reported any incidents of threats, abuse, or harassment (which you have either experienced or witnessed) to any of the following? (Please select all that apply)

Base=188 MPs.

Chart 4: If you have not reported any incident/s [of threats, abuse, or harassment], why not?

For the general election period, base=148 candidates; since becoming an MP, base=43 MPs.

70% of MPs had not reported an incident during the general election period, compared to 23% who had not reported anything since becoming an MP.

Most of those who did not report anything as a candidate said this was because they had nothing to report (61%). However, the majority of those who had not reported an incident since becoming an MP said the reason was that they did not think an incident was serious enough to report (63%).

Some MPs said in the free text that they did not report an incident during the general election period because it was not a physical threat or because it was an issue with another candidate. Disabled MPs were significantly more likely to say they did not think reporting an incident would lead to a solution (17% disabled MPs vs 3% non-disabled MPs).

MPs were more satisfied with how reported incidents had been handled since becoming an MP (64%) than during the general election period (51%).

MPs representing urban constituencies were significantly less satisfied with the response to, or outcome of, reported incidents during the general election period (31%) compared to those representing rural constituencies (81%). A similar percentage of MPs’ staff—around two thirds (66%) who had reported an incident—were satisfied with the response or outcome.

Most MPs and MPs’ staff who were dissatisfied with reporting an incident, both during the general election period and since, said in the free text comments that no action or insufficient action was taken, or they had not been informed about any action or outcome. Some said they were happy with the response but not the outcome, and several staff said that the process of who to report to was confusing.

Abuse on Social Media

89% of MPs who have an active presence on social media, have experienced some form of threatening, abusive or intimidating behaviour through one or more of their social media accounts.

Chart 5: Percentage of MPs who are active on social media platforms, and the proportion of those active who have and have not received abuse on those platforms.

Base=188 MPs. Percentages refer to the percentage of MPs who are active on each social media platform.¹⁴⁸

MPs are more likely to have experienced abuse on X and Facebook compared to other social media platforms. Around three in four who have an active presence on X or Facebook said they have experienced abuse on those platforms.

Although not a social media platform and therefore not shown in the chart above, 64% of MPs reported having received abuse via their Parliamentary email address. This places Parliamentary email as the third highest avenue for receiving online abuse, behind X (69%) and Facebook (70%).

27% of MPs said they oversee and manage their own social media, whilst 69% said they delegate management of their social media to their staff. Staff are therefore often the ones who see the abusive communication first-hand; 77% of staff said they take steps to shield their MP from offensive social media content.

Three quarters of MPs (75%) who manage their own social media said they do not have enough information on how to request the removal of posts from the platforms they use. Similar proportions said the content they see affects their mental/emotional wellbeing (75%) and their sense of safety at work (71%).

A high proportion of MPs’ staff also said the content they see affects their mental/emotional wellbeing (70%) and their sense of safety at work (65%). Over half (56%) have sought to have posts removed from social media and 83% said social media platforms do not do enough to moderate or remove threatening, abusive or offensive content.

Chart 6: Which social media platforms do not do enough to remove harmful content?

For MPs, base=159; for MPs’ staff, base=201.

MPs and their staff overwhelmingly agree that X and Facebook do not do enough to moderate or remove threatening, abusive or offensive content.

Impact of abuse on MPs

Chart 7: Has the abuse that you have experienced had a psychological impact on you? Since becoming an MP, have you… (please select any that apply)

Base=171 MPs.

91% of MPs who reported having experienced abuse (either in-person or online) indicated that it has had a psychological impact on them.

MPs representing urban constituencies were more likely, compared to those representing rural constituencies, to have felt unsafe (urban 56% vs rural 37%) and worried about being out in public (urban 67% vs rural 49%).

Black, Asian and minority ethnic MPs were more likely than White MPs to have worried about being out in public (B.A.M.E 87% vs White 58%) and have feared being physically attacked (B.A.M.E 73% vs White 35%).

Disabled MPs were more likely to have experienced a number of these psychological effects than non-disabled MPs. Most notably, a significantly higher proportion of disabled MPs than non-disabled MPs had considered resigning from public office (disabled 47% vs non-disabled 12%) and not standing for re-election (disabled 53% vs non-disabled 24%).

MPs who identify as LGBT+ were more likely than MPs who identify as heterosexual/straight to have: felt anxious or depressed (LGBT+ 75% vs heterosexual 43%), worried about the safety of their staff (LGBT+ 88% vs heterosexual 61%) or worried about being out in public (LGBT+ 83% vs heterosexual 56%).

Half of MPs (51%) who responded to a question about the triggers of abuse said the abuse directed at them was based on their politics or party, 23% said it stemmed from a misunderstanding about their role as an MP and 11% said the abuse was personal.

Chart 8: Has the abuse that you have experienced led to any changes in your working practices? (Select any that apply)

Base=171 MPs.

A high percentage of MPs reported having increased security measures to protect themselves, their families and their staff, because of the abuse they have experienced.

Chart 9: Has the abuse that you have experienced led to any changes in your working practices? (Select any that apply)

Base=171 MPs.

Some MPs have made changes to their personal activities and movements to increase their sense of safety. This reduces the time they spend in public places and their interaction with members of the public, such as declining invitations to events and reducing, or not holding, constituency surgeries in-person.

Chart 10: Has the abuse that you have experienced led to any changes in your working practices? (Select any that apply)

Base=171 MPs.

Some MPs reported changing the way they campaign, debate and even vote, as a result of the abuse they have experienced.

