The UK’s development partnership with Nigeria

Summary

In 2024, the UK Government agreed a strategic partnership with Nigeria, bringing together multiple strands of bilateral co-operation and elevating the bilateral relationship to a more strategic footing. The Government said that the partnership will “provide a comprehensive framework for jointly achieving our shared objectives and further strengthening our bilateral relationship. It will build on and strengthen our existing bilateral dialogues across areas of mutual interest and benefit, including i) economic, trade and investment opportunities; ii) security and defence issues; and iii) migration, justice and home affairs.”¹

This represents a grand strategic bet for the UK: that targeted support and technical assistance, as well as closer trade ties, can help Nigeria to modernise its economy; end its reliance on humanitarian aid; and significantly increase its GDP. This would bring several mutual benefits. First, an improvement in Nigeria’s fiscal position, with a significantly broadened tax base, will allow the country to begin to meet its own humanitarian need. This would consequently lead to a reduction in UK bilateral aid for humanitarian funding, freeing it up for use on development projects.

Secondly, improved prosperity across the country, in conjunction with closer trade ties as part of the strategic partnership, will hopefully lead to an increase in the sale of goods and services from the UK to Nigeria. This will be bolstered by the historic ties and people-to-people links shared by the two countries. Thirdly, a strong Nigeria with reduced instability and increased opportunity for all will provide a bulwark against extremism and instability across not only the country but the Sahel more widely, reducing forced displacement and irregular migration, which has the potential to disrupt the UK economy.

This partnership, and planned future engagement with Nigeria, may also represent an exemplar of how the UK will conduct development relationships in the coming years, with significantly reduced funding but a greater focus on technical assistance. In addition, the acknowledgement of the need for development work to mitigate and reduce the drivers of displacement is welcome, as is the recently published Africa Approach.

However, multiple obstacles risk undermining the partnership. UK engagement with Nigeria must be framed within a long-term, integrated strategy that reflects the interconnected nature of insecurity, humanitarian need, governance challenges, climate pressures and economic instability across Nigeria and the wider Sahel. Witnesses and Ministers argued that these issues cannot be addressed through fragmented or short-term interventions, but require a joined-up approach combining humanitarian, development, governance and security tools. Nigeria was repeatedly described as a strategic partner central to regional stability, with instability closely linked to wider dynamics across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, where international responses remain disjointed and vulnerable to funding volatility that undermines prevention and peacebuilding efforts. A failure to mitigate these issues will lead to the Nigerian Government’s newly increased federal budget being increasingly swallowed up by trying to respond to them.

If the Government does not present a more wide-ranging and strategic plan to assist Nigeria in achieving significant reductions in humanitarian need, displacement and instability, there is very little chance that it will reap the desired mutual benefits of the strategic partnership. Furthermore, if the model of engagement with Nigeria is to provide an exemplar for future development partnerships, these will be undermined if the same level of optimism is applied by the Government to the rest of its development relationships—it simply will not garner significant benefits from these relationships, particularly when spending only 0.3% of Gross National Income on Official Development Assistance.

1 Introduction

The Four Essential Shifts and the Africa Approach

1. Since coming to power in July 2024, the UK Government has sought to reset Britain’s role as a development partner in both values and desired outcomes. The first major change was termed by the Minister of State (International Development and Africa), the Rt Hon Baroness Chapman of Darlington, (“the Minister”) as the “four essential shifts”. These changes in development approach were labelled:

• From donor to investor—partnering with countries to unlock growth, jobs and trade through innovative finance and private sector investment.
• From service delivery to system support—helping countries build their own education, health and economic systems, so they can thrive without aid.
• From grants to expertise—leveraging UK strengths such as its world-class universities, the City of London, the Met Office, HMRC, education, health and tech sectors.
• From international intervention to local provision—working through local partners and civil society to deliver sustainable, locally-led solutions.²

2. Furthermore, in December 2025, the Minister set out the UK Government’s new “Africa Approach”, detailing the changing approach that the UK would take in its development relationships with African countries. According to the Minister, previous UK development engagement across Africa was outdated, overly aid-focused and insufficiently responsive to contemporary global realities such as economic transformation, climate change, migration, AI and shifting geopolitical power. In contrast, the new approach will be guided by seven core principles:

1. The UK will move “from donor to investor”, prioritising trade, private investment, manufacturing and economic growth.
2. The UK will work with African partners on migration, focusing on tackling illegal migration, organised criminal networks, border security and improving understanding of UK visa systems for business travel.
3. The UK will deepen co-operation on climate, nature and clean energy.
4. Peace and security cooperation, particularly efforts to address conflicts in Sudan, the Great Lakes region, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Somalia, while promoting international humanitarian law, freedom of religion and action on violence against women and girls.
5. The UK aims to strengthen health, education, and financial systems through long-term institutional support rather than piecemeal aid.
6. The Government commits to championing African representation in global institutions and debt reform, including stronger African voices at the IMF and World Bank, and reforms during the UK’s planned G20 Presidency in 2027.
7. A focus on innovation, education, AI, science and cultural partnerships.³

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office country allocations

3. On 24 March, the Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, the Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP, told us that they would publish bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) country allocations to the Committee as soon as possible. In April, the Minister told us that the “very latest” we would get these would be the beginning of July.⁴

4. However, at the time of writing, the allocations have not been published or shared with the Committee. This makes it extremely difficult to assess the FCDO’s strategic focus on Nigeria. Announcing a new approach without the clarity on allocated funds to support it also raises doubts that the Government’s planning and strategies align with its spending plans. Furthermore, this lack of clarity will make future planning by the FCDO team in Nigeria more difficult, as they will be unable to plan and implement programmes that align with the Government’s strategy.

2 The Nigeria-UK Strategic Partnership

7. With a population of approximately 242 million people, Nigeria is the largest country by population in Africa and the second largest Commonwealth country after India.⁵ By 2050, its population is projected to grow to 400 million, making Nigeria the third most populous country globally, overtaking the United States.⁶ Nigeria’s population is young, with a median age of just 18.⁷

8. Agreed in November 2024, the Nigeria-UK Strategic Partnership is underpinned by three formal agreements: the Enhanced Trade and Investment Partnership (ETIP); the Security and Defence Partnership (SDP); and the Annual Migration, Justice and Home Affairs talks. The partnership demonstrates the UK “resetting its developmental partnership with Nigeria” and elevating bilateral relations between the two nations, allowing for greater co-operation across security, economic growth and migration, with the strategic aim of reducing instability and increasing prosperity across west Africa.⁸ Regarding the genesis of the strategic partnership, and demonstrating the importance that the UK Government attaches to this bilateral relationship, the Minister told us:

I do not think we have any choice about being engaged in a deep way with Nigeria, given our historical connections and the people-to-people links. It is always going to be a close relationship for us.⁹

9. According to the Department, the partnership is based on:

• a genuine listening approach;
• unlocking growth and investment;
• a focus on shared priorities;
• locally led development;
• and tailored technical assistance.¹⁰

10. In support of the final point, the UK shares expertise in economic transformation, climate mitigation and transition, public sector reform, governance and regulatory frameworks.¹¹

11. Furthermore, the Government states that the partnership is based on six pillars:

• Pillar 1: Growth and jobs, through implementation of our Enhanced Trade and Investment Partnership (ETIP) and economic programmes that deliver reciprocal growth to Nigeria and the UK, including by facilitating value addition and skills acquisition where appropriate, as well as cooperation on climate change and inclusive and sustainable green growth.
• Pillar 2: Enhanced national security cooperation, though our Security and Defence Partnership (SDP), with emphasis on co-ordinated approaches across civilian government, military and civil society that take into account good governance, human rights and community engagement, alongside wider defence cooperation. Our cooperation will address the broad spectrum of threats faced, including terrorism, cyber threats, and maritime issues.
• Pillar 3: Migration, Justice and Home Affairs dialogue to ensure the safety, security and dignity of our citizens.
• Pillar 4: Strengthening our international collaboration, through a new annual Foreign Policy Dialogue, covering common international challenges.
• Pillar 5: A modernised development partnership, with a focus on mutual priorities, upholding best practice in the use of official development assistance and concessional finance, and avoiding development models that may encourage dependency.
• Pillar 6: Sustained people to people links, to harness our respective demographic and diaspora resources.¹²

12. Meanwhile, Cynthia Rowe, head of development co-operation at the British High Commission in Abuja, Nigeria, told us that the Nigerian Government wanted to pursue the strategic partnership approach, and that it allows the countries to work on shared ambitions, including mutual growth and stabilisation.¹³ The partnership emerged at an opportune time for the UK, with a reforming, ambitious Government now in place in Nigeria. As the Minister told us:

There is a willingness to engage. There is competence, and growing capability. They have expertise in Government, and they are reaching out and want to work in partnership.¹⁴

Technical assistance

13. A key element of the UK’s partnership with Nigeria, consistent with its four essential shifts and the Africa Approach, is to offer technical assistance on governance and public service reform, utilising key UK institutions.

