Science diplomacy: Sovereignty, strategy, and the global race

Summary

The geopolitical landscape has been turned upside down in recent years. War in Ukraine and the Middle East and a US administration repeatedly over-turning established norms has led to a fragmentation of alliances. Alongside rapid technological advancement this has made science diplomacy more important than ever. While the UK has big ambitions for its science diplomacy, successive UK governments have struggled to keep up with the pace of change. Efforts to attract science and tech talent have lacked ambition, particularly when the US is stepping back, while cuts to aid spending on R&D risk being a shortsighted retreat from investments that support global health and scientific discovery. The Life Sciences agreement with the US has been driven by the Trump administration’s desire to advantage its own life sciences sector, and while raising spending on new and innovative medicines could help UK patients, it remains unclear how these will be funded within the UK health budget.

The UK government’s stated objective is sovereign capability across a range of technologies, but it has failed to explain what this means, and what success would look like or deliver, saying that it does not want to highlight vulnerabilities to competitors. Whether it acknowledges it or not, the UK is in a global race for sovereign capability, and must be focused and realistic about what it can achieve. The US’s move to restrict Anthropic’s latest AI models should be a powerful reminder that the UK may not be able to count on even its allies for access to vital technology. This is at a time when AI is emerging as a central arena for both international competition and collaboration in science. The government has not articulated a coherent strategic framework setting out priority partners, technologies or intended outcomes of its science and tech partnerships, while its approach to specialisation in key sectors such as space and quantum remains unclear.

This report seeks to look comprehensively at the government’s efforts on science diplomacy in the context of its assertion that a key strategic goal in this area is tech sovereignty. We consider some of the important elements of a successful science diplomacy. We recommend that the government develop and set out a comprehensive strategy, clearly defining its priority partners, technologies and intended outcomes, and how these align with wider objectives.

The UK has long-standing strengths in generating world-class science and early-stage innovation, but it has often struggled to scale these into world-leading companies. Structural issues—including lack of specialist funds, a lack of growth-stage lead investors, and the size of the UK market—mean that many promising scientific and technological breakthroughs have been commercialised abroad.

Alongside this lack of strategy and limited ability to commercialise, the UK’s traditionally open approach to international collaboration has not been matched by a sufficiently robust framework for managing the associated risks, and the government’s approach to research security does not currently provide a sufficiently clear or effective framework to protect UK intellectual property and safeguard research from exploitation by hostile actors. While the security failures at UK Biobank showed that research and innovation collaborations are vulnerable to exploitation, the government’s current “actor agnostic” approach has not translated into clear, practical guidance for the academics expected to manage these risks on the ground, while dealing with deep structural challenges to the university sector.

We are in the premier division of science, we are in the premier division of diplomacy, but we don’t know where we stand in the field of science diplomacy, due to a lack of explicit strategy and cross-governmental coordination.

Introduction

Science and technology

1. With science and technology ever-more key enablers of economic and strategic priorities, states are increasingly turning to science diplomacy to pursue their interests. International relations are now defined by “geotechnology disputes” as well as by traditional geopolitics, with global alliances reshaped by the scramble to secure control over data, infrastructure, and the digital tools of the future.¹ Since OpenAI launched ChatGPT in 2022, there has been a global race among both companies and countries to dominate artificial intelligence and the infrastructure that underpins it. Over the course of this inquiry, AI continued to emerge as a central arena for both competition and collaboration in science diplomacy. We heard that advances in science and technology are “evolving faster than regulatory and governance regimes can keep pace”, while “areas once seen as apolitical scientific frontiers, like outer space and the deep oceans, are now sites of geopolitical contention”.² As then-Government Chief Scientific Adviser Patrick Vallance noted in 2022:

The number of countries that now employ science and technology strategically is much greater than ever before, and they are very alive to the fact that this capability can give them an advantage.³

2. In 2010, the Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science published a report which outlined three parts to science diplomacy: science in diplomacy; diplomacy for science; and science for diplomacy.⁴ In 2025, they published an update, ‘Science diplomacy in an era of disruption’, that proposed a simplified framework “as the world becomes more divided and complex”.⁵ These were: science impacting diplomacy; and diplomacy impacting science. These frameworks were referenced repeatedly in written evidence submissions to this inquiry.⁶

3. Successive UK governments have sought to assert the country’s global position as a leader in science and technology. Boris Johnson set out the ambition to transform the UK into a “science superpower” by 2030.⁷ Rishi Sunak’s 2023 Science and Technology Framework aimed to “cement the UK’s place as a global science and technology superpower by 2030”.⁸ This framing was criticised in evidence we received. The Council on Geostrategy told us that its research found that UK scientists and innovators were broadly sceptical about the “superpower” rhetoric, and believe that this is not grounded in the realities of the UK’s capabilities or investment.⁹ The Wellcome Trust called for the government to switch from projecting the UK as a science superpower to the “global partner of choice for research and innovation”, as the former was “increasingly out of step with the reality of the UK’s evolving place in the world”.¹⁰

4. Under Keir Starmer, the government has largely stepped back from the superpower slogan and withdrew the Framework, but has stated its ambition for the UK to become a “clean energy superpower” and an “AI superpower”.¹¹ In 2025, the government promised to make the UK a world leader in artificial intelligence, with “national champion” companies as a critical pillar of national and economic security”.¹²

5. The UK has a large and internationally competitive research base, supported by a strong university system, including three institutions in the global top ten and eleven in the top 100,¹³ and ranks sixth in the Global Innovation Index.¹⁴ Publications affiliated with UK institutions accounted for 5.9% of global publications and received 8.4% of global citations, with 15.7% of UK publications among the top 10 most cited worldwide.¹⁵ Total R&D expenditure is 2.68% of GDP, the 13th highest of any nation.¹⁶ However, this is not matched by overall investment levels. Meanwhile, the UK’s scientific strength is closely tied to its ability to attract international talent. At UK academic institutions, around 23% of students are from overseas, over three times the OECD average,¹⁷ and a third of academic staff are non-UK nationals.

Geopolitics

6. The geopolitical landscape has been turned upside down in recent years, with fragmentation of alliances and rapid technological advancement. Nearly all submissions to this inquiry highlighted this shifting and challenging environment, including changes to US policy under the Trump administration, and the international activities of Russia and China. However, none could have anticipated the rapid pace of change that has occurred since we began this inquiry, with developments in Venezuela, Greenland and Iran, as well as US threats of global tariffs.¹⁸

7. This instability has driven a dramatic increase in defence spending worldwide, with the war in Ukraine acting as testing ground for innovative defence tech. The shift within NATO has been particularly stark: European allies and Canada invested 1.4% of their combined GDP in defence in 2014; by 2025 that figure had reached 2.3%, with a commitment to reach 5% of GDP by 2035 – including spending on national resilience.¹⁹ Venture capital spending on defence tech startups in the US and Europe was a combined $7.7 billion in the first ten months of 2025—more than double the total for all of 2024—as the battlefield utility of commercial AI and autonomous drone technology was demonstrated in real time.²⁰ Geopolitical rivalries have sparked an arms and technology race, with AI, quantum computing, biotech, and robotics now driving economic growth and military dominance.²¹

Our inquiry

8. We launched our inquiry to examine how the UK government should leverage scientific research and innovation to support its diplomatic goals, growth missions and national security – and whether its strategy for doing so is fit for purpose in the current geopolitical environment. As science diplomacy is a vast topic that sits at the intersection of some of the most pressing challenges facing the UK, we decided to examine the strengths and weaknesses of UK science diplomacy through three lenses: health and life sciences, quantum, and space. Despite not being one of our chosen lenses, AI came up repeatedly throughout the inquiry.

9. As a consequence of the shifting global security situation, we have chosen to focus on the UK government strategy for science diplomacy, and its implications for sovereignty and research security, as parts of the much wider and more complex topic of science diplomacy.

10. We held five evidence sessions, with ministers, policy experts, officials and former officials, and civil society. We received over 50 pieces of written evidence, including from think tanks, researchers, policy experts, and members of the public. We also held two evidence sessions and gathered written evidence on life sciences investment. We are grateful to everyone who contributed to our inquiry.

11. Specifically, this report will examine:

• How the UK has reacted to shifts in the global science and tech landscape (Chapter 1);
• The government’s strategy for international collaboration on science and technology (Chapter 2);
• The government’s approach to sovereignty in science and technology, including the barriers to achieving it (Chapter 3);
• The security of the UK’s research base (Chapter 4).

1 Shifting global policy – the current context

12. In this chapter we consider how the UK’s science diplomacy plays out through three policy areas, all of which have been affected in recent years by shifts in US politics: official development assistance (ODA), including to fund scientific research and development (R&D); policies to attract science and tech talent to the UK; and investment in the life sciences – a key industry for the UK.

