UK International Climate Finance: Sustaining Commitments and Impact Amid a Shrinking Aid Budget

Summary

Cuts to the UK’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget by successive governments have been harmful and undermined the UK’s ability to deliver its International Climate Finance (ICF) commitments in a meaningful, transparent and credible way. At the same time, the climate crisis and the threat of extreme weather are intensifying, leaving those most vulnerable unable to withstand the devastating impacts.

Given the magnitude of climate finance needs in climate-vulnerable and low- and middle-income countries, it is critical that the government spends its ICF across its full portfolio strategically, with urgency, and the intent to generate both greater value for money, and demonstrable climate and nature outcomes. The evidence is also clear that achieving system-level transformation, and meeting the long-term needs of those disproportionately affected, is contingent on who is funded and how. As such, the UK’s ICF, regardless of the delivery channel, needs to be accessible, be inclusive and promote ownership and decision-making that filters down to those who are closest to the challenges at the community and local level.

The argument for the shift from donor to investor in context of the UK’s ICF is also growing. Against the backdrop of a shrinking ODA budget, the government must leverage its entire toolkit to mobilise additional sources of public and private finance to advance ICF impact and to meet the UK’s climate mitigation and adaptation obligations under the Paris Agreement. In doing so, the government must avoid exacerbating existing inequalities. It must use the ODA element of its ICF strategically, but also with the primary purpose of alleviating poverty and targeting the economic development and welfare of the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries. Using limited public ICF to mobilise private finance should not come at the expense of this core mandate. The ICF architecture that emerges from this shift must be underpinned by a robust evidence base that allows the government to use its full toolkit in a co-ordinated way, ensuring that spending—whether public or private—is tailored to countries’ specific needs and priorities, and targets those that are most in need. The government needs to make sure that the UK’s ICF is also grounded in the realities and limits of what it can offer.

The quantity, transparency and quality of the UK’s ICF portfolio are central to achieving greater outcomes. These factors determine not only its direct impact, but also the integrity of the example it sets for its delivery partners. If the government fails to spend the UK’s ICF effectively in the face of the climate crisis, and lead others to also spend in the countries that need it the most, it risks eroding existing development gains. This will in turn further compound poverty, instability and humanitarian need, driving up the long-term development cost, and, more importantly, the human cost.

1 Introduction to the Paris Agreement and the UK’s ICF

The Paris Agreement

1. The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change. It was adopted by 195 Parties at the United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference of Parties 21 (COP21) in Paris in 2015, and entered into force the subsequent year.¹ The overarching goal of the Paris Agreement is to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”.²

The US$100 billion climate finance goal

2. At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the UK and other “developed countries” committed a collective target of providing and mobilising US$100 billion per year, from public and private sources, by 2020 for climate action in “developing countries”.³ The goal was formalised at COP16 in Cancun and, at COP21 in Paris, it was reiterated and extended to 2025.⁴

The US$300 billion New Collective Quantified Goal

3. At COP29 in Baku, held in 2024, parties adopted a new goal for delivering climate finance from developed countries to developing countries, which is referred to as the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). Countries agreed to work towards an overall goal of scaling up financing for developing countries to at least US$1.3 trillion annually by 2035 from all sources, and a goal to mobilise at least US$300 billion per year by 2035.⁵ In addition to increasing the volume of climate finance, the NCQG is committed to considering the “needs and priorities” of developing countries.⁶

4. As part of the broader NCQG of reaching US$300 billion per year, in 2025 at COP30 in Belém, countries agreed to triple adaptation finance by 2035. In effect, this means tripling the US$40 billion adaptation finance goal established four years prior at COP26 in Glasgow, creating a new US$120 billion target.⁷

The UK’s ICF commitments

5. UK International Climate Finance (ICF), which the government launched in 2011, plays a crucial role in fulfilling the UK’s obligations under the Paris Agreement.⁸ It also advances the government’s wider ambition to establish the UK as a global leader in international climate and nature action. The Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and three other government departments—the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra), and Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade (DBIST)—have responsibility for “investing” ICF.⁹

6. The UK’s ICF has historically been delivered in five-year cycles. The government announced ICF commitments of £3.9 billion from 2011–12 to 2015–16 (ICF1), £5.8 billion from 2016–17 to 2020–21 (ICF2) and doubled the pledge in 2019 to £11.6 billion from 2021–22 to 2025–26 (ICF3; see Table 1).¹⁰ As part of ICF3, which was guided by the Together for People and Planet 2023 iteration of the ICF strategy, the government had committed to:

• up to £1 billion—through the Ayrton Fund—to support clean energy, research, development and demonstration;¹¹
• at least £3 billion on protecting, restoring, and sustainably managing nature, with £1.5 billion on forests;¹² and
• tripling funding for climate adaptation from £500 million in 2019 to £1.5 billion in 2025.¹³

The government states that it has met all three of its previous ICF commitments.¹⁴

The UK’s fourth ICF cycle

7. The UK has now entered a critical ICF juncture where the government is seeking to achieve greater climate and nature outcomes despite its fast-shrinking Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In March 2026, it announced its new three-year cycle of ICF from 2026–27 to 2028–29 (ICF4), the length of which the government states was decided in line with the spending review period.¹⁵ During this period, alongside providing around £6 billion of ODA as ICF, the government will also invest £6.7 billion of additional public finance to “drive climate and nature outcomes” (see Table 1).¹⁶ This is expected to include finance backed by UK Export Finance, investment by British International Investment (BII; the UK’s development finance institution)¹⁷ and guarantees to multilateral development banks to increase their “affordable” lending.¹⁸ The government has stated that it will also use public finance “to mobilise billions more from the private sector” which will include leveraging the City of London’s position as the “green finance capital of the world”.¹⁹

Table 1: The UK’s International Climate Finance (ICF) commitments

Year	2011–12 to 2015–16	2016–17 to 2020–21	2021–22 to 2025–26	2026–27 to 2028–29
Cycle	ICF1	ICF2	ICF3	ICF4
Commitment (£ billions)	3.9	5.8	11.6	6.0 (ODA)* 6.7 (Non-ODA)*

*ODA – Official Development Assistance

The UK’s ICF strategy 2026

8. ICF4 is guided by the government’s updated version of the ICF strategy which it published in June 2026.²⁰ Through the strategy, the government has sought to take a new and “integrated approach” across the four delivery departments to how the UK’s ICF will be delivered. This approach is built on four stated priorities:

• mobilise public and private finance at scale for climate and nature outcomes;
• transform the global energy system to deliver clean and affordable energy for all;
• accelerate a transition to climate-resilient communities, economies and ecosystems; and
• safeguard and sustain nature, including forests, oceans and coastal, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems.²¹

The government’s new approach to ICF is informed by its broader reset to modernise the UK’s role as a development partner, which is underpinned by its “four essential policy shifts”.²²

Language used in this report

9. The classification of countries as ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ remains widespread. Although these terms do not have a universally agreed upon definition, they are embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiation process, the Paris Agreement and other legal documents attempting to address climate change and the protection of the global environment. These terms can be reductive as they group together highly diverse countries with varying political, economic and development characteristics.

10. In recognition of these issues, we have sought to use this terminology sparingly throughout the report. To ensure factual accuracy and consistency, we have retained these terms only when discussing externally published literature, internationally agreed treaties and climate finance goals, or where they appear in evidence submitted by witnesses and other contributors. In such cases, the terminology reflects the language used in the sources referenced and should not be taken as indicating the committee’s preferred language. Where possible, we have instead used classification by country income level, namely ‘low-’, ‘middle-’ or ‘high-’ income, to describe geography.

2 The integrity and credibility of the UK’s ICF commitments

Impact of ODA cuts on the UK’s ICF

New and additional ICF

11. Article 4 of the UNFCCC enshrines the obligations on developed countries to “provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to tackle climate change.²³ When the UK first established its ICF in 2011, it did so against a backdrop of a growing ODA budget and a commitment to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA. We received evidence that, under these conditions, the government’s commitment to providing new and additional ICF was credible.²⁴ However, successive ODA budget cuts have undermined the UK’s ability to meet its ICF commitments and provide new and additional resources.²⁵ Due to lack of a formal definition of what qualifies as ‘new and additional’ climate finance or agreed protocol on reporting it internationally, measuring the extent to which the UK’s ICF is new and provided in addition to ODA is difficult.²⁶ However, evidence submissions argue that there are two key factors that have eroded the UK’s ICF additionality and credibility:

• First, the evidence we received argues that the government has been able to maintain its headline commitment of £11.6 billion without contributing any new and additional ICF.²⁷ In its 2024 rapid review ‘UK aid’s international climate finance commitments’, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) found that in 2023, the then-government had changed the methodology it used to define and measure spending reported against its ICF3 commitment.²⁸ These changes include accounting a share of the UK’s contributions to multilateral development banks (MDBs), and applying 30% ICF to humanitarian programmes operating in the 10% of countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.²⁹ Evidence from Center for Global Development (CGD), a non-profit think tank, characterises the latter change as “arbitrary”, given that humanitarian projects are “already assessed for their ICF contribution”.³⁰ In its rapid review, ICAI also concluded that meeting the ICF3 commitment was “contingent” on the way the government accounts for the UK’s ICF spend, which has now allowed “more aid spending to be counted as ICF”.³¹ Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) note that, in doing so, the then-government not only “weakened transparency” but also undermined the “additionality and real-world impact” of the UK’s ICF.³² These changes were retained by the subsequent government, meaning that it will also be easier to meet the ICF4 commitment with existing spending, thereby reducing its impact. However, the then-Minister of State (International Development and Africa; “the minister”) Baroness Chapman, disputed this assessment, stating that the government abides by “internationally agreed ways of calculating ICF” and that it is “consistent” with international partners, such as France. She further acknowledged that, if the government was not doing so, its credibility would be “absolutely shot” and that the UK could no longer present itself as a “leader” in this space.³³
• Second, the conditions under which the government first established its ICF no longer exist. A shrinking ODA budget of 0.3% GNI means that the government can no longer expand its ICF without “displacing other urgent development and other humanitarian priorities”.³⁴ Climate Action Network-UK (CAN-UK), a network of international development and environment NGOs, explains that this is reflected in the government’s 2025–26 ICF spend, which was expected to account for approximately 24–28% of total ODA. CAN-UK describes this as an “unprecedented concentration within an already diminished budget”.³⁵

The UK’s fair share of ICF

12. The UK announced in March 2026, as part of its allocations process, that it is committed to spending around £6 billion of ODA as ICF over the next three financial years from 2026–27 to 2028–29. It also stated that, during this period, it would deliver an additional £6.7 billion of public investments to drive climate and nature outcomes.³⁶ According to some estimates, the UK’s fair share of ICF should be around US$12 billion or £9 billion a year, on average, to 2030.³⁷ Evidence to this inquiry states that, as the worlds “sixth largest economy and the fifth largest historical emitter”, the UK “can and must do more”.³⁸

13. With inflation and the government’s changes to accounting methodology, the ODA element of ICF4 diverges even further from the UK’s fair share of NCQG. Analysis by Carbon Brief estimates that, once these factors have been considered, the government’s ICF allocation sits roughly 50% lower when compared to ICF3.³⁹ Adding to these concerns, ODI Global’s latest assessment warns that cuts to bilateral aid are likely to result in “falling levels of concessionality and an increased bias towards mitigation”.⁴⁰

Trade-offs

14. A shrinking ODA budget will have real-world consequences and trade-offs in the face of the climate crisis. Climate change is “driving and compounding humanitarian need in some of the world’s fragile and poorest countries”.⁴¹ ODA cuts will inevitably result in “unfortunate choices” between “delivering the UK’s fair contribution to tackling climate change versus addressing humanitarian need”.⁴² Mercy Corps, a global humanitarian NGO, echoes this in its written submission by highlighting that failure to tackle the climate crisis will erode development gains and push “more people into resource competition and humanitarian need, creating a vicious cycle of poverty and instability”.⁴³

UK leadership on ICF

15. As well as undermining the additionality and credibility of the UK’s ICF commitments, we heard from witnesses that ODA cuts have damaged the UK’s ability to demonstrate leadership in the climate space. For example, Ian Mitchell, Co-Director, Europe and Senior Fellow for CGD, noted that the cuts have made it “difficult to see us in a leadership space”.⁴⁴ He further reflected on the importance of maintaining the confidence of the international community:

We are trying to persuade other countries to reduce their emissions through an internationally agreed target. We will not defeat climate change on our own, so if we do not get that right and they will not reduce their emissions, we will not defeat climate change.⁴⁵

The need for a long-term approach

16. In June 2026, the FCDO published its refreshed ICF strategy. We heard from Ian Mitchell that this was “more of a statement of what it’s [the government] doing rather than a long-term decision-making document”.⁴⁶ ICAI has previously highlighted similar criticism in relation to the 2023 iteration of the ICF strategy, finding across multiple reports that the government’s approach needs to be built on a “clearer long-term strategy”.⁴⁷ Given the scale of the ODA cuts, the diminishing additionality and real-world impact of the UK’s ICF, the case for this is now stronger than ever.