Healthcare reform

14. Under Co-ordinating Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Dr Muhammad Pate, the Nigerian Government is undertaking “once in a generation” healthcare reforms.¹⁵ The FCDO in Nigeria has supported the Co-ordinating Minister’s health sector transformation agenda through:

• committing £15.8 million up to 2026–27 through a multi-donor trust fund that will support Government disbursement-linked indicators through a wider World Bank programme. This includes £4.4million to support a technical assistance pooling and co-ordination mechanism that will support Government ambitions on health sector transformation.
• flexible technical assistance that supports key design and implementation aspects of the reforms and takes a flexible and adaptive approach to respond to Government direction on resource allocation.
• the UK has worked with Government and health development partners, including through the FCDO’s role as Health Development Partner Group Co-Chair (until summer 2025) to design, develop and implement the reforms.¹⁶

15. Part of this work is the High Commission’s Lafiya programme, its flagship health systems strengthening programme. The programme has three core aims:

• catalyse the Government of Nigeria’s political and financial commitment to health, particularly for the poorest.
• improve basic health and nutrition service provision through upstream systems strengthening.
• increase the use of modern contraceptives.¹⁷

16. Furthermore, the UK has worked with local and international partners to develop a climate resilience model for health and education, implemented across 84 clinics and schools. The FCDO in Nigeria worked with the Nigerian Government and the World Bank to incentivise the scale-up of this approach to 2,000 primary healthcare clinics.¹⁸

The FCDO in Nigeria

17. In October 2025, we visited Nigeria to investigate FCDO engagement and programming across the country. This included a significant number of meetings with a range of stakeholders across Abuja, as well as a field visit to a health facility in Kano funded by the FCDO, which will serve as a blueprint for future health service improvements across underserved areas. At all times, we were struck by the professionalism and diligence of FCDO staff in country. This was evidenced not only by the esteem in which the team were held by stakeholders whom we met across Abuja and Kano, but by Arjun Jain, UNHCR Country Representative for Nigeria, who told us:

May I add that the FCDO team here is quite brilliant? You have a really good team here. During the many crises of this year, your high commissioner has really helped hold us together, worked with us to identify some of the challenges that we are facing, and been guiding us through a very difficult time, making interventions with the Government as and where possible. You have a fantastic development and humanitarian team that is on top of the situation and is tracking a number of the issues that we are working on.¹⁹

In addition, Mr Jain pleaded with the FCDO not to dismantle, underfund or defund the team in Nigeria.²⁰

18. The Minister is of a similar opinion regarding the team in Nigeria, telling us:

I think this is probably one of the strongest teams that we have in the network. I think the work that they are doing is groundbreaking, innovative and impactful. They are doing incredibly well. ²¹

3 Humanitarian need and displacement

23. Humanitarian need across Nigeria is vast and worsening, particularly in the North East and North West regions of the country, including escalating food insecurity, displacement and severe pressure on humanitarian systems already operating beyond capacity. Some 30 million people nationwide are food insecure, and the Lake Chad Basin is the location of one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. Violence across northern Nigeria causes widespread instability and has led to the displacement of 3.5 million people, fuelling social strain, gender-based violence, crime and protest. Furthermore, more than 8 million people in North East Nigeria need humanitarian assistance, including more than 2 million internally displaced people, with many residing in camps or chronically underserved host communities.²²

24. Such is the severity of continuing humanitarian need, Thierno Samba Diallo, country director for Action Against Hunger Nigeria, described Nigeria as a “forgotten crisis”.²³

Hunger and malnutrition

25. In northern Nigeria, malnutrition is driven by a combination of interrelated and context-specific factors that significantly impact food availability and population health. These drivers vary significantly between regions, states and localities.²⁴ Around 3.5 million children suffer from severe acute malnutrition and risk of death—40 times the capacity of Wembley stadium.²⁵ Of these, around 2 million were at the brink of dying if no support was provided.²⁶

26. In Katsina state, between January and the end of June 2025, Médecins Sans Frontières treated nearly 70,000 children for malnutrition, almost 10,000 of whom were hospitalised in a serious condition—an increase of one-third compared with the same period in 2024.²⁷

27. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that, during the 2026 lean season, 34.7 million people across Nigeria—nearly 1 in 7 Nigerians—will require food assistance. This year’s lean season is projected to be the most severe on record, following several years of increasing severity, driven by record humanitarian needs linked to conflict and economic pressures, as well as funding cuts. In North East Nigeria, more than 5.8 million people are projected to face “Crisis” or “Emergency” food insecurity.²⁸ These figures are stark and demonstrate a worsening trajectory: between January and June 2025 in Katsina, cases of nutritional oedema—the most severe and life-threatening form of malnutrition—were more than three times the number the same period in 2024.²⁹

28. Severe acute malnutrition affects about 10% of children under five, and even more critically, about 12% of infants under 24 months. In Katsina state, close to 700 children and babies are admitted to stabilisation centres and out-patient therapeutic programme centres every week. However, funding cuts are reducing the capacity of those organisations, which are having to deny care to children who are “not sick enough”—displaying only moderate acute malnutrition—and prioritising those suffering from severe acute malnutrition.³⁰ In July 2025, screening of 750 mothers revealed that more than half were acutely malnourished, with 13% suffering from severe acute malnutrition.³¹ We also heard that more than 750,000 pregnant and lactating mothers are acutely malnourished.³² It is therefore no surprise that Nigeria has one of the worst child mortality rates, the second highest global burden of stunted children and third worst maternal mortality rate globally.³³

29. Mary Dinah, founder and CEO of the Mary Dinah Foundation, told us that areas with the highest levels of malnutrition also have the highest occurrences of extremism, terrorism and activities of non-state armed groups, further demonstrating the link between humanitarian and security issues.³⁴ She added that the correlation between the reduction in funding, malnutrition rates and extremism and terrorism is “quite strong” and getting worse. However, she doubted whether this correlation had been well understood by the Nigerian Government.³⁵

30. The FCDO undertakes some humanitarian work across Nigeria, particularly within the northern states. The Humanitarian and Resilience Programme, which will run from 2022–27, with a budget of up to £191 million, provides life-saving humanitarian assistance to people affected by conflict in North East Nigeria. The programme has thus far seen more than 400,000 people receive life-saving food assistance, with almost 6,000 mother-to-mother nutrition groups supported and 278,000 pregnant women accessing antenatal care. More than 250,000 children under five years old have been treated for severe acute malnutrition and more than 3,000 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence have also been assisted.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

31. WASH needs are closely related to malnutrition. Children under five who drink contaminated water develop continuous diarrhoea, making it difficult for them to absorb nutrients. This causes about 65,000 under-five deaths per year in Nigeria.³⁶ Furthermore, WASH needs across Nigeria are vast:

• about 70 million people do not have access to clean water;
• 117 million people do not have decent toilets;
• 48 million people are defecating in the open;
• and about 82% of the population do not have a place to wash their hands.³⁷

32. The heaviest burden of WASH-related inequalities falls on women and girls.³⁸ In Nigeria, 89% of schools do not have access to basic WASH services, forcing girls to miss out on schools when they are on their period due to lack of or inappropriate toilets that lack privacy. An additional year of education for girls in Africa leads to a 14% increase in future income, demonstrating that school absences compromise economic growth.³⁹ In addition, up to 91% of healthcare facilities in Nigeria do not have access to WASH, exacerbating maternal and infant mortality. Healthcare-associated infections are high, with around 93,600 related deaths per year.⁴⁰

33. Cynthia Rowe explained that UK work in this area had established best practice that is now being replicated by World Bank WASH programming.⁴¹ In addition, the Minister explained:

We have had this conversation about … how we could continue to do WASH bilaterally, but it would be a bad use of money, because we are never going to get the infrastructure development we need to provide reliable WASH services for people if we do it that way.⁴²

Funding cuts

34. Global aid cuts in recent years, including by the UK and USA, have exacerbated challenges in responding to Nigeria’s humanitarian needs, leading to disruptions in the supply of ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF), clinic closures and decreased access to vaccinations.⁴³ Millions of people are increasingly at risk, with women and children facing heightened exposure to gender-based violence, child labour and early marriage.⁴⁴ The previous heavy reliance on now-diminished US funding has undermined efforts to build long-term resilience and stability, with cuts to, or suspensions of, essential programmes addressing the root causes of conflict and supporting communities to withstand climate, economic and security shocks.⁴⁵

35. We do not have detailed figures for future UK ODA spend in Nigeria. However, bilateral ODA has been cut by an estimated 37% across the board, with ODA spent through country and regional programmes cut by 36%. Centrally managed programmes will be reduced by approximately 42%.⁴⁶ When asked whether an equality impact assessment had been taken on the country-by-country effects of this reduction, the Minister confirmed that this had not taken place.⁴⁷

36. UK ODA to Nigeria has declined from a high of £327 million in 2017–18. Despite this, UK bilateral ODA for Nigeria remains significant, at £135 million in 2025–26, compared with £117 million in 2024–25.⁴⁸ However, this remains well below historical levels, particularly following the substantial aid reductions in 2021. According to UNHCR, the FCDO’s continued support in the power and agricultural industries, especially in the north, will help address the severe food and malnutrition crisis that the country is facing. It will also boost the economy and make it easier to seek sustainable solutions for forcibly displaced communities.⁴⁹