Aid

13. We received a large amount of evidence warning of us of the devastating impact of cuts to aid-funded research.²² The UK’s cuts to aid spending in recent years have disproportionately affected ODA for R&D—at least that disbursed by the FCDO—despite the fact that R&D makes up a small percentage of overall ODA spend. In February 2025, the Prime Minister announced a reduction in ODA spending from 0.5% of gross national income (GNI) to 0.3% in 2027, to fund a rise in defence spending,²³ following a drop from the 0.7% target in 2021.²⁴ According to department figures, FCDO ODA R&D spending will be reduced by 44% in the current spending review period compared to the 2025/26 financial year, and by 60% when compared to the 2024/25 financial year.²⁵ This compares with a 31% reduction to total FCDO ODA.²⁶

14. The Minister for International Development resigned over the 2025 announcement, saying it would be “impossible” to maintain priorities including vaccination, climate and rules-based systems, and that it would boost Russian and Chinese influence and “deeply” harm the UK’s reputation.²⁷ We heard that ODA cuts to R&D would diminish UK soft power in science and technology, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, at a time when countries including China and Russia are increasing their activity and influence in the region,²⁸ and that:

Science and technology ODA can be particularly effective in building relationships with emerging powers and regions of strategic importance, while simultaneously addressing shared challenges such as climate change, antimicrobial resistance, and food security.²⁹

15. Witnesses emphasised the importance of ODA R&D funding to the UK’s international reputation and soft power. The government told us:

DSIT’s R&D ODA investments mobilise the UK’s science base, through equitable international partnerships, to deliver against a proven track record of development impact. These accelerate development progress through generating high-quality outputs aligned to developing countries’ needs, thereby empowering them to enter collaborations on a more equitable footing.

Professor Charlotte Watts, former FCDO Chief Scientific Adviser, highlighted that ODA R&D was “solution-focused”, generating answers to specific problems in recipient countries.³⁰

It was a modern development offer [ … ] Because we had science and research funding and worked in collaboration we were able to develop new solutions, but it was also an important part of the UK’s relationship with a range of lower and middle-income countries. That has now been undermined.³¹

16. Former head of the UK Health Security Agency Professor Dame Jenny Harries cited ODA funding in Pakistan that helped to develop an outbreak control system that benefits both Pakistan and the world. She spoke of her concern about the impact of the cuts:

Hopefully, the relationships will be maintained. But there are risks, and each time one of those relationships gets damaged or impeded, that trusted relationship starts to diminish.³²

This was echoed by Dr Jean-Christophe Mauduit, Associate Professor of Science Diplomacy at UCL, who said that “to be seen as a reliable partner is to think long-term”, arguing that the cuts will be detrimental to future collaborations across different sectors.³³ Similarly, Dr Philippa Matthews, professor of infectious diseases at the Francis Crick Institute, said that the ODA cuts had impacted the organisation’s ability to do collaborative research internationally.³⁴ We also heard about the impact of ODA cuts on health outcomes, both in the UK and globally, and about the impact on the science sector in the UK – including in terms of jobs.

17. The FCDO’s Minister for Growth told us that the government’s commitment to international development was “really clear”, but that the UK needed to “modernise” its approach – without outlining what this would entail. She reiterated the government’s desire to return to the 0.7% target when possible.³⁵ The Science Minister echoed this but stressed the need for the UK to make the best of the current circumstances.³⁶

US aid cuts

18. The US has made large cuts to its aid budget, closing USAID and cutting 82% of all programmes – worth around $54 billion.³⁷ Witnesses told us that reductions in US aid are reshaping the international landscape and creating opportunities for other countries to expand their influence. Lord O’Neill of Gatley, who led the Cameron Government’s Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, described the US reducing its development funding as a “huge opportunity” for the UK, saying it could capitalise to “positively accelerate” its standing in international science, “rather than letting it slip to some other nation”.³⁸ Professor Dame Jenny Harries echoed this, arguing that unless the UK “pick[s] up the opportunity of a changing world, somebody else is going to step into that”.³⁹ Mike Podmore, CEO of StopAIDS, told us that when the US withdrew funding from the World Health Organization (WHO), “China responded by having one of its biggest delegations ever, and it firmly recommitted to the WHO”.⁴⁰

Talent and visa policy

21. Since returning to office in January 2025, President Trump has pursued reductions to US science funding. In last year’s budget process he proposed large cuts, though these were largely rejected by Congress.⁴¹ The administration cancelled or froze more than 7,800 research grants in 2025 and sharply reduced the number of new grants.⁴² In April 2026, the president dismissed all members of the National Science Board,⁴³ and has announced planned further cuts in his 2027 budget request, including 55% to the National Science Foundation.⁴⁴

22. Witnesses told us that the US move away from domestic science funding presented an opportunity for the UK. Dr Jean-Christophe Mauduit told us that the UK could fill this gap by “supporting universities, attracting talent and being welcoming to any kind of research that tackles global challenges such as climate change”, describing it as a “window of opportunity” for a “win-win” to draw talent and demonstrate commitment to science.⁴⁵

Visa policy

23. UK visa costs for skilled workers, researchers, and students are up to nine times higher than the international average, and up to 22 times higher when the UK is excluded from this calculation, according to the Royal Society.⁴⁶ This research was referenced repeatedly in written evidence to this inquiry, with one organisation saying that the best “efforts to attract talent will fail if HMG does not remove structural financial barriers which make it [ … ] more expensive for top talent to immigrate to the UK compared to the average leading science nations”.⁴⁷ The Wellcome Trust highlighted that the total upfront cost of a five-year skilled worker visa is 970% higher than the average for equivalent routes across other leading science nations, and we heard that this is “blocking talented international researchers from UK careers”.⁴⁸

24. Professor Charlotte Watts told us that the key barrier to the UK attracting talent was cost:

It is the fees. It is the visa costs of entry. It is the costs linked to health services. When you add up those figures [ … ] it just makes the UK unattractive [ … ] At one level we are going out diplomatically and saying, ‘We welcome talent and we want to collaborate,’ but on another level we are not demonstrating that in the bureaucratic challenges and the costs that are then layered on.⁴⁹

25. Following President Trump’s decision to cut science budgets, a number of countries and institutions launched schemes to attract talent. In December 2026, Canada said it would spend US$1.2 billion to bring in up to 1,000 leading researchers.⁵⁰ In spring 2025, the EU announced €500 million in funding to attract US researchers, and France separately launched a €100 million fund.⁵¹ France has since announced grant funding for 46 researchers—41 from US institutions—under the initiative.⁵²

26. In July 2025, the UK launched a £54 million Global Talent Fund designed to attract 60-80 “top researchers” and their teams.⁵³ However, applicants come through existing visa routes, meaning costs will remain high. The announcement of the fund was accompanied by the launch of a “global talent taskforce” which will “support researchers, entrepreneurs, investors, top tier managerial and engineering talent and high-calibre creatives to relocate [ … ] and build a pipeline of talent who want to come to Britain”.⁵⁴ As of June 2026, just 18 researchers had been announced as taking up new roles as part of the fund.⁵⁵

Life sciences

28. The government has set an ambition to be a world leader in life sciences. In 2025, a series of major pharmaceutical countries announced that they were pausing planned investments in the UK. We held an evidence session with several of these companies, who pointed to the UK’s “chronic underinvestment” in medicine spending.⁵⁶

Voluntary scheme for branded medicines pricing, access and growth (VPAG)

29. The Voluntary Scheme for Branded Medicines Pricing, Access and Growth (VPAG)—which controls spending on branded medicines by capping overall NHS expenditure, obliging companies to repay a percentage of sales revenue if spending exceeds the cap—was raised by all three of our industry witnesses.⁵⁷ Tom Keith-Roach, President of AstraZeneca UK, described it as “a symptom of the problem”, with Dr Richard Torbett, Chief Executive of the ABPI, calling on the government to restart talks on the cap.⁵⁸.

Medicine investment

30. However, witnesses made clear that the issue extends beyond VPAG, pointing to persistently low levels of UK spending on medicines as a proportion of total healthcare expenditure. Ben Lucas, Managing Director of MSD UK and Ireland, told us that there is “chronic underinvestment” in medicines,⁵⁹ with Richard Torbett highlighting the decline over the last decade or more:

At the root of this is that since 2014, the NHS budget has increased in real terms by 43%. What is less known is that the investment in branded, innovative medicines has declined by 10% since 2014. That divergence between where the NHS budget is going and medicines is at the root of this problem.⁶⁰

31. In September 2025, the Science Minister acknowledged to us that this imbalance in spending was an issue. He indicated that the government intended to increase spending on medicines as a proportion of overall healthcare expenditure from its current level of around 9%. However, he provided no detail on the scale of this increase or how it would be funded.⁶¹

US-UK pharmaceutical deal

32. These domestic issues played out against a backdrop of US tariffs. In May 2025, President Trump directed the administration to bring US drug prices in line with the lowest prices paid by comparable developed nations – accusing other countries, including the UK, of free-riding on US-funded innovation.⁶² In September he announced that from 1 October manufacturers would face a 100% tariff on all branded or patented drugs imported to the US – companies could avoid the tariff by striking most-favoured nation (MFN) pricing deals or committing to US manufacturing.⁶³

33. In December 2025, the US and UK announced an agreement in principle on pharmaceutical pricing.⁶⁴ The full details emerged in April 2026, including commitments for the UK to increase new medicines spending from 0.3% of GDP to 0.6% by 2036, increase the share of the NHS budget spent on medicines from 10 to 12%, and cap the repayment rate of pharmaceutical companies under VPAG at 15%.⁶⁵ It removed the possibility of tariffs, but allowed for either side to cancel the deal with six months’ notice.