3 Access, balance and reach of the UK’s ICF

Locally-led principles

20. Since coming into power in July 2024, the government has renewed its focus on locally-led principles through its broader reset to the UK’s role as a development partner. One of the government’s four essential shifts underpinning this reset is focused on moving away from “international intervention to local provision” by working through “local partners and civil society to deliver sustainable, locally-led solutions”.⁴⁸

21. There has been agreement throughout this inquiry that ICF is more effective when it is locally led, particularly in the countries closest to the climate crisis.⁴⁹ As Zahid Shashoto, Programme Development Specialist at Uttaran, a grassroots organisation in Bangladesh, explained:

Countries like Bangladesh have demonstrated significant capacity in locally led adaptation, where national and community-based organisations play a central role in designing and implementing solutions. Local organisations often operate with lower operational costs, have deep contextual understanding, and maintain long-standing relationships with the communities they serve. This allows them to deliver support more directly and effectively while ensuring that interventions are tailored to local realities.⁵⁰

22. It is clear, however, that what determines whether localisation is realised in practice is how the ICF funding is designed and delivered. This includes, for example, whether ICF is delivered through multi-year commitments rather than short-term cycles; is allocated directly to national and local level actors rather than routed through additional layers; and whether reliance on intermediaries, namely multilateral institutions and UN systems, is kept to a minimum.⁵¹

23. The UK’s Least Developed Countries Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) is a UK ICF funded programme that illustrates some of these features. The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), an independent policy organisation, states in its written submission that LIFE-AR’s 70:30 principle allocates 70% of funding directly to the community level and 30% to strengthening national systems. According to IIED, this has supported a “whole-of-society approach to adaptation and resilience”. IIED has also highlighted that the predictability of the 10-year funding timeframe has enabled countries to integrate climate investments into existing national planning systems, such as their Nationally Determined Contributions.⁵² This has strengthened long-term capacity building and country ownership, thereby reducing reliance on intermediary support.⁵³ Evidence from ActionAid UK suggests that the Women-Led Alternatives to Climate Change (WLACC) programme bears similar characteristics. It stresses that the WLACC programme has shown that the UK’s ICF delivers more sustainable outcomes when funding is directed to local and national actors, and programmes are designed around community-identified priorities, planning and accountability, rather than treating those actors “solely as delivery partners”.⁵⁴ In its written submission, ICAI also states that it has observed a “growing focus on country ownership and country-led programming” and characterises the UK as a “pragmatic and responsive partner”.⁵⁵

24. While examples of UK ICF programmes that have successfully operationalised locally-led principles and participatory approaches exist, challenges persist in how the government consistently translates its localisation agenda into practice. ActionAid UK’s written submission tells us that – outside of notable exceptions – the government has been unable to “consistently align” UK ICF with the “long-term needs and priorities” of climate-vulnerable communities, in part due to the limitations of programme selection and funding models.⁵⁶ Specifically, ActionAid UK argues that in addition to demonstrating successful outcomes, such as promoting strong local ownership, its experience with the WLACC programme also demonstrates the limitations of current UK ICF delivery models. These include for example, the programme’s “three-year timeframe and rigid funding structure” which ActionAid states “constrained sustainability, limited responsiveness to emerging climate risks, and risked undermining longer-term institutional gains”.⁵⁷ ICAI tells us that progress against landmark country platforms, such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership, has been “slow”, and that the government must adopt “more realistic design anchored in national plans as part of future initiatives”.⁵⁸

25. IIED warns that the pressure to demonstrate results favours centrally managed, short-term programmes that disadvantage locally-led approaches.⁵⁹ Therefore, despite the government’s existing policy commitments, ICF funding mechanisms remain “highly centralised and administratively complex”.⁶⁰ According to IIED, this means that decision-making power remains upstream, “prioritising larger intermediaries” such as multilateral institutions, over local organisations.⁶¹ As such, the UK’s ICF potentially has to pass through multiple intermediaries, which in turn “dilute decision-making”, before ultimately reaching local communities.⁶² In addition to adding layers of “rigid conditionality and institutional practice” that delay how quickly UK ICF reaches local communities, it also makes it harder for communities to access the resources they need.⁶³

26. In its written submission, the FCDO tells us that, although the UK’s ICF spend is not managed as a single fund with central decision making:

Inclusivity and local leadership are prioritised, supporting greater participation of marginalised groups, including women and girls, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and people with disabilities.⁶⁴

Moreover, in its oral evidence, the FCDO alluded to examples of ICF programming delivered at the local level, such as its Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems Initiative, that seek to strengthen locally led principles and inclusivity.⁶⁵ However, the FCDO acknowledges that access to the UK’s ICF is a “perennial issue […] not only in terms of the smaller organisations”, but also in terms of the “speed, time taken and bureaucracy in accessing climate finance”.⁶⁶ The FCDO also told us that it recognises the barriers to smaller organisations accessing ICF delivered through multilateral institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund.⁶⁷ The FCDO has reassured us that the government is seeking to address these issues by “listening to the concerns of partners, including at the very local level” about the barriers they face as well as using “its position on boards and through ICF programming to improve access”.⁶⁸ To date, the government has not released disaggregated project-level data which would show the effectiveness of its actions on these issues, and whether the UK’s ICF is reaching national and local actors.

Women and girls

27. Climate change exacerbates inequality, with women and girls most affected by ecosystem breakdown and climate impacts.⁶⁹ In developing countries, women farmers produce “60–80% of all food production”, meaning that ecosystem breakdown impacts women’s productivity and livelihoods disproportionately.⁷⁰ For example, we heard from Deborah Sanchez, a Honduran Indigenous Leader and Director of the Community Land Rights and Conservation Finance Initiative, who described how her community’s agricultural system—which predominantly relies on women—is being destabilised by extreme weather events such as hurricanes and droughts.⁷¹ She explained that the climate crisis is leaving their agricultural system, and in turn the women that maintain it, “more and more vulnerable every time”.⁷² Biodiversity loss also affects gender equality as it requires women and girls to spend more time on tasks like food, fuel and water collection.⁷³ We heard concerning evidence from Elizabeth Wathuti, Founder and Executive Director of the Green Generation Initiative, that when women are unable to provide food and water due to the impacts of the climate crisis, “domestic conflicts and violence arise”.⁷⁴

28. Building on the access issues raised in the preceding section of this chapter, women and girls—despite being among the groups most vulnerable to climate change—continue to receive only a small proportion of ICF globally. Deborah Sanchez further described how structural barriers to access can compound this gap:

From research, we have seen that less than 1% of climate funding reaches communities directly anyway. Within that 1%, if you make structural barriers for women even higher, it is more difficult for them to access funding, leadership and roles. If we are now competing against the weather and this thing climate change, and investment is not realised in the way we expected, the minimal investment that goes to women can be lost in a day of rain – in a two-hour storm. That is the critical situation that we are facing.⁷⁵

Gender equality, disability and social inclusion

29. The FCDO has reassured us that it recognises the vulnerability of women and girls to the impacts of climate change:

We have programmes that do lean into the women and girls space, recognising that the poorest and most marginalised—who are often women and girls—are disproportionately impacted by climate change.⁷⁶

30. In this context, the FCDO told us that the government is committed to strengthening gender-responsiveness and inclusivity across the UK’s ICF programming, including that which is delivered through its partners, such as BII.⁷⁷ In May 2025, the government published a guidance note for the integration of Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion (GEDSI) into all ICF programming delivered through its departments and partners.⁷⁸ Under this guidance, the government expects that “all new ICF programmes should be designed to be GEDSI empowering at a minimum”.⁷⁹ In our November 2025 report, ‘Empowering Development: Energy Access for Communities’, we concluded that the effectiveness of the updated GEDSI guidance is dependent on how it is “applied in practice”.⁸⁰

31. The FCDO told us that the government “will continue to monitor and hold ourselves to account” for GEDSI integration across the ICF portfolio.⁸¹ However, more than a year on from its publication, the government has failed to establish clear targets, timelines or a reporting framework for how its guidance is expected to be applied.⁸² This is despite the stated outcomes of the guidance being “increased consistency and quality of GEDSI integration across the ICF portfolio” and “measurable improvement” in UK ICF reporting against internationally agreed standards.⁸³ Moreover, the government does not routinely publish data on the proportion of ICF programmes that have been assessed under the GEDSI marker over time, making it difficult to assess the guidance’s effectiveness in improving outcomes for women and girls. As part of ICF4, the government is also increasingly focused on multilateral channels and non-ODA tools, such as the mobilisation of funding through the private sector, to deliver the totality of is portfolio. Yet it remains unclear how it plans to hold these partners accountable for increasing gender-responsiveness and inclusivity using its guidance.⁸⁴

Geographic prioritisation

39. ‘Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs), ‘Small Island Developing States’ (SIDS) and ‘Low-Income Countries’ (LICs) are among those most exposed to the impacts of climate change and least responsible for causing it.⁸⁵ These countries’ significant challenges in accessing and increasing the volume of ICF, namely for adaptation, have been well documented in the wider literature. These include:

• complexity of the multilateral climate funds’ architecture, with its numerous funds, diverse mandates and funding criteria;
• accreditation barriers that impede direct access to ICF;
• difficulties in meeting eligibility criteria and application requirements for project proposals; and
• an ICF architecture that is not tailored to their specific needs and priorities.⁸⁶

These barriers are compounded by the structural vulnerabilities of these countries, such as their limited capacity to take on additional borrowing. When combined, these factors mean that they cannot rely on the current suite of debt-focused ICF instruments, such as loans, which require significant financial and institutional capacity.⁸⁷

Debt distress

40. There is an increasing recognition that debt, development and climate change are interconnected.⁸⁸ In developing countries debt levels are rising sharply − Oxfam, an international charity, estimates that, for every US$5 developing countries receive in ICF, they are paying US$7 back in debt.⁸⁹ According to Mercy Corps, high debt repayment costs means that these countries have less budgetary space to address their climate adaptation, mitigation or disaster response needs. It further highlights that increasingly frequent extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, also further debt distress by damaging infrastructure, reducing developing countries’ economic output, and increasing public expenditure.⁹⁰ As May Thazin Aung, senior researcher at IIED, explained, for the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries, debt creates tension between meeting basic development needs, such as having “food security” and responding to climate change.⁹¹