UN funding cuts

37. Nigeria has been named as one of the locations where the UNOCHA will scale down as part of the “Humanitarian Reset” led by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher. OCHA’s team halved in size during 2025 and will likely close down in 2026.⁵⁰ Arjun Jain told us:

We are not expecting the FCDO to cover the losses and the gaps that have been created by the absence of USAID, but strategic investments in the humanitarian and development fields would be absolutely critical to regional stability and the stability of Nigeria … Without that funding, you will have challenges in realising some of these issues in the strategy.⁵¹

38. Arjun Jain further explained that his organisation’s finances are “precarious”, and indicated that UNHCR would cut down its area of operations from 13 states, in 50 Government areas, to five or six states, working in 20 or 25 Government areas.⁵² His warning of the consequences of these cuts is alarming:

most likely you will see a massive displacement crisis, which will only increase [ … ] A previous speaker spoke about people joining armed and insurgent groups, and I think that that is quite evident in situations of extreme poverty. We will also see people move across the border and create regional instability.⁵³

Impact on women and girls

39. We heard concerning evidence that these cuts in funding have had a disproportionate impact on women and girls. Evelyn Mere, country director of WaterAid Nigeria, laid out these impacts in stark terms, citing evidence from UN Women:

• about 62% of women-led organisations have had to suspend or reduce services to women and girls;
• about 51% have been forced to suspend or end programmes;
• 33% face severe cash-flow issues;
• and about 34% have shut down programmes aimed at ending violence against women.⁵⁴

This brings into question the UK Government’s strategy in Nigeria, given that some of its major development priorities in the country include ending violence against women and increasing female empowerment. Evelyn concluded:

this means that the UK Government say one thing but do another with the aid pot.⁵⁵

Transfer of funding responsibility

40. Amid swingeing funding cuts, NGOs and stakeholders are calling for responsibility for funding Nigeria’s humanitarian need to transfer to the Nigerian Government. Camilla Higgins, director of INGO Forum Nigeria, told us that the international community had, to some extent, been guilty of contributing to a cycle of dependency in this regard.⁵⁶ Furthermore, she added that there is the financial capacity for this to occur, but that change could not come overnight—in other words, that this transition must be managed and monitored, otherwise large gaps in provision will emerge.⁵⁷ She also highlighted that Nigeria’s oil industry had net revenues in 2024 of around $32 billion, while the humanitarian appeal at the same time was $926 million—less than 3% of the year’s oil revenue.⁵⁸

41. Camilla Higgins added that development investments will simply not take hold unless the humanitarian emergency is reduced to a point that it can be absorbed by local systems and structures. However, the scale of the current problem is so vast that it would be unreasonable to expect any Government to be able to handle it alone.⁵⁹

42. The Minister agreed. First, given the scale of the humanitarian need across Nigeria, emanating from displacement, food insecurity and climate shocks, she told us:

I do not think the time is right for the idea that we can just step back entirely.⁶⁰

However, she was also clear that the FCDO is working with the Nigerian Government on making this a reality.⁶¹ Furthermore, although no specific dates were given, the Minister told us that the Government of Nigeria not meeting this need to the fullest extent possible in 10 years’ time would represent “a failure”.⁶² Cynthia Rowe told us that workstreams already exist on transferring this responsibility, in alignment with the Nigeria Government, who are “determined to take on the leadership and responsibility for trying to exit the crisis.”⁶³

Displacement

46. Our 2025 report, “The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People”, concluded that the world is in the midst of a displacement crisis, with more than 120 million people displaced globally.⁶⁴ Nigeria is not immune to these pressures, with the country and its surrounding region hosting around 3% of the world’s displaced population.⁶⁵ There are around 3.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) across Nigeria—about 3% of Nigeria’s total population—with 2.3 million in the North East, 1.7 million of whom are in Borno state. Meanwhile, IDP numbers across the North West are rising as a result of banditry, illegal mining and insurgency.

47. Across the Middle Belt and North Central regions, a range of issues contributes to forced displacement. Benue state has 500,000 IDPs, the second-largest of any state, due to gang violence, the farmer-herder conflict, natural disasters and a series of other concerns.⁶⁶ Around 400,000 Nigerians are refugees in the Lake Chad Basin countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon.⁶⁷ Nigeria is also host to around 140,000 asylum-seekers and refugees, mainly from Cameroon and residing in the southern states.⁶⁸ Northern Nigeria now hosts 720,000 IDPs—a 12% increase in less than a year—with 86% living in host communities.⁶⁹

48. Arjun Jain of UNHCR explained that Nigeria has a displacement crisis precisely because of the regional crisis—insurgency movements and other armed groups from outside the country—as well Nigerian refugees in neighbouring countries who are unable to come back due to safety concerns.⁷⁰ Andrew Mamedu, country director of ActionAid Nigeria, highlighted how these pressures may ultimately have an impact closer to our own shores:

People in the northern states that have borders with other countries find ways to escape to Libya and find their way to Europe. That has implications for Europe, of course, including the UK.⁷¹

Data collection

49. Within Nigeria’s displacement crisis lays another significant problem. Tog Gang, senior adviser for peace and conflict at Mercy Corps Nigeria, told us that sudden funding cuts across Nigeria had led to the rapid closure of programmes that collect data on displacement. This gives rise to two major issues.

50. First, displacement figures are significantly out of date. When he gave evidence to us in early 2026, he told us that displacement figures for North East Nigeria had last been collected in October 2024, with the true numbers likely “significantly higher”.⁷² Secondly, it means that humanitarian staff on the ground, NGOs operating in country and the FCDO and Nigerian Government do not have insight into the nuances of each case, such as what caused the initial displacement.⁷³ The impact of this paucity of data on the ability to plan appropriately and target interventions strategically is likely to be severe.

4 Instability and insecurity

53. Nigeria is experiencing several conflicts driven by multiple factors that have led to the loss of lives and livelihoods for millions across the region. Contributing factors include:

• ideological differences;
• natural resource management and climate change;
• political grievances and governance failures;
• poverty and a lack of opportunities.⁷⁴

54. North East and North West Nigeria face different but related problems with extremism and banditry respectively. As Aisha Abdurrahman, chief executive of the Bridge for Women Development Initiative (BOWDI) explained:

You cannot say, “This is the problem,” and you cannot say, “This is the specific kind of conflict we are going through in Nigeria.” One minute it is banditry; the other minute it is a bomb blast at one place or another, or abductions of women.⁷⁵

Regional insecurity—the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin

55. Nigeria is a linchpin of regional stability in West Africa, but a resurgent Boko Haram is testing this in the North East states. Extremists have repeatedly overrun military outposts, mined roads with bombs and raided civilian communities, raising fears of a possible return to Boko Haram’s peak conflict era of 2014–15.⁷⁶ Since May 2011, the conflict in North East Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin has seen estimates of:

• 38,000 people killed.
• 2.5 million reported as internally displaced.
• 10 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.⁷⁷

56. The Sahel faces significant challenges related to acute water scarcity, land degradation due to climate change and uneven access to energy services, which fuel competition among communities and non-state actors. In Nigeria’s northern states bordering the Sahel, energy poverty limits economic opportunities and weakens public service delivery, exacerbating social unrest that often escalates into violence.⁷⁸

57. Further highlighting the level of instability across the Sahel, the International Rescue Committee’s 2026 Watchlist features within its top 10 several of Nigeria’s close neighbours:

• 9—Burkina Faso: the epicentre of conflict in the Sahel region, accounting for more than 55% of fatalities tied to al-Qaeda or Islamic State-linked groups between June 2024 and June 2025.
• 8—Mali: facing escalating instability following changes in Government, the withdrawal of French forces and the growing presence of the Russian Africa Corps. Armed groups—particularly Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—have expanded across central and southern Mali, attacking key trade routes and blocking the flow of fuel and goods into the capital, Bamako. Hunger is intensifying as conflict is disrupting markets.
• 3—South Sudan: at risk of sliding back into civil war, as the 2018 peace agreement collapses and the current Government breaks down. Meanwhile, the civil war in neighbouring Sudan has led to an influx of refugees, added to domestic tensions and disrupted vital oil exports, triggering economic turmoil and growing unrest among unpaid security forces.
• 1—Sudan: violence and siege warfare have pushed 19.2 million people, 40% of the population, into crisis or worse levels of food insecurity. More than 200,000 people have endured catastrophic levels of food insecurity and the daily risk of starvation.⁷⁹

58. Furthermore, the Sahel has experienced military coups in Mali in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023. As a result, all three were ejected from ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African states, and in response formed the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), challenging Nigerian leadership in the region.

