Joint Committee On Human Rights Seventeenth Report


The Joint Committee on Human Rights has agreed to the following Report:


The Background to the Bill and the Committee's Scrutiny

1. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill (HC Bill 119) was introduced to the House of Commons and received its first reading on 12 April 2002. It completed its Commons stages on 12 June, and was introduced to the House of Lords as HL Bill 89. It carries a section 19 statement of compatibility by Lord Filkin. The published Explanatory Notes[1] include material on the Government's view as to the particular human rights engaged by the Bill.[2] The Bill's purpose is to give effect to a number of proposals derived from the White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Havens: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain[3] (hereafter 'White Paper') and the consultation process which flowed from it. The Bill was heavily amended in the House of Commons, with the Government proposing substantial amendments on Report. References to clause numbers in this Report are to the Bill as introduced to the House of Lords.

2. Immigration control, naturalisation qualifications, and the provision of support for asylum-seekers are all emotive and sensitive issues. They bring into play diverse opinions about the nature of British society, methods of managing relationships between diverse social, racial, ethnic and religious communities, the best approach to regulating immigration, the proper response to the country's responsibilities in respect of people claiming refugee status. We are well aware of the emotiveness of the subjects with which the Bill deals, and of the social and political controversies which surround them. However, we are concerned the necessity to provide effective protection for human rights against the misuse of public powers. The wider policy debates are relevant to our work only as part of the background against which we have scrutinized the Bill for its human rights implications.

3. Nevertheless, we consider that the way a State treats powerless and vulnerable people is an important indicator of the vitality of its human rights culture. We recall that the Preambles to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, all assert that recognition of the inherent dignity of all members of the human family is the foundation of equal human rights. This view also underpins the Preambles to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Immigrants and asylum-seekers, lacking a political base in the United Kingdom, are particularly at risk of having their dignity and rights undervalued in the legislative process and subsequent administrative action. When evaluating its human rights implications, we have therefore examined the Bill with particular care.

4. Following an initial assessment, the Chair of the Committee wrote to the Secretary of State for the Home Department on 29 April 2002 seeking answers to a number of questions about the Bill by 15 May.[4] The Home Office failed to meet that target. Its response was received on 30 May. We draw attention to the fact that this made it impossible for us to report on the Bill in time for our conclusions to be useful to the House of Commons. It is essential for Departments to comply with deadlines for their replies to our questions if we are to report in time for both Houses to be in possession of our considered views when they examine Bills. This is particularly important when a Bill has substantial human rights implications. In future, if a Department cannot meet the deadline for replying to our questions about such a Bill, especially one which is programmed in the House of Commons, the Government's business managers should ensure that the Bill's timetable is set to give time for the Committee to Report. In the meantime, we have been greatly assisted by submissions from a number of organizations and individuals, whose expertise has contributed substantially to our deliberations. This evidence is reproduced as an Annex to this Report, and we acknowledge our gratitude to its authors.

5. For the reader's convenience, section B of this Report provides an overview of the Bill, and section C offers an outline of relevant human rights principles. The Report then examines particular issues arising under the Bill—

    Matters relating to nationality

    The regime for accommodation centres, particularly in relation to children

    Destitute asylum-seekers and their dependants outside accommodation centres

    Detention before removal, particularly in relation to children

    Removing asylum-seekers to other EU Member States under the Dublin Convention


    Penalties, authority to carry schemes, and criminal offences

The Structure of the Bill

6. The Bill is divided into eight Parts. The Government accepted that some aspects of the Bill might engage Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998, and expressed a view about compatibility in the published Explanatory Notes to the Bill. These aspects are noted in this section of the Report, and are discussed in subsequent sections.