34. Appearing before us ahead of publication of these details, the Science Minister would not be drawn on whether the UK would proceed with the domestic policy changes if the UK did not secure MFN status. He said he would “not pick apart the deal” but expected the UK side to go ahead.⁶⁶ The Minister for Health Innovation told us in December that the VPAG negotiations had “largely been usurped” by the trade talks.⁶⁷

2 Strategy

International strategy

37. The government’s May 2025 submission to this inquiry told us that the UK’s position on international research collaboration is “to cooperate where we can, compete where we need to, and challenge where we must”.⁶⁸ However, what this means in practice for the government’s overall international strategy on science and technology is unclear – including which countries it seeks closer relationships with, and which technologies it is prioritising for trade deals.

38. The UK has a number of bilateral science and technology agreements with the US, Japan, Germany, France, Brazil, and others across quantum, AI, nuclear fusion, and compute.⁶⁹ However, we heard that these have not been translated into operational plans.⁷⁰ The UK has not, one witness suggested, sufficiently studied where global science and tech skills and capabilities are concentrated, how many British researchers are working overseas and in which countries and fields, or the extent to which it could inadvertently be incubating other countries’ strategic programmes—including in sensitive areas like quantum—that may not serve British interests.⁷¹

39. James Black, Deputy Director of Defence and Security at RAND Europe, told us that “real clarity” was needed on the strategy for international partnerships in science and tech, including setting out difficult trade-offs for which countries the UK wants to work with and under what conditions.⁷² We heard that any UK science and technology strategy should include “geographic prioritisation of international partnerships”, and that, as part of this, the UK Science and Technology Network—which leads on developing science partnerships and deploying science diplomacy around the world—should review its current country portfolio.⁷³ ICR Research, a consultancy, told us that the UK “lacks the comprehensive coordination mechanisms for soft power and science diplomacy that exists in competitor countries”.⁷⁴ It cited France’s Cooperation and Cultural Action Network (SCAC), which brings together different institutions and organisations to implement a coherent diplomatic strategy.⁷⁵

40. Several organisations called for the UK to develop an international science strategy. The Royal Society recommended a “single, highly visible, cross-government international science strategy”, which would include clear objectives for international partnerships and outline priorities for investment in key scientific areas.⁷⁶ The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) said that such a strategy should identify areas of UK expertise and comparative advantage and explain “how the government will work to protect and promote these”.⁷⁷ One key part of the UK’s international influence, which should form part of this strategy and be better integrated into its wider science and international policy, is its ability to set and influence regulatory regimes around the world, including through the British Standards Institution.

Domestic policy

41. This lack of clarity in the international science and technology arena is a result of a lack of clarity in domestic policy. We heard throughout this inquiry that the UK lacks a clear, joined-up strategy for turning its science and technology aspirations into reality.⁷⁸ As one witness put it regarding the quantum sector: you can “have a vision and ambition, [but] you also need to articulate the plan and execute”.⁷⁹ Will Whitehorn, Chair of the Seraphim Space Investment Trust, told us that none of the ambitions for space set out by various UK governments over the past several years have “managed to encapsulate” a strategy.⁸⁰ He added that the forthcoming Plan for Space was “definitely need[ed]”.⁸¹ Dr Alice Bunn, President of UKspace, linked domestic capabilities to international collaboration, telling us that the UK needs to make its investments in the space sector go further through “strategic intentional choices about the national capability we want to deliver in order to be a meaningful international partner”.⁸²

42. We heard that UK science and technology policy is undermined by a lack of cross-government coordination. Witnesses told us that the system does not reliably bring the right perspectives together at the right moment, leaving strategic decisions less well-informed than they should be. For example, we heard that space is an issue that cuts across multiple departments, but that no department “is thinking in any joined-up way about it”, risking them pulling in different directions, duplicating efforts, or leaving critical gaps unaddressed. ⁸³ This applies to other areas of science diplomacy, including health. Professor Dame Jenny Harries, former head of the UK Health Security Agency, said the difficulty was typically the “interconnection between somebody looking through what the global risk is, what the risk is to the UK, what we are all doing, where the investments are going and what the impact will be”.⁸⁴ She argued that, when a government investment is made, “there isn’t the right input to advice” because people tend to have “segregated understanding of one component or another”.⁸⁵

43. The cross-departmental Science and Technology Cabinet Committee was a “welcome step” in ensuring that all government departments owned the science, technology and innovation agenda, the Royal Society told us in 2025.⁸⁶ However, later that year the cabinet committee, which had core members from nine key departments across government, was removed and replaced with a Digital and Technology Committee, with a core membership of only DSIT, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office.⁸⁷

Science funding

44. The connections between domestic and international science policy are illustrated by major reforms currently underway to how the UK funds scientific research, intended to place more emphasis on driving economic growth.⁸⁸ UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), which disperses some £9 billion a year, will now divide spending into three main “buckets”: curiosity-driven research; strategic government and societal priorities; and supporting innovative companies to start and scale – aiming to break down siloes between its research councils.

45. This shift in domestic policy has major implications for science diplomacy. In early 2026, staff at UKRI’s Science and Facilities Research Council (STFC), which funds research across astronomy, particle physics, and nuclear physics, among other areas, were asked to model spending cuts to focus on “a more concentrated set of priorities”, as part of the transition to the new model.⁸⁹ We received a flood of letters from researchers setting out their fears for the future of their fields, and concern that high-risk curiosity-driven research, which is not primarily focused on economic growth, would lose out. In addition to the planned cuts at STFC, UKRI removed funding that had been committed for a planned upgrade to the Large Hadron Collider in CERN, Switzerland, placing the project in jeopardy.⁹⁰

46. We heard that this damaged trust in the UK as a partner – particularly as it coincided with the start of the hard-won term of the first British director general of CERN in 30 years. The head of STFC acknowledged that the move “certainly weakens our standing”.⁹¹ The apparent urgency and lack of warning of the cuts has added to their reputational impact. Professor Jon Butterworth of UCL told us that “our name is going to be mud if this is not sorted out.”⁹²

3 Sovereignty

52. The government has repeatedly outlined that building sovereign capability is a “critical priority”⁹³ for the UK but has not been clear on what exactly this means or how it might be measured. Sovereignty is often linked to security,⁹⁴ resilience,⁹⁵ and reduced reliance on other states and private companies.⁹⁶ The government’s 2025 Modern Industrial Strategy and accompanying Digital and Technologies Sector Plan outlined policies to build “sovereign capability” in key emerging digital technologies: advanced connectivity; AI; cyber security; engineering biology; quantum technologies; and semiconductors.⁹⁷ It also said that space was one of the five “frontier manufacturing industries with the greatest growth potential”.⁹⁸ However, as noted by the Business and Trade Committee, the strategy provided no definition of sovereign capability.⁹⁹ The Joint Committee for National Security Strategy also highlighted this point, calling for the government to outline a definition of what sovereign capability is in its 2026 inquiry.¹⁰⁰ The government declined to do this, citing national security. After being pressed on this issue by the Business and Trade Committee Chair, the Prime Minister wrote with the following explanation for not publishing a list of sovereign capabilities:

Any published list risks becoming outdated as technologies advance, and risks inadvertently telegraphing our specific vulnerabilities to hostile actors or signalling areas of strategic strength and drivers of growth to competitors.¹⁰¹

53. In April 2026, the Secretary of State for DSIT said that sovereignty in relation to AI is about reducing dependencies and increasing resilience in key national strategic priorities, including through working with allies, “especially other middle power nations”.¹⁰² The Minister for AI and Online Safety defined it similarly as a state’s ability to have “strategic leverage” for a specific technology, so that it can ensure:

ongoing access to critical inputs and ongoing assurance that its wider economic and national security objectives can be met more broadly.¹⁰³

54. James Black, of RAND Europe, told us that the UK cannot do everything in technologies such as quantum and AI but should “work out the necessary UK sovereign role in that tech stack” and then mitigate what cannot be achieved on a sovereign level through alliances and partnerships. This was supported by other witnesses, who told us that it “might be unrealistic to strive for an entirely sovereign supply chain” in quantum.¹⁰⁴ However, as outlined in the previous chapter, the government does not appear to have a clear strategy for which countries it intends to collaborate with, either to co-develop technology with or access technology through.

