18. The written and oral evidence we have received
has been highly critical of the Bill from a wide range of different
viewpoints. While no one has challenged the need for new legislation,
there have been many adverse comments on the approach adopted
in the Bill and its drafting, clarity and comprehensibility. Some
have argued that the new corruption offences should be specific
rather than broad-based. Among our witnesses, only the responsible
Minister argued unequivocally for the Bill in its current form
although he was willing to contemplate improvements. Comments
on specific parts of the Bill are set out in the paragraphs below.
Detailed points raised by witnesses, together with comments by
the Home Office are set out in Annex 1.
19. On the general clarity of the Bill we have been
"The draft Corruption Bill sets out the proposed
new offences in very abstract terms, which may not be easily understood
by ordinary or business people. The objective of all legislative
wording should be clarity and certainty, and this is especially
important in legislation that imposes criminal sanctions".
"I do not believe that the drafters of the Bill
understand the workings of corruption". (Bob McKittrick).
"The intention of the UK legislative drafters
seems to have been to construct an offence that is as broad as
possible. This approach is certainly coherent, but it does not
make for legislation which is clear and readily understandable
to those charged with enforcing it". (OECD)
"I have considered whether the proposed definitions
will be readily understood by police, prosecutors, jurors and
the public, and have concluded that the way in which the proposed
legislation is drafted will not, without considerable study, be
readily understood by any of those groups". (George Staple)
"It is very difficult to understand". (Professor
"I think the technical provisions in the Bill
will make a field day for lawyers but will not be helpful to the
average person who has to refer to it in terms of seeing what
it is driving at". (Transparency International (UK))
"[The offences in the Bill could be translated
into other languages] in the same way as they could be translated
to your jurors but it would take quite a bit of effort to do so
and you would raise a lot of issues that would leave your opposite
number [in other countries] puzzled". (Professor Pieth)
"To attempt to explain an offence as defined
in the draft Bill to other jurisdictions, vital for the effective
operation of mutual legal assistance and necessitating translation
into other languages, would be formidable, resulting in huge expense
and abandonment of cases". (Transparency International (UK)).
20. The Director of the Serious Fraud Office told
"I think the Bill will be understandable to
juries, at least as far as Clauses 1, 2, and 3 are concerned.
There may be disadvantages in the wording which explains the meaning
of corruption and the like, which I think juries may find quite
difficult. Otherwise, I think it is a helpful Bill overall.
21. The Director of Public Prosecutions said:
"This Act seems to me to fall short of the clear,
comprehensive statement of the law that one would like. On the
other hand, it is an extremely complex area because as soon as
you try to define corruption in one sense, you find that you have
included behaviour which people find perfectly acceptable, and
you then move to another one and find you have excluded by mistake
behaviour which people find unacceptable. I have great sympathy
with the draftsmen, but [the Bill] is very, very complex
22. The Home Office position was explained thus:
"The need to express concepts in terms of statutory
drafting often leads to apparent complexity. This is particularly
so in the present case where the criminality involves three parties.
(This contrasts with most criminal law where the basic offences
have two parties, the defendant and complainant - where three
parties are concerned, as for example in conspiracy, further complexity
is inevitable.) But we would argue that in spite of the apparent
complexity, the underlying principles are clear and simple. We
believe that when it comes to its operation in the courts - in
particular cases with their individual circumstances, as opposed
to its consideration as a Bill as a whole with all the various
permutations possible to be considered - it will not in fact prove
troublesome. But we would welcome any suggestions from the Committee
on how to make the Bill more accessible".
or broad offences
23. Both the Crown Prosecution Service and the Serious
Fraud Office favoured the approach of "one broadly-based
and general offence of corruption".
On the other hand, Transparency International (UK) said: "Practice
elsewhere would suggest that corruption should be broken down
into a series of readily identifiable specific offences".
They drew attention to a new Bill being considered in South Africa.
In a subsequent memorandum, Transparency International (UK) argued
for combining the three general offences of corruption in the
draft Bill with a small number of specific offences.
They pointed out that the latest version of the South African
Bill had reduced the number of specific offences to 16. The Bill
would provide for specific offences such as:
of public officer
of foreign public official
in relation to auctions
for giving assistance in regard to contracts
in relation to sporting events.