59. Instability in the region has been compounded by the withdrawal of French troops from several Sahel countries, including Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Chad. Nick Dyer, Interim Permanent Under Secretary at the FCDO, told us:

The hard reality is that if you talk to the French, they put billions into the Sahel compared with the UK and our overall response in the Sahel—globally, collectively—has failed. The question is why and what you can do now to respond effectively in that context. I am not sure that any of us really have the right answer to what we do in the Sahel.⁸⁰

60. The Minister concurred, telling us of the “failure of the international community”, in partnership with states across the Sahel, to agree and act on a shared strategy to achieve economic development and growth, alleviate poverty and strengthening governance, as has happened in Ghana and other countries.⁸¹ Furthermore, the Minister told us that solving the issues in the Sahel is “almost in the “too difficult” box”, and that, despite the situation in the Sahel “deteriorating before our eyes”, the only way for the region to receive appropriate attention is for there to be a resolution to the conflicts in Ukraine, Palestine and Iran.⁸²

61. In addition to a 16-year jihadist insurgency in the North East, Nigeria is plagued by persistent insecurity, with frequent kidnappings for ransom. The first mass abduction to shock Nigeria was in 2014, when Boko Haram kidnapped 276 teenage girls in Chibok, in the North East. Since then, thousands of kidnappings have occurred. More than 1,500 children have been abducted from the country’s schools since 2014. Across just a few days in late 2025, extremists across Nigeria kidnapped:

• 25 Muslim schoolgirls;
• 38 Christian worshippers;
• more than 300 schoolchildren and teachers from a Catholic school;
• 13 young women and girls walking near a farm;
• and 10 further women and children.⁸³

Schools across Niger state were closed earlier this year owing to the prevalence of kidnappings, but have since reopened.⁸⁴

62. Political and military experts underscore that a military solution alone will not resolve the security crisis, and that targeted humanitarian and development support that focuses on saving lives and empowering communities economically is also needed. These investments, when properly made, reduce the attractiveness of insurgents and bandits that target young men, and they will allow communities to access basic healthcare and educational services.⁸⁵

63. Cuts to foreign assistance in the Sahel have left vulnerable communities with fewer options for livelihoods and education, increasing the likelihood of people joining non-state armed groups or violent extremist organisations, or seeking a better life elsewhere.⁸⁶

The farmer-herder conflict—land disputes and climate change

66. The expansion of violence in the North West and North Central regions has origins in conflict between farming and pastoral communities, but it has evolved into violence by armed criminal groups, known as “bandits”, against communities, with responses from official bodies and self-defence or “vigilante” groups. In the North Central region, banditry overlays inter-communal conflict, often termed the “farmer-herder conflict”.

67. Water and land scarcity have led herders to graze cattle in farming areas, resulting in violent conflicts with local farmers, claiming thousands of lives in recent years. Additionally, the environmental damage caused by Nigeria’s Niger Delta petroleum extraction, including the pollution of regional water sources, fisheries and farmlands, has been cited by ethnic rebel groups, such as the Niger Delta Avengers, as a driver behind their attacks on international oil companies and confrontations with the state.⁸⁷

68. According to Bryan Weiner, senior regional programme manager, Africa, at Search for Common Ground, the farmer-herder conflict is linked to climate change. Traditional nomadic herding groups are getting pushed further south into the Sahel—because of desertification—into more populated farming lands. He added that further climate change can only exacerbate this conflict.⁸⁸

Drivers of extremism and banditry

69. Bryan Weiner told us that a lack of opportunities, grievances and unaddressed problems are key to making people want to join extremist or bandit groups, adding that the continued cycle of greater instability leading to greater displacement then leads to greater drivers of displacement that contribute to increased instability.⁸⁹ Hamsatu Allamin, founder of the Allamin Foundation, described how insecurity, poverty, exclusion, lack of education and lack of opportunity create conditions in which extremist groups can present themselves as sources of empowerment, identity, status and protection. Many young people join extremist groups not primarily because of ideological extremism, but because of economic desperation, social exclusion and the collapse of trust in state protection structures.

70. Nigeria is not immune to these drivers, with 63% of the Nigerian population, around 130 million people, under the threshold of poverty, with the North East and North West alone accounting for 75% of that number. In some states, such as Sokoto, about, 90% of the population is under that threshold.⁹⁰

71. The World Food Programme has attempted to contribute to stabilisation and containment of the security threat by providing humanitarian food assistance. This will likely mitigate migration to other countries and ensure that the most vulnerable do not join armed insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and Islamic State.⁹¹ Underlining this link, Mary Dinah told us that:

The areas that have the highest levels of malnutrition also have the highest occurrences of extremism, terrorism and activities of non-state armed groups. That is definitely not a coincidence.⁹²

72. Tog Gang called it “far-fetched” to assume that development work alone can address these root causes.⁹³ However, he also made clear that building the economy and ensuring that citizens have economic opportunities are central to achieving stability in the country, and the region more widely.⁹⁴

Freedom of religion or belief

73. We heard evidence that conflicts in Nigeria are often characterised through religious narratives, but that the underlying drivers are frequently more complex, involving poverty, exclusion, governance failures, weak institutions, competition over resources and lack of economic opportunity. Witnesses cautioned against reducing insecurity in Nigeria to a purely religious conflict. Bryan Weiner told us that, while religion plays a role, “it is not the root cause; it is not the driver of the conflict.”⁹⁵ He further argued that, although extremist groups often present themselves as jihadist, the core drivers for people joining are a lack of opportunities and jobs; poor governance; climate change; and natural resource conflicts.⁹⁶

UK-funded programmes

74. The FCDO tells us that its work in aligning defence co-operation with development and diplomacy will help Nigeria address the root causes of conflict and strengthen its role as a stabilising force in the Sahel.⁹⁷

75. The Integrated Security Fund-funded Nigeria Security & Regional Resilience Programme, with a budget of £10.2 million in 2025–26, will strengthen military and security partners’ capability to address improvised explosive devices, mass kidnappings and banditry-related violence—threats that predominately impact women and girls across Nigeria. UK assistance does not involve weaponry and promotes conditions for a future peaceful negotiated settlement. International humanitarian law and human rights obligations are strongly promoted throughout the programme.⁹⁸

76. The Strengthening Peace and Resilience in Nigeria (SPRING) programme works on atrocity and conflict prevention by integrating programme delivery, policy engagement and technical partnerships to strengthen early warning and response in Nigeria. In collaboration with a central programme of the FCDO’s Conflict and Atrocity Prevention Department and other stakeholders, it has supported the development of the Nigeria Atrocity Risk Assessment and PREVENT toolkit, which provides an evidence-based framework to analyse risk drivers, resilience factors, perpetrators, victims and prevention priorities. This is reinforced through targeted training, capacity building and policy dialogue with British High Commission Abuja staff and Nigerian partners to embed prevention-focused analysis and inform operational and diplomatic responses.⁹⁹

77. The Nigeria Security & Regional Resilience Programme was a one-year programme (£9.85 million in 2025–26) delivering interventions in Nigeria, including the Lake Chad Basin. The programme contributed to policy and institutional development on protection of civilians and reintegration; strengthened community protection and trust between citizens and security actors; supported women-led peacebuilding and access to justice; and built national capability to respond to explosive threats, kidnapping, and serious security threats.¹⁰⁰

78. Saratu Joshua Pindar told us that CIVIC, which receives FCDO funding, operates in three states in the North East, with 450 community volunteers who support with risk monitoring and conflict assessment. While that resource is already insufficient, she states that, with potential future funding cuts, “I do not think we would be able to do much.”¹⁰¹

79. Cynthia Rowe noted how agricultural programmes can provide livelihoods and alternatives to recruitment into crime.¹⁰² One such example is the UK’s Propcom+ programme, which is also supported by British International Investment. This programme aims to increase the incomes and climate resilience of 3.79 million poor and vulnerable men and women in Nigeria—including farmers, small businesses and entrepreneurs, especially women, young people and marginalised groups—by transforming Nigeria’s rural economy. It will do this by:

• scaling-up proven climate-smart business models and markets;
• developing and piloting new business models that improve productivity, enhance resilience to climate change, and reduce emissions;
• supporting policies for an improved enabling environment for sustainable land and agricultural systems;
• addressing the key challenges in environmental, social, and economic dimensions of Nigeria’s food and land-use system.¹⁰³

80. A recent annual assessment of the programme by the BEAM Exchange found that programme performance is exceeding expectations, with strong progress on climate adaptation support, private sector engagement, policy reform and knowledge dissemination. Furthermore, more than half a million people were supported to adapt to climate change, with close to gender parity.¹⁰⁴

5 Civil Society

88. Civil society organisations play a central role in peacebuilding, humanitarian response, governance accountability and conflict prevention. Locally led organisations possess the contextual understanding, trust and flexibility necessary to operate effectively in conflict-affected environments, and are often more effective, more accountable and more sustainable than heavily centralised delivery models. Tog Gang of Mercy Corps emphasised that localisation is not simply a question of delivery but of ensuring that communities themselves identify needs, shape interventions and lead processes for change.¹⁰⁵

89. Andrew Mamedu, country director of ActionAid Nigeria, stressed the importance of independent civil society and media organisations in holding Government accountable and combating corruption. However, witnesses expressed concern that shrinking support for governance and accountability programming risks weakening civic space and democratic resilience.¹⁰⁶

90. Women are central to mediation, early warning, conflict prevention and humanitarian response. Saratu Joshua Pindar told us that many of the most successful community protection initiatives had been led by women because “women have a lot to lose in this context”.¹⁰⁷ We heard compelling examples of women-led community protection committees identifying vulnerable children at risk of recruitment into armed groups and supporting their reintegration into education. Witnesses also described women playing a leading role in responding to displacement and humanitarian emergencies within affected communities.