7. Part 1 of the Bill (clauses 1-13 and Schedules 1 and 2) would amend the law on nationality and citizenship, inter alia introducing additional criteria to be met by those wishing to become UK citizens by naturalisation (knowledge of a language and knowledge about life in the United Kingdom), and a requirement that (unless waived by the Secretary of State on exceptional grounds) new British citizens swear an oath (or make an affirmation) of allegiance to the Crown and make a pledge of loyalty to the United Kingdom. Clause 4 would, for the first time, allow the Secretary of State in some circumstances to withdraw British citizenship from someone who was born a British citizen. Clause 6 would bring nationality (but not immigration) functions for the first time within the scope of the duty of public authorities not to discriminate on racial grounds under the Race Relations Act 1976 as amended. (At some future time, we may wish to consider whether immigration functions could be included within the scope of the 1976 Act.) Clause 7 would require reasons to be given for discretionary decisions about nationality, and would permit a right of appeal against such decisions, for the first time.

8. Part 2 (clauses 14-36) would allow the Secretary of State to establish 'accommodation centres' for asylum-seekers, and would make provision for their use and management and the facilities they would provide. It would be possible to require a person to leave an accommodation centre if he or a dependant breached a condition of residence. This gives rise to questions about the effect of the new regime on the human rights of destitute asylum-seekers. In relation to human rights, the Government takes the view that—

9. A further issue arises in relation to the provision of education in accommodation centres (clauses 31 and 32).

10. Part 3 (clauses 37-51 and Schedule 3) would amend the rules relating to other forms of support for asylum-seekers, clarifying the law in some respects and replacing the current scheme of vouchers with money payments. However, clause 48 and Schedule 3 would make certain classes of person ineligible for support. The Government accepts that this could engage ECHR Article 3, but argues that the exceptions to the provisions would avoid incompatibility.[7] Clause 44 would allow the Secretary of State to deprive a person of support available under Parts 2 and 3 if the person had not complied with conditions on which temporary admission or release from detention has been granted. The Government accepts that this too could engage ECHR Article 3, but points out that the support could be reinstated if withdrawal gave rise to a risk of a violation of Article 3 and the person agreed to comply with the conditions.[8] These matters are considered further below.

11. Part 4 (clauses 52-68) would amend the law on detention and removal of people whose applications to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are being considered or have been rejected. Among other things—

    —  there would be power to detain pending a decision whether to remove (clause 52);

    —  detention centres would be redesignated as removal centres (clause 56);

    —  there would be restrictions on release on bail after a decision to remove but before removal (clause 57);

    —  there would be provision for directing the removal of members of the family of a person whose removal had been ordered (clause 62); and

    —  clause 68 would change the law on removing an asylum-seeker to a Member State of the EU, which would be assumed to be 'safe' for this purpose.

12. Part 5 (clauses 69-101 and Schedules 4 to 7) would amend and to some degree consolidate and rationalise the law on appeals against immigration and asylum decisions, including the circumstances in which an applicant would have to leave the United Kingdom before being permitted to appeal, and those in which no appeal would be available and the applicant would only be able to apply for judicial review. Clauses 81 to 87 would permit the Secretary of State or an immigration officer to cut off a person's right of appeal against certain immigration, deportation and refusal of entry decisions, including (clause 81) a decision to remove an asylum-seeker to a third country, by certifying (for example) that the ground of appeal has already been considered on an earlier appeal, or that the claim is clearly unfounded, etc. Clause 83 would prevent a person outside the United Kingdom from appealing on the ground that removal would violate his or her rights under the Convention on the Status of Refugees. The Government accepts that the loss of a right of appeal while within the country may affect people's Convention rights, but points out that, when a person is to be removed to another country without a right of appeal under the Immigration and Appeals Act 1999 (rather than a right of appeal under the Bill), the Secretary of State would have to certify that there was no reason to believe that the person's Convention rights would be infringed in that country.[9] That provision, in clause 101(2) and (4), appears to be merely transitional. We give further consideration to the matter below, paragraphs 93-108.

13. Part 6 (clauses 102-123 and Schedules 7 and 8) would amend the law on immigration procedures. Among other things—

    —  Clause 103 would allow the Secretary of State or an immigration officer to require a person to state the grounds on which he or she seeks to stay in the United Kingdom. An adjudicator hearing an appeal would then have to decide all grounds which could be the subject of an appeal under clause 70(1) (see clauses 73 and 74). An applicant for asylum is thus deemed also to have applied for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom on other grounds, allowing all possible arguments for allowing him or her to remain to be dealt with in the same set of proceedings.