24. The Home Office's response to the argument for
a Bill based on the South African model was:
"Whatever the merits of this model in the South
African situation, we are not minded to adopt it for the UK. That
would be to move in the opposite direction to that recommended
by the Law Commission - not only in their Corruption Report, but
also in their Fraud Report (2002), which recommends the replacement
of the existing 8 separate offences of deception under the Theft
Acts 1968-96, and the common law of conspiracy to defraud. The
multiplicity of offences has not proved helpful in practice in
the case of fraud, or of corruption. By contrast, the South African
legislation creates 23 separate offences, as well as reinstating
the common law of bribery, which they abolished in 1992. Some
of these offences are very clearly covered by the general offences
in our Bill (for example, "bribery of public officer"
and "bribery of foreign public officials"). Others are
dealt with by other offences in our law (for example "intentional
obstruction of investigation of offence"). Others criminalise
behaviour which we do not think should be criminal (offence for
a public official not to report a corrupt offer)".
25. What constitutes corruption lies at the heart
of this Bill. Mr Justice Silber told us:
"At the forefront of the criticisms of the present
law is the use of the ambiguous word 'corruptly' in each of the
main corruption statutes. This term is not defined in the legislation
and its meaning has been the subject of probably six different
conflicting judicial interpretations [dating from Cooper v. Stade
(1858) to R v Harvey (1999)]. [The Law Commission] were told that
this has led to difficulties for lawyers in advising and prosecutors
in determining whether to prosecute".
26. We have received a variety of comments on the
definition used in the Bill:
"The high-level, abstract language used is difficult
to translate into concrete terms. This is especially so with regard
to the key definition of 'corruptly', which seeks to define the
mental element of the offence by reference to exceptions which
are themselves unclear". (OECD)
"At least one of the definitions of 'corruptly'
remains circuitous, in that it depends ultimately on knowing what
is meant by 'corruptly'". (Transparency
"Dishonestly could either be an alternative
to 'corruptly' or an additional element in all the new offences".
(Criminal Bar Association)
"It is doubtful whether this [wording: 'primarily
in return for the conferring of the advantage'] is in line with
the requirements of international conventions.
of the word 'primarily' in the draft can give rise to difficulties
of implementation in everyday practice". (Drago Kos)
"There has been a lot of negative comment from
employers about the ambiguity in Clauses 6 and 7". (CBI)
27. In response to this, Lord Falconer, the Minister
responsible for the draft Bill, set out what he considers to be
the options and how he and his colleagues eventually adopted what
they considered to be a middle course:
"There were a range of alternatives. You could
have a Bill without any definition of 'corruption' or 'corruptly'
in it at all and simply, as it were, leave it to the good sense
of the jurors or the common law to determine what 'corruption'
meant. The difficulty with that would be you would end up with
potentially differing definitions of 'corruptly' from one case
to another. We also took the view that if you did that you would
be dealing with a situation where unlike the phrase, say, 'dishonesty'
there is not a popular view necessarily of what 'corruptly' means.
We were not attracted by the idea of having no definition of 'corruptly'.
An alternative approach is to take the approach in the South African
Bill. I am told it is not law yet in South Africa. What the South
African approach has been is effectively to create 23 different
sorts of offences of corruption, so it will be much, much more
specific. We thought the problem in relation to that was if we
were too specific we might catch things we would not necessarily
as a matter of policy want to catch and you were not leaving it
enough to the jury to decide what the right solution was. Yes,
the answer is we did consider other solutions, and the range is
really from having a Bill but no definition of 'corruption', to
having something pretty precise like you have got in the South
African Bill, and we have gone for a middle course which we think
embraces both simplicity but also clarity and codification".
28. Several witnesses were critical about how the
agent/principal relationship applies in the public sector:
"In particular, I think that extending the concept
of principal and agent to so many different relationships, particularly
that between a public official and the public at large, is likely
to cause confusion and uncertainty and may result in a reluctance
to prosecute cases where, under the existing law, prosecution
would be seen to be justified". (George Staple)
"The concept of agency, although well developed
in common law, has been stretched unreasonably in this Bill".