41. The UK delivers a higher share of ICF spending to developing countries in the form of debt instruments, compared to other developed countries. ODI Global estimates that in total, around 2.5% of bilateral ICF provided by developed countries to developing countries in 2023 was in the form of debt. In comparison, the UK provided 2.8% of its bilateral ICF in the form of debt − the fourth highest among developed countries. Grant finance is far less prevalent in multilateral channels, particularly MDBs which typically on-lend as concessional loans as opposed to grant finance. In 2023, grants accounted for just 7% of the ICF provided by MDBs to low- and middle-income countries.⁹² This figure is particularly concerning given the government’s increasing reliance on multilateral channels, including MDBs, to deliver the UK’s ICF going forward.⁹³ While delivering ICF through multilateral channels can offer advantages, for example substantial leverage of additional finance, this approach may also result in a greater share of UK’s ICF reaching LDCs and SIDS and other highly vulnerable countries in the form of debt instruments, thereby reducing its impact.⁹⁴

42. Professor Nicola Ranger, Professor in Practice of Natural Capital, Risk and Finance in the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, warned that an overly debt-focused ICF portfolio risks excluding “fragile countries, the poorest communities and the smallest businesses”. She argued that addressing these challenges requires changes to the ICF instruments the government deploys, and to how it assesses debt-sustainability at the programme and country level.⁹⁵

Ringfenced funding

43. The FCDO acknowledges some of these issues. In its written submission, the FCDO states that it will:

look to make sure that grant finance and concessionality is focused on the most vulnerable countries or on those issues that could deliver a step change in the wider system.⁹⁶

Both the FCDO and DESNZ also told us that—while the government is not committing to a specific grant funding “ringfence” for the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries—these departments have “regular and extensive discussions” about their respective ICF portfolio planning.⁹⁷ Yet research by ICAI has found “no geographic prioritisation” for ICF funding, and that the government’s approach to ICF has “not sufficiently addressed public commitments to addressing climate change in LDCs and SIDS”.⁹⁸ It found this to be particularly true for the UK’s ICF delivered via multilateral climate funds and the UK’s development finance institutions, including both BII and Private Infrastructure Development Group.⁹⁹

44. Moreover, the government’s sentiments on these issues are in contradiction with its most recent policy decisions – which have further eroded the UK’s already limited concessional ICF resources. In July 2026, to “ease the cost of living”, the government reprioritised £400 million of DESNZ’s ICF budget, converting funding that had been earmarked as grants into loans.¹⁰⁰ The government has framed this as an opportunity to use these loans as “financial transactions available to support the government’s intention to invest in ICF projects” which “could include” the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF - see sub-section in this chapter). In September 2026, DESNZ told us of the government’s intention to invest in the TFFF via a loan, subject to the finalisation of the TFFF’s “governance and operational arrangements, completion of our usual due diligence checks and our conditions being met”.¹⁰¹

Balance between mitigation and adaptation

47. Article 9 of the Paris Agreement enshrines the need for a balance of mitigation and adaptation finance.¹⁰² In the absence of a clear definition, it is difficult to determine how ‘balance’ should be interpreted. How it is operationalised is dependent on context:

• providers have different capabilities − for example, they will have ICF tools that are better suited to climate mitigation efforts, such as renewable energy programmes, in middle-income countries; and
• different recipients have different needs − for example, as outlined earlier in this chapter, LDCs and SIDS are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, but have lower emissions than middle-income countries.¹⁰³

The adaptation finance gap

48. Despite internationally agreed commitments, adaptation finance continues to receive a minority share of global ICF, even before the impacts of recent cuts from governments across high-income countries.¹⁰⁴ This also reflects the evidence received from ICAI which states that the adaptation finance gap is widening.¹⁰⁵ The UN Environment Programme’s 2025 ‘Adaptation Gap Report: Running on Empty’, estimates that adaptation needs in developing countries are 12–14 times current flows.¹⁰⁶

49. The evidence we received argues that without a substantial scale-up of adaptation finance, namely in the form of grants, developing countries will remain “under-resourced to protect lives, livelihoods and economic stability in the face of accelerating climate impacts”.¹⁰⁷ Silvia Carolina Herrera Hernandez, a Mexican coffee producer and member of a fairtrade producers’ network in Latin America, described the lived reality of Mexican coffee farmers, forced to weigh the cost of adaptation against meeting basic needs:

if people have to choose between eating something at least once a day […] rather than investing in adapting their farm, of course they will choose food.¹⁰⁸

A high-minimum share

50. In its written submission, ICAI highlights that the government treats balance between mitigation and adaptation appropriately as “a strategic objective to be managed at the portfolio level, rather than a rigid 50:50 split”. However, it notes that in recent years the government has failed to sustain a balance, with the proportion of the UK’s adaptation finance dropping below 40% in 2023. This is below informal bilateral spending benchmarks set by the Champions Group of Donors—which aims to increase the total level of adaptation finance—of which the UK is a member.¹⁰⁹

51. The government’s reporting of how much of the UK’s ICF is adaptation finance is also at risk of inflation. In its 2025 report, ODI Global found the UK to be the only developed country in 2023 to have tagged none of its bilateral ICF as “adaptation-finance, only” with all resilience finance instead tagged as ‘cross-cutting’.¹¹⁰ In the absence of exclusive adaptation tagging, ODI Global stresses that the “UK in particular would benefit from scrutiny”.¹¹¹

52. Unlike several of its international counterparts, such as Australia, that have targets of 50% or more for adaptation, the UK is described as “lacking in its commitment to balance”.¹¹² To maintain a focus on the needs and priorities of the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries, the evidence calls for the government to specify a high-minimum share − ranging from 45% by Greenpeace to as high as 70% by CGD − of its bilateral ICF for adaptation.¹¹³ Setting an explicit target “signals intentionality, drives operationalisation, and enables transparent tracking over time”.¹¹⁴

53. The FCDO states in its written submission that it will “seek to maintain a balance in spend between mitigation and adaptation” in ICF4, and later reaffirmed this in its oral evidence. When asked about ringfencing funding for adaptation spending, an FCDO spokesperson agreed that having a commitment to a balance is “really important” and told us that achieving this is “effectively something that we will need to hold ourselves to account for.”¹¹⁵ In this context, the FCDO also stated:

we will continue to track to see if we are meeting it—that is the driving factor—as well as tracking very carefully what we are doing through our posts and thinking about the work that our humanitarian colleagues, for example, are doing to strengthen systems.¹¹⁶

The FCDO did not elaborate on how the government will track progress in practice. Additionally, it did not specify how the government intends to course-correct should it continue to fall short on scaling up the proportion of the UK’s ICF that is directed to adaptation finance.

Nature

Nature and forest sub-pledges

56. In its 2026 iteration of the ICF strategy, the government has identified “safeguard and sustain nature, including forests, oceans and coastal, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems”, underpinned by three objectives, as one of its four priorities for ICF4.¹¹⁷ We received positive evidence referencing the UK’s “long and distinguished” leadership on nature, emphasising its role as the “driving force” behind key COP26 nature and forest commitments.¹¹⁸

57. There is a general consensus across the evidence to the inquiry that investments in nature-based solutions are among the most cost-effective and impactful uses of ICF.¹¹⁹ These submissions argue that nature-based solutions deliver:

• mutually reinforcing benefits critical to achieving several of the sustainable development goals;
• have the potential to reduce long-term adaptation and mitigation costs for low-income and other highly climate-vulnerable countries; and
• are vital to the livelihoods of local communities.¹²⁰

We also heard from witnesses on the vital importance of maintaining nature and forest sub-pledges for ICF4, specifically to Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities’ livelihoods:

It is important to invest in nature-based solutions as well because ecosystems are foundational to our survival. There was an investment in forest and in nature under ICF3. We want to see some ringfenced funding going forward to make sure that this is protected because local communities—especially indigenous people—really rely on ecosystem services.¹²¹

At the time of writing, the government had not made a comparable nature and forest sub-pledge under ICF4.

58. An ICF4 sub-pledge for nature is especially pertinent considering the government’s ‘National security assessment on global ecosystems’ which was published in January 2026.¹²² The report emphasises that ecosystem degradation is occurring across all regions and that every critical ecosystem, such as the Congo Basin and Amazon forests, is “on a pathway to collapse” meaning irreversible loss of function beyond repair.¹²³ The assessment also highlights the cascading implications that global ecosystem degradation will have for the UK’s own long-term prosperity, security and systems that underpin economic, water and food security. Alongside being crucial to the global economy, the assessment emphasises that biodiversity and nature loss threaten to reverse existing development gains. As more people are pushed into poverty and food and water insecurity, migration is expected to increase.¹²⁴ Migration flows caused by a lack of meeting basic needs such as food and water are becoming more acute and, as written evidence submitted by the Independent notes, foundational issues like food systems are slipping from the top of the global climate agenda.¹²⁵ Professor Nicola Ranger told the committee that the government is not doing enough, stating:

The fact that the recent commitment to investment […] through the ICF to forests and nature was removed was a significant negative signal of the importance that the government are placing on this. It is in all our interests to solve this problem. Our whole economy is dependent on nature around the world, so it is not just a development issue; it is in our own economic benefit to do this.¹²⁶

59. However, the then-minister told us that the government is not yet committing to any sub-pledges – despite recognising that they are “an effective tool” in “every area of public policy”.¹²⁷ The minister explained that this is because the government is seeking to take a more integrated approach to nature, meaning that ICF programming will be “complementary and looked at as a coherent offer to a country”.¹²⁸ The FCDO also stated that sub-targets can risk “distorting decision-making” and “incentivising short-term quick wins over what is best for nature for the long-term”. However, the FCDO has not provided supporting evidence of how this has previously happened in practice.¹²⁹ Additionally, the FCDO told us that climate and nature spend will remain at “around 20%” of the government’s ODA budget over the Spending Review.¹³⁰ However, without better ICF data transparency, it will be difficult to examine what proportion of this envelope the government will have spent on nature throughout ICF4.

60. Witnesses and written evidence alike have highlighted the potential consequences of the government’s decision to drop these sub-pledges. These risks include the resulting “uncertainty and lack of trust” in the UK as a major donor and its ability to deliver on its commitments, for example those on the Global Biodiversity Framework, as well as the UK’s own nature agenda.¹³¹ The minister acknowledged that there are risks associated with dropping these sub-pledges, characterising the government’s new integrated approach to ICF programming and nature as a “gamble”.¹³² The minister noted that the government will remain accountable should the approach not deliver as anticipated and stated that the FCDO expects to know whether the approach “will have worked by September 2026”.¹³³

The Tropical Forest Forever Facility

61. Launched at COP30, the TFFF is an innovative US$125 billion global fund designed to support the long-term conservation of forests in developing countries.¹³⁴ Key features of the TFFF include:

• a blended finance mechanism combining US$25 billion of sovereign and philanthropic contributions in the form of, for example, long-term loans, with US$100 billion from private investors;
• performance-based payments designed to reward countries that maintain or increase their forest cover, and have a deforestation rate at or below 0.5%;
• an expected return of around US$3 to US$4 billion a year, which will be used to make payments of up to US$4 per hectare annually to countries maintaining the required deforestation rate; and
• at least 20% of funding channelled directly to Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities.¹³⁵

62. The UK has been instrumental to the design of the TFFF by providing technical assistance to “get the fund ready”.¹³⁶ However, at the time of our oral evidence session with the then-minister, Baroness Chapman of Darlington, the UK had not yet committed funding to the TFFF.¹³⁷ The minister acknowledged that the work the UK had conducted alongside Brazil and the World Bank had been essential to getting the TFFF to a place where it was “investable for the UK taxpayer”.¹³⁸ The minister also recognised that several countries, including Norway and France, were able to make contributions to the TFFF “largely because of the work that we [the UK] did to get the fund ready”.¹³⁹ However, when pressed on the government’s decision not to contribute, the minister had stated:

we do not have large sums of money like that available to invest in new things at the moment. We all understand why that is. There is no point me pretending otherwise; that is the situation we are in. We have made a lot of big bets multilaterally with our ODA budget, in the Global Fund, Gavi and the International Development Association. To make another, we need to have the funds available to invest.¹⁴⁰