    —  Clauses 107-108 and Schedule 8 would allow the Secretary of State to introduce a new 'authority to carry' (ATC) scheme, requiring carriers to seek authority to bring passengers to the United Kingdom, and would allow the Secretary of State to impose a penalty on carriers who bring people to the United Kingdom without authority under the scheme. The details of the scheme or schemes would be set out in subordinate legislation, which, to be lawful, would have to be compatible with Convention rights. The provisions would also amend the arrangements for penalising carriers who bring into the United Kingdom clandestine entrants or people without proper documents, in order to rectify an incompatibility between the present arrangements and the right to a fair hearing under ECHR Article 6(1). The Government takes the view that the latter amendments would ensure that the law is compatible with Convention rights.[10]

    —  Clauses 109-111 would allow travellers to be required or permitted to provide information about their physical characteristics, and would authorise that information to be collected and stored under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The Government accepts that this engages the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article 8(1), but argues that the provisions are justified under Article 8(2) as being in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime and for the maintenance of an orderly immigration system, which is in the interests of the economic well-being of the country.[11] We accept this, and will not refer further to this matter in this Report.

    —  Clauses 112-121 would permit information about individuals to be disclosed in some circumstances for the purposes of immigration-related proceedings. The privilege against self-incrimination would be protected by clause 122. The collection and disclosure of personal data could engage rights under ECHR Article 8(1). The Government takes the view that the powers would be justifiable under Article 8(2).[12] We agree, and will not refer further to this matter in this Report.

14. Part 7 (clauses 124-136 would amend the law on immigration-related offences. It would also change the current law on forfeiture, following conviction of an offence of assisting illegal immigration, of vehicles, ships and aircraft in which immigrants have arrived without proper papers in the United Kingdom. Clauses 133-135 would also confer additional powers of entry, search and seizure on immigration officers and police officers investigating immigration matters. The Government accepts that these powers engage rights under ECHR Article 8(1), but considers that they are justifiable under Article 8(2).[13] We agree, and will not consider these provisions further in this report.

15. Part 8 (clauses 137-143 and Schedule 9) contain the usual supplementary provisions relating to interpretation, money, repeals, commencement, extent, and short title. They give rise to no risk of incompatibility with human rights, and are not considered further in this Report.

Outline of relevant human rights principles

16. International law recognises the right of States to control entry to their territories. However, the United Kingdom is bound in international and national law by Article 3 of the ECHR (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). The European Commission of Human Rights has held that systematic racial discrimination against a particular racial group in immigration control may in some circumstances amount to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.[14]

17. The United Kingdom is bound in international law by a number of human rights obligations relating to immigration. In particular—

    —  ICCPR Article 12(4) protects nationals of a State by prohibiting States from arbitrarily depriving anyone of the right to enter his own country, although the United Kingdom has entered a reservation to Article 12(4) reserving its 'right to continue to apply such immigration legislation governing entry into, stay in and departure from the UK as they may deem necessary from time to time'. The operation of Article 12(4) therefore does not prevent legislation from restricting the right 'as regards persons not at the time having the right under the law of the UK to enter and remain in the UK', but this must not permit arbitrary deprivation of the right, as this would frustrate one of the purposes of Article 12(4).

    —  Children are entitled to special protection. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 3(1) requires that authorities make the best interests of the child a primary consideration in all actions concerning children. Article 9(1) requires States to ensure that children are not separated from their parents, except where that would be in the best interests of the child. Article 10(1) accordingly provides that applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the purposes of family reunifications are to be dealt with in a 'positive, humane and expeditious manner', and Article 10(2) requires States to 'respect the right of the child and his or her enter their own country'. However, when it ratified the Convention the United Kingdom entered reservations similar in effect to those it entered to Article 12 of the ICCPR. One of the reservations, read literally, would allow the Government to disapply the CRC rights so far as they relate to people who are subject to immigration control. In our view, that would be incompatible with the object and purposes of the CRC, and so would not constitute a valid reservation. Indeed, we note that the Committee on the Rights of the Child concluded in 1995 that the reservation 'does not appear to be compatible with the principles and provisions of the Convention' on these grounds,[15] and that this view is shared by some independent experts in human rights and immigration law.[16] We comment further below on the measures which need to be taken to ensure that the proposals in the Bill do not violate rights under the CRC.