55. Some witnesses told us that the UK needs to be clearer on what this means for specific technologies. Jonathan Legh-Smith, Executive Chairman of UKQuantum, told us that the UK should establish what its ambition was for quantum sovereignty, and called for “much more focused activity on understanding what the real supply chain is and where the critical points and opportunities for the UK are”.¹⁰⁵ Jess Wade, a physicist from Imperial College, agreed with this, telling us that there are a number of researchers trying to develop quantum technologies that have a “potential sovereign purpose”, but that this is difficult without a “really clear framework” of what the government’s ambitions are for quantum.¹⁰⁶

Own-collaborate-access

56. The Johnson government outlined the “own-collaborate-access” framework to manage the development of critical science and technology capabilities in the 2021 Integrated Review. It has been referenced in subsequent documents, including the 2023 Science and Technology Framework.¹⁰⁷ Own-collaborate-access offers an approach to managing UK capability that sets out to recognise finite resources and prioritise accordingly, rather than aiming to develop sovereign capability across all areas. Its aim is to allow the government to maintain sovereign independence for critical systems through allies’ supply chains. The Integrated Review said this required “a long-term approach to building and using capability in the most important future fields”, and that the government’s role in delivering this framework is as an enabler of the private sector and wider community.¹⁰⁸

Source: HM Government, “Global Britain in a competitive age”, CP 403, 16 March 2021

57. The framework has not been included in any publications from the current government, but the Science Minister told us that the government considered quantum to be in the “own” category, citing the recent commitment to invest £1 billion in quantum technologies and a further £1 billion to procure a quantum computer by the early 2030s as “a clear indication that we want to be in the ‘own’ space” in the technology.¹⁰⁹ He said that the framework meant “that if you think you want to own something, of course you are going to collaborate and you are going to have to access internationally as well”, but that quantum was in the “own” space because the UK can “provide a lot of the answer”.¹¹⁰

58. Witnesses told us that the lack of detail on where different capabilities within technologies fit into the framework was hindering progress. Jess Wade of Imperial College told us that greater clarity around the own–collaborate–access framework would support the UK in achieving its sovereign capability ambitions. She suggested that the government should set out which parts of the quantum supply chain the UK should seek to own, and which it should prioritise for collaboration or access – rather than aiming to have the whole technology in the “own” category.¹¹¹

59. The shortcomings of the government’s interpretation of sovereignty as leverage—where the UK can possess a sovereign capability without owning the entire technology stack—were illustrated in recent weeks by the US government’s move to place export controls on Anthropic’s latest AI models, banning non-US citizens from access, and subsequently restricting access to OpenAI’s latest models to a small group of US companies and organisations approved by the Trump administration.¹¹² The UK Minister for AI stated that the “main lesson” was that “as we debate the future of national security and technological sovereignty, access to AI capabilities is crucial.”¹¹³ He pointed to the Sovereign AI Unit, which backs British AI startups, and to a £1.1 billion plan to invest in AI hardware.¹¹⁴

Decision-making and specialisation

65. As technological capability becomes increasingly central to national security as well as economic growth, the need for clear and effective decision-making on where to focus effort and investment has become more acute. The UK does not have the scale or resources to lead across all areas of advanced technology and must make choices about where to specialise. However, evidence to this inquiry suggests that while the government recognises this constraint, it is not clear how priorities are set or translated into specific areas of capability.

Space

66. Space policy provides an example. The 2025 Modern Industrial Strategy identified six priority areas in which national space capability should be developed: space domain awareness; in-orbit servicing, assembly and manufacturing; earth observation; position, navigation and timing; satellite communication technology; and launch capability.¹¹⁵ Witnesses told us that these were too high-level and broad, failing to sufficiently prioritise certain technologies. Dr Alice Bunn, President of UKspace, said that the government had not been specific enough in its choices,¹¹⁶ while former UK Space Agency CEO Graham Turnock said that it was clear that the strategy did “not intend that we should do everything in each of those chunks, but it is silent on what we should do”,¹¹⁷ with just four of those areas representing over 95% of the commercial space sector.¹¹⁸

67. In March 2026, the Minister for Space announced that the UK would concentrate on four of the six previously identified capability areas—satellite communications; in-orbit servicing, assembly and manufacturing; space domain awareness; and launch—with over £500 million allocated to national space programmes in these fields.¹¹⁹ However, she provided no further information on which sub-sectors would be prioritised, and no detailed rationale for why these four were chosen, beyond that they would “drive economic growth and national security outcomes”.¹²⁰ The Minister also confirmed that a Plan for Space would be published later in the year. Speaking before the announcement, our witnesses described earth observation as a strategically important and high-value area for the UK,¹²¹ and warned that reduced investment in this area risked the UK falling behind others, particularly the EU, raising questions about why this was selected for deprioritisation.¹²²

Investment

70. One challenge the UK faces in achieving sovereignty in key technologies is the factors pushing British firms to scale overseas. The UK has long-standing strengths in generating world-class science and early-stage innovation, but it has often struggled to scale these into world-leading companies. Structural issues—including lack of specialist funds, a lack of growth-stage lead investors, and the size of the UK market—mean that many promising scientific and technological breakthroughs have been commercialised abroad. Founders are forced to seek overseas investors, meaning time spent away from a growing business, and a risk that investors want them to relocate.¹²³ Witnesses highlighted the lack of technical expertise in the UK to lead investments in deep tech businesses, noting that specialist funds at the start-up phase in the UK often lack the level of capital to operate on a sufficiently large scale.¹²⁴

71. The case of DeepMind illustrates that the UK’s weakness is not generating innovation but retaining it at scale. Founded in London in 2010, it was acquired by Google in 2014 for between £400 and £650 million, at a relatively early stage in its development. While the company remains headquartered in the UK, ownership, strategic control, and the majority of its long-term value sit with a US parent. DeepMind is now central to the development of Google’s Gemini AI models.

72. Will Whitehorn of the Seraphim Investment Trust emphasised that while the UK has strong public investment bodies, including the National Security Strategic Investment Fund and the British Business Bank, they lack the scale, certainty and strategic backing needed to operate effectively and support deep tech companies. He called on the government to make better use of existing institutions, increase their funding, and take action to strengthen the UK’s capital markets—particularly to attract more IPOs—while addressing slow and bureaucratic procurement processes, which risk leaving UK firms reliant on overseas support in strategically important sectors such as space and defence.¹²⁵

73. Dr Chandran-Ramesh, a partner at a deep tech investment firm, also highlighted the lack of growth-stage investors able to lead in industries such as quantum, noting that most UK capital is invested as follow-on funding, with the board seat—and accompanying input—going to the lead investor.¹²⁶ She called for greater development of lead investment expertise within the UK.¹²⁷ She said the government should work to attract large quantum companies to base themselves in the UK, and called for “more connections with Europe” to help companies scale in a larger market.¹²⁸

74. We explored this issue in more depth in our recent report Flying blind: Innovation, growth and the regions, highlighting the lack of specialist investor capability for deep tech industries. ¹²⁹ We noted that investors can be deterred from deep tech startups in strategic areas such as quantum, AI and biotechnology by the high costs, high risks, and long timelines, and that, though the UK is a world-leader in quantum research, its quantum start-ups face challenges in scaling and competing with US counterparts.¹³⁰ We called on the government to encourage the development of specialist investor capability in science and tech, particularly in these strategic sectors. Meanwhile, our counterparts on the Lords Science and Technology Committee recently concluded that the UK’s long-standing failure to scale science and technology companies had reached a critical point, calling for urgent, decisive and system-wide reform to retain the economic benefits of the UK’s research base, including around investment, procurement, skills and regulation.¹³¹

75. The Science Minister emphasised the importance of public investment institutions, noting that the government intends them to unlock as much private sector capital as possible, and that increased funding for the British Business Bank is intended to expand availability of domestic capital for later-stage investment.¹³²

Mansion House reforms

76. The Minister highlighted the importance of the 2023 Mansion House reforms,¹³³ which aim to unlock assets managed by UK workplace pension schemes to increase funding for high-growth companies.¹³⁴ He described the reforms as a key lever for increasing private investment and noted that industry expected this to unlock a significant influx of capital.¹³⁵ However, witnesses told us that they were concerned about the time that the reforms would take, and how far they would have an impact on fast-growing strategic tech sectors.¹³⁶

Procurement

77. Government procurement can be key in ensuring that strategically important sectors receive investment, even if they have limited immediate commercial potential. For example, we heard that in quantum a significant proportion of private investment, particularly venture capital, has flowed into quantum computing rather than navigation, sensing or timing because it is more difficult to achieve “venture-style returns”. Dr Manjari Chandran-Ramesh argued that this increases the importance of government procurement in these areas, as public sector demand can help validate use cases and crowd in private investment.¹³⁷

78. However, it is not clear that this is always put into practice. The government’s announcement of £1 billion to procure UK-built quantum computers by the early 2030s, with a further £1 billion to invest over four years, £500 million for quantum computing, with smaller proportions for sensing and navigation and networking, meaning government funding is going to the area that already attracts private investment. ¹³⁸ Nick Davies of the Institute for Government told us that the government is:

insufficiently strategic about how it uses its buying power… Often, it goes to market with highly specified solutions rather than clear outcomes that it wants to achieve… you often preclude potential innovations that you might have been able to procure.¹³⁹