63. The government’s decision not to invest in the TFFF subsequent to COP30 was particularly concerning in view of its 2026 iteration of the ICF strategy. The strategy identifies mobilisation of “significantly greater volumes of capital” including through “blended finance and innovative instruments” as one of its four key priorities.¹⁴¹ Set against this, the TFFF is a clear test of the government’s stated shift from “donor to investor” (see Chapter 3), which the minister also recognised.¹⁴²

64. However, the minister stated that the government’s decision not to invest, at COP30 and thereafter, was taken on the basis that the TFFF is one of many “investor models”, competing for the UK’s limited resources, that that the government “could choose to invest in”.¹⁴³ The government has since signalled its intention to invest in the TFFF, subject to several conditions being met, as a result of its decision to reprioritise £400 million of DESNZ’s ICF budget from grants to loans to fund its cost-of-living measures (see section: Debt distress).¹⁴⁴

4 The UK’s ICF architecture

From donor to investor: leveraging the private sector

71. As part of its four essential shifts, the government will move away from being a traditional donor and position the UK as an “investment partner”.¹⁴⁵ A key element of this shift is the aim to significantly increase the amount of investment mobilised from the private sector, including for climate and nature outcomes.¹⁴⁶ With recent cuts to ODA, the government is increasingly focused on using public ICF to leverage private finance, and “mobilising increased investment” through multilateral and bilateral channels, with the aim of obtaining “greater impact with reduced resources”.¹⁴⁷ The government has yet to quantify how much private capital it expects to mobilise through these mechanisms, stating only that the figure will be in the “billions”.¹⁴⁸

72. FCDO measures the cumulative amount of private finance the UK’s ICF has helped to mobilise to date, and publishes this as part of its annual ICF results report under key performance indicator 12, ‘Volume of private finance mobilised for climate change purposes’ (see Chapter 4). Between April 2011 and March 2025, the FCDO reports that it mobilised £10.5 billion of private finance across 98 programmes. It states that this represents a 28% increase in the cumulative total reported to March 2024, equivalent to around £2.3 billion in additional private finance mobilised during 2024–25.¹⁴⁹ Despite the growth of private finance mobilised by the UK in recent years, the current volume remains below the level required to meet the UK’s estimated fair share of climate finance needs (see Chapter 1).”

73. Witnesses to the inquiry set out why leveraging private finance towards climate and nature outcomes is critical to the fight against climate change. First, we heard that the magnitude of global climate finance needs far exceeds public ICF, making it insufficient to achieving the collective goals under the Paris Agreement. Dharshan Wignarajah, a Director at the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), estimated that global ICF need will triple from US$1.9 trillion to US$6.5–7.8 trillion per year between 2025 and 2030.¹⁵⁰ Second, witnesses explained that the value of the private sector extends beyond finance, offering innovation, operational expertise and speed. For example, Amar Inamdar, Managing Director of KawiSafi Ventures, told us that:

private enterprise and the entrepreneurial capacity of ordinary people can build businesses, drive those businesses and achieve real outcomes for people that create value on the whole climate spectrum, be it mitigation or adaptation. On the mitigation side, think of all the renewables deployment; on the adaptation side, think of, for example, agricultural cooling or solar irrigation. In all those spaces, private businesses are stepping up to the challenge and delivering, often in a cheaper, faster and more value-creating way than the alternatives.¹⁵¹

74. Currently, only 3% of adaptation finance needs are met by the private sector.¹⁵² Witnesses stressed that private finance is not a “magic bullet” and that it will not automatically flow to low-income and other highly climate-vulnerable countries and sectors with the greatest climate and nature needs.¹⁵³ We heard from Dharshan Wignarajah that there is not a shortage of “capital pools that could be deployed against both mitigation and resilience” objectives.¹⁵⁴ Amar Inamdar, however, cautioned that private finance tends to flow towards opportunities offering “the lowest risk and the highest returns”.¹⁵⁵ He further argued that the challenge extends to whether commitments are being deployed, and are translating to “bankable projects” that drive tangible outcomes “on the ground” and “in the places where it will make most difference”.¹⁵⁶ These concerns reflect the wider consensus across the evidence that, while investment-based models and private finance mobilisation have proven to be effective in climate mitigation, they are less suitable to adaptation and resilience needs – particularly in low-income and fragile countries, many of which are inherently not reliably revenue-generating.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, concessional finance, ideally grant-based public ICF, “remain critical” to reduce risk, and create financial structures that support private sector participation in sectors they will not enter in alone.¹⁵⁸ In relation to adaptation and resilience, Dharshan Wignarajah specifically noted that the need for grant-based instruments:

is far higher than the opportunity to drive forward with drawing in private markets, particularly in fragile, conflict-affected states, where those markets simply do not exist.¹⁵⁹

75. Witnesses therefore argued that the government could play a pivotal role in creating the “enabling environment” needed for private capital to flow towards climate and nature outcomes.¹⁶⁰ Professor Nicola Ranger emphasised that successful UK-supported programmes have focused not only on individual investments but on addressing wider barriers to private finance mobilisation through a “whole system” approach.¹⁶¹ She cited Financial Sector Deepening Africa as an example, noting that it works with regulators and central banks to strengthen market infrastructure, while also providing data, capacity building and funding to accelerate smaller programmes.¹⁶² Professor Ranger further noted that creating the right conditions for investment must be accompanied by a more strategic use of available tools. She suggested that the government could combine its tools strategically, and in a co-ordinated way, to work in partnership with a country to develop solutions.¹⁶³

Box 1: Indonesia – the challenges of moving from a donor to an investor

80. The government acknowledges some of the risks associated with its shift from a donor to an investor model. Echoing the points raised by witnesses, the FCDO told us that that while “there is no pathway that does not involve private sector investment”, the government needs to ensure that “investment is targeted at the right places”.¹⁷² It also recognises that the challenge does not simply lie in the volume of private finance mobilised – but rather how the government utilises its limited public ICF strategically to “create conditions and the right environment into which finance can flow”.¹⁷³ More crucially, the FCDO acknowledges that although the government has seen success in creating the enabling conditions for climate mitigation where “significant volumes of finance” have been channelled, the FCDO characterised climate resilience as being “one of the harder-to-crack” areas.¹⁷⁴ Specifically, the FCDO told us that “it is harder to incentivise and get private finance to recognise the value of investments in resilience” but that this “absolutely needs to be a focus” for the government going forward.¹⁷⁵

81. However, it is unclear exactly how much private capital the government expects to mobilise, or how it plans to assess whether private capital is flowing to where it is needed the most. In contrast, BII presents a strong example of a clear and measurable approach with respect to its own “strategic shift” to accelerate private capital to support low- and middle-income countries to tackle climate change. In its 2026–31 strategy, BII explicitly states that it will aim to mobilise £6–7.5 billion in private capital over the next five years.¹⁷⁶

Multilateral channels

90. The UK has a strong track record of engaging with multilateral institutions “in line with the previous ICF3 strategy”.¹⁷⁷ Specifically, in its written submission, ICAI states that the UK plays an “important funding role and is recognised as an influencer and leader on ICF within the multilateral development banks and multilateral climate funds”. As one of the top three donors to the Green Climate and the Climate Investment Funds, ICAI has also found that the UK “exercises strategic leadership” across both of these and is “widely recognised as a “consistent and influential voice”.¹⁷⁸

91. There are also key advantages in channelling UK ICF through multilateral channels. For example, according to ICAI, this approach allows the UK to make greater contributions to the collective goals of the Paris Agreement, more easily meet its ICF commitments, and mobilise or influence additional finance at a greater scale.¹⁷⁹ We heard from several witnesses that the “pooling of experience” and “aggregation of talent” across multilateral institutions enables, for example, “learning and improvement around development outcomes [which is] critical”.¹⁸⁰

92. However, building on the concerns raised in earlier chapters of this report, we also heard that multilateral channels are not without their limitations. For example, we heard from Amar Inamdar that one of the key challenges of delivery through MDBs is the difficulty in tracing spend to the ground and “too many filters” between the funding and outcomes.¹⁸¹ He pointed to the need for MDBs to be more “flexible, less bureaucratic and more responsive to local institutions and local needs”.¹⁸² These reforms, he said, would enable multilateral institutions to tackle “system-level improvements” that drive outcomes and allow local private sectors to invest in addressing climate challenges.¹⁸³ Amar Inamdar also referenced renewable energy access, for example in Nigeria, as an example of where this has been achieved.¹⁸⁴

93. The government recognises these issues and has previously reassured us of its goal of influencing structural reform and cohesion across its multilateral partners. In March 2026, we heard from the then-minister that the UK will use its position to push for greater impact through multilateral channels, namely MDBs, and ensure that institutions’ efforts are complementary to the UK’s own development spending.¹⁸⁵ More recently, the minister also outlined the need for a nuanced approach to navigating the differences in these institutions’ “dynamics” as well as their respective approaches to deploying climate finance.¹⁸⁶

5 Transparency, accountability and governance of the UK’s ICF

Data reporting

International requirements

97. Article 9 of the Paris Agreement requires developed countries to report qualitative and quantitative information relating to the ICF they provide to developing countries.¹⁸⁷ Reports containing this information, referred to as Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), are submitted to the UNFCCC under the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF).¹⁸⁸ In its written submission, the FCDO acknowledges the importance of international reporting requirements, stating that:

The ETF ensures that Parties are transparent about financial contributions and how these funds are used which is crucial for building trust among Parties and stakeholders, as well as tracking progress.¹⁸⁹

98. The FCDO’s written submission highlights that the UK submits BTRs every two years.¹⁹⁰ The UK’s most recent BTR was published in December 2024 and contains data on UK ICF spending for 2021 and 2022.¹⁹¹ In addition to its BTR submissions, the FCDO stated that the UK “regularly” reports to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which previously tracked progress against the US$100 billion climate finance goal and now, the US$300 billion of the NCQG .¹⁹² OECD donor ICF data was last updated in July 2026, with data for 2024.¹⁹³

99. Evidence submissions have highlighted the transparency limitations of the government’s “formal policy” to report on ICF spending through BTRs biannually, and with a 12-month lag.¹⁹⁴ For example, according to Conservation International UK, “taxpayers will not formally get to know how ICF was spent in 2023 until the end of 2026”. It characterises this as “inappropriate for any levels of scrutiny and accountability to be possible”.¹⁹⁵

Domestic publications

100. In addition to meeting its international reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement, the FCDO told us that it publishes ICF spending and results data domestically, namely through the UK’s:

• annual ICF results report showing portfolio-level results against 15 key performance indicators (KPIs), such as “number of people supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change” (KPI 1);¹⁹⁶
• Development Tracker (DevTracker)—a public information portal for UK ODA spending—which draws on data published by the government and its delivery partners using the International Aid Transparency Initiative standard.¹⁹⁷ DevTracker also includes ICF programme documentation, such as individual programme business cases, programme annual reviews and information on transactions;¹⁹⁸ and
• annual Statistics for International Development publication which includes high-level statistics on the UK’s ODA spending.¹⁹⁹

101. However, there are several significant limitations in the accessibility, completeness and usability of these datasets.²⁰⁰ For example, witnesses told us that neither the DevTracker nor the Statistics on International Development publication clearly lay out which programmes contribute to ICF, despite climate finance now accounting for a significant proportion of the UK’s overall ODA spending.²⁰¹

Data disaggregation

102. Despite the government’s assertion that it has “continued to expand the availability of disaggregated results”, it publishes little disaggregated data on its ICF.²⁰² This issue is highlighted consistently across the evidence we received.²⁰³ The UK’s annual ICF results report only provides data on the cumulative total result achieved against each KPI, over the lifespan of UK ICF since 2011.²⁰⁴ While it is possible to use this data to work out the yearly contribution of UK ICF to each KPI, it is impossible to calculate the underlying contributions of each programme or project to each KPI.²⁰⁵ Obscuring individual programmes’ results in this way prevents scrutiny of both the effectiveness of the project and the accuracy of the government’s KPI calculations.²⁰⁶ Ian Mitchell described the annual ICF results report as a “PR [public relations] document”.²⁰⁷ He also explained that, in the absence of cost and spending data published alongside KPIs, it is difficult to determine cost-effectiveness and value for money of ICF programming:

It aggregates the results up and says, “Look at all these great things we have done,” but it is not clear about the projects that are contributing to it. It is not clear about how much those projects cost—how much was invested in them—so it is hard to see whether you are getting value out of them. You are only seeing the outcomes.²⁰⁸

103. The lack of disaggregation reporting in a standardised way also prevents external organisations and partner countries from independently assessing impact and effectiveness of the ICF portfolio.²⁰⁹ This includes the relative effectiveness of different delivery channels, such as aid delivered multilaterally versus bilaterally, or whether impacts are being achieved for the most climate-vulnerable groups and geographies, such as LDCs and women and girls.²¹⁰ ICAI has found that over 90% of relevant programmes were geographically “unspecified” in ICF data, often because they are multi-country. ICAI concluded that such data limitations, among other factors, do not “allow a clear understanding of how energy transition-relevant spend within these programmes is spread across sectors, delivery channels, and geographical location”, making it difficult to assess impact.²¹¹ As May Thazin Aung also reflected, a similar gap exists for gender-disaggregated data:

if you look at the markers it is actually very difficult to tell how much money is going to gender and how much to particular disaggregated groups within these target groups.²¹²

104. The government wrote in its response to ICAI’s findings that it remains “committed to strengthening the integration of gender considerations across the ICF portfolio” and that it will continue to “track ICF spend and results by geography within the parameters” of its programme management system.²¹³ The government also states that through its membership of the Inclusive Data Charter it “prioritises better data disaggregation across FCDO programmes”.²¹⁴ Although the then-Department for International Development signed the Charter 8 years ago, the lack of disaggregated data remains a significant transparency issue.²¹⁵

Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning programme and value for money

105. The government has a separate cross-departmental Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) programme in place designed to maximise the impact and value for money achieved through its ICF portfolio. However, its evaluation reports are infrequent. In 2024, the government published reports from the three independent portfolio evaluations − covering “integration of ICF”, “mobilising private finance through demonstration effects” and “support for policy change” − conducted between 2018 and 2020.²¹⁶ In 2023, DESNZ also published a separate “synthesis of learning” of its ICF programmes covering the period between 2015 and 2021.²¹⁷

106. In general, the government receives praise for the UK’s ICF MEL. The evidence describes the UK as a “thought leader” on ICF MEL, being one of the only providers to report results “regularly”.²¹⁸ The evidence also notes that the UK’s ICF MEL is recognised as “stronger and more transparent than those of other donors”.²¹⁹ According to ICAI, UK leadership on MEL has also influenced multilateral institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, in strengthening their results management systems.²²⁰ While there has been “significant investment” from the government on MEL, recent ODA cuts have led to a reduction in MEL spending within the FCDO, undermining this.²²¹

107. There remain issues in relation to the government’s KPIs. In its written submission, ICAI notes dissonance between these KPIs and the high-level goals set out in the 2023 ‘Together for People and Planet’ iteration of the ICF strategy. Specifically, it found that KPIs do not provide a “comprehensive picture of what UK ICF is achieving”, or address results generated through multilateral institutions.²²² The evidence further highlights a lack of clarity on the robustness of the KPI methodology as well as uncertainty over how recent accounting methodology changes have affected reporting.²²³ However, the government appears to be taking some steps to address these concerns. For example, in its 2026 iteration of the ICF strategy, it has aligned some KPIs with the four priority areas identified for ICF4, and states that it will be publishing the ICF results report as Official Government Statistics for the first time, meaning they will be subject to external review.²²⁴

108. Moreover, the FCDO acknowledges that “portfolio oversight” could be improved in context of ICF MEL.²²⁵ In both its written submission and 2026 iteration of the ICF strategy, the FCDO states that it is “investing” in a new strategic MEL programme to improve “oversight and sharpen learning across the ICF portfolio” for the ICF4 period.²²⁶ Within this, the FCDO told us it anticipates that the programme will:

conduct high-priority evaluations, centralise evidence, and update the KPI monitoring framework to reflect current UK priorities and global standards.²²⁷

It expects that these steps will help ensure “smarter spending, better delivery, and demonstrate to taxpayers that their money is driving real change”. Furthermore, as part of its new MEL programme, the FCDO told us that it planned to complete a “learning synthesis” of ICF3 by April 2026, which it would use to inform ICF4 programming.²²⁸ However, it has since stated that this is now expected to be finalised by January 2027 − more than a year into the ICF4 cycle and well after its latest strategy had already been developed.²²⁹

‘Best buys’

109. In addition to its MEL programme, the government has also sought to assess value for money options in climate mitigation programmes through a ‘best-buy’ document which draws on evidence from several donors.²³⁰ According to ICAI, the most recent version of this document is from 2019 and, in 2024, DESNZ produced an unpublished ICF ‘Assessment of Mitigation Options’ report to “inform its strategic approach to value for money”.²³¹ However, ICAI has found, specifically in relation to the UK’s energy transition portfolio, that “these documents were not being systematically used and understood by staff”.²³²

Cross-departmental co-ordination

115. In its written submission, the FCDO points to “well-established” cross-departmental governance structures at both at the official and ministerial levels for overseeing ODA and ICF spend.²³³ This includes the refreshed Ministerial ODA Delivery and Impact Board and the senior official-level ICF Management Board, which meets regularly to “oversee policy implementation, ensure coordination across ICF spending departments, and promote learning, monitoring, and evaluation”.²³⁴ The FCDO tells us that these mechanisms aim to “maximise value for money, assess impact, and ensure effective delivery of the UK’s ICF commitments”.²³⁵

116. This is reflected in ICAI’s written submission, which references positive FCDO management processes at the sector and ICF programme level “designed to promote value for money decision-making”.²³⁶ ICAI has also noted persistent challenges in this area, notably around division of labour between the two main delivery departments—the FCDO and DESNZ—citing blurred responsibilities and fragmented implementation at the portfolio level.²³⁷ In reference to its latest review on energy transition, ICAI states that:

evidence from cross-departmental programmes is often siloed, with limited use of thematic synthesis or structured learning to inform strategic decisions across the portfolio.²³⁸

117. Similar criticisms were raised in the evidence regarding specific ICF programmes such as those established under the Ayrton Fund − an ICF partnership platform co-ordinating UK international support for clean energy innovation across the FCDO, Defra and DBIST.²³⁹ For example, evidence from the Modern Energy Cooking Services programme has demonstrated that while cross-departmental co-ordination is “possible and valuable”, it relies heavily on “programme-level effort rather than central systems” and is not yet “routine or institutionalised”.²⁴⁰ Learning from the Ayrton Sustainable Cooling Challenge suggests that effective cross-departmental co-ordination for the initiative was contingent on programme-level efforts to establish an advisory steering group which brought together stakeholders including government department representatives.²⁴¹ According to the Energy Saving Trust, the steering group was the key enabler to being able to “identify opportunities for cross-programme collaboration and track activity for monitoring, reporting and learning purposes”.²⁴²

118. Nonetheless the Ayrton Fund is overall regarded as a good practice example and a “conduit” for cross-departmental collaboration.²⁴³ Using the framework established by the Aryton Fund as its baseline, the Energy Saving Trust argues that the government could build on progress to improve cross-departmental co-ordination and integration of efforts “with a view to maximising the overall effectiveness and value for money” of the ICF portfolio.²⁴⁴ The Carbon Trust also supports continuation of the Ayrton Fund model as well as other cross-departmental co-ordination efforts based upon similar models.²⁴⁵

119. The FCDO acknowledges that ICF cross-departmental co-ordination remains an area “for improvement”.²⁴⁶ Specifically, the FCDO has outlined that for the ICF4 period, it plans to address this by “strengthening governance and learning systems by taking forward recommendations from recent ICAI reviews”.²⁴⁷ The then-minister also agreed that strategic alignment for ICF across the four delivery departments was previously “insufficient”.²⁴⁸ She reassured the committee that governance is “much better now” but noted that:

The proof of all this will be whether we get better outcomes, and I am as confident as you can be that we will, but I can say that the alignment across Whitehall is much stronger now.²⁴⁹

Despite these sentiments, the minister failed to elaborate on the breadth of changes the government has made to ICF governance structures or the extent to which lines of responsibility have been formalised.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The integrity and credibility of the UK’s ICF commitments

1. The government has prioritised maintaining headline ICF3 spending commitments under the constraints of its ODA budget, as opposed to striving to deliver genuine climate and nature outcomes. The government’s changes to ICF accounting methodology have undermined the impact, additionality and credibility of ICF3, and any future commitments, by counting reclassified humanitarian ODA towards UK ICF – despite the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) requirement for climate finance to be new and additional. We are concerned that these changes—in conjunction with the scale of ODA cuts and inflation—risk compromising the UK’s ability to:

• meet its legal obligation under the UNFCCC to provide new and additional resources to low- and middle-income countries;
• meet its fair share of the New Collective Quantified Goal and its commitment to tripling adaptation finance by 2035;
• maintain its international leadership role and political capital on climate and nature; and
• retain partner countries’ trust in the UNFCCC negotiation process. (Conclusion, Paragraph 17)

2. The committee recognises that classification of humanitarian spending as ICF is not uncommon practice among the UK’s international counterparts. Nonetheless, we urge the government to minimise its use of this approach, where it arbitrarily classifies a fixed proportion of humanitarian spending as ICF, including projects already assessed for their ICF contribution. The committee is also concerned that we were unable to verify the £11.6 billion that the government states it has spent between 2021–22 to 2025–26 in climate finance due to lack of available evidence, and we would urge them to publish a full breakdown. (Recommendation, Paragraph 18)

3. Where humanitarian ODA spend is classified as ICF in the latest programming cycle, we recommend that the government develop clear guidance and criteria for staff responsible for programme design and assessment to ensure that such spending delivers genuine climate or nature outcomes. Alongside this, we urge the government to establish clear targets for the amount of humanitarian ODA that can be classified as ICF and ensure better transparency through data publication of this spend. (Recommendation, Paragraph 19)

Access, balance and reach of the UK’s ICF

4. ICF programming is most effective when it is long-term, country-led, and aligned with the needs and priorities of partner countries’ existing national plans, for example their Nationally Determined Contributions. It is most transformative when it incorporates locally led principles and local leadership at the sub-national government, community and civil society level. We are encouraged by examples of innovative ICF programmes the government has implemented and delivered at the local level. However, the UK’s ICF remains overly complex, bureaucratic and risk-averse – particularly funding delivered through multilateral institutions. This means that funding is not sufficiently flexible for, or accessible to, those who need it most. (Conclusion, Paragraph 32)

5. We recommend that, through its limited concessional resources, the government seeks to scale innovations and the funding models that work, particularly from the perspective of those most in need. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)

6. The government should use its standing as a significant shareholder to lead multilateral partners and push for institutional reform to:

• simplify access to UK ICF for local activities at the lowest appropriate level with a focus on gender-responsiveness and inclusivity. This must include streamlining the application, accreditation and reporting processes across funds;
• strengthen and scale-up structures for country ownership, for example through country platforms; and
• increase multi-year, programmatic funding, allowing partner countries to better integrate climate investments into their national planning systems and cycles. (Conclusion, Paragraph 34)

7. The government should ensure that local voices are embedded in all stages of UK ICF programming, from design to delivery, across the portfolio. It should systematically collect and publish disaggregated project-level data to track, monitor and report on the extent to which this has been achieved over time. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35)