18. The United Kingdom is under an obligation, in both international and national law under ECHR Article 8(1) and the Human Rights Act 1998, to respect the rights to family life of people in de facto family relationships to the mutual enjoyment of each other's company. This is capable of affecting immigration decisions, although an interference with the right may be justified under Article 8(2) in the circumstances of an individual case. There are also obligations to ensure that people have housing which is adequate to their needs and an adequate standard of living, under ICESC Article 11(1).

19. The United Kingdom is bound by a general obligation of non-discrimination on the ground of race, etc., under ICCPR Article 26, and an obligation of non-discrimination in relation to the enjoyment and protection of rights under the respective international treaties by virtue of ECHR Article 14 and ICESC Article 2(2), and the equivalent provisions in the CRC.

20. The United Kingdom is bound by the Convention on the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1951).

21. The United Kingdom has not ratified the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR. As a result, Article 2(1) and (4) (which provides everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall have the right to liberty of movement and the right to choose his residence within that territory, subject to any restrictions imposed in particular areas in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society) is not one of the Convention rights made part of national law by the Human Rights Act 1998. Nor are Article 2(2) (the right to leave the country, subject to any conditions permitted under Article 2(3)) and Articles 3 and 4 (freedom from expulsion from territory of State of which one is a national, freedom from deprivation of right to enter State of which one is a national, and prohibition on collective expulsion of aliens).

22. Similarly the right of aliens lawfully resident in the territory of a State not to be expelled without having an opportunity to exercise specified procedural rights, unless the expulsion is necessary in the interests of national security or is grounded on reasons of national security (Article 1 of the Seventh Protocol to the ECHR) does not bind the United Kingdom in international or in national law.


23. Clause 4 of the Bill (deprivation of citizenship) would substitute new sections 40 and 40A for section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981. New section 40 would, among other things, for the first time allow the Secretary of State to deprive a person born a British citizen of his or her British citizenship. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution asked the Government about the constitutional justification for this, and was told that the Government intends the provision to remove unjustifiable distinctions between naturalised British citizenship and those who acquired their citizenship at birth.[17] The conditions for exercising the power (as amended in the House of Commons) would be (a) that 'the Secretary of State is satisfied' that the person had done anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom or a British overseas territory, and (b) that the Secretary of State does not think that it would make the person stateless.

24. There is no right, under international human rights law, to be a citizen of any country. Nevertheless, we were concerned that depriving someone of citizenship might indirectly have an adverse impact on their human rights. We therefore asked the Secretary of State whether depriving a person of citizenship would make them more liable to lose benefits in the United Kingdom, or to be removed to another country, in circumstances which would put at risk their right to be free of degrading treatment (ECHR Article 3), their right to liberty (ECHR Article 5), their right to respect for family life (ECHR Article 8), their right not to be subjected to the death penalty (ECHR Protocol No. 6), their right to an adequate standard of accommodation and standard of living (ICESC Article 11(1)), and the rights of their children under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and, if so, what steps would be taken to ensure that these matters are taken into account when considering whether or not to deprive a person of citizenship.

25. In reply, the Home Office acknowledged that the impact of depriving someone of citizenship would sometimes deprive him or her of a right of abode. The person would then become subject to immigration control. However, the Home Office points out that—

    —  the person would have had dual nationality, and so would not become stateless if British citizenship were withdrawn,

    —  any decision to deport the person would be taken subsequently and separately, and would be subject to the usual protections against being subjected to the threat of inhuman or degrading treatment and the imposition of the death penalty,[18]

    —  the status of the person's existing children would be unaffected,[19] and

    —  it takes the view that the right to respect for private and family life does not require that all members of a family should be guaranteed the same nationality or citizenship.[20]

The status of children as yet unborn would be affected, and it is possible that this might engage Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides—

    1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

    2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

However, the Home Office draws attention to the fact that any impact on the right to a nationality would be covered by the reservation to Article 7 which the United Kingdom entered on ratifying the CRC.