91. Cynthia Rowe argued that localisation is “the only way that we are going to be able to sustain beyond aid”.¹⁰⁸ We heard evidence that UK-supported programmes increasingly seek to work directly with local communities, women’s groups and local justice structures.¹⁰⁹ Officials described programmes focused on community dialogue, mediation and women’s participation in peacebuilding and protection initiatives.¹¹⁰

Women and girls

92. Nigeria performs poorly on most gender equality indicators. It is one of only two African countries to have regressed on the UNDP Gender Inequality Index between 2010 and 2022. A recent World Bank study estimates that closing gender gaps in key sectors could add at least $9.3 billion to Nigeria’s GDP.¹¹¹

93. Politically, despite the well-documented benefits of gender-balanced representation, women comprise only four out of 107 Senators and 16 out of 420 Members of the House of Representatives—about 3.6% of seats in Nigeria’s National Assembly.¹¹² In response, advocates have introduced the Special Seats Bill, which seeks to create 37 additional seats reserved exclusively for female candidates in both the Senate and House of Representatives, with one per state plus the Federal Capital Territory, as well as three dedicated seats per state assembly.¹¹³ We were encouraged by the FCDO’s support for this measure.¹¹⁴ At the time of writing, the Bill is continuing its passage through Nigeria’s legislative process.

Good governance and elections

94. If the FCDO is to achieve many of its stated ambitions in Nigeria, including an improvement in female empowerment, working with civil society will be essential. Andrew Mamedu told us how his organisation’s work on good governance and elections is being undone by the programme reductions necessitated by funding cuts. ActionAid is a member of the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, a network of civil society organisations that received FCDO funding to track and monitor the most recent election. A clear example of success was its pushback against an attempt by the previous Government to appoint one of its spokespeople as head of the Independent National Electoral Commission, with the Government eventually backing down.¹¹⁵ However, as a result of funding cuts, anti-corruption work and accountability work is gradually reducing, with assertions that the level of corruption is increasing.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, Andrew Mamedu told us of concerns about the knock-on effect of cuts on governance in Nigeria and more widely:

I am sure that we are following all the coups d’état that are happening across Africa, and we pray that Nigeria does not fall into that. But if we do not get the issues of governance right, we might get Nigeria falling into that, and if that happens, it will affect the whole of Africa, and it will spill into Europe and particularly the UK.¹¹⁷

95. The Minister acknowledged that recent ODA reductions had constrained the UK’s ability to fund large-scale nationwide civil society interventions. However, she spoke of continued support through the Partnership for Agile Governance and Climate Engagement programme for civil society coalitions, such as the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, to drive citizen engagement and accountability, as well as individual CSOs working on electoral reform, legislative accountability and citizen oversight. She further told us that the FCDO has mainstreamed inclusion and civic engagement within its institutional support for government actors ahead of Nigeria’s 2027 general elections.¹¹⁸

6 Economic Development

The Nigerian Economy

100. In recent years, and with tangible FCDO input, Nigeria has taken important steps to significantly modernise its economy, which has been well received by international investors but initially led to high inflation and an increased cost of living, making them unpopular with those most affected and pushing more people into poverty.¹¹⁹ Inflation rose to 33% in 2024, falling to 16% by 2026, and is predicted to fall to 10% by 2031. At the same time, economic growth has risen, with real GDP growth rising to 4.1% in 2024 and projected to stay above 4% for the next five years.¹²⁰

101. Meanwhile, UK-funded experts supported the Central Bank of Nigeria to stabilise the Naira in 2023–24, boosting investor confidence and increasing foreign reserves by $20 billion, while HMRC collaborated with Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service to improve data quality and correct revenue collection errors in the same financial year. Alongside other reforms, this contributed to $24 billion increase in tax revenue in 2024.¹²¹ This is essential, as the Nigerian Government views economic growth as a means of alleviating poverty, reducing insecurity and increasing self-reliance.¹²²

Trade

102. In February 2024, the UK and Nigeria signed an Enhanced Trade & Investment Partnership (ETIP) to expand bilateral trade and unlock market access. Nigeria is the UK’s largest export market in Africa. For the four quarters to the end of Q4 2025, total trade in goods and services—exports plus imports—between the UK and Nigeria was £7.6 billion, a 10.8% increase, or £737 million in current prices, from the four quarters to the end of Q4 2024. Of this £7.6 billion, over the same accounting period:

• total UK exports to Nigeria amounted to £5.5 billion, an increase of 10.5%, or £521 million in current prices, compared to the four quarters to the end of Q4 2024;
• total UK imports from Nigeria amounted to £2.1 billion in the four quarters to the end of Q4 2025 (an increase of 11.3% or £216 million in current prices, compared to the four quarters to the end of Q4 2024).¹²³

Investment

103. Despite the ETIP with the UK, Nigeria continues to face challenges in securing foreign direct investment. In 2023, FDI was US$1.87bn, less than Egypt and Ethiopia, both of which have much smaller populations.¹²⁴ In addition, FDI stock fell, driven by divestments from major multinational companies such as GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Nigeria, which exited after 51 years; Procter & Gamble; Unilever Nigeria; Sanofi; and Bolt Foods.¹²⁵ British International Investment suggests that significant security issues, particularly in the northern regions, affect investment stability and food security.¹²⁶ Commercial investment can be deterred by a number of challenges, many of which are set out in the appendix to this report.

Job creation and the private sector

104. With limited economic opportunities, the attraction of extremist and bandit gangs will remain for many, as highlighted by Hamsatu Allamin.¹²⁷ World Bank President Ajay Banga emphasised that job creation must be at the heart of development strategies. He noted that 1.2 billion young people expected to enter adulthood over the next 15 years, particularly in Africa, which will require moving beyond traditional aid models towards approaches that strengthen infrastructure, human capital, private-sector growth and access to finance.¹²⁸

105. Banga emphasises infrastructure, agriculture, healthcare, value-added manufacturing, creative industries and tourism as potential drivers of employment, while stressing that priorities must be tailored to each country’s circumstances. His argument is that governments and development partners must work together to create the conditions for businesses—especially small and medium-sized enterprises—to grow, while mobilising private investment alongside public finance. This reflects a broader shift in international development thinking towards supporting economic transformation, resilience and sustainable livelihoods rather than focusing solely on service delivery.¹²⁹

106. The Minister told us that, with more than half of Nigeria’s population below the poverty line, resolving the many and interlinked crises facing the country will not be possible with ODA alone. Instead, the FCDO will seek to assist Nigeria in growing its economy and tax revenue.¹³⁰ As Cynthia Rowe succinctly put it, “Private sector development is the way out.”¹³¹

British International Investment

107. British International Investment, the UK’s development finance institute, retains a strong interest in Nigerian growth and development. Its portfolio of investments in the country totals just over $590 million, employing more than 54,000 people, and it has been able to support around $90 million of taxes being paid by the 116 different businesses that it has invested in.¹³² Nigeria is BII’s largest investment market in Africa.¹³³

108. BII expanded financial inclusion, through a US $100 million loan to First Bank of Nigeria and a $162.5 million loan package to Nigeria’s Access Bank Plc to increase funding to local micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. It supported the expansion of access to affordable clean energy through investments such as Lumos, an off-grid solar company offering access to affordable and reliable electricity to homes and small businesses.¹³⁴

109. Furthermore, Chris Chijiutomi, managing director, head of Africa at BII, told us that BII’s investment strategy in the country is aligned with the Nigerian Government’s development priorities, including:

• expanding energy access;
• digital infrastructure connectivity;
• food security;
• financial inclusion.¹³⁵

110. In our 2025 report “The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People”, we recommended that the Government work with BII to see how a focus on reducing displacement could feature in BII’s 2026 strategy refresh, to which the Government agreed.¹³⁶ However, the strategy refresh contained no reference to this. The strategy refresh also saw Nigeria lose its designation as a BII “powerhouse country”, potentially indicating a declining focus on the country.