8. It is well established that women and girls are disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change, particularly those who experience multiple forms of marginalisation such as age, disability and ethnicity. Being situated at the forefront of the climate crisis means that women and girls are uniquely positioned to act as agents of change. This means that women and girls’ active participation in the design and delivery of ICF programmes is more likely to drive longer-lasting and meaningful climate and nature outcomes against the priorities of the communities they serve. We therefore welcome the government’s reassurance that it is committed to gender responsiveness and inclusivity across the UK’s ICF portfolio. (Conclusion, Paragraph 36)

9. The government should prioritise direct financing, ideally highly concessional resources, such as grant-based public UK ICF, to women-led organisations embedded in local networks. (Recommendation, Paragraph 37)

10. We urge the government to establish clear targets for Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion (GEDSI) integration, underpinned by a robust monitoring and reporting framework. The government should also write to the committee within six months of this report’s publication, setting out any data it holds on the proportion of new ICF programmes that have been assessed or targeted for GEDSI since publication of its updated guidance. (Recommendation, Paragraph 38)

11. Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Low-Income Countries (LICs) are among the hardest hit by the impacts of climate change and are the least responsible for causing it. These countries’ high exposure to climate change impacts partly stems from a combination of characteristics, for example their limited financial capacity, and a ICF architecture predicated on policy and economic stability. Current ICF mechanisms are therefore often ill-suited and inaccessible to these already debt-distressed countries. Without clear spending targets or better geographic prioritisation, the government risks sidelining low-income and other highly climate-vulnerable countries, and leaves the UK’s ICF susceptible to being diverted for domestic and other political priorities. A stark demonstration of this is the government’s £400 million reprioritisation of the UK’s ICF budget to loans in July 2026. This reprioritisation will likely reduce grant-based funding for the most vulnerable and make the UK’s ICF less effective and impactful as a direct result, at least in the absence of further measures to support the financial capacity-building of these countries and their resulting ability to access climate finance. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

12. We urge the government to set geographic targets for the UK’s limited, highly concessional ICF resources to avoid deepening climate-vulnerable countries’ debt distress. Specifically, for LDCs, SIDS, LICs and other highly fragile countries, it should set a minimum share of the UK’s grant-based public ICF, to meet countries’ non-revenue generating needs, such as resilience building and adaptation. We urge the government to further write to this committee to clarify whether the converted ICF loans in question meet the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development concessionality requirements to remain classifiable as ODA. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)

13. Adaptation finance is chronically under-resourced, and the gap is widening. The government has not been able to sustain a balance between mitigation and adaptation in previous cycles of the UK’s ICF spending. More concerning still is its persistent lack of data transparency, which undermines clear reporting on adaptation and resilience outcomes, thereby substantially limiting parliamentary scrutiny. (Conclusion, Paragraph 54)

14. The government should ensure that it maintains sufficient focus on scaling up the quality and volume of financing for the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries throughout ICF4. We therefore urge the government to establish a high-minimum share of the UK’s public ICF for adaptation finance. To drive data transparency, the government should report annually against this target through “adaptation finance, only” data tagging, as is common among international counterparts. (Recommendation, Paragraph 55)

15. We welcome the government’s recognition of the centrality of nature to tackling the climate crisis in its 2026 iteration of the ICF strategy. We also acknowledge the government’s intention to take a more integrated approach to nature spending going forward to ensure a more coherent offer to partner countries. However, we are concerned that in retreating from nature and forest sub-pledges the government risks:

• removing the principal mechanism for meeting its legal obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF);
• compromising partner countries’ trust in the CBD/GBF negotiation process; and
• its ability to secure buy-in on the climate and nature outcomes from countries that hold most of the world’s most critical ecosystems, which underpin UK security and prosperity. (Conclusion, Paragraph 65)

16. We urge the government to build on the precedent it has set for previous ICF cycles and set sub-pledges for nature and forest spending as part of ICF4. (Recommendation, Paragraph 66

17. In response to this report, the government should write to the committee by November 2026 outlining:

• how it plans to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of its integrated approach to nature in ICF4; and
• the timeline and conditions under which it might re-consider committing to nature and forest sub-pledges. (Conclusion, Paragraph 67)

18. Where possible, the FCDO should look to the latest evidence on locally-led and shock-responsive social protection systems to deal with the impact the climate crisis is having on agriculture as a driver of instability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 68)

19. We welcome the government’s long overdue decision to invest in the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), given the instrumental role the UK has played in designing the fund. The committee understand that the government must take difficult prioritisation decisions in view of its constrained ODA budget. However, we strongly believe that the government’s pending £400 million investment in the TFFF has come at the cost of cutting the UK’s already limited concessional ICF for those most in need. (Conclusion, Paragraph 69)

20. The government should reconsider its decision to fund its investment in the TFFF by redirecting existing grant-based ICF towards loans, rather than drawing on new and additional sources. Nevertheless, we believe that it should continue to provide technical assistance on innovative finance instruments pioneered by countries at the forefront of the climate crisis. In doing so, it should aim to shift the ICF paradigm away from “traditional aid” towards investment and partnerships, in line with its broader ODA policy commitments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 70)

The UK’s ICF architecture

21. The government is increasingly shifting its focus to using both ODA and non-ODA instruments to unlock an unquantified amount of private finance for climate and nature outcomes. This is in a bid to use the ODA element of its ICF, and other public finance, to leverage private finance to generate greater impact despite reduced resources. However, in pursuing this objective the government must not lose sight of the primary purpose of UK ODA, including ICF, which is to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development and welfare in the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries. This means that the government should not deploy its public ICF with the sole objective of generating financial return or commercial market building in middle-income countries. (Conclusion, Paragraph 82)

22. We urge the government to follow the example of British International Investment by establishing a clear, measurable target for the amount of private capital it expects to mobilise for climate and nature outcomes, and the settings in which it intends to do so. This target should be underpinned by evidence reflecting the realities of where such investments can achieve the most value for money and on-the-ground impact. (Recommendation, Paragraph 83)

23. The private sector can offer innovation, expertise and flow of capital at scale for climate and nature outcomes. It is also evident that, while the two are not interchangeable, public UK ICF and private finance must play complementary roles for the collective advancement of the Paris Agreement goals. We therefore welcome the government’s willingness to explore additional sources of climate finance from public and private sources. We especially note the critical role the UK can play in creating the enabling environment required to encourage the flow of existing and mobilised private capital, and into areas and markets where it is needed but would not ordinarily go. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84)

24. It is clear that private finance alone is not a panacea, and no single instrument or mechanism can address the scale, urgency and complexity of global climate finance needs. What is clearer is that the effectiveness and alignment of the UK’s ICF tools, whether ODA or non-ODA, varies significantly by context and objectives. The most impactful strategies combine multiple instruments, such as grants, loans, and risk-sharing mechanisms. These instruments each play a role in mobilising private capital through targeted, complementary approaches that address different levels of risk tolerance, funding gaps, and country-specific priorities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 85)

25. We recommend that the government develop a robust evidence base underpinning its donor to investor model in the delivery of ICF. This should assess:

• how ODA and non-ODA instruments can be deployed in a co-ordinated and effective way to mobilise private finance for climate and nature outcomes. This should include an examination of the conditions and contexts in which private capital can deliver the greatest additionality and impact in line with country-specific needs and priorities, particularly the poorest and most climate-vulnerable; and
• whether the necessary systems, capabilities and market infrastructure are in place to support the transition to the investor model, particularly in the countries where ODA is being significantly scaled back. This should also include examining whether the model is well aligned with the government’s wider climate and development finance architecture. For example, newly established centrally managed structures, such as the FCDO’s Communities of Expertise, investment through development finance institutions, and efforts to mobilise private capital. (Conclusion, Paragraph 86)

26. Where private capital is mobilised, we recommend that alongside tracking volumes, the government:

• systematically measure the extent to which private capital has reached the areas where it is most needed; and
• develop standardised key performance indicators measuring the impacts achieved against stated objectives. (Conclusion, Paragraph 87)

27. The UK needs to be seen as a reliable partner and recognise that where sudden reductions in ODA have occurred across the portfolio, its credibility and return on investment are likely to be impacted. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)

28. The government must factor in considerations around any future funding changes, including how best to mitigate and manage their unintended consequences, both for its international reputation and for the ability of its in-country staff to operate effectively. (Conclusion, Paragraph 89)

29. Multilateral institutions, including development banks and climate funds, play a critical role in generating climate and nature outcomes at scale. These institutions have an aggregation of expertise, capacity and capability, which cannot be met solely through public ICF programming. However, these institutions require checks and balances to ensure that they are held accountable to the UK taxpayer and can course correct as necessary to ensure they are channelling ICF to those that need it the most. (Conclusion, Paragraph 94)

30. We recommend that the government ensure that the FCDO is able to retain a set of individuals who can act as an integrity function across its multilateral partners. As a major shareholder of these institutions, this function should enable the government to utilise its convening power to:

• push these institutions to become more flexible and responsive with fewer bureaucratic barriers;
• work with these institutions to determine how ICF can be deployed innovatively;
• hold these institutions to account when they are not generating impact in, or channelling sufficient funding to, the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries; and
• hold these institutions to account on adequately reflecting UK priorities in the spend of ICF. (Conclusion, Paragraph 95)

31. The government should set out clear, measurable objectives for what it intends to achieve from its convening and influencing role for multilateral institutions on climate and nature outcomes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 96)

Transparency, accountability and governance of the UK’s ICF

32. We welcome the government’s designation of the ICF annual results report as Official Government Statistics for the first time as this marks a positive step on data integrity and transparency. We were also pleased to learn that overall, the UK outperforms in ICF Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) relative to its international counterparts. However, it’s clear to the committee that gaps remain in the frequency, quality and disaggregation of the ICF results and spending data currently published. Substantial improvements are required to allow effective scrutiny of the UK’s ICF and enable assessment of whether spending across the government’s full portfolio is cost-effective and generating impact for the most climate-vulnerable countries and groups. (Conclusion, Paragraph 110)

33. The government should commit, as part of the FCDO’s new strategic MEL programme, to publish an annual report setting out its full ICF portfolio. The report should include disaggregated project-level data, alongside any relevant information on financial cost, linked to ICF key performance indicators. At the minimum, disaggregation should cover delivery channel, funding instrument, geography and demographic characteristics such as gender. (Recommendation, Paragraph 111)

34. We urge the government to publish more granular data on ICF results and spending through its existing ODA reporting mechanisms, including the annual Statistics for International Development publication and Development Tracker. (Recommendation, Paragraph 112)

35. We welcome the government’s renewed focus on driving results and value for money in its 2026 ICF strategy. By sharing evidence on climate mitigation and adaptation best buys, the government can strengthen UK ICF value for money assessment and encourage its delivery partners to do the same. (Conclusion, Paragraph 113)

36. To support better assessment of cost-effectiveness and value for money of the ICF portfolio, we recommend that the government update and publish best buy documents for climate mitigation and adaptation programme options. These documents should be used systematically by staff to guide internal cross-departmental ICF4 prioritisation decisions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 114)

37. Strategic alignment and cross-departmental co-ordination across the ICF portfolio has historically been an area of weakness and often resulted in, for example, siloed learning and fragmented implementation of programmes. Although strong cross-departmental co-ordination is evident in some ICF programmes, this appears to be driven at the programme level rather than formalised centrally. The government has however reassured the committee that it has sought to address these issues for the ICF4 period by, for example, strengthening ICF governance and learning systems. (Conclusion, Paragraph 120)

38. With a view to maximising the overall effectiveness and value for money of the ICF portfolio, the government should build on any progress it has already made to:

• improve cross-departmental coordination by formalising clear lines of responsibility across the four main delivery departments;
• better integrate cross-departmental efforts to minimise fragmentation; and
• establish robust cross-departmental processes for knowledge sharing to avoid a siloed approach to learning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 121)