(Transparency International (UK))
"It is very difficult nowadays for a company
to be able to say whether it is acting in a public capacity or
not. We are thinking perhaps of utility supply companies or the
press or the media, the television service - whatever. How is
a company to know whether, for the purposes of the Bill, it is
acting in a public capacity or not?" (CBI)
29. The Minister told us:
"We think the essence of corruption is cheating
on the person who trusts you or cheating on the public. That is
why we have focused, as you rightly say, on the principal/agent
or agent/public relationship".
of the principal
30. Clause 7 provides one of the defences to a charge
of corruption: that the principal consents to the conferring of
an advantage. As the Crown Prosecution Service told us:
"A private principal can consent to something
which would otherwise be corrupt but where functions are of a
public nature the principal's consent cannot exonerate. This could
give rise to problems where the public/private functions are blurred".
31. Public Concern at Work pointed out that the draft
Bill does not contain the same proviso as the explanatory notes
about the defendant having a mistaken but genuine belief in his
They argue that the draft Bill is currently too broad at this
point and that it should state that the belief must be 'reasonable'
or 'genuine'. Public Concern at Work also suggested that, to encourage
employers to adopt clear policies on and routes for reporting
about corruption, there should be some form of defence for an
employer in relation to corrupt activity by employees.
The Home Office argued against using either 'reasonable' or 'genuine'.
32. Clause 5 defines corruptly in terms of someone
acting 'primarily' in return for the 'advantage' conferred on
them. It is unclear whether 'primarily' posits a causal test,
one of intention or one of purpose. The OECD argued that 'advantage'
should be qualified with the word 'undue'.
We were told by the Chairman of GRECO:
"The Council of Europe's Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption refers repeatedly to 'undue advantage', a
concept which is explained in detail in the explanatory memorandum.
By comparison, the text of sections 4 and 5 of the draft Bill
refers only to 'an advantage'. The reference of an unqualified
'advantage' entails a widening of the scope of the offence, which
would cover more ground than required by CoE and other international
standards. This leads to the need to provide for exceptions in
sections 6 and 7".
33. The CBI said:
"We are certainly strongly of the view that
it is insufficient to rely upon 'primarily' and that it would
be a much better approach to adopt either 'improper' or 'undue'
or some other word that has international currency from the OECD
or other appropriate international bodies".
34. We have heard a variety of evidence on whether
dishonesty should be an element in the offence of corruption.
The Criminal Bar Association has argued:
should be an alternative to 'corruptly' or
should be an additional element in all the new offences.
35. The Director of the Serious Fraud Office said:
"I think that the Law Commission consultation
paper concluded that corruption was not necessarily an offence
of dishonesty, although in our cases I think very often, if not
always, dishonesty is present. In practical terms, I think juries
are very unwilling to convict unless they see some sort of dishonesty,
or at least moral turpitude that they can really get a grip on
in the way that people have behaved. Very few of the cases that
we would prosecute would not involve dishonesty".
36. The Director of Public Prosecutions agreed but
pointed to other considerations:
"It is hard to imagine cases which we prosecute
in which it could not be said that there was an element of dishonesty,
but when one moves to the sort of behaviour which is probably
better characterised as misuse of public office or some form of
really outrageous behaviour as a public servant, then you are
moving away from dishonesty into another kind of concept, some
of which would be caught by this new Corruption Bill, I believe.
So if the legislature decides it wants to include that sort of
behaviour, I think dishonesty might limit the scope of the Bill
beyond what was intended".
37. On the other hand, the Minister (Lord Falconer)
said: "We think that dishonesty is a different concept from
Mr Justice Silber told us: "the word 'dishonestly' is a very
uncertain word. It means different things to different people
[in many statutory offences] the word 'dishonestly' is used where
the matter would normally be criminal in itself
does not add very much to it
. it has a totally uncertain
The Committee understands that in most circumstances of corruption,
if dishonesty is involved, there will also be conspiracy to defraud,
an offence which is widely drawn.
with international conventions
38. Several witnesses have expressed concern that
the draft Bill does not meet the United Kingdom's international
obligations (set out in Annex 2). In this section we concentrate
on those concerns relating to the definition of corruption. There
are also issues (connected with parliamentary privilege, the Attorney-General's
consent to prosecutions and the authorisation of the intelligence
agencies to engage in activities which would otherwise be unlawful),
which have international implications (see paragraphs 101 to 154
39. The main concerns in relation to the definition
of corruption are:
of an explicit offence of bribery of a foreign public official
- in relation to the OECD Convention
of an explicit offence of trading in influence - as required by
the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention
rather than 'conferring an undue advantage' may not be
entirely consistent with the requirements of international conventions.