111. Chris Chijiutumi told us:

In northern Nigeria, one of the challenges over the last 30 years or so is just the lack of sustained economic activities. By investing in businesses that can grow in the north, you are essentially taking away some of the displacement pressures that we currently see in that region.¹³⁷

Illicit Financial Flows

112. Independent estimates put the value of illicit funds leaving Nigeria at $15 billon per annum. The UK National Crime Agency is home to the International Anti-Corruption Co-ordination Centre. UK investment into the centre led to a 1:63 return on investment in support to global investigations versus illicit funds frozen through those investigations. In line with its refreshed development approach, as outlined in earlier chapters, the UK was able to make use of this centre by offering technical assistance to Nigeria on reducing illicit financial flows leaving the country, including by establishing a central database of recovered assets and supporting the implementation of landmark regulations on anti-money laundering in the legal profession.¹³⁸

113. Furthermore, Andrew Mamedu, country director of ActionAid Nigeria, spoke of how FCDO funding enabled his organisation to help Nigerian Government’s anti-corruption agency to recover more than $700 million in illicit financial flows in one year. However, funding cuts brought the programme to an end, halting this progress.¹³⁹

114. UK technical assistance and operational co-operation with Nigerian law enforcement, including the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission tackles corruption. Co-operation on cross border investigations builds capacities to recover proceeds of crime and regulate financial and professional services sectors.¹⁴⁰ Cynthia Rowe told us that the FCDO’s work with the Nigerian Government had helped it to get off the Financial Action Task Force’s grey list.¹⁴¹

Appendix: Nigeria investment risks

Table 1: Overview

Corruption index—26/100	142nd of 182142
GDP growth	+4.2% (2027 estimate)143
Inflation	23%144
Poverty rate	63%145
Mass killing risk	6% (8th highest globally)146

Security & political risk

Multi-front insurgency & banditry

1. Nigeria faces simultaneous security threats across distinct geographic zones: Boko Haram and ISWAP activity in the North East (Borno, Adamawa, Yobe); organised banditry and mass kidnappings in the North West; farmer-herder violence spreading through the Middle Belt; and Biafran separatist agitation in the South East. A spike in North Central violence was recorded in early 2026, including a massacre in Kwara state in February.¹⁴⁷ Mass displacement continues to undermine stability across northern states.

Political instability & 2027 election risk

2. President Tinubu’s administration faces mounting popular discontent driven by inflation and subsidy removal. “End Bad Governance” protests continue.¹⁴⁸ As Nigeria approaches the 2027 general election, weakening opposition structures, political defections, and resistance to electoral reform—including rejection of mandatory electronic transmission of results—elevate political risk. The BTI 2026 report notes lingering concerns about the role of the military behind the scenes.¹⁴⁹

US–Nigeria bilateral tensions

3. Relations with Washington deteriorated sharply in late 2025 following Trump Administration allegations about the persecution of Nigerian Christians. This diplomatic friction introduces risk for development finance, security cooperation and trade access at a time when Nigeria relies on Western institutional support for reform programmes.¹⁵⁰

Currency depreciation & inflation

4. The Naira lost more than 40% of its value against the US dollar in 2024, following a 44% devaluation in June 2023 when exchange rate unification was implemented. Inflation surged to 33.5% in 2024, among the highest on the continent. The Central Bank raised its monetary policy rate to a record 26.75% by July 2024.¹⁵¹

Subsidy reform fragility

5. The Tinubu Government’s signature fuel subsidy removal was partially reversed in 2024 amid social pressure, with subsidies costing 3.3% of GDP that year. Full phase-out is scheduled by 2028.

Governance & corruption risk

Entrenched systemic corruption

6. Nigeria scored 26/100 on the 2025 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index—unchanged from 2024—ranking 142nd of 182 countries and falling two places year-on-year.¹⁵² The country ranks 5th from the bottom among African nations on the Ibrahim Index’s “Absence of Corruption in State Institutions” metric. Corruption permeates procurement, the judiciary, legislature, and law enforcement. In early 2025, investigations revealed bribery schemes involving federal lawmakers extorting universities over budget allocations; by August 2025, a serving MP alleged that bribes of ₦1m–₦3m were demanded to introduce motions in the House of Representatives.¹⁵³

Judicial independence concerns

7. The Nigerian Bar Association has repeatedly warned that corruption within courts threatens democracy and social justice.¹⁵⁴ Allegations of politically influenced judicial appointments and biased rulings persist. While election results are increasingly contested in court rather than through violence—a positive democratic signal—the integrity of those verdicts remains in question.

Shrinking civic space

8. Media Rights Agenda recorded 86 attacks on journalists and media organisations in 2025 alone.¹⁵⁵ Whistleblowers and activists face intimidation through repressive legislation and strategic lawsuits. The Whistleblower Protection Bill remains unpassed. These constraints reduce accountability mechanisms and complicate due diligence for investors and development partners.

Humanitarian & social risk

Food insecurity & humanitarian crisis

9. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis for 2025 confirmed millions in crisis (Phase 3) or critical (Phase 4) food insecurity during the lean season in the North East and North West. Over 441,000 severely malnourished children were treated in the North East alone in 2025.¹⁵⁶

Poverty trajectory

10. Despite positive GDP growth, poverty is projected to continue rising, reaching 53.4% in 2026 before declining marginally in 2027. Per capita income gains are too weak to offset population growth of approximately 2.5% per annum. More than 54% of Nigeria’s 240 million people currently live in poverty, creating significant social instability risk and constraining consumer market development.¹⁵⁷

12-month outlook

11. Nigeria’s macroeconomic position is modestly improving—inflation is easing, the Naira has stabilised, reserves are building and the FATF grey-listing exit restores some financial credibility. However, structural risk profile elevated. Negative scenarios include:

• security deterioration ahead of 2027 elections, particularly farmer-herder and North Central violence spreading southward;
• reversal of reform momentum on subsidy removal, foreign exchange liberalisation or anti-corruption enforcement;
• wider diplomatic isolation given US–Nigeria tensions and proximity to Sahelian instability.

Conclusion

12. The headline story is a paradox—GDP is forecast to grow around 4.2% in 2025, yet poverty is projected to keep rising to 53.4% in 2026 before only marginally declining in 2027. Population growth is outpacing per capita gains.¹⁵⁸

13. On security, Nigeria confronts multiple simultaneous threats: Boko Haram in the North East, Niger Delta militancy, spreading herder-farmer violence, and separatist agitation in the South East. A spike in north-central violence in early 2026 included a massacre in Kwara state in February.¹⁵⁹

14. On economics, the single biggest structural vulnerability is oil concentration: oil exports represent 90% of total exports and oil revenue sits at just under 40% of government revenue, while the fiscal breakeven oil price is assessed to be above $150 per barrel.¹⁶⁰

Conclusions and recommendations

Introduction

1. We are disappointed by the delayed release of the FCDO’s Official Development Assistance country allocations for the coming years. This made deeper scrutiny of FCDO strategy in Nigeria difficult while our inquiry was under way, as we did not have access to spending plans for the years ahead. (Conclusion, Paragraph 5)

2. The Department must commit to aligning the announcement of new approaches and strategies with the release of spending plans, in order to generate confidence in its plans and its appetite for transparency. (Recommendation, Paragraph 6)

The Nigeria-UK Strategic Partnership

3. The UK’s partnership with Nigeria represents a grand strategic bet: assisting Nigeria to improve its economy, administration and security in order to unlock its growth potential, and then capitalising on the two countries’ shared history and people-to-people links in order to achieve development objectives in the country, as well as further mutual benefits for both nations. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)

4. We welcome the long-term, strategic partnership established between the UK and Nigeria, grounded in shared interests relating to stability, security and economic development. The strategy represents a wider shift in development strategy from the UK Government, with the intention of putting partnership and mutual benefit at the centre of programming. However, these mutual benefits will not be realised if the humanitarian and security issues threatening Nigerian stability are allowed to grow, potentially undermining the partnership. (Conclusion, Paragraph 20)

5. As we outlined in our report, “The Future of UK Aid and Development Assistance”, the FCDO will need to set out further details on how its four essential shifts can create a step-change in policy efficacy and implementation. A belief that a changed mindset alone will make a marked difference, in an era of significantly constrained spending, risks giving the impression of unrealistic optimism in the FCDO’s policy levers. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

6. The FCDO must develop a clear monitoring framework for assessing implementation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in Nigeria. This framework should include:

• the proportion of programmes containing integrated cross-sector objectives;
• the proportion of funding allocated to multi-sector programming;
• measures of local civil society and women-led participation;
• indicators relating to displacement, livelihoods and community resilience;
• and the balance between preventive and emergency spending.