Only 5% of MPs who said they had experienced one or more forms of online/in-person abuse in the survey (93%), had not changed their behaviour in any of the ways listed in the three charts above.

A significantly higher percentage of women than men had requested provision of security officers, requested provision of close protection, declined media engagement, reduced social media interactions, and chosen not to attend a hustings. This shows that women in particular are adapting the way they work as MPs.

Impact of abuse on MPs’ families

Chart 11: To what extent has your experience of abuse impacted your family? (Please select any that apply)

Base=169 MPs.

Returning MPs and disabled MPs were more likely to say their family had directly experienced harassment, abuse or intimidation compared to new MPs and non-disabled MPs respectively (returning MPs 19% vs new MPs 6%; disabled MPs 41% vs non-disabled MPs 7%).

Black, Asian or minority ethnic MPs were more likely than White MPs to say their family was aware of the abuse and harassment they received and that it affected their family’s mental/emotional wellbeing (B.A.M.E 73% vs White 29%) and sense of safety (B.A.M.E 53% vs White 16%).

Disabled MPs were also more likely than non-disabled MPs to say the abuse they received affected their family’s mental/emotional wellbeing (disabled 65% vs non-disabled 28%) and sense of safety (disabled 53% vs non-disabled 15%).

Impact of abuse on MPs’ staff

Chart 12: [Asked to MPs’ staff] As a result of the abuse you have experienced/witnessed since working for an MP, have you... (please select any that apply)

Base=224 staff.

Returning staff were more likely than new staff to: have felt unsafe (58% vs 38%), feared being physically attacked (32% vs 15%), worried about going into the office (34% vs 21%) and considered leaving their job due to abuse (18% vs 8%). Returning staff were also more likely than new staff to say they had normalised the abuse (44% vs 24%), as were men compared to women (46% vs 29%). More women than men worried about going into the office (33% vs 19%) and worried about the safety of their MP (81% vs 66%).

72% of staff said their experience of witnessing abuse or intimidation whilst working for an MP made them less likely to stand for election themselves. Women were more likely than men to be put off (77% vs 58%).

Conclusions and recommendations

Threats against candidates and MPs and their impact on the democratic process

1. To be elected as a Member of Parliament is an honour and privilege, and it is one of the most important and rewarding jobs any of us have undertaken. Robust political discourse and challenge is an important part of the role that we want to protect and encourage. (Conclusion, Paragraph 13)

2. However, the current level of threats against MPs and candidates is stifling debate and weakening democracy as a whole. It is dissuading candidates from standing and making it harder for MPs and candidates to engage with the public. It is improperly influencing political decisions by forcing people to weigh the public good against their own safety and the wellbeing of their colleagues, their staff and their families. Because of the threat of abuse, some MPs already self-censor by not speaking about contentious issues, and on rare occasions it can even affect their voting intention. Abuse and intimidation are not part of the job of being an MP and threaten the health of our democracy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 14)

3. Politicians have a responsibility to their constituents and must be accountable to their electorates for their decisions. It is to be expected that some constituents will disagree with decisions a politician has made. Everyone has a right to try to influence their MP’s positions and ultimately hold them to account at the ballot box. However, personal abuse and threats to the safety of MPs because of how they have spoken or voted are never appropriate. Yet increasingly people think it is acceptable to engage with politicians in a confrontational, aggressive manner. Some people even believe that MPs and candidates should expect some level of abuse as part of the job: a view we wholeheartedly reject. We will consider the public attitudes that drive this behaviour, and the ways such societal tendencies can be halted and reversed in our second phase of work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 18)

4. The nature and tone of engagement on, as well as policies and approaches of some social media platforms, are contributing to the level of threats against MPs and candidates. Although many MPs and candidates choose to ignore insults and allegations online, either because of a mistaken belief that they are to be expected or because of the difficulties and expense of trying to have them removed, libelous smears or hyperbolic attacks are sometimes taken literally and can lead people who believe them to aggressively confront the MP or candidate in real life. We will return to the role of social media in our second phase of work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 20)

5. While we respect and wish to protect the right of the press to hold politicians to account fairly and honestly, how the press report on politicians and Parliament shapes public attitudes towards MPs and candidates and can add fuel to the fire, which is at best unhelpful, at worst, causes real harm. We will return to this issue in our second phase of work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 22)

6. We are acutely aware that the way politicians engage with each other shapes people’s perception of how politics is done. MPs and candidates have a responsibility to lead by example and we must all strive for courtesy and respect in our politics. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

7. There should be a code of conduct for all candidates, MPs and parties that defines a collectively agreed set of principles to guide behaviours and language when campaigning. The Speaker will work with the parties currently represented in Parliament and the Electoral Commission to develop such a code, in order to ensure it meets the needs of the broad range of candidates who stand in elections. Not wanting to preclude the uptake of this code of conduct for other elections, the Speaker will also invite representations from the Local Government Association as part of this process. (Conclusion, Paragraph 28)

8. The leadership of all parties represented in Parliament and the Electoral Commission should engage constructively with the Speaker to develop a code of conduct for campaigning, to be agreed and in place at the next general election. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28)

9. Parties have a duty of care to their candidates, particularly during election periods. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)

10. They should ensure all candidates and agents are aware of how to report threats to, or request support from, appropriate external agencies. Parties should also offer candidates and agents appropriate avenues within the party for raising issues they may be having with abuse and intimidation, so that they are aware of the scale of threats against their candidates. The precise mechanism for gathering this information will vary according to party size and resources and should not compel or pressure candidates to share cases or details they do not wish to. (Recommendation, Paragraph 29)