26. Although (as noted in paragraph 17 above) we have some concerns about the reservations entered by the United Kingdom to the CRC (a matter considered further below, paragraphs 46-48), we accept that it is legitimate for the Government to adopt this position. At the same time, we are very conscious that depriving people of British citizenship has serious consequences. These include loss of the right to a United Kingdom passport, which may affect people's ability to travel, especially if the other State of which a person is a citizen were to deny a passport to the person for political reasons.[21] Inability to obtain a passport could make a person's alternative nationality little more than an empty shell. In addition, deprivation of British citizenship would entail loss of British diplomatic protection; loss of status; loss of the ability to participate in the democratic process in the United Kingdom; and serious damage to reputation and dignity. The Home Office argument assumes that the real threat to human rights would derive from any subsequent decisions taken as part of the immigration control process. In that process, there would usually be adequate opportunity to ensure that effect is given to Convention rights, and that other rights are given appropriate weight. However, we are concerned about the wider implications of loss of British citizenship. We also have deep concerns about other parts of the Bill which affect the protection for rights of immigrants and which are considered below. We draw these matters to the attention of each House.

27. Turning to the conditions governing the power to deprive someone of British citizenship, we were concerned that there was no requirement for the Secretary of State to show that there were objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. This seemed to us to put at risk a person's legal status without adequate safeguards against arbitrariness (although we noted that clause 7 would require reasons to be given for decisions, and would provide for a right of appeal).[22] We therefore asked the Secretary of State why it was thought to be appropriate to dispense with any requirement for objectively reasonable grounds.

28. In its reply, the Home Office referred to a long history of allowing the Secretary of State to deprive people of British nationality on the basis of a subjective view, and argued that it is entirely appropriate that the Home Secretary should be permitted to decide whether a person has done something 'seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK or a British overseas territory'. The Home Office drew attention to a long-standing judicial acceptance that the Home Secretary is in the best position to decide what national security requires.

29. We cannot agree with this line of argument. The requirements which statutes imposed on Secretaries of State in earlier centuries were shaped by the different, and less demanding, standards of due process and fairness which were then accepted as being appropriate in public administration and administrative law. In the light of today's more fully developed standards of decision-making under the rule of law, not to mention enhanced protection for due process under the Human Rights Act 1998, we do not accept that it is any longer appropriate to allow a Secretary of State to deprive a person of a status as important as citizenship on the basis of the Secretary of State's purely subjective assessment. We recognize that the Secretary of State is likely to be in a particularly good position to form a judgment, and that it may in consequence be entitled to considerable respect. However, we consider that the Secretary of State should be required to justify the decision by showing that there are reasonable grounds for it. In some limited circumstances it might be appropriate to limit the burden of justifying decisions. For example, national security decisions (to which the Home Office memorandum refers) may be made on the basis of evidence which could not properly be publicly revealed. However, the Home Office has offered no support for its implied suggestion that any decision that someone has done something seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK or a British overseas territory would necessarily be made on the basis of that kind of evidence. Indeed, the very breadth and indeterminacy of the phrase 'seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK', etc., suggests that decisions may be made on the basis of many different kinds of evidence, and that it will often be both possible and desirable for the Secretary of State to be required to justify such decisions by reference to standards of reasonableness.

30. The Home Office has suggested that there would be adequate safeguards against arbitrary use of the power. The Secretary of State would have to give reasons for the decision, and a person who had been deprived of British citizenship could challenge it on the ground that the decision was 'Wednesbury unreasonable' (i.e. that it was so unreasonable that no reasonable Secretary of State, properly understanding the relevant facts and applicable law, could have come to that conclusion).[23] We recognize that this offers some protection against arbitrariness which results in a manifestly irrational decision, in which the reasons advanced could not properly and reasonably be regarded as supporting the decision made. However, the protection offered by the Wednesbury unreasonableness principle is unsatisfactory in this context. Instead of the Secretary of State having to establish that his or her decision had been reasonable, the aggrieved person would have to establish that the decision had been wholly unreasonable. Both the burden of proof and the standard of proof are different. As a matter of general principle, we consider that it is a far more effective guarantee against arbitrariness, and a better way of assuring good administrative decision-making (as well as being far more compatible with the rule of law which underpins human rights), to require public authorities to justify the deprivation of a person's status to a standard of reasonableness, than to require the person subject to the decision to establish that it is wholly unreasonable.