7. The FCDO should report progress on this to the Committee within six months of the publication of this report, and annually thereafter. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)

Humanitarian need and displacement

8. The Committee is deeply concerned by the scale of humanitarian need in Nigeria and by evidence that humanitarian systems are increasingly unable to meet demand. These issues have the potential to undermine the goals of the Nigeria-UK Strategic Partnership. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)

9. Nigeria has the potential to take on responsibility for meeting its own humanitarian need. It is right that the FCDO is working alongside the Government of Nigeria to achieve this end, allowing UK ODA to be reallocated to projects and programmes that work towards the UK’s strategic development goals in the country. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)

10. In response to this report, the Government must detail the steps it is taking to assist the Nigerian Government to assume responsibility for meeting its own humanitarian need. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45)

11. We are concerned by evidence that funding reductions have weakened displacement monitoring. (Conclusion, Paragraph 51)

12. Within six months of the publication of this report, the FCDO should share with us funding and programming details for humanitarian and conflict monitoring, displacement tracking and early-warning systems across Nigeria, including how data from these systems is integrated into wider programming in the country. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52)

Instability and insecurity

13. We are shocked by the Minister’s admission that the international community has “failed” in the Sahel. (Conclusion, Paragraph 64)

14. The Government must undertake a review, to be shared with the Committee no later than six months from the publication of this report, on how it can contribute towards strengthening regional approaches to insecurity and instability across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, recognising the increasingly transnational nature of displacement, organised violence and climate pressures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 65)

15. Instability in Nigeria cannot be addressed through military responses alone and requires a comprehensive strategy addressing the underlying drivers of conflict and insecurity. It is not the responsibility of the UK alone to address this instability. (Conclusion, Paragraph 81)

16. We are encouraged by many of the programmes implemented by the FCDO across Nigeria. The Propcom+ programme, for instance, has been independently assessed to be achieving commendable results in agricultural transformation, which will combat several drivers of instability, including poverty and tensions over land use. (Conclusion, Paragraph 82)

17. However, left unchecked, this instability will make it impossible for the UK to achieve its development goals across Nigeria, potentially undermining the wider Nigeria-UK strategic partnership. (Conclusion, Paragraph 83)

18. While many of these programmes satisfy the pleas made to us by witnesses and stakeholders for improvements in UK programming across Nigeria and the Sahel, they are clearly insufficient: conflict, extremism and banditry continue to rise, with severe knock-on effects for Nigerians and for regional security. Given the relatively low UK spending on responses to security issues, in comparison to the scale of the challenge, only time will tell whether the technical assistance offered and capacity building engendered by these programmes will be sufficient in helping Nigeria to overcome its security challenges. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84)

19. The FCDO should ensure that conflict prevention and atrocity prevention capabilities remain adequately resourced and integrated across future Nigeria and Sahel programming. This must include strengthened support for:

• early-warning systems;
• conflict monitoring;
• atrocity prevention;
• and data collection relating to displacement and violence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 85)

20. The FCDO must set out its spending plans on these areas in Nigeria in response to this report, including detailed Integrated Security Fund spending plans. (Recommendation, Paragraph 86)

21. While it is the case that instability arising from religious tensions is notable, we do not consider it to be a primary driver of instability across Nigeria, particularly when considered alongside compounding factors, including land disputes resulting from climate change. (Conclusion, Paragraph 87)

Civil Society

22. The FCDO should review its current level of support for community-led early-warning, mediation and peacebuilding structures; and the level of female leadership within these structures. When sharing the findings of that report with the Committee, the FCDO should set out whether it believes its measures on these metrics are sufficient, and if not, how it intends to improve them. (Recommendation, Paragraph 96)

23. Without clear information on the design and accessibility of programmes, and without equality impact assessments being carried out routinely, we are unable to scrutinise fully the degree to which FCDO programming in Nigeria is targeted at:

• women and girls;
• children;
• LGBTQ+ people;
• Disabled people;
• older people. (Conclusion, Paragraph 97)

24. The FCDO should ensure that equality impact assessments are systematically incorporated into future programming and funding decisions relating to Nigeria, which should be available to the Committee on request. (Recommendation, Paragraph 98)

25. We are impressed by the work of local organisations with whom the FCDO works, including on peacebuilding, stabilisation and early warning efforts. This is an excellent example of localisation within the FCDO’s Nigeria portfolio. (Conclusion, Paragraph 99)

Economic Development

26. Economic resilience and livelihoods support should form a central component of the UK-Nigeria strategic partnership. It is vital that the partnership helps to provide economic opportunities for women and young people, recognising the role of inclusion and livelihoods in reducing vulnerability to recruitment into extremist groups and instability. (Conclusion, Paragraph 115)

27. We are disappointed that the FCDO has not worked alongside BII to ensure that a reduction in forced displacement becomes a key criterion in BII’s investment decision making. With such a large portfolio across Nigeria—a country that hosts a vast number of displaced people—strategic investments from BII in this regard could make a significant difference. (Conclusion, Paragraph 116)

Within six months of the publication of this report, the FCDO must undertake a review of all of the factors that risk undermining the UK-Nigeria strategic partnership, including humanitarian need, instability, insecurity, good governance issues and the low investor confidence in Nigeria’s economy, and how it plans to mitigate those risks. Findings should be shared with the Committee no later than one year from the publication of this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 117)

Formal minutes

Tuesday 7 July 2026

Members present:

Sarah Champion, in the Chair

Janet Daby

Tracy Gilbert

Monica Harding

Noah Law

Brian Mathew

David Mundell

James Naish

Sam Rushworth

David Taylor

The UK’s development partnership with Nigeria

Draft Report (The UK’s development partnership with Nigeria), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 117 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Appendix agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Tuesday 14 July at 1.30 p.m.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Tuesday 2 December 2025

Mary Dinah, CEO and Founder, Mary Dinah Foundation; Evelyn Mere, Country Director, WaterAid Nigeria; Andrew Mamedu, Country Director, ActionAid NigeriaQ1–28

Camilla Higgins, Director, INGO Forum Nigeria; Thierno Samba Diallo, Country Director, Action against Hunger; Arjun Jain, Representative in Nigeria, UNHCRQ29–49

Tuesday 13 January 2026

Hamsatu Allamin, Founder, Allamin Foundation for Peace and Development; Saratu Joshua Pindar, Country Programme Co-ordinator, CIVIC; Aisha Abdurrahman, Chief Executive, Bridge for Women Development Initiative (BOWDI)Q50–59

Bryan Weiner, Senior Regional Programme Manager, West Africa, Search for Common Ground; Tog Gang, Senior Advisor for Peace and Conflict, Mercy CorpsQ60–83

Tuesday 28 April 2026

Chris Chijiutomi, Managing Director and Head of Africa, British International InvestmentQ84–101

The Rt Hon the Baroness Chapman of Darlington, Minister for Development and Africa, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office; Cynthia Rowe, Development Director, Nigeria, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development OfficeQ102–166

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

DPN numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 Action against Hunger DPN0027

2 All-Party Parliamentary Group on Nigeria DPN0002

3 Anonymised DPN0003

4 British International Investment DPN0028

5 Busara DPN0017

6 CGIAR DPN0016

7 CSI-UK DPN0010

8 Dibiaezue, Barrister Uchechi Ucheoma (Godiya Women Education and Sustainable Development Initiative) DPN0004

9 Enconverge Green Ltd DPN0020

10 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office DPN0032

11 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office DPN0026

12 Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART) DPN0007

13 International Organisation for Peace Building and Social Justice UK (PSJ UK) DPN0031

14 Inuwa, Haruna (DPhil Student Energy Systems and Transition, Energy and Power Group, University of Oxford); Dr Alycia Leonard (Senior Research Associate in Energy Systems, Energy and Power Growth , Univeristy of Oxford); and Professor Stephanie Hirmer (Professor, Climate Compatible Growth, Energy and Power Group, University of Oxford) DPN0011

15 Malaria No More UK DPN0006

16 Mercy Corps DPN0021

17 Médecins Sans Frontières DPN0019

18 Nigeria Governors’ Forum Secretariat  DPN0015

19 Nyombi, Professor Chrispas (Professor of International Commercial Law , University of Derby UK); Dr Eghosa Ekhator (Associate Professor of International Environmental Law, University of Derby UK); and Dr Doyin Babajide (Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Derby UK)DPN0014

20 Obaji, Dr Synda (University of Birmingham) DPN0018

21 Omo, (Country Director, Mon Club International) DPN0009

22 Open Doors UK & Ireland  DPN0022

23 Population Matters DPN0008

24 Sightsavers DPN0030

25 The development Research and Projects Center DPN0013

26 UNHCR DPN0029

27 Udosen, Namse Peter DPN0001

28 United Against Malnutrition & Hunger DPN0012

29 WaterAid DPN0023

30 World Food Programme DPN0024

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

Session 2026–27

Number	Title	Reference
2nd Special	UK Aid and Development Assistance in a Fracturing World: Strengthening Resilience and Cooperation: Government Response	HC 499
1st Special	Peace under pressure: Protecting Women, Peace and Security: Government Response	HC 210

Session 2024–26

Number	Title	Reference
11th	UK Aid and Development Assistance in a Fracturing World: Strengthening Resilience and Cooperation	HC 1835
10th	Peace under pressure: Protecting Women, Peace and Security	HC 782
9th	Future of UK aid and development assistance: interim report	HC 1330
8th	Empowering Development: Energy Access for Communities	HC 849
7th	Assessing Value, Ensuring Impact: The FCDO’s Approach to Value for Money in Official Development Assistance	HC 422
6th	The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People	HC 525
5th	Protection not permission: The UK’s role in upholding international humanitarian law and supporting the safe delivery of humanitarian aid	HC 526
4th	The ‘In Development’ process	HC 333
3rd	The Government’s efforts to achieve SDG2: Zero Hunger	HC 515
2nd	Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory	HC 373
1st	Appointment of the Chief Commissioner of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact	HC 448
9th Special	Future of UK aid and development assistance: interim report: Government Response	HC 1830
8th Special	Assessing Value, Ensuring Impact: The FCDO’s Approach to Value for Money in Official Development Assistance: Government Response	HC 1669
7th Special	Empowering Development: Energy Access for Communities: Government response	HC 1626
6th Special	The FCDO’s approach to displaced people: Government response	HC 1522
5th Special	Protection not permission: The UK’s role in upholding international humanitarian law and supporting the safe delivery of humanitarian aid: Government Response	HC 1301
4th Special	The Government’s efforts to achieve SDG2: Zero Hunger: Government Response	HC 923
3rd Special	Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Government Response	HC 797
2nd Special	The UK Small Island Developing States Strategy: Government Response	HC 597
1st Special	FCDO and disability-inclusive development: Government Response	HC 568