In our Flying blind report, we called for there to be a minister in the Cabinet Office responsible for procurement of innovation, supported by a dedicated unit and responsible for exploring new approaches to engaging SMEs and scaleups, particularly those developing UK-owned intellectual property. The government told us that it was exploring the creation of a dedicated unit to increase procurement of innovation.¹⁴⁰

4 Research security

82. As the international environment becomes more competitive and fragmented, there are increased concerns around research security, both in relation to cybersecurity and the risk of research collaborations being exploited by hostile states or actors. Dr Jean-Claude Mauduit told us that the shift from a collaborative to a more competitive environment is leading to a rise in research security issues.¹⁴¹ Two research institutes at the University of Manchester told us that there was “growing concern” that international research collaborations are being used by “bad-faith actors to seek to acquire academic research and expertise or interfere with academic discourse”.¹⁴² The Royal Society highlighted concern that the current approach to securing research against hostile state actors is having a “chilling effect whereby UK researchers are disincentivised from collaborating internationally”. It added that too much burden was placed on academics:

Academics who wish to collaborate internationally must keep informed of multiple separate areas of legislation, all of which are managed by separate government departments.¹⁴³

UK Biobank

83. In April, the government announced that information on UK Biobank’s 500,000 participants had been offered for sale online in China.¹⁴⁴ This was not the result of a leak or cyber-attack, but a “legitimate download by a legitimately accredited organisation” – three Chinese institutions.¹⁴⁵ Two of the three instances were researchers not approved on the projects using colleagues’ credentials to access the data.¹⁴⁶ A report on the breach noted that UK Biobank had interacted with the government’s Research Collaboration Advice Team (RCAT) “relating to certain categories of applicants” for access to the data, but it is unclear what the outcome of this interaction was.

Approaches to security

84. In April 2024, under the Sunak Government, vice-chancellors from the Russell Group of research-intensive UK universities were briefed by MI5 and GCHQ on the threat posed by hostile actors, with a consultation slated to follow on measures to protect the sector from national security threats. ¹⁴⁷ However, the consultation was never launched. In a joint submission to this inquiry DSIT and the FCDO noted that research practices were “increasingly being exploited” by state and non-state actors to enhance economic and military capabilities but said the UK’s approach was “actor agnostic”—applying to all countries—arguing there is no single solution to address these threats. They said that the government instead “support[s] the research sector to make informed decisions on managing and mitigating risks”.¹⁴⁸

85. The EU has adopted a different approach. The European Council requires member states to take into consideration “key principles for responsible internationalisation”, and states that cooperation with non-EU countries must be “done in a way that is both open and secure”, following the principle “as open as possible, as closed as necessary”.¹⁴⁹

86. The UK’s National Security and Investment Act 2021¹⁵⁰ introduced obligations for institutions and academics to manage national security risks in research and innovation activity in relation to acquisition of certain entities or assets in sensitive sectors. Academics are expected to identify where their work may fall within the scope of the Act, and to engage with institutional processes to assess and escalate these risks.¹⁵¹ Dr Pia Hüsch, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, argued that this approach relies unduly on individual academics, and that it is unrealistic to expect them to prioritise national security considerations without the intelligence or contextual understanding of threats that is available to the national security community.¹⁵² She noted that RCAT could provide support but that it is “fairly poorly staffed” relative to academics’ needs.¹⁵³

Funding challenges and international students

87. James Black told us that issues such as funding, access to talent and infrastructure, and energy costs “fundamentally affect the incentive structures for academics to be secure”.¹⁵⁴ These pressures are reinforced by the UK’s university funding model, in which international student fees subsidise domestic provision.¹⁵⁵ While this provides essential income, it creates a structural reliance on overseas students rather than strengthening the domestic talent pipeline.

88. This is particularly the case in subjects critical to science and technology sovereignty. Jess Wade told us that as these subjects are more expensive to teach, there is a greater reliance on international students to subsidise domestic ones.¹⁵⁶ She said that uptake among domestic students in subjects such as physics and engineering remains low, describing it as a “talent pipeline issue” for industries such as quantum.¹⁵⁷ A senior strategic scientist at the Ministry of Defence told us of her concerns about the number of foreign nationals in key STEM areas such as radar: “If we want to be able to skill up people, we need them to be UK nationals rather than skilling up the world.”¹⁵⁸

Conclusions and Recommendations

Shifting global policy – the current context

1. The Committee recognises that Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) spending has been reduced to allow the wider defence budget to be increased, but highlights the risks in making deep cuts to ODA for Research and Development (R&D). The UK has been shortsighted in making cuts to this area as part of its wider cuts to overseas aid. Along with its spending on health, a much larger part of the aid budget, ODA for R&D is an investment that can greatly benefit the UK in terms of preventing disease outbreaks and assisting future science discoveries, as well as building important science diplomacy links. While recognising the financial and political constraints around restoring ODA spend, we call on the government to reconsider when it comes to R&D spend. The cuts constitute a missed opportunity for the UK to strengthen its global leadership in science and technology, with the risk that this spot may be taken up by competitors. The impact on our relationships and reputation will resonate for years to come. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)

2. In its response to this report, the government should set out its assessment of the impact of ODA cuts on international science collaboration, including on areas such as the International Science Partnership Framework. While recognising the pressures and trade-offs facing public finances, we urge the government to restore ODA funding for research and development across departments, given the clear strategic, diplomatic and scientific benefits of doing so. (Recommendation, Paragraph 20)

3. The UK’s Global Talent Fund is a welcome initiative but lacks ambition and scale. It fails to address the high upfront costs faced by researchers coming to the UK, which our witnesses consistently identified as a key deterrent for science and tech talent. It is short-sighted to promote the UK as a destination for global talent while retaining financial barriers that make it less competitive than its peers. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

4. The UK-US pharmaceutical agreement has secured benefits—notably exemption from tariffs—but it also appears to have involved significant commitments affecting core elements of UK domestic policy. Changes relating to medicine spending, NICE thresholds, and the Voluntary Scheme for Branded Medicines Pricing, Access and Growth (VPAG) are key to UK health policy, and it is disappointing that it is external pressure rather than discussion within the UK that seems to have led to change. It also raises the question of how far the UK can rely on its strategic relationship with the US. Although the global nature of the pharmaceutical sector inevitably means that trade negotiations will have an impact, decisions about NHS spending, pricing, and access to medicines should primarily be driven by the needs of UK patients, balanced with the sustainability of the life sciences sector. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)

5. In its response to this report, the government should set out how commitments made under the UK-US agreement will deliver tangible benefits for NHS patients and system sustainability, rather than simply improving commercial conditions for industry. It should commit to ensuring that UK medicine policy will remain sovereign, transparent, and grounded in domestic priorities, and ensure that future trade negotiations do not unduly determine core elements of UK health policy. The government should also set out how it determined that 12% of NHS spending on medicines, as set out in the UK-US agreement, is the correct amount. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)

Strategy

6. The UK has big ambitions for science diplomacy, and a strong research base, but these are not matched by strategy or delivery. The government has not articulated a coherent strategic framework setting out priority partners, technologies, or intended outcomes of its partnerships, but instead seems to take an opportunistic approach to international agreements. Without such a framework, the UK risks substituting activity for strategy, undermining both domestic outcomes and its credibility as an international partner. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)

7. The Government should move beyond its opportunistic approach to international agreements in science and technology. It should, in its response to this report, commit to establishing and publishing clear criteria for decisions on its science partnerships. This should include explicit strategies for engagement with the US, the EU, Commonwealth partners, other middle powers, and competitor states such as China and Russia. Within this framework, the government should set out:

• How it intends to define and pursue technology sovereignty, including the balance between domestic capability, bilateral dependencies with trusted partners, and participation in wider networks of allied nations;
• Its strategy for talent development and recruitment, including the balance between building domestic capability and attracting international expertise; and
• Its approach to risk, including the degree to which UK intellectual property should be protected in collaborative arrangements, and the extent to which the UK faces technological competition or hostile activity from partner and competitor states.