11. Parties also have a responsibility to properly vet and select candidates who would be appropriate MPs, in line with legal restrictions on who can stand for election. We will return to the question of whether current legal restrictions on standing for election are sufficient in our second phase of work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)

Effectiveness of the response: Elections

12. At the dissolution of Parliament for an election, all MPs wishing to continue in the role become candidates and the Parliamentary Security Department (PSD) ceases to have responsibility for their security. But security risks and concerns remain. Overall, the arrangements made between the Home Office and PSD for the 2024 General Election, as well as other security provisions introduced through the Defending Democracy Policing Protocol, were welcome and effective. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)

13. The immediate transfer of the capacity to provide candidates with private security operatives from PSD to the Home Office should be established as a default arrangement for future general elections, effective from the moment of dissolution. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)

14. The Government should monitor and record the use of Disqualification Orders under the Elections Act 2022, review their effectiveness, and report the results to Parliament by means of a Written Ministerial Statement. The Government should also submit a report to the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, as soon as feasibly possible and at the latest in time for reforms to be implemented at least six months before the next general election, in line with the Gould principle. (Recommendation, Paragraph 37)

15. Elections occur infrequently and present policing challenges that exist alongside every police force’s “business as usual”. We recognise this strain and thank the police for their work, during the election and every day since. Policing elections is hard. Electoral law is complicated and disparate. The negative trends described in this report have changed what it means to police elections. The focus has moved from matters of fraud and other administrative malpractices, to dealing with incidents of alleged political abuse and intimidation. The current structures for policing elections fail to reflect this shift. We will return to these structural issues in our second phase of work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)

16. The policing response during the 2024 general election period was mixed, in terms of the level of engagement police had with candidates, their presence at hustings, polls and counts, and the handling of incidents. The issue of inconsistency in police responses to incidents of abuse and intimidation is a significant challenge, which we cover elsewhere in this report. Engagement and resourcing during an election period can and must be planned for through comprehensive, risk-assessed policing plans. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)

17. Every police force should produce a fully risk-assessed policing plan ahead of a general election period. As a minimum, such plans must:

• identify potential “flashpoint” events and ensure an appropriate police presence is available for them; and
• account for the potentially higher risk profile some candidates may have, either carried over from their time as an MP, because of their own prominence, or for other factors affecting their level of risk, whilst ensuring no political advantage is given to any candidate.

The national portfolio lead for policing elections should take steps to ensure this is done in a consistent and standardised way, with input from local returning officers and processes for keeping the plan under review throughout the election period. Candidates and relevant parties should be able to contribute to plans if they wish to do so. Similar plans should be drawn up and implemented for by-elections if they occur. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45)

18. Government guidance and advice on security for candidates in the 2024 General Election was welcome, but its reach was limited in part because of a lack of understanding of data sharing powers by returning officers. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48)

19. The Government and the Electoral Commission should investigate reforms to the system for candidate registration so that candidates and agents are asked to provide an email address at registration which can be shared with the Electoral Commission and the police. This will allow the Electoral Commission and the police to send security guidance directly to all candidates. While these reforms are being considered and implemented, the Electoral Commission should provide guidance to returning officers to signpost every candidate to the single source hosting security-related guidance and advice, as well as relevant local security information, at the point they register. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)

20. When it comes to tackling harassment, abuse and intimidation of candidates, electoral law is not fit for purpose. Whilst there are specific offences designed to deal with these issues, they often lack clarity, are outdated, or do not reflect challenges of the modern context. Because of one or all of these factors, the existing offences are little used and ineffective. (Conclusion, Paragraph 56)

21. The Electoral Commission should produce a code of practice for election officials, drawing together all the necessary information related to the safety and security of candidates. (Recommendation, Paragraph 56)

22. The Government must undertake a full review of electoral law with the intention of identifying:

• offences that require clarification through legislative change or further guidance;
• gaps in the powers of returning officers to ensure the effective administration of elections in the context of situations relating to harassment, abuse and intimidation; and
• administrative practices or processes that unintentionally undermine security or electoral integrity.

As a minimum, the Conference recommends that the Government:

a. Remove the option for any home addresses to be published as part of the nomination process. Instead, UK parliamentary election ballots should state which constituency each candidate lives in.

b. Introduce ID and address checks for all candidates.

c. Work with the Electoral Commission to review the adequacy of nomination requirements in protecting elections from candidates seeking to mislead the electorate or undermine the integrity of the democratic process.

d. Clarify what behaviour is and is not permissible outside a polling station.

e. Introduce a new power for returning officers to work in collaboration with the police to extend the protective perimeter around a polling station in certain circumstances.

f. Update, or clarify the scope of, the offence of causing disturbances at election meetings under section 97 of the Representation of the People Act 1983.

g. Review how to make the intention behind section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, regarding false statements of fact in relation to a candidate’s personal character or conduct, enforceable and able to keep pace with technological developments in AI and deepfakes. This should include consideration of expanding the offence beyond personal character and conduct, and the challenges of disproving the statutory defence of honest belief.

h. Update, or clarify the scope of, the provisions of paragraph 42 of Schedule 1 to the Representation of the People Act 1983 to more clearly identify the circumstances in which the presiding officer can adjourn a poll.