40. Professor Mark Pieth, Chairman of the OECD Working
Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, told
"The one requirement we are looking for is that
it says the active bribery of a foreign public official is captured
You could save a lot of the situation if you inserted one Clause
making it very clear that the foreign, public officials are covered
all the other countries have simply picked up in one way or the
other the language of the Convention" .
41. On the other hand we have been told by Khawar
Qureshi, an expert on international law:
"The core of the activity of corruption identified
in the Bill is rooted in the conferral of an advantage in return
for a gain. This is often described as 'transactional' corruption,
and it is reflected in the majority of definitions of corruption
contained in international agreements, or the domestic law of
most states. Accordingly the definition of corruption contained
in the Bill accords with the UK's obligations under public international
42. Neither the Law Commission report in 1998 nor
the draft Bill contains an offence of 'trading in influence'.
The Home Office White Paper in 2000, however, did propose the
inclusion in the offence of corruption of 'trading in influence'
where the decision-making of public officials by intermediaries
Support for inclusion of such an offence came from the Corner
Transparency International (UK) noted that this was a specified
offence in the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention.
But the chairman of the Council of Europe's corruption body, GRECO,
did not criticise this omission.
43. The Director of Public Prosecutions told us that
"looking at some of the continental legislation on trading
in influence, it would actually be caught, the behaviour that
they are attempting to criminalise would be covered almost certainly
by the current provisions of the draft Bill".
The Minister said that the activity of trading in influence would
be covered by the draft Bill where an agent/principal relationship
of public office
44. The draft Bill does not contain a statutory offence
of 'misuse of public office'. The Committee on Standards in Public
Life (under Lord Nolan) published a consultation paper in July
1997 recommending a new statutory offence of 'misuse of public
office' as a replacement for surcharges on councillors. This issue
was not mentioned in the Law Commission report of 1998. Meanwhile
the common law offence of 'misconduct in public office' has been
revived in recent years as a means of prosecuting police officers
There is also, in civil law, the tort of 'misfeasance in public
office'. The Law Commission has recently proposed a statutory
offence of misconduct in the context of new fraud legislation.
45. The Director of Public Prosecutions told us :
"I can see great advantage for public servants in having
a misconduct offence which was statutory rather than dredged up
from the Middle Ages".
Transparency International (UK) said: "A separate offence
committed by a public official or servant could be a useful tool
for upholding public integrity in cases where to mount a full
corruption prosecution would present insuperable difficulties
eg the corruptor is beyond the jurisdiction".
subsidiaries of UK companies
46. The Corner House was "deeply concerned that
intermediaries including agents and subsidiaries of UK companies
are not covered by the new corruption offences
a serious loophole which will be damaging to the efficacy of the
.evidence shows that it is through agents and subsidiaries
that the vast majority of bribes are paid".
47. PricewaterhouseCoopers told us:
"In the UK, the law generally does not automatically
impute to parent companies absolute control over or knowledge
of the actions of their subsidiaries. This means that a corrupt
act committed by an overseas subsidiary may not necessarily render
the UK parent company criminally liable under the Bill. To do
so would appear to require evidence that the UK parent company
had in some way directed or otherwise influenced the subsidiary
to commit the corrupt act".
48. Transparency International (UK) said:
"United Kingdom prosecutors should be able to
prosecute companies which are responsible for the actions of subsidiaries
or effectively controlled joint ventures so that very few bribes
or corrupt acts would take place directly from a UK based company
or any country in the world. In nearly all cases, it would be
done through an intermediary. Sometimes that would be a subsidiary.
Sometimes it would be an intermediary agent working closely with
that subsidiary. Even more often, it would be a joint venture
which is rather more difficult to catch, but nonetheless highly
. There is a suggestion that intermediaries will
still be left out. If the Bill is really going to tackle the mischief,
most people who understand the way in which international business
is conducted are aware of the role of intermediaries
are not tackling that problem".
"Clause 13 (Corruption outside the UK) should
extend to include subsidiary companies of those incorporated in
the UK if under actual control (according to an appropriate definition);
in the case of other subsidiaries, associated companies and joint
ventures, there should be an offence by the UK incorporated company
if it fails to take adequate measures to satisfy itself that the
foreign registered company or joint venture is implementing suitable
anti-corruption policies in the conduct of its business".
"Unincorporated associations and partnerships
(according to English and Scottish definitions) should be included
as bodies capable of committing corruption offences".