---

Footnotes

1 UK Government, Establishing the Nigeria-United Kingdom Strategic Partnership: joint communiqué, 6 November 2024

2 Letter from the Minister of State to the Chair of the International Development Committee, 12 June 2025

3 The Rt Hon Baroness Chapman, Launch of the UK’s new Approach to Africa, 15 December 2025

4 Q105

5 International Monetary Fund, Country Data: Nigeria, accessed 10 June 2026

6 UN Population Fund, United Nations Population Fund Country programme document for Nigeria, February 2023

7 British International Investment (DPN0028)

8 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026); UK Government, Establishing the Nigeria-United Kingdom Strategic Partnership: joint communiqué, 6 November 2024

9 Q107

10 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

11 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

12 UK Government, Establishing the Nigeria-United Kingdom Strategic Partnership: joint communiqué, 6 November 2024

13 Q106

14 Q119

15 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

16 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Annual Review - Lafiya Nigeria, 2025

17 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Annual Review - Lafiya Nigeria, 2025

18 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

19 Q39

20 Q48

21 Q120

22 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026); All-Party Parliamentary Group on Nigeria (DPN0002)

23 Q31

24 Médecins Sans Frontières (DPN0019)

25 Q29

26 Q31; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘A child belongs to the community’: Mothers take the lead in fight against hunger in northern Nigeria, 15 August 2025

27 Médecins Sans Frontières (DPN0019)

28 UNOCHA, Nigeria 2026: Lean Season (An Unprecedented Food and Nutrition Crisis) Advocacy Note, 20 May 2026

29 Médecins Sans Frontières (DPN0019)

30 Q11

31 Médecins Sans Frontières (DPN0019)

32 Q31

33 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

34 Q16

35 Qq16–17

36 Q19

37 Q19

38 WaterAid Nigeria Calls for Accelerated Action on Gender Equality in WASH on International Women’s Day | WaterAid Nigeria

39 WaterAid (DPN0023)

40 Q19

41 Q159

42 Q159

43 Médecins Sans Frontières (DPN0019)

44 Action Against Hunger (DPN0027)

45 Mercy Corps (DPN0021)

46 UK Government, FCDO multi-year Official Development Assistance programme allocations 2026–2027 to 2028–2029: equality impact assessment, March 2026

47 Q139

48 FCDO, Annual Report and Accounts - 2024–25; figures in cash terms

49 UNHCR (DPN0029)

50 Tom Fletcher, Extracts from USG Fletcher’s message to staff on the OCHA reset, July 2025

51 Q39

52 Qq35–36

53 Q38

54 Q7

55 Q7

56 Q40

57 Q40

58 Q40

59 Q49

60 Q107

61 Q107

62 Q108

63 Q135

64 International Development Committee, Sixth Report of the Session 2024–25, The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People, HC 525

65 Q34

66 Q34; UNHCR, Nigeria Displacement Statistics

67 Q34

68 UNHCR (DPN0029)

69 UNOCHA, Nigeria 2026: Lean Season (An Unprecedented Food and Nutrition Crisis) Advocacy Note, 20 May 2026

70 Q34

71 Q15

72 Q76

73 Q75

74 Q61

75 Q56

76 World Food Programme (DPN0024)

77 CIVIC, Nigeria

78 Haruna Inuwa et al, Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford (DPN0011)

79 International Rescue Committee, The top 10 crises the world can’t ignore in 2026, December 2025

80 Oral evidence: FCDO Annual Report and Accounts, Tuesday 9 December 2025, Q5

81 Q121

82 Q126; Qq123–124

83 Le Monde, Nigeria declares ‘nationwide security emergency’, 26 November 2025

84 BBC News, Schools to start reopening after Nigeria mass abduction, January 2026

85 UNHCR (DPN0029)

86 Mercy Corps (DPN0021)

87 WaterAid (DPN0023)

88 Q77

89 Q70

90 Q32

91 World Food Programme (DPN0024)

92 Q16

93 Q63

94 Q66

95 Q71

96 Q71

97 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

98 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0032)

99 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0032)

100 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0032)

101 Q53

102 Q127

103 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026); DevTracker, Propcom+ - Supporting economic development in conflict and climate affected regions in Nigeria, accessed 10 June 2026

104 BEAM Exchange, Propcom+ annual review (2025), accessed 11 June 2026; The BEAM Exchange is a specialist platform for knowledge exchange and learning about using the market systems development (MSD) approach to achieve international development and cooperation goals. It is managed and run by the secretariat of the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED), under the supervision of the DCED’s MSD Working Group. Source: About the BEAM Exchange

105 Q79

106 Q8

107 Q58

108 Q134

109 Qq50-59

110 Q134

111 World Bank, Scalable solutions to close gender gaps in Nigeria, November 2023

112 Global Voices, Can the Special Seats Bill deliver the gender parity Nigeria needs?, 18 June 2026; Q25

113 Global Voices, Can the Special Seats Bill deliver the gender parity Nigeria needs?, 18 June 2026

114 Q151

115 Q8

116 Q23

117 Q8

118 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0032)

119 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

120 International Monetary Fund, Country Data: Nigeria, accessed 10/06/2026

121 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

122 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

123 UK Government, UK Trade and Investment Factsheet: Nigeria, 14 May 2026

124 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2024, 2024

125 British International Investment (DPN0028)

126 British International Investment (DPN0028)

127 Q52

128 Atlantic Council, Ajay Banga on the World Bank Group’s jobs agenda and global development, 7 April 2026

129 Atlantic Council, Ajay Banga on the World Bank Group’s jobs agenda and global development, 7 April 2026

130 Q118

131 Q117

132 Q84

133 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

134 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

135 Q85

136 International Development Committee, Sixth Report of the Session 2024–25, The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People, HC 525

137 Q93

138 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0032)

139 Q8

140 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (DPN0026)

141 Q109; The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. The inter-governmental body sets international standards that aim to prevent these illegal activities and the harm they cause to society. As a policy-making body, the FATF works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.
The 40-member body sets international standards to ensure national authorities can effectively go after illicit funds linked to drugs trafficking, the illicit arms trade, cyber fraud and other serious crimes. In total, more than 200 countries and jurisdictions have committed to implement the FATF’s Standards as part of a co-ordinated global response to preventing organised crime, corruption and terrorism.
The FATF was established in 1989 and is based in Paris.
The FATF grey list identifies countries that are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. Source: Financial Action Task Force, Who We Are

142 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2025

143 International Monetary Fund, Country Data: Nigeria, accessed 10 June 2026

144 World Bank, Nigeria, accessed 18 June 2026

145 World Bank, Nigeria, accessed 18 June 2026

146 Early Warning Project, Nigeria, accessed 17 June 2026

147 International Crisis Group, Massacre in Kwara State Heightens Nigeria’s Security Challenges, 6 February 2026

148 CIVICUS Lens, Nigeria: ‘Protests will keep happening, because bad governance keeps happening’, 17 May 2026

149 BTI, Nigeria Country Report 2026, accessed 18 June 2026

150 Atlantic Council, The United States and Nigeria must rebuild their engagement architecture for a new global era, 4 February 2026; Chatham House, How Nigeria flipped the script on Trump, 30 January 2026

151 Chatham House, Nigeria’s economy needs the naira to stay competitive, 4 March 2025; International Monetary Fund, Country Data: Nigeria, accessed 10/06/2026; Central Bank of Nigeria, Monetary Policy Decisions, accessed 15 June 2026

152 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2025

153 Premium Times Nigeria, SERAP demands probe of alleged ₦3m “Bribe-for-Bills” scandal in National Assembly, August 2025

154 Nigeria Premium Times, Nigeria needs moral reawakening to defeat corruption – NBA anti-corruption chair, 15 June 2026

155 Media Rights Agenda, MRA Releases 2025 Annual Report on Free Expression, Decries ‘Reign of Impunity’, 24 February 2026

156 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, Northeast, Northwest and North Central Nigeria, December 2025

157 World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook, April 2026

158 Allianz, Country Risk Report: Nigeria, February 2026; World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook, April 2026

159 International Crisis Group, Massacre in Kwara State Heightens Nigeria’s Security Challenges, 6 February 2026

160 Allianz, Country Risk Report: Nigeria, February 2026