Whilst our remit is for parliamentary candidates and elections, we encourage Government and the devolved Administrations to ensure that, where possible and appropriate, a consistent approach is taken across all elections. (Recommendation, Paragraph 57)

Effectiveness of the response: security of MPs

23. Security measures for MPs have come a very long way in recent years, but the political environment has also changed dramatically. It is not for the Speaker’s Conference to assess the safety of individual MPs. Rather, we will focus on the effectiveness of measures at making MPs feel safe within the context of the threats most visible to them. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)

24. Despite the step change in vulnerability reduction measures over recent years, many MPs remain concerned for their safety, as well as that of their staff and families. However, we agree with the assessment that a further step change in vulnerability reduction measures is not currently deliverable and would lead to a fundamental and undesirable change in the way MPs carry out their roles and engage with their constituents. Improvements need to come from encouraging appropriate uptake and effective delivery of existing measures, since issues with the delivery of security measures undermine MPs’ confidence in the service itself. In turn, this diminishes their sense of safety which can affect their willingness to continue to serve in public office. Above all, the focus must be on reducing the level of threat posed to MPs and candidates. Threat reduction will be at the centre of our second phase of work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 67)

25. Notwithstanding our conclusion against a further step change in security arrangements, what is being done can always be done better. PSD’s work relating to families and its focus on online safety are necessary and welcome. But the political landscape in which MPs operate is continually changing and recent experience demonstrates how global events can drive domestic discourse and action. Both can have implications for the security of MPs and any future reforms must anticipate, rather than respond to the risk. (Conclusion, Paragraph 69)

26. PSD should continue to be proactive and flexible in assessing how significant events or trends might change the security needs of MPs and should be prepared to adapt its security posture in anticipation of any changes in the threat landscape. PSD’s security arrangements for individual MPs must continue to respond to their professional assessment of anticipated risk. In exceptional circumstances where the level of abuse and intimidation against an MP means there is also an identified threat to their staff, PSD should consider flexible and pragmatic arrangements to ensure appropriate security for those staff. (Recommendation, Paragraph 69)

27. MPs have a vital role to play in their own security. They must take it seriously and engage with PSD, not only for themselves but as a duty of care towards their staff. (Recommendation, Paragraph 70)

28. As part of their duty of care as employers, MPs must ensure their staff are aware of the security offering available to them and take their views into account when considering their own security, particularly in relation to the installation of security measures in constituency offices and the use of security operatives during surgeries. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71)

29. A consistent, swift response to reported incidents of abuse and intimidation is integral to MPs’ sense of safety and their ability to effectively carry out their role. But consistency does not currently exist, either between or within police forces, or across the criminal justice system. Inconsistency weakens the deterrent effect and empowers perpetrators. In our second phase of work we will undertake an end-to-end review of the criminal justice response to crimes that undermine democracy and identify recommendations for how it could be strengthened. Specifically, we will explore the merits of a more centralised approach to policing these issues, noting the need to consider the different policing and legal systems across the UK. (Conclusion, Paragraph 79)

30. Some change need not wait. The Government should ensure that all parts of the criminal justice system drive a cultural shift and ensure relentless challenge of the perception that abuse and intimidation comes with the job of being an MP. Its response to this report should list the steps it intends to take to achieve this. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)

31. There is at best inconsistent understanding and awareness amongst police officers of relevant electoral, communications and public order offences as they relate to electoral events or politicians. Even when offences are widely known, several lack clarity on the criminal threshold. This places undue pressure on the judgment of the responding officer, who may be operating in a politically charged and sensitive environment, in considering whether an offence may or may not have been committed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 86)

32. The police, Crown Prosecution Service and Government should work together to develop guidance that clarifies the criminal thresholds for communications, electoral and public order offences as they relate to incidents of abuse and intimidation of MPs and candidates, or electoral events. This guidance must form the basis of training for returning officers and police officers. MPs and candidates should also have access to this guidance, so they are better informed on what and when to report issues and the response to expect. Equivalent guidance with input from the relevant bodies should be developed in the devolved nations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 87)

33. Whilst most incidents of abuse or intimidation experienced by MPs and candidates do not meet a criminal threshold, the distinction is often irrelevant in terms of the impact they have. Repeated “low level” abuse and intimidation is wearing on the individual and corrosive to our democracy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 91)

34. The police must adopt a preventative, proactive approach to policing harassment, abuse and intimidation against MPs. PLaIT must renew its focus on offender management, and work with the Bridger Network and Chief Constables to develop guidance on interventions for non-criminal incidents, including the use of anti-social behaviour legislation. Police Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland should consider what similar legislative tools are available to them to facilitate an equivalent response to non-criminal incidents. (Recommendation, Paragraph 91)

35. Neither MPs nor their staff should assume responsibility for determining what does and does not warrant reporting. MPs and their staff must report to the police any incident that strikes them as abusive or intimidatory. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92)

36. Local police forces and PLaIT must ensure that MPs, candidates or their staff, are kept informed of action taken, progress of investigations and outcomes of reported incidents. In line with the Victims’ Code, the police should ask and establish how often an MP or candidate wishes to receive updates on their case and keep them informed in line with those preferences. (Recommendation, Paragraph 94)

37. As part of our second phase assessment of the criminal justice system’s response to crimes that undermine democracy, we will explore in greater depth the adequacy of the existing legislative frameworks and criminal justice processes giving particular consideration to: the merits or otherwise of a) a specific offence against MPs and b) an aggravating factor applicable to sentencing for crimes committed against candidates or MPs because of their role; and whether the classification of threats of violence against MPs under existing offences appropriately reflects their seriousness in the context of their impact on democracy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 97)