Based on this, the UK Science and Technology Network should be given a more significant role in setting direction, tasked with reviewing and rationalising its country portfolio in line with these priorities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48)

8. For the six frontier technologies in the Digital and Technologies Sector Plan, and for space, the government should bring forward detailed, cross-government strategies accompanied by clear delivery plans. The forthcoming Plan for Space provides an important opportunity to do this. These strategies should set out national capability priorities, funding commitments, responsible departments, and measurable targets, as well as which technologies should be controlled by government, by UK industry and institutions, by non-UK firms operating in the UK, and whether our goals in each are leadership, competitiveness, or capacity. The strategies should move beyond high-level ambition to provide a clear framework for execution, ensuring that investment is targeted, decisions are prioritised, and the UK is positioned as a credible and consistent international partner. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)

9. We support the principles behind the government and UKRI’s efforts to reform research funding, streamlining and coordinating work across its councils, and deploying it to drive economic growth. However, this should be carefully managed to take into account the impact on the UK’s international commitments and reputation. The welcome emphasis on achieving economic growth should not be at the expense of the longer-term, curiosity-driven work that is needed to drive scientific progress, and should not be allowed to damage the UK’s international standing or wider science diplomacy. Science diplomacy should be explicitly incorporated into UKRI’s remit, to help ensure that its funding decisions, programmes and international partnerships are aligned with the UK’s strategic objectives. (Conclusion, Paragraph 50)

10. We visited the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in 2025 and were greatly impressed not only by the work being carried out there to push back the boundaries of human knowledge, but by the scope and depth of the international collaboration it involves. We hoped in this report to celebrate the appointment of the first British head of CERN for three decades as a major win for science diplomacy, particularly after the UK’s exit from the EU. Unfortunately, this success has been overshadowed by events. Marking the beginning of the director general’s term by abruptly pulling promised funding from a planned upgrade at CERN—threatening the project’s future—displays a fundamental lack of joined-up thinking and potentially jeopardises the UK’s relationship with the EU on issues of science and innovation. The hasty and abrupt way the decision was communicated compounds the damage to the UK’s standing with its international partners. (Conclusion, Paragraph 51)

Sovereignty

11. As geopolitics shifts, the UK is in a global race for sovereign capability across a range of technologies, whether it acknowledges it or not. Achieving sovereign capability requires the government to be clear about the trade-offs and risks involved and realistic about what is achievable. Setting an ambition for what the government considers sovereign capability, in what it considers to be key sectors, is a necessary precursor for a joined-up strategy to develop key technologies. Limiting transparency around the UK’s ambitions for sovereign capabilities is unlikely to be hiding anything from competitors such as Russia and China, but it is leaving UK tech companies in the dark. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

12. The US’s decision to restrict some advanced AI models should be a powerful reminder to the UK government that it may not be able to count even on its allies for access to technologies. Leverage may not be enough to guarantee sovereignty. As AI and other technologies develop fast and in unpredictable directions—and play an increasingly central role in national security—it is essential to ensure that the UK cannot be cut off from key technologies at the whim of a foreign government. This could mean diversifying partnerships to ensure multiple points of access where possible, and thinking creatively about sources of leverage outside a specific tech stack, or outside tech altogether. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)

13. The government should set out how it intends to protect its sovereignty in AI, in particular, in the face of fast-changing geopolitical and technological developments. The government should work with industry and academia to define sovereign capability for the five critical technologies outlined in its 2025 Science and Technology Framework. This should include setting a clear and consistent definition of sovereignty, supported by detailed analysis of technology supply chains to identify critical components, dependencies, and areas of comparative UK strength. This should be published—or at least shared with the Intelligence and Security Committee—and used to guide investment, procurement, and research funding decisions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)

14. While the own–collaborate–access framework provides a useful foundation for prioritising the UK’s approach to critical technologies, it is currently applied at too high a level to guide effective decision-making. Holding an ambition for an entire technology to be in the “own” category, as the government currently does in relation to quantum, may not be feasible. (Conclusion, Paragraph 63)

15. The Government should operationalise the own–collaborate–access framework by applying it at the level of specific capabilities within technology stacks, rather than to technologies as a whole. It should publish assessments setting out which components the UK seeks to own, where it should prioritise collaboration, and where access will be required. These priorities should be aligned with the broader international strategy for science and tech, as outlined in the previous chapter. (Recommendation, Paragraph 64)

16. The government’s move towards prioritising specific technologies in sectors such as space represents a welcome shift away from a broad-based approach. However, its current approach to specialisation remains high level and insufficiently defined in areas we examined, including space and quantum. The rationale underpinning these priorities is not clearly articulated, and there is limited transparency about how decisions have been made. As a result, it is difficult to assess whether the selected areas reflect the UK’s comparative strengths or maximise long-term strategic advantage. (Conclusion, Paragraph 68)

17. The government should provide greater clarity on its approach to technological specialisation. This should include setting out, in specific terms, the capabilities and sub-sectors it intends to prioritise within broad fields such as space and quantum. It should also publish the criteria and evidence base used to inform these decisions, including how considerations such as market opportunity, existing strengths, sovereign capability, and international competition have been weighed. Greater transparency would strengthen confidence in these choices and help ensure that public and private investment is directed effectively. (Recommendation, Paragraph 69)

18. The UK excels at generating early-stage research and innovation but falls short in translating this strength into the growth and scaling of high-tech domestic companies. UK-developed innovations are too often commercialised overseas, with high-growth firms in strategic sectors such as quantum and space forced to go overseas to scale. DeepMind is perhaps the clearest example: had the UK been able to provide the scale-up investment required, the company might not have been sold to Google, and the UK would not need to rely on overseas firms for its generative AI capabilities. This long-standing issue has become urgent as geopolitical shifts, combined with leaps in technology, focus attention on the question of technology sovereignty. It is unclear what the government’s objectives are in relation to capital markets and the commercialisation of innovation: whether it seeks to retain and scale leading companies domestically or is content for them to be acquired overseas, provided the UK shares in the returns. (Conclusion, Paragraph 79)

19. The failure to scale companies reflects longstanding and deep-seated weaknesses in availability of laterstage capital, including a shortage of large, specialist funds and a limited pool of investors with the technical expertise and risk appetite to lead deeptech investments. The government is taking steps to address the issue, but they may not be enough. Public investment institutions such as British Business Bank play an important role in supporting UK tech but are too limited in scale and coordination to mobilise private capital at the level needed. Recent reforms, including the Mansion House agenda, have the potential to unlock substantial new capital, but their impact will take time to materialise, and without systemic reform they are unlikely to resolve the scaleup gap on their own. (Conclusion, Paragraph 80)

20. The government should encourage the growth of specialist funds with deep sectoral expertise, including by supporting team development, attracting international talent, and enabling experienced technical leaders to transition into investment roles. The government should use its own procurement more strategically to support innovative companies, providing them with early revenue, validation, and a pathway to scale within the UK, particularly in strategically important sectors. We encourage the government to move ahead with its proposed dedicated unit to increase procurement of innovation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 81)

Research security

21. The UK’s research base is operating in an increasingly contested global environment. The risks to research security are growing but the UK’s response is insufficiently developed. Though the recent breach at UK Biobank illustrated how research collaborations can be exploited by hostile actors, the government’s current “actor agnostic” approach has not translated into clear, practical guidance for those managing these risks on the ground. Too much responsibility is placed on individual academics, who do not have the resources to make informed judgements on national security risks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 89)

22. The government should provide clearer and more detailed guidance on how institutions should approach research security, aligned with its wider strategy for international collaboration, as set out in chapter 1. This should include better information-sharing between government and institutions to support decision-making and a review of how central advisory functions such as the Research Collaboration Advice Team are operating and how they can be strengthened to better support researchers in navigating security risks. (Recommendation, Paragraph 90)

23. While targeted measures to strengthen research security are important, they cannot be considered in isolation from the wider structural pressures facing UK universities. Financial constraints, reliance on international student income and weaknesses in the domestic talent pipeline in key subjects such as physics and engineering all shape institutional incentives. Without addressing these underlying factors, efforts to improve research security may be limited in impact. Building a clearer evidence base on the domestic talent pipeline in critical disciplines is essential. (Conclusion, Paragraph 91)

24. In its response to this report, the government should set out a clear, cross-departmental strategy for ensuring a secure and sustainable domestic talent pipeline in the key scientific and technological capabilities it has identified as critical to the UK’s future prosperity and security. This should include an assessment of current and projected skills needs, and should set out how the government will determine and maintain an appropriate balance between domestic and international talent in these areas, ensuring that reliance on overseas recruitment does not undermine the development of domestic capability. (Conclusion, Paragraph 92)

Formal minutes

Wednesday 1 July 2026

Members present

Dame Chi Onwurah, in the Chair

Tom Collins

Emily Darlington

Dr Allison Gardner

Kit Malthouse

Freddie van Mierlo

Martin Wrigley

Daniel Zeichner

Declaration of interests

The following declarations of interest relating to the inquiry were made:

9 September 2025

Dr Lauren Sullivan declared the following interest: that she was a visiting professor at the Crick Institute, and Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Malaria, which works with the charity Malaria No More.

3 December 2025

George Freeman declared the following interest: that he was an advisor to the Board of Trustees at the Guy Foundation Family Trust.

17 March 2026

Emily Darlington declared the following interest: that the British Standards Institution is located in her constituency.

1 July 2026

Kit Malthouse declared the following interest: that he was a shareholder and unpaid director of Lockhouse Systems Ltd, a software and technology development company.