39. In response to this report, we request that the government write to us setting out the full list of changes it has made to its ICF governance structures so far, and how it plans to measure effectiveness of these changes against its objectives for reform. (Conclusion, Paragraph 122)

Formal minutes

Tuesday 8 September 2026

Members present:

Sarah Champion, in the Chair

Tracy Gilbert

Brian Mathew

James Naish

Sam Rushworth

David Taylor

UK International Climate Finance: Sustaining Commitments and Impact Amid a Shrinking Aid Budget

Draft Report (UK International Climate Finance: Sustaining Commitments and Impact Amid a Shrinking Aid Budget), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 122 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Tuesday 15 September at 1.30 p.m.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Tuesday 3 March 2026

Elizabeth Wathuti, Founder and Executive Director, Green Generation Initiative; Zahid Shashoto, Head of Programme, Uttaran; Dishon Lionel Murage, Technical Advisor, Oceans Alive FoundationQ1–21

Professor Avinash Persaud, Special Advisor on Climate Change, Inter-American Development Bank; May Thazin Aung, Senior researcher, International Institute for Environmental DevelopmentQ22–44

Tuesday 2 June 2026

Deborah Sanchez, Indigenous Leader and Director of Community Land Rights and Conservation Finance Initiative, Rights and Resources Initiative; Silvia Carolina Herrera Hernandez, Coffee Producer and Secretary of the Board of Directors, CLAC Comercio JustoQ45–75

Professor Nicola Ranger, Executive Director of Earth Capital Nexus and Professor in Practice, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science; Dharshan Wignarajah, Director, Climate Policy Initiative; Amar Inamdar, Managing Director, KawiSafi VenturesQ76–101

Tuesday 30 June 2026

The Rt Hon. the Baroness Chapman of Darlington, Minister for International Development and Africa, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Matt Toombs, Director, International Climate Finance and Strategy, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Ros Eales, Director of the Energy and Climate Directorate, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development OfficeQ102–160

Anouschka Rajah, Research and Analysis Manager, More in Common; Ian Mitchell, Co-Director, Europe and Senior Fellow, Centre for Global DevelopmentQ161–182

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

ICF numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 ActionAid UK ICF0027

2 Acumen ICF0015

3 Age International ICF0031

4 Aikman, Lucia (Student, The University of Warwick) ICF0038

5 Banya, Yusufu ICF0002

6 British International Investment ICF0030

7 Buziuk, Hleb (Independent policy researcher and human-rights advocate, FairGo CIC) ICF0001

8 CARE International UK ICF0021

9 CBM UK (Global Disability Inclusion) ICF0032

10 Carbon Trust ICF0036

11 Center for Global Development ICF0017

12 Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) ICF0024

13 Concern Worldwide UK ICF0010

14 Conservation International UK ICF0019

15 Energy Saving Trust ICF0029

16 Fairtrade Foundation ICF0040

17 Farm Africa ICF0005

18 Fauna & Flora ICF0033

19 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office ICF0042

20 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office ICF0035

21 GOGLA ICF0022

22 Greenpeace UK ICF0006

23 Independent Commission for Aid Impact ICF0018

24 International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC ICF0009

25 International Institute for Environment and Development ICF0012

26 Mercy Corps ICF0003

27 Modern Energy Cooking Services, FCDO Programme – hosted at Loughborough University ICF0004

28 RSPB ICF0023

29 Scottish Research Alliance for Energy, Homes and Livelihoods ICF0013

30 Tan, Professor Celine (Professor of International Economic Law, Warwick Law School, University of Warwick); Dr Anil Yilmaz Vastardis (Senior Lecturer, Essex Law School, University of Essex); and Dr Gamze Erdem Turkelli (Associate Research Professor Professor in Public International Law, Human Rights and Sustainable Development, Faculty of Law, University of Antwerp) ICF0026

31 TRAFFIC ICF0011

32 The Independent ICF0037

33 The Nature Conservancy ICF0008

34 The UK Committee for UNICEF (UNICEF UK) ICF0020

35 The Wildlife Trusts ICF0025

36 UK NGO Forest Coalition ICF0041

37 University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL) ICF0034

38 Uttaran ICF0039

39 WaterAid ICF0007

40 World Resources Institute ICF0016

41 Zoological Society of London ICF0014

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

Session 2026–27

Number	Title	Reference
1st	The UK’s development partnership with Nigeria	HC 207
2nd Special	UK Aid and Development Assistance in a Fracturing World: Strengthening Resilience and Cooperation: Government Response	HC 499
1st Special	Peace under pressure: Protecting Women, Peace and Security: Government Response	HC 210

Session 2024–26

Number	Title	Reference
11th	UK Aid and Development Assistance in a Fracturing World: Strengthening Resilience and Cooperation	HC 1835
10th	Peace under pressure: Protecting Women, Peace and Security	HC 782
9th	Future of UK aid and development assistance: interim report	HC 1330
8th	Empowering Development: Energy Access for Communities	HC 849
7th	Assessing Value, Ensuring Impact: The FCDO’s Approach to Value for Money in Official Development Assistance	HC 422
6th	The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People	HC 525
5th	Protection not permission: The UK’s role in upholding international humanitarian law and supporting the safe delivery of humanitarian aid	HC 526
4th	The ‘In Development’ process	HC 333
3rd	The Government’s efforts to achieve SDG2: Zero Hunger	HC 515
2nd	Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory	HC 373
1st	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact	HC 448
9th Special	Future of UK aid and development assistance: interim report: Government Response	HC 1830
8th Special	Assessing Value, Ensuring Impact: The FCDO’s Approach to Value for Money in Official Development Assistance: Government Response	HC 1669
7th Special	Empowering Development: Energy Access for Communities: Government response	HC 1626
6th Special	The FCDO’s approach to displaced people: Government response	HC 1522
5th Special	Protection not permission: The UK’s role in upholding international humanitarian law and supporting the safe delivery of humanitarian aid: Government Response	HC 1301
4th Special	The Government’s efforts to achieve SDG2: Zero Hunger: Government Response	HC 923
3rd Special	Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Government Response	HC 797
2nd Special	The UK Small Island Developing States Strategy: Government Response	HC 597
1st Special	FCDO and disability-inclusive development: Government Response	HC 568

---

Footnotes

1 UN Treaty Collection, Paris Agreement (accessed 12 August 2026)

2 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Paris Agreement (accessed 12 August 2026)

3 The terms ‘developed countries’ and ‘developing countries’ are used in line with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Reflecting the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, the convention distinguishes between developed and developing country Parties and recognises the obligation of developed countries to provide financial resources to support developing countries in implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Climate Finance and the USD 100 billion goal (accessed 12 August 2026)

5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (accessed 12 August 2026)

6 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its third session, held in Glasgow from 31 October to 13 November 2021, 08 March 2022, p9

7 UN News, “Belém COP30 delivers climate finance boost and a pledge to plan fossil fuel transition”, 22 November 2025 (accessed 12 August 2026); World Resources Institute, “Reaching $120 Billion in International Adaptation Finance Is Possible—Here’s What It Takes”, 25 November 2025 (accessed 12 August 2026)

8 Department for International Development, Department of Energy and Climate Change and Defra, International Climate Fund (ICF) Implementation Plan 2011/12–2014/15: Technical Paper, 2011

9 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, DBIST, International Climate Finance, gov.uk (accessed 12 August 2026)

10 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICF0018)

11 FCDO, DESNZ, DBIST, Ayrton Fund, gov.uk (accessed 12 August 2026)

12 Development Aid: Nature Conservation PQ HL2339, 26 February 2024

13 Climate Change: Finance PQ 5560, 13 December 2023; FCDO, DESNZ and Defra, Together for People and Planet: UK International Climate Finance Strategy, gov.uk, 30 March 2023

14 FCDO (ICF0035)

15 Q104; HCWS1425 [on Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme allocations 2026/27–2028/29], 19 March 2026

16 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026

17 This refers to British International Investment’s (BII’s) contribution to £6.7 billion of non-ODA finance. The ICF ODA contribution to BII comes under the overall commitment of around £6 billion.

18 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026

19 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, DBIST, International Climate Finance, gov.uk (accessed 12 August 2026)

20 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, DBIST, International Climate Finance, gov.uk (accessed 12 August 2026)

21 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026

22 FCDO, The UK’s modern development approach, gov.uk, 16 July 2026

23 UNFCCC, Article 4: Commitments, 1992 (accessed 12 August 2026)

24 See, for example, Climate Action Network-UK (CAN-UK) (ICF0024); Christian Blind Mission (CBM) UK (ICF0032)

25 See, for example, CARE International UK (ICF0021); CBM UK (ICF0032); CAN-UK (ICF0024)

26 ICAI, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, 29 February 2024

27 See, for example, CAN-UK (ICF0024); CGD (ICF0017); ActionAid UK (ICF0027)

28 ICAI, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, 29 February 2024

29 ICAI, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, 29 February 2024; The two other main changes to the UK’s ICF accounting methodology included: rather than assigning BII’s ICF contribution ratio as a fixed percentage, the government now calculates this based on actual BII investments; and ‘scrubbing’ the existing ODA portfolio to identify additional ICF-eligible programmes.

30 CGD (ICF0017)

31 CGD (ICF0017)

32 CBM UK (ICF0032); ICAI (ICF0018)

33 Q121

34 CAN-UK (ICF0024)

35 CAN-UK (ICF0024)

36 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026; HCWS1425 [on Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme allocations 2026/27–2028/29], 19 March 2026

37 CAN-UK (ICF0024); ODI Global, A fair share of climate finance? The collective aspects of the New Collective Quantified Goal, ODI Working Paper, September 2024, p11

38 CAN-UK (ICF0024)

39 Carbon Brief, “Analysis: UK is “halving” its climate finance for developing countries”, 27 March 2026

40 ODI Global, A fair share of climate finance? Assessing quantity, quality and alignment with gender goals, November 2025, p45

41 Concern Worldwide UK (ICF0010)

42 Concern Worldwide UK (ICF0010)

43 Mercy Corps (ICF0003)

44 Qq169–170

45 Qq169–170

46 Q168

47 ICAI (ICF0018)

48 FCDO, The UK’s modern development approach, July 2026, gov.uk, 16 July 2026

49 Qq7, 21, 43; See, for example, Acumen (ICF0015); CAN-UK (ICF0024); Uttaran (ICF0039); International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) (ICF0012)

50 Uttaran (ICF0039)

51 See, for example, Uttaran (ICF0039); IIED (ICF0012); ActionAid UK (ICF0027)

52 In their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), countries communicate actions they will take to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in order to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement. Countries also communicate in their NDCs actions they will take to build resilience to adapt to the impacts of climate change.

53 IIED (ICF0012)

54 ActionAid UK (ICF0027)

55 ICAI (ICF0018)

56 ActionAid UK (ICF0027)

57 ActionAid UK (ICF0027)

58 ICAI (ICF0018)

59 IIED (ICF0012)

60 IIED (ICF0012)

61 IIED (ICF0012)

62 See, for example, ActionAid UK (ICF0027); Uttaran (ICF0039); IIED (ICF0012); UK NGO Forest Coalition (ICF0041)

63 IIED (ICF0012)

64 FCDO (ICF0035)

65 Q146; FCDO (ICF0042)

66 Q148

67 Q148

68 Q148

69 Qq8, 27; See, for example, ActionAid UK (ICF0027); IIED (ICF0012)

70 The Nature Conservancy (ICF0008)

71 Q47

72 Q47

73 Q8; The Nature Conservancy (ICF0008)

74 Q8

75 Q38; Q52

76 Q149

77 Q147; FCDO, Defra, DESNZ, UK International Climate Finance guidance note for delivery partners: integration of gender equality, disability and social inclusion, gov.uk, 16 May 2025

78 Q149; FCDO, Defra, DESNZ, UK International Climate Finance guidance note for delivery partners: integration of gender equality, disability and social inclusion, gov.uk, 16 May 2025

79 FCDO (ICF0042)

80 International Development Committee, Empowering Development: Energy Access for Communities, Eighth Report of Session 2024–26, HC 849, House of Commons, 14 November 2025

81 Q147

82 CARE International UK (ICF0021)

83 FCDO, Defra, DESNZ, UK International Climate Finance guidance note for delivery partners: integration of gender equality, disability and social inclusion, gov.uk, 16 May 2025

84 CARE International UK (ICF0021)

85 IIED, “Multilateral climate funds: three ways to step up for the world’s most vulnerable nations”, 28 October 2025; CGD, Climate Finance Allocations and Vulnerability, CGD Working Paper 735, November 2025, p1; Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), “Unlocking Climate Finance for Least Developed Countries: Innovations and Opportunities”, 24 June 2025; The terms LDCs and SIDS are established country groupings that receive special recognition within the UNFCCC process because of their particular vulnerability to climate change. LICs are also often highly vulnerable but are not a formal UNFCCC grouping.