The Conference’s next phase of work

38. Given the limits of vulnerability reduction, more work must be put into understanding what is driving the threat level, and how it can be reduced. This will be the focus of the next phase of our inquiry. We have identified three areas where we believe we may be able to make practical recommendations that could reduce the level of threats against candidates and MPs:

• Public attitudes towards MPs and the level of abuse and intimidation in political debate, including the influence of the press and broadcast media.
• How threats against MPs and candidates are handled in the criminal justice system.
• The role of social media in promoting or combatting threats against MPs and candidates. (Conclusion, Paragraph 99)

Formal Minutes

Wednesday 21 May 2025

Members present

Sir Lindsay Hoyle, in the Chair

Kirsty Blackman MP

Samantha Dixon MP

Dr Rupa Huq MP

Leigh Ingham MP

Jessica Morden MP

Rebecca Paul MP

John Slinger MP

Sammy Wilson MP

Speaker’s Conference on the security of MPs, candidates and elections

Draft Report (Speaker’s Conference on the security of MPs, candidates and elections), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 100 read and agreed to.

Annexes and Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Conference to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Wednesday 4 June 2025 at 3.30pm.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Wednesday 5 February 2025

Ellie Reeves MP, Chair, Labour Party; Andrew Whyte, Executive Director, Governance and Legal, Labour Party; Bob Blackman MP, Chair 1922 Committee, Conservative Party; and Stephen Massey, Former Chief Executive Officer, Conservative PartyQ1–17

Jeremy Corbyn MP, Independent; and Iqbal Mohamed MP, IndependentQ18–22

Mike Dixon, Chief Executive Officer, Liberal Democrats; and Elfrede Brambley-Crawshaw, Elections Manager, The Green PartyQ23–36

Owen Roberts, Chief Executive Officer, Plaid Cymru; Timothy Johnston, Chief Executive, DUP; and Colin McGrath MLA, Chair, SDLPQ37–44

Wednesday 26 February 2025

Vijay Rangarajan, Chief Executive, Electoral Commission: Niki Nixon, Interim Director of Communications, Electoral Commission; Peter Stanyon, Chief Executive, Association of Electoral Administrators; DCI Kevin Ives, National Co-Ordinator for Election Crime, City of London PoliceQ45–76

Will Fletcher, Interim CEO, The Jo Cox Foundation; Professor Helen Margetts, Professor of Society and the Internet, Oxford University; Dr Sofia Collignon, Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Queen Mary University of LondonQ77–96

Wednesday 12 March 2025

Detective Inspector Lee Barnard MBE, Operational Lead, Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team (PLaIT), Steve Jones, Lead Analyst, Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team (PLaIT), Chief Inspector Bryan Duffy, National Strategic Bridger Lead and Simon Messinger, Commander, ProtectionQ97–122

Alison Giles, Director, Parliamentary Security Department and Oliver Davis, Deputy Director (Members’ Security and Risk), Parliamentary Security DepartmentQ123–146

Wednesday 2 April 2025

Dan Jarvis MBE MP, Minister for Security, Home Office; Shaun Hipgrave, Director Protect and Prepare, Home Office; Rushanara Ali MP, Minister for Homelessness and Democracy, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government; Becca Crosier, Deputy Director for Elections Strategy, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local GovernmentQ147–170

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

SCS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 50:50 Parliament SCS0036

2 Anonymised SCS0044

3 Anonymised SCS0043

4 Anonymised SCS0033

5 Antisemitism Policy Trust SCS0006

6 Association of European Threat Assessment Professionals SCS0029

7 Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) SCS0019

8 Banducci, Susan (Professor, University of Birmingham); Professor Tyler, Katharine (Professor, University of Exeter); Fagin, Dr Jessica (Postcotoral Reearcher, University of Sheffield); Blamire, Dr Joshua (Research Fellow, University of Wolverhampton); Tirado, Dr Alejandro Castro (Postdoctoral Reearcher, CSIC, Spain); and van Zijl, Julia (PhD Reseacher, University of Birmingham) SCS0030

9 BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT SCS0025

10 Campbell-Savours, Lord SCS0035

11 Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) SCS0028

12 Clean up the Internet SCS0007

13 Collignon, Dr Sofia (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Queen Mary Unviersity of London); Rüdig, Dr Wolfgang (Reader in Politics, University of Strathclyde); and Banducci, Professor Susan (Professor in Political Science, University of Birmingham) SCS0023

14 Collignon, Dr Sofia (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Queen Mary University of London) SCS0041

15 Committee on Standards in Public Life SCS0012

16 Compassion in Politics SCS0034

17 Crown Prosecution Service SCS0024

18 Khan DBE, Dame Sara SCS0039

19 Danczuk, Mr Simon SCS0021

20 Electoral Commission SCS0020

21 Electoral Commission SCS0049

22 Glitch SCS0018

23 Harmer, Dr Emily (Senior Lecturer in Media , University of Liverpool); and Southern, Dr Rosalynd (Senior Lecturer in Political Communication, University of Liverpool) SCS0017

24 Hogan Lovells International LLP SCS0038

25 Home Office SCS0042

26 Joint Committee on Human Rights (UK Parliament) SCS0037

27 King, Florence (PhD Researcher, Swansea University) SCS0015

28 Maynard, Dr Diana (Senior Research Fellow, University of Sheffield); and Professor Bontcheva, Kalina (Professor, University of Sheffield) SCS0014