Science diplomacy: Sovereignty, strategy, and the global race

Draft Report (Science diplomacy: Sovereignty, strategy, and the global race), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 92 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Third Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Tuesday 7 July at 11.15 a.m.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Tuesday 15 July 2025

Professor Charlotte Watts, Executive Director, Solutions, Wellcome Trust; Dr Jean-Christophe Mauduit, Associate Professor of Science Diplomacy, University College London (UCL)Q1-34

Dr Pia Hüsch, Research Fellow in Cyber, Technology and National Security, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI); James Black, Deputy Director, Defence and Security, European Lead, Space, RANDQ35-54

Tuesday 9 September 2025

Lord O’Neill of Gatley, Lord, House of Lords; Professor Dame Jenny Harries, Former Chief Executive, UK Health Security AgencyQ55-84

Victoria Fowler, Head of UK Advocacy, Malaria No More UK; Mike Podmore, CEO, Stop AIDS; Dr Philippa Matthews, Clinical Group Leader, Francis Crick InstituteQ85-121

Tuesday 2 December 2025

Dr Manjari Chandran-Ramesh, Partner, Amadeus Capital Partners; Jessica Wade, Associate Professor, Imperial College LondonQ122-159

Jonathan Legh-Smith, Executive Director, UKQuantum; Duncan Jones, General Manager, QuantinuumQ160-206

Tuesday 27 January 2026

Dr Sania Nishtar, CEO, GaviQ207-224

Dr Alice Bunn, President, UKspace; Graham Turnock, Ex-CEO, UK Space AgencyQ225-257

Will Whitehorn, Chair, Seraphim Space Investment TrustQ258-275

Tuesday 17 March 2026

The Lord Vallance of Balham KCB, Minister for Science, Innovation, Research and Nuclear, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; Seema Malhotra MP, Minister for Indo-Pacific, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office; Rhys Bowen, Director for International and Economic Security, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; Nathanael Bevan, Deputy Director of the What Works Research and Evidence, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development OfficeQ276-359

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

SDY numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 Araújo, Professor Henrique (Professor, Imperial College London); Kaboth, Dr Asher (Senior Lecturer, Royal Holloway University of London); Palladino, Dr Kimberly (Associate Professor, University of Oxford); and Tovey, Professor Dan (Professor, University of Sheffield) SDY0024

2 Academy of Medical Sciences SDY0040

3 Academy of Social Sciences SDY0010

4 Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA) SDY0012

5 Agriculture, Nutrition & Health Academy SDY0047

6 Animal Aid SDY0031

7 Asthma + Lung UK SDY0030

8 Barrett, Dr Gordon (Research Associate, Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine (CHSTM) - University of Manchester); Flanagan, Professor Kieron (Professor of Science and Technology Policy, Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (MIOIR) - University of Manchester); Naisbitt, Alice (Research Associate (Science Policy), Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (MIOIR) - University of Manchester); and Turchetti, Professor Simone (Professor of History of Science and Technology, Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine (CHSTM) - University of Manchester); SDY0044

9 Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge SDY0026

10 CGIAR SDY0058

11 Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations SDY0034

12 Council on Geostrategy SDY0023

13 Crescenzi, Professor Riccardo (Professor of Economic Geography & Deputy Head of Department for Research, London School of Economics); and Piazza, Mr Gabriele (Research Officer, London School of Economics) SDY0006

14 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology SDY0020

15 Donovan, Professor Amy (Professor of Environmental Geography, University of Cambridge and co-chair, UK Alliance for Disaster Research) SDY0057

16 Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) SDY0061

17 Franklin, Dr Tom (Research Associate, University of Sheffield) SDY0008

18 Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance SDY0025

19 Hammond, Professor James (Director, Mount Paektu Research Centre, Birkbeck, University of London) SDY0005

20 High Value Manufacturing Catapult (HVM) SDY0054

21 Horby, Professor Sir Peter (Director of the Pandemic Sciences Institute, University of Oxford) SDY0041

22 IAVI SDY0015

23 ICR Research SDY0001

24 Impact Global Health; and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine SDY0036

25 Imperial College London SDY0033

26 JLR SDY0038

27 Khastgir, Professor Siddartha (WMG, University of Warwick, UK) SDY0050

28 Malaria No More UK SDY0045

29 Met Office SDY0043

30 Nabil, Mr Ryan SDY0053

31 National Biofilms Innovation Centre SDY0029

32 National Centre for Earth Observation (NCEO) SDY0051

33 National Measurement Laboratory at LGC SDY0013

34 National Oceanography Centre SDY0039

35 National Physical Laboratory SDY0049

36 Oxford China Policy Lab SDY0019

37 PHG Foundation SDY0028

38 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) UK SDY0018

39 Rees, Professor Gareth (Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge) SDY0022

40 Results UK SDY0011

41 Riches, Dr Amy SDY0052

42 Royal Academy of Engineering SDY0009

43 Royal Astronomical Society SDY0016

44 Russell Group SDY0017

45 STOPAIDS SDY0014

46 Sandhu, Dr Sandeep SDY0002

47 Stingelin-Giles, Dr Nicola (Ethics Advisor) SDY0003

48 The Alan Turing Institute SDY0035

49 The British Academy SDY0004

50 The Centre for Long-Term Resilience SDY0032

51 The NIHR Global Surgery Unit, University of Birmingham SDY0059

52 The Pirbright Institute SDY0048

53 The Royal Society SDY0021

54 The UK Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) SDY0027

55 UK Centre for Observation and Modelling of Earthquakes, Volcanoes and Tectonics (COMET) SDY0046

56 United Against Malnutrition and Hunger SDY0007

57 University College London - Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP) SDY0042

58 Wellcome Sanger Institute SDY0037

59 the Wellcome Trust SDY0056

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

Session 2026–27

Number	Title	Reference
2nd	Pre-appointment hearing for the Chair of Ofcom	HC 55
1st	Rewiring the state: Delivering digital government	HC 61
1st Special	Flying Blind: Innovation, Growth and the Regions: Government Response	HC 271

Session 2024–26

Number	Title	Reference
4th	Pre-appointment hearing for the Chair of UK Research and Innovation	HC 1844
3rd	Flying Blind: Innovation, Growth and the Regions	HC 538
2nd	Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms	HC 441
1st	Pre-appointment hearing for the Executive Chair of Innovate UK	HC 834
3rd Special	Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms: Government and Ofcom responses	HC 1397
2nd Special	Insect decline and UK food security: Government Response	HC 717
1st Special	Governance of artificial intelligence (AI): Government Response	HC 591

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Footnotes

1 World Economic Forum, “AI geopolitics and data in the era of technological rivalry”, 24 July 2025

2 Royal Society (SDY0021)

3 Patrick Vallance, “Creating strategic advantage in science and innovation”, FST Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2, July 2022

4 Royal Society, “New frontiers in science diplomacy”, January 2010

5 Royal Society, “Science diplomacy in an era of disruption”, February 2025

6 For example, Dr Nicola Stingelin-Giles (SDY0003), British Academy (SDY0004), Professor James Hammond (SDY0005), Professor Gareth Rees (SDY0022), Professor Siddartha Khastgir (SDY0050)

7 Prime Minister’s Office, PM Economy Speech, 30 June 2020; HM Government, “Global Britain in a competitive age”, CP 403, 16 March 2021

8 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “The UK Science and Technology Framework”, 6 March 2023

9 Council on Geostrategy (SDY0023)

10 Wellcome Trust (SDY0056)

11 Prime Minister’s Office, “Make Britain a Clean Energy Superpower” (accessed 30 June 2026); Peter Kyle, Speech at Giant Ideas, 16 June 2025

12 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, AI Opportunities Action Plan, CP 1241, 13 January 2025; Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “Prime Minister sets out blueprint to turbocharge AI”, 12 January 2025

13 Times Higher Education, “World University Rankings 2026”, 9 October 2025

14 World Intellectual Property Organization, Global Innovation Index 2025, 18 September 2025

15 Universities UK, Research and innovation data, [accessed 30 June 2026]

16 World Bank, “Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) - OECD members” [accessed 30 June 2026]

17 HESA, “UK higher education student numbers fall for second year in a row”, 27 January 2026

18 BBC News, “Spies, drones and blowtorches: How the US captured Maduro”, 3 January 2026; The Guardian, “Iran state media confirms killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei after US-Israeli missile strikes”, 1 March 2026; Centre for Strategic and Internation Studies, “Liberation Day” Tariffs Explained, 3 April 2025; Commons Library research briefing CBP-10472, President Trump and Greenland: Frequently asked questions

19 NATO, “Defence expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment” [accessed 30 June 2026]

20 Chatham House, “How a surge in defence and dual-use technology investment could reconfigure the global AI race”, 28 April 2026

21 European Parliament, Briefing: Defence and artificial intelligence, 11 April 2025

22 For example, NIHR Global Surgery Unit (SDY0059), Professor Amy Donovan (SDY0057), Professor Sir Peter Horby (SDY0041), The Centre for Long-Term Resilience (SDY0032), STOPAIDS (SDY0014)

23 HC Deb, 25 February 2025, col 632

24 HC Deb, 26 November 2020, col 1019

25 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, FCDO multi-year Official Development Assistance programme allocations 2026–2027 to 2028–2029: equality impact assessment, 19 March 2026