86 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Scaling Up Adaptation Finance in Developing Countries: Challenges and Opportunities for International Providers, 2023, p51–52

87 CPI, “Unlocking Climate Finance for Least Developed Countries: Innovations and Opportunities”, 24 June 2025

88 Q27

89 Oxfam Great Britain, Climate Finance Shadow Report 2025: Analysing progress on climate finance under the Paris Agreement, 6 October 2025

90 Mercy Corps (ICF0003)

91 Q26

92 ODI Global, A fair share of climate finance? Assessing quantity, quality and alignment with gender goals, November 2025, p36–38; ICAI (ICF0018)

93 ICAI (ICF0018); ICAI, UK aid spending to 2029, 16 July 2026

94 Qq86, 92; ICAI (ICF0018); ICAI, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, 29 February 2024

95 Q99

96 FCDO (ICF0035)

97 Qq150, 154

98 ICAI (ICF0018)

99 ICAI (ICF0018)

100 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, HM Treasury and Department for Transport, Cheaper travel for millions with a third off fares, gov.uk, 22 July 2026

101 Letter from the Minister of State for Energy Security and Net Zero relating to the UK’s investment in the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF), 3 September 2026

102 UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative, “The COP30 Mutirão decision and what it means for the global finance sector”, 28 November 2025 (accessed 12 August 2026); World Resources Institute, “Reaching $120 Billion in International Adaptation Finance Is Possible—Here’s What It Takes”, 25 November 2025 (accessed 12 August 2026)

103 ODI Global, A fair share of climate finance? Assessing quantity, quality and alignment with gender goals, November 2025, p15–16; ICAI (ICF0018)

104 See, for example, ActionAid UK (ICF0027); The Independent (ICF0037)

105 ICAI (ICF0018)

106 UN Environment Programme, Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on Empty, 29 October 2025, p50

107 CBM UK (ICF0032)

108 Q55

109 ICAI (ICF0018); ICAI, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, 29 February 2024

110 ODI Global defines climate finance counted as ‘cross-cutting’ as corresponding to finance that has the dual objective of supporting mitigation and adaptation purposes.

111 ODI Global, A fair share of climate finance? Assessing quantity, quality and alignment with gender goals, November 2025, p37

112 IIED (ICF0012)

113 Q31; Q171; See, for example, Greenpeace UK (ICF0006); ActionAid UK (ICF0027), CGD (ICF0017), IIED (ICF0012)

114 IIED (ICF0012)

115 Q157; FCDO (ICF0035)

116 Q157

117 FCDO (ICF0035); FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026

118 World Resources Institute (ICF0016); Conservation International UK (ICF0019)

119 See, for example, Conservation International UK (ICF0019); The Nature Conservancy (ICF0008); TRAFFIC (ICF0011)

120 See, for example, Conservation International UK (ICF0019); The Nature Conservancy (ICF0008); TRAFFIC (ICF0011); Zoological Society of London (ICF0014)

121 Q31

122 Defra, Global biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and national security: a national security assessment, gov.uk, 2 February 2026

123 Defra, Global biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and national security: a national security assessment, gov.uk, 2 February 2026

124 Defra, Global biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and national security: a national security assessment, gov.uk, 2 February 2026

125 The Independent (ICF0037)

126 Q101

127 Q112

128 Q110

129 Letter from the Minister for International Development and Africa to the Chair regarding the International Climate Finance (ICF) sub-pledge for nature-based solutions, 8 April 2026

130 Letter from the Minister for International Development and Africa to the Chair regarding the International Climate Finance (ICF) sub-pledge for nature-based solutions, 8 April 2026

131 Q101; See, for example, Zoological Society of London (ICF0014); Conservation International UK (ICF0019)

132 Q110

133 Qq111–112

134 TFFF, TFFF Fact Sheet, 2025, p3–4

135 TFFF, TFFF Fact Sheet, 2025, p3; World Resources Institute, “The Tropical Forests Forever Facility Could Finally Finance Nature Conservation. Will Funders Back It?”, 26 November 2025

136 Qq114, 116

137 Q114

138 Q114

139 Q116

140 Q114

141 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026

142 Qq117, 125; Q61

143 Q117

144 Letter from the Minister of State for Energy Security and Net Zero relating to the UK’s investment in the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF), 3 September 2026

145 FCDO, The UK’s modern development approach, gov.uk, 16 July 2026

146 FCDO, The UK’s modern development approach, gov.uk, 16 July 2026

147 FCDO (ICF0035); FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, DBIST, International Climate Finance, gov.uk (accessed 12 August 2026)

148 Q23; See, for example, WaterAid (ICF0007); The Nature Conservancy (ICF0008)

149 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, UK International Climate Finance results 2025, gov.uk, 9 October 2025

150 Qq83–84, 86, 91, 93; CPI, Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2025, 23 June 2025

151 Q86

152 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, UK International Climate Finance results 2025, gov.uk, 9 October 2025

153 Qq93, 100

154 Q79

155 Q93

156 Q93

157 Q93; See, for example, Greenpeace UK (ICF0006); ICAI (ICF0018)

158 Qq82–83, 86

159 Q82

160 Qq80–81, 91

161 Q80

162 Q81

163 Qq80–83

164 British Embassy Jakarta, FCDO (ICF0043)

165 British Embassy Jakarta, FCDO (ICF0043)

166 British Embassy Jakarta, FCDO (ICF0043)

167 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, Annex to: A New Strategic Partnership Between the UK and Indonesia, gov.uk, 21 January 2026

168 FCDO, Annual Report and Accounts 2025–26, HC 521, July 2026, p234

169 British Embassy Jakarta, FCDO (ICF0043)

170 British Embassy Jakarta, FCDO (ICF0043)

171 British Embassy Jakarta, FCDO (ICF0043)

172 Q144

173 Q144

174 Q144

175 Q144

176 BII, Building Markets, Transforming Lives: 2026–31 Strategy, London: British International Investment, 2026, p13

177 ICAI (ICF0018)

178 ICAI (ICF0018)

179 ICAI (ICF0018)

180 Qq86, 88

181 Q86

182 Q86

183 Q86

184 Q86

185 Qq268–269

186 Q133

187 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, 2015, art 9

188 FCDO (ICF0035)

189 FCDO (ICF0035)

190 FCDO (ICF0035)

191 DESNZ, UK’s first Biennial Transparency Report submitted to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, under the Paris Agreement, gov.uk, 27 December 2024

192 FCDO (ICF0035); OECD, Finance and investment for climate goals (accessed 5 August 2026)

193 OECD, Development finance for climate and the environment (accessed 5 August 2026)

194 See, for example, CGD (ICF0017), The Wildlife Trusts (ICF0025); Conservation International UK (ICF0019); Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (ICF0023)

195 Conservation International UK (ICF0019)

196 FCDO (ICF0035); FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, UK International Climate Finance results 2025, gov.uk, 9 October 2025

197 The International Aid Transparency Initiative standard is an international standard for international development data and allows ready comparison of information from different donors.

198 FCDO (ICF0035); CGD (ICF0017); FCDO, Development Tracker, gov.uk (accessed 5 August 2026)

199 FCDO, Statistics on International Development: provisional UK Official Development Assistance spend 2025, gov.uk, 9 April 2026

200 See, for example, CGD (ICF0017); ActionAid UK (ICF0027); The UN Children’s Fund UK (ICF0020); CBM UK (ICF0032)

201 Q167

202 FCDO, UK Government response to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s review of UK aid’s International Climate Finance commitments, gov.uk, 16 December 2024, Recommendation 3; ICAI, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, 29 February 2024

203 See, for example, CAN-UK (ICF0024); CGD (ICF0017); Conservation International UK (ICF0019); ActionAid UK (ICF0027)

204 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, UK International Climate Finance results 2025, gov.uk, 9 October 2025

205 CGD (ICF0017); CGD, “UK Climate Finance Results: What They Tell Us and Why They Can Be Better”, 14 February 2025

206 CGD (ICF0017)

207 Q167

208 Q167

209 See, for example, CGD (ICF0017); ICAI (ICF0018)

210 See, for example, CGD (ICF0017); ICAI (ICF0018); CBM UK (ICF0032); IIED (ICF0012); ActionAid UK (ICF0027)

211 ICAI (ICF0018); ICAI, UK aid for energy transition, 05 November 2025, paras 3.22 and 4.3

212 Q38

213 FCDO, UK Government response to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s review of UK aid’s International Climate Finance commitments, gov.uk, 16 December 2024, Recommendations 3–4

214 FCDO, UK Government response to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s review of UK aid’s International Climate Finance commitments, gov.uk, 16 December 2024, Recommendations 3–4; Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, Inclusive Data Charter, IDC vision and principles, 2024, p1–2; The Inclusive Data Charter aims to advance the availability and use of inclusive and disaggregated data so that governments and organisations “better understand, address, and monitor the needs of marginalised people.

215 Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, Inclusive Data Charter (accessed 5 August 2026)

216 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance monitoring, evaluation and learning, gov.uk, 1 March 2024

217 DESNZ, Synthesis of learning from DESNZ International Climate Finance programmes, gov.uk, 28 June 2023

218 ICAI (ICF0018)

219 ICAI (ICF0018)

220 ICAI (ICF0018)

221 ICAI (ICF0018); FCDO, Defra, DESNZ, Together for People and Planet: UK International Climate Finance Strategy, gov.uk, 30 March 2023

222 ICAI (ICF0018)

223 ICAI (ICF0018); CGD (ICF0017)

224 FCDO (ICF0035); FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026

225 FCDO (ICF0035)

226 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026, “Delivering results and value for money”

227 FCDO (ICF0035)

228 FCDO (ICF0035)

229 FCDO (ICF0042)

230 ICAI (ICF0018); CGD (ICF0017)

231 ICAI (ICF0018)

232 ICAI (ICF0018)

233 FCDO (ICF0035)

234 FCDO (ICF0035)

235 FCDO (ICF0035)

236 ICAI (ICF0018)

237 ICAI (ICF0018)

238 ICAI (ICF0018)

239 FCDO, DESNZ, Defra, International Climate Finance Strategy 2026, gov.uk, 22 June 2026, “Priority 2: Transform the global energy system to deliver clean and affordable energy for all”

240 Dr Simon Batchelor OBE, Modern Energy Cooking Services Programme, Loughborough University (ICF0004)

241 The Ayrton Sustainable Cooling Challenge sits under the Low Energy Inclusive Appliances programme and is led by the Energy Saving Trust.

242 Energy Saving Trust (ICF0029)

243 Dr Simon Batchelor OBE, Modern Energy Cooking Services Programme, Loughborough University (ICF0004); Energy Saving Trust (ICF0029); Carbon Trust (ICF0036)

244 Energy Saving Trust (ICF0029)

245 Carbon Trust (ICF0036)

246 FCDO (ICF0035)

247 FCDO (ICF0035)

248 Q122

249 Q122