29 Members’ and Peers’ Staff Association (MAPSA) SCS0032

30 Metropolitan Police SCS0048

31 Metropolitan Police SCS0047

32 Online Safety Act Network SCS0001

33 Perry, Professor Barbara (Professor, Ontario Tech University) SCS0003

34 Parliamentary Security Department SCS0046

35 Parliamentary Security Department SCS0045

36 Public Prosecution Service SCS0013

37 Renwick, Professor Alan (Professor of Democratic Politics and Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit, University College London) SCS0031

38 Reset.Tech SCS0004

39 Scottish Sentencing Council SCS0022

40 Sentencing Council SCS0005

41 Shair-Rosenfield, Dr. Sarah (Professor, University of York); Davies, Dr. Graeme (Professor, University of York); Johns, Dr. Robert (Professor, University of Southampton); and Wood, Dr. Reed (Professor, University of Essex) SCS0026

42 Stephen, Mr. Michael (Conservative MP 1992–97, House of Commons) SCS0002

43 The Jo Cox Foundation SCS0008

44 Theseus Risk Management Ltd SCS0010

45 Walney, Lord (UK Government’s Independent Adviser on Political Violence and Disruption, The Home Office) SCS0016

---

Footnotes

1 Votes and Proceedings, 14 October 2024

2 Defending Democracy Taskforce PQ 5269, 7 October 2024; Qq147–149; The Taskforce works across government and with Parliament, the UK Intelligence Community, the devolved administrations, local authorities and the private sector.

3 Votes and Proceedings, 18 December 2024

4 Parliamentary Security Department (SCS0045)

5 Dr Sofia Collignon (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London); Dr Wolfgang Rüdig (Reader in Politics at University of Strathclyde); Professor Susan Banducci (Professor in Political Science at University of Birmingham) (SCS0023)

6 Dr Sofia Collignon (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London); Dr Wolfgang Rüdig (Reader in Politics at University of Strathclyde); Professor Susan Banducci (Professor in Political Science at University of Birmingham) (SCS0023)

7 Dame Sara Khan DBE (SCS0039)

8 Lord Walney (UK Government’s Independent Adviser on Political Violence and Disruption at The Home Office) (SCS0016)

9 Q58 [DCI Ives]

10 Speaker’s Conference Survey of MPs and MPs’ Staff 2025: Annex 1

11 Speaker’s Conference Survey of MPs and MPs’ Staff 2025: Annex 1

12 Speaker’s Conference Survey of MPs and MPs’ Staff 2025: Annex 1

13 Dame Sara Khan DBE (SCS0039)

14 Speaker’s Conference Survey of MPs and MPs’ Staff 2025: Annex 1

15 Q96 [Professor Margetts, Sofia Collignon, Will Fletcher]; Q30 [Mike Dixon]; Q1 [Bob Blackman MP]

16 Reset.Tech (SCS0004); Dr Diana Maynard (Senior Research Fellow at University of Sheffield); Professor Kalina Bontcheva (Professor at University of Sheffield) (SCS0014); Q78 [Professor Margetts]

17 Reset.Tech (SCS0004)

18 Speaker’s Conference Survey of MPs and MPs’ Staff 2025: Annex 1

19 Q98; The Jo Cox Foundation had a slightly longer timeline, claiming that threats had been normalised over the last ten years (The Jo Cox Foundation (SCS0008))

20 Ellie Reeves MP (Q1)

21 Q37 [Owen Roberts], Q23 [Elfrede Brambley-Crawshaw, Mike Dixon]

22 Qq1–2 [Bob Blackman MP, Stephen Massey, Ellie Reeves MP, Andrew Whyte)

23 Electoral Commission (SCS0020) Vijay Rangarajan confirmed this concern (Q45 and Oral evidence taken by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee on 7 January 2025, Q25 [Vijay Rangarajan]) The Electoral Commission is the independent body responsible for setting the standards for delivering an election and monitoring how returning officers in each constituency are delivering against them. The Commission’s post-election review identifies any issues in an election and makes recommendations for future polls. They also advise parties and campaigners on election rules and regulate political finance.

24 Committee on Standards in Public Life (SCS0012) supported by Antisemitism Policy Trust (SCS0006) and The Jo Cox Foundation (SCS0008)

25 Q2 [Bob Blackman MP]; Q37 [Owen Roberts, Timothy Johnston, Colin McGrath MLA]

26 Theseus Risk Management Ltd (SCS0010)

27 Q29 [Elfrede Brambley-Crawshaw]; Prof Margetts agreed “there is an association between online violence and offline real-world violence” (Q78)

28 Q45; Rushanara Ali MP also noted the experience of videos of candidates being taken and shared online to generate more abuse (Q159)

29 Online Safety Act Network (SCS0001); Clean up the Internet (SCS0007); The Jo Cox Foundation (SCS0008); Committee on Standards in Public Life (SCS0012); Dr Diana Maynard (Senior Research Fellow at University of Sheffield); Professor Kalina Bontcheva (Professor at University of Sheffield) (SCS0014); Florence King (PhD Researcher at Swansea University) (SCS0015); Glitch (SCS0018); Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) (SCS0019); Electoral Commission (SCS0020); Dr Sofia Collignon (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London); Dr Wolfgang Rüdig (Reader in Politics at University of Strathclyde); Professor Susan Banducci (Professor in Political Science at University of Birmingham) (SCS0023); BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT (SCS0025); Dr. Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (Professor at University of York); Dr. Graeme Davies (Professor at University of York); Dr. Robert Johns (Professor at University of Southampton); Dr. Reed Wood (Professor at University of Essex) (SCS0026); Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) (SCS0028); Compassion in Politics (SCS0034); Joint Committee on Human Rights (UK Parliament) (SCS0037); Dr Sofia Collignon (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London) (SCS0041); Q6 [Stephen Massey]; Q84 [Professor Margetts]; Q113 [Detective Inspector Barnard]

30 Q88

31 Q89

32 Professor Alan Renwick (Professor of Democratic Politics and Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit at University College London) (SCS0031) Compassion in Politics (SCS0034) also called for more moderation in parliamentary debate. Chief Inspector Duffy agreed that politicians needed to set a high standard of conduct and debate as an example for the public (Q99).

33 Committee on Standards in Public Life (SCS0012); The Jo Cox Foundation (SCS0008)

34 A charity campaigning for gender equality in the House of Commons

35 50:50 Parliament (SCS0036)

36 Q9 [Andrew Whyte]; Q20 [Jeremy Corbyn MP, Iqbal Mohamed MP]

37 Q8 [Stephen Massey, Ellie Reeves MP]; Q33 [Elfrede Brambley-Crawshaw]; Q42 [Owen Roberts, Timothy Johnston]

38 Q20 [Jeremy Corbyn MP, Iqbal Mohamed MP]

39 Q9 [Andrew Whyte]; Q20 [Jeremy Corbyn MP, Iqbal Mohamed MP]

40 Joint Committee on Human Rights, First Report of Session 2019–20, Democracy, freedom of expression and freedom of association: Threats to MPs, HC 37, paras 138–141; Committee on Standards in Public Life, Intimidation in Public Life: a review by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, December 2017, p53; Online Safety Act Network (SCS0001) also recommended parties should act as if they had a duty of care to candidates regarding what exposure candidates could be expected to have on social media

41 Q1 [Ellie Reeves MP, Andrew Whyte]; Q12 [Stephen Massey]; Mr Massey also told us that his party had been working on setting up an alarm system for candidates before the election was called (Q5)

42 Q24 [Mike Dixon]; Q27 [Elfrede Brambley-Crawshaw]

43 Q38 [Timothy Johnston, Colin McGrath, Owen Roberts]

44 Home Office, Defending democracy policing protocol, gov.uk, February 2024

45 There are now two separate programmes: Op Bridger covering MPs, their staff and families and parliamentary candidates; and Op Ford covering other elected officials (e.g. local councillors, Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners) and candidates for those roles.

46 Home Office (SCS0042); Qq149, 153 [Shaun Hipgrave] MPs and general election candidates are now supported by both the Op Bridger point of contact and the FEOA in their force.

47 More detail on PSD’s work can be found at the start of Chapter Three.

48 Q148 [Shaun Hipgrave]; Home Office (SCS0042)

49 Sections 30–38 of the Elections Act 2022

50 For more background see House of Commons Library, “Intimidation of candidates and voters” Research Briefing 9192, 25 March 2025

51 Q156 [Rushanara Ali MP]; Elections: Prosecutions PQ 36476, 12 March 2025

52 Q148

53 Q148; Anonymous (SCS0033) is one example of the level of abuse a candidate received. The Minister for Democracy also reminded us that abuse is not confined to general elections, noting that “local councillor candidates, who, as we face local elections, are often at the sharp end of harassment and intimidation” (Q152).

54 Dr Diana Maynard (Senior Research Fellow at University of Sheffield); Professor Kalina Bontcheva (Professor at University of Sheffield) (SCS0014); Florence King (PhD Researcher at Swansea University) (SCS0015)

55 Home Office (SCS0042); Stephen Massey and Andrew Wright both called the police response “mixed” (Qq11–12)

56 Dr Sofia Collignon (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London); Dr Wolfgang Rüdig (Reader in Politics at University of Strathclyde); Professor Susan Banducci (Professor in Political Science at University of Birmingham) (SCS0023)

57 Q47; The elections SPOC position is in addition to the police officer’s normal role and is focused on coordinating and supporting, but not necessarily leading, election related criminal investigations (Q76 [DCI Ives]). They will provide advice on electoral matters to the leadership and other officers in their force, as well as liaising with returning officers, who deliver the election locally, and the Electoral Commission, who set standards and guidance for returning officers to follow (College of Policing, Policing Elections: Key Roles and Planning, 12 April 2024)

58 Q47 [DCI Ives]; City of London Police, National Lead Force (accessed 13 May 2025); Police: Elections PQ 9203, 18 January 2024; Metropolitan Police (SCS0048)

59 Electoral Commission, Report on the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election and the May 2024 elections, p33

60 Q47

61 Qq147–8; Letter from the Security Minister to the Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy following oral evidence held on 17 March on Defending Democracy, 16 April 2025

62 Q18; Jeremy Corbyn MP also recommended ensuring candidates were given packs like this (Q19)

63 Q148; Q150

64 Home Office, Defending democracy policing protocol, gov.uk, February 2024

65 Electoral Commission (SCS0049)

66 Q150 [Becca Crosier]

67 Electoral Commission (SCS0049)

68 Q68 [Vijay Rangarajan]; Electoral Commission (SCS0049)

69 Q61

70 Section 97 of the Representation of the People Act 1983; Q101 [Inspector Barnard]; Metropolitan Police (SCS0048)

71 Clean up the Internet (SCS0007); Dr Sofia Collignon (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London); Dr Wolfgang Rüdig (Reader in Politics at University of Strathclyde); Professor Susan Banducci (Professor in Political Science at University of Birmingham) (SCS0023); Q63 [DCI Ives]

72 Section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983

73 Letter from Stephen Parkinson, Director of Public Prosecutions, to the Speaker of the House of Commons, 9 May 2025; Letter from Joanna Killian, Chief Executive, Local Government Association, to the Speaker of the House of Commons, 7 May 2025

74 Letter from Stephen Parkinson, Director of Public Prosecutions, to the Speaker of the House of Commons, 9 May 2025

75 Letter from Joanna Killian, Chief Executive, Local Government Association, to the Speaker of the House of Commons, 7 May 2025

76 Electoral Commission (SCS0049)

77 Q95 [Professor Margetts]; Q94 [Will Fletcher]

78 Letter from Rushanara Ali MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Homelessness and Democracy, to the Speaker of the House of Commons, 2 May 2025

79 Q65 [Peter Stanyon, DCI Ives]

80 Q65 [Vijay Rangarajan]

81 Q159

82 Schedule 1, Part III, Paragraph 42 of the Representation of the People Act 1983; Q162

83 Qq156–7

84 Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) (SCS0019)

85 Electoral Commission, Report on the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election and the May 2024 elections, pp33–35; Electoral Commission, Guidance for Candidates and Agents at UK Parliamentary general elections in Great Britain: Appointing an election agent, (accessed 13 May 2025)

86 Q50 [Peter Stanyon]

87 Q51

88 Qq51–55; Dr Sofia Collignon (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London); Dr Wolfgang Rüdig (Reader in Politics at University of Strathclyde); Professor Susan Banducci (Professor in Political Science at University of Birmingham) (SCS0023) proposed providing PO Boxes for this purpose.

89 Q51 [Peter Stanyon]

90 Electoral Commission, Report on the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election and the May 2024 elections, p41

91 Q55

92 Q51 [Peter Stanyon]

93 Q55 [Vijay Rangarajan]

94 Qq163–166

95 UK Parliament, Paul Martin to step down as Parliamentary Security Director, 19 January 2016

96 House of Lords Finance Committee, Minutes of the 6th Meeting, 31 January 2018

97 Members: Security PQ 55828, 15 December 2016

98 Parliamentary Security Department (SCS0045); Q136 [Alison Giles]

99 Speaker’s Conference Survey of MPs and MPs’ Staff 2025: Annex 1

100 Anonymous (SCS0043)

101 Members’ and Peers’ Staff Association (MAPSA) (SCS0032); In oral evidence PSD confirmed that staff would be covered by security measures in offices and noted that, although security operatives are only assigned to MPs, they should also be considering the security and wellbeing of staff members present (Qq127, 130)

102 Members’ and Peers’ Staff Association (MAPSA) (SCS0032)

103 Q127 [Oliver Davis]

104 Parliamentary Security Department (SCS0046); Qq125–127

105 Dr Sofia Collignon (Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London); Dr Wolfgang Rüdig (Reader in Politics at University of Strathclyde); Professor Susan Banducci (Professor in Political Science at University of Birmingham) (SCS0023); PSD also cautioned that additional close protection for MPs risked negatively affecting democratic accessibility, as well as warning that it might also be intrusive in MPs’ and their families’ lives (Qq125–127)

106 Q18

107 Parliamentary Security Department (SCS0045)

108 Q130 [Oliver Davis]

109 Q119 [Commander Messinger]

110 Qq106–107 [Detective Inspector Barnard]

111 Q109 [Detective Inspector Barnard]; Metropolitan Police (SCS0047)

112 Q10

113 Q110

114 Q100 [Commander Messinger]; Home Office (SCS0042); DCI Ives made similar comments (Q45)

115 Metropolitan Police (SCS0048)

116 Committee on Standards in Public Life (SCS0012)

117 Dame Sara Khan DBE (SCS0039)

118 Q97 [Commander Messinger]

119 Q39

120 Q97

121 Q110

122 Q97; Commander Messinger made a similar point at Q104

123 Sentencing Council (SCS0005)

124 Q149

125 Q100 [Commander Messinger]

126 Q101

127 Q57 [DCI Ives]; Q101 [Commander Messinger]; Q90 [Dr Sofia Collignon]

128 Paragraph 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988; Parliamentary Security Department (SCS0045)

129 Q101

130 Q102 [Detective Inspector Barnard]

131 Q161; Dr Sofia Collignon agreed [Q90]

132 Parliamentary Security Department (SCS0046)

133 Q40 [Owen Roberts]; Qq103–104 [Simon Messinger]

134 Electoral Commission (SCS0020)

135 The Jo Cox Foundation (SCS0008)

136 Q102

137 Metropolitan Police (SCS0048)

138 Qq97, 104 [Detective Inspector Barnard, Steve Jones]; Metropolitan Police (SCS0047)

139 Association of European Threat Assessment Professionals (SCS0029)

140 Speaker’s Conference Survey of MPs and MPs’ Staff 2025: Annex 1

141 Q114

142 Q136

143 We also targeted a random sample of former MPs who lost their seats or stood down in 2024.

144 In the analysis for this survey, the Insight Team used a 95% confidence interval to determine whether a difference between two survey results is real, or whether it has occurred merely by chance. This means that if the question were asked 100 times to different samples of the same group, we would expect to see the same difference 95 times.

145 Net Safe = very safe + somewhat safe / Net unsafe = very unsafe + somewhat unsafe

146 Only staff who work in the constituency or split time between constituency and Westminster were asked this question.

147 Data on reporting during the general election period is not directly comparable with data on reporting since becoming an MP due to differences in reporting options.

148 Of those who said they were active on other social media platforms, the majority said BlueSky, then LinkedIn.