26 As above

27 Anneliese Dodds (@AnnelieseDodds), X (Twitter), 28 February 2025 [accessed 30 June 2026]

28 Royal Academy of Engineering (SDY0009)

29 ICR Research (SDY001)

30 Q16

31 As above

32 Q66

33 Q22

34 Q94

35 Q334

36 Q331

37 The White House, “Re-evaluating and realigning United States Foreign Aid”, 20 January 2025; US State Department, “On Delivering an America First Foreign Assistance Program” 28 March 2025; BBC News, “More than 80% of USAID programmes ‘officially ending’”, 10 March 2025

38 Q68

39 Q57

40 Q108

41 US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, “Science Survives Existential Threat From Trump Budget as Senate Rejects Gutting NASA, NSF, & NIST”, 15 January 2026

42 Nature, “White House proposes vast overhaul of US science funding: what you need to know” 3 June 2026

43 FABBS News, “National Science Board Dismissed”, 6 May 2026

44 The White House, “President’s Budget” [accessed 30 June 2026]

45 Q24

46 Royal Society, “UK immigration costs: an international comparison of skilled worker, researcher and student visas in 2025”, 21 October 2025

47 For example, Animal Aid (SDY0031), The British Academy (SDY0004), Royal Academy of Engineering (SDY0009), Russell Group (SDY0017)

48 Wellcome Trust (SDY0056), Academy of Medial Sciences (SDY0040)

49 Q8

50 Financial Times, “Canada launches $1.2bn fund to poach academic talent from US”, 9 December 2025

51 Science, “Europe pledges €600 million to lure foreign researchers, vows to protect scientific freedom”, 5 May 2025

52 The Pie, “We’ve lost a generation of scientists’: US talent turns to France”, 5 March 2026

53 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “Leading lights of UK research spearhead search for world’s best talent”, 18 July 2025

54 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “UK launches global talent drive to attract world-leading researchers and innovators”, 22 June 2025

55 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “More leading researchers brought to the UK, while Horizon Europe performance strengthens in 2024”, 5 June 2026

56 Financial Times, “Merck slams UK as it scraps £1bn London drug research centre”, 10 September 2025; BBC News, “AstraZeneca pauses £200m Cambridge investment”, 12 September 2025

57 Department for Health and Social Care, “2024 voluntary scheme for branded medicines pricing, access and growth”, 14 December 2023; Association for the British Pharmaceutical Industry, “Voluntary Scheme on branded medicines” [accessed 30 June 2026]

58 Q11; Q17

59 Q11

60 Q11

61 Q51

62 The White House, “Delivering Most-Favored-Nation Prescription Drug Pricing to American Patients”, 12 May 2025

63 POLITICO, “Trump hikes tariffs on heavy trucks, pharma and kitchen cabinets”, 25 September 2025

64 Office of the US Trade Representative. “U.S. Government Announces Agreement in Principle with the United Kingdom on Pharmaceutical Pricing”, 1 December 2025

65 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “Arrangement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom on pharmaceutical pricing”, 2 April 2026

66 Q353-Q355

67 Q86

68 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) (SDY0020)

69 Prime Minister’s Office, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding the Technology Prosperity Deal”, 18 September 2025; Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “UK-India Technology Security Initiative factsheet”, 25 July 2024; Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “UK and Japan strengthen science and technology ties”, 3 February 2026; Department for Science Innovation and Technology, “UK-Canada cooperation in AI compute: memorandum of understanding”, 31 January 2024; Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “Stronger tech ties and international agreements on AI to modernise public services and reduce costs for Britons as UK Tech Minister wraps Canada visit”, 12 December 2025

70 Q169 [Jonathan Legh-Smith]

71 Q168 [Jonathan Legh-Smith]

72 Q40

73 Royal Academy of Engineering (SDY009)

74 ICR Research (SDY001)

75 ICR Research (SDY001)

76 The Royal Society (SDY0021)

77 IAVI (SDY0015)

78 For example, National Oceanography Centre (SDY0039); Department for Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy, University College London (SDY0042)

79 Q161 [Jonathan Legh-Smith]

80 Q268

81 UK Space Agency, “Space firms to scale-up and thrive in Britain with government backing for bolder strategy”, 4 March 2026; Q269

82 Q228

83 Q273 [Will Whitehorn]

84 Q65 [Professor Dame Jenny Harries]

85 Q65 [Professor Dame Jenny Harries]

86 The Royal Society (SDY0021)

87 House of Commons, written question UIN 105676, 27 January 2026

88 UKRI, “Budget allocations for UK Research and Innovation”, 17 December 2025

89 Michele Dougherty, “Re: STFC - reprioritisation of PPAN investments”, 28 January 2026

90 Financial Times, “UK to scrap more than £250mn in planned physics project funding”, 5 February 2026; Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, “Correspondence from Minister for Science to the Chair”, 19 March 2026; Q11

91 Q48

92 Q27

93 Liaison Committee, “Letter from the Prime Minister relating to his appearance before the Committee on 23 March 2026”, 13 April 2026

94 Royal Academy of Engineering (SDY0009)

95 High Value Manufacturing Catapult (SDY0054)

96 Comment is Freed, Sovereignty for Sale (accessed 10 June 2026)

97 Department for Business and Trade, The UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy, CP 1451, 23 June 2025; Department for Business and Trade, The UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy - Digital and Technologies Sector Plan, 23 June 2025

98 Department for Business and Trade, The UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy - Advanced Manufacturing Sector Plan, 23 June 2025

99 Business and Trade Committee, Toward A New Doctrine For Economic Security, 24 November 2025, para 114

100 Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, The National Security Strategy, 27 March 2026, para 153

101 Liaison Committee, “Letter from the Prime Minister relating to his appearance before the Committee on 23 March 2026”, 13 April 2026

102 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “Rebuilding Britain for the new world: Liz Kendall’s speech at the Royal United Services Institute”, 28 April 2026

103 HC Deb, 10 March 2026, col 103WH

104 Q167 [Duncan Jones]

105 Q168

106 Q126

107 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “The UK Science and Technology Framework”, 6 March 2023

108 HM Government, “Global Britain in a competitive age”, CP 403, 16 March 2021, p38

109 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “UK’s “Quantum leap” to help beat disease, deliver high-paid jobs, and strengthen national security, as first country in the world to roll out Quantum computers at scale”, 17 March 2026 ; Q295

110 Q323

111 Q126

112 Financial Times, “Anthropic scrambles after Trump administration freezes its top AI models”, 15 June 2026; Financial Times, “Trump administration asks OpenAI to stagger release of new model to vet users”, 26 June 2026

113 Kanishka Narayan (@KanishkaNarayan) X (Twitter), 13 June 2026 [accessed 30 June 2026]

114 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “A decisive shift to power British AI: new £1.1 billion plan to back chip firms, boost computing power and skills for the AI revolution”, 8 June 2026

115 Department for Business and Trade, The UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy, CP 1451, 23 June 2025

116 Q229

117 Q235

118 Q234

119 UK Space Agency, “Space firms to scale-up and thrive in Britain with government backing for bolder strategy”, 4 March 2026

120 As above

121 Q225, Q237

122 Q237, Q238

123 Q124 [Dr Manjari Chandran-Ramesh]

124 Q161 [Jonathan Legh-Smith]

125 Q258, Q260, Q275

126 Q140

127 Q142

128 Q148

129 Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, Flying Blind: Innovation, Growth and the Regions, 13 March 2026, para 93

130 As above, para 91

131 House of Lords Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, Bleeding to death: the science and technology growth emergency, 5 November 2025

132 Q313

133 HM Treasury, “Chancellor Jeremy Hunt’s Mansion House speech”, 10 July 2023

134 HM Treasury, Pensions Investment Review: Final Report, 29 May 2025; Pension Schemes Act 2026

135 Q313

136 Q141

137 Q130

138 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “UK’s “Quantum leap” to help beat disease, deliver high-paid jobs, and strengthen national security, as first country in the world to roll out Quantum computers at scale”, 17 March 2026

139 Q193

140 Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, Flying Blind: Innovation, Growth and the Regions: Government Response, 16 June 2026

141 Q27

142 The Manchester Institute of Innovation Research and the Centre for the History of Science Technology and Medicine at the University of Manchester (SDY0044)

143 The Royal Society (SDY0021); legislation includes security, data, and export legislation.

144 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, “Minister of State statement to the House of Commons”, 23 April 2026

145 HC Deb, 23 April 2026, col. 473

146 UK Biobank, “UK Biobank Oversight Committee report”, 4 June 2026

147 BBC News, “Foreign states targeting UK universities, MI5 warns”, 26 April 2024

148 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) (SDY0020)

149 European Council, “Council adopts a recommendation to enhance research security”, 23 May 2024

150 National Security and Investment Act 2021

151 Cabinet Office, “National Security and Investment Act: guidance for the higher education and research-intensive sectors” 21 May 2024

152 Q41

153 Q41

154 Q39

155 The Manchester Institute of Innovation Research and the Centre for the History of Science Technology and Medicine at the University of Manchester (SDY0044)

156 Q126

157 Q156, Q157

158 Oral evidence: Government Chief Scientific Adviser and departmental Chief Scientific Advisers, HC 670, 28 January 2025, Q32 [Professor Tamsin Mather, Senior Strategic Scientist, Ministry of Defence]