31. We therefore draw this matter to the attention of each House.

32. We asked the Secretary of State about rights of appeal in relation to deprivation of citizenship. We were concerned about provisions in clause 4, inserting a proposed new section 40A into the British Nationality Act 1981. This would allow the Secretary of State to deprive a person of the right to appeal to an adjudicator against deprivation of citizenship by certifying under proposed new section 40A(2) that the decision—

    ... was taken wholly or partly in reliance on information which should not be made public on grounds relating to-

    (a) the interests of national security,

    (b) the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or

    (c) another matter of a political kind.

The Department pointed out that in such a case there would be a right to appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Tribunal (SIAC) under proposed new section 2(2A) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, to be inserted by clause 4(2) of the Bill. In addition, proposed new section 40A(6) of the British Nationality Act 1981, to be inserted by clause 4 of the Bill as amended in Committee, would prevent a deprivation order being made until an appeal to the Commission had been concluded or the time for making such an appeal had expired.[24]

33. The procedure would therefore seem to be as follows. The Secretary of State would give notice to a person that he had decided to make a deprivation order. If the person sought to appeal, the Secretary of State would certify that the case was concerned with national security, etc., ruling out an appeal to the adjudicator. The person could then appeal to the SIAC, which would be able to consider whether the decision was justified (in the light, inter alia, of any relevant Convention rights). The SIAC would have full jurisdiction, and would be competent to deal with all issues of fact and law.[25] Only after the time for appealing had expired without an appeal being lodged, or the SIAC had held that the Secretary of State's decision had been lawful, could a deprivation order be made pursuant to the Secretary of State's decision. Having considered the matter, we are satisfied that clause 4 of the Bill, as amended in the House of Commons, is likely to offer adequate safeguards for the rights of potential appellants.

1   HL Bill 89-EN (London: The Stationery Office, 2002) Back

2   ibid., pp 56-58, paras. 331-342 Back

3   Cm. 5387 (London: The Stationery Office, 2001) Back

4   For the text of the letter, see our Sixteenth Report of Session 2001-02, Scrutiny of Bills: Further Progress Report, HL Paper 113, HC 805, pp Ev 1-Ev 8 Back

5   Explanatory Notes, para. 332 Back

6   Explanatory Notes, para. 333 Back

7   Explanatory Notes, para. 334 Back

8   Explanatory Notes, para. 335 Back

9   Explanatory Notes, paras. 336-338 Back

10   Explanatory Notes, para. 340 Back

11   Explanatory Notes, para. 339 Back

12   Explanatory Notes, para. 341 Back

13   Explanatory Notes, para. 342 Back

14   Patel and others (The East African Asians) v. United Kingdom, Apps. Nos. 4403-19/70, 3 EHRR 76 Back

15   CRC/C/15/Add.34, para. 7 Back

16   See the Opinion by Nicholas Blake QC and Sandhya Drew, reproduced as an Annex to this Report Back

17   House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill, Sixth Report of 2001-02, HL Paper 129 Back

18   Home Office Memorandum, paras. 2-3, Ev 1 Back

19   ibid., para. 5, Ev 1 Back

20   ibid., para. 4, Ev 1 Back

21   On the constitutional significance of the loss of the right to a passport, see e.g. Kent v. Dulles 357 US 116 (1958), SC of the USA, but cp. Haig v. Agee 453 US 280 (1981) Back

22   See the comments of the Society of Legal Scholars (Immigration and Refugee Law Section), reproduced as an Annex to this Report, Ev 28-32 Back

23   Home Office Memorandum, para. 8, Ev 2 Back

24   Home Office Memorandum, para. 9, Ev 2 Back

25   See, mutatis mutandis, R. (on the application of the Kurdistan Workers' Party and others) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and other applications, [2002] EWHC 64 (Admin), 17 April 2002, Richards J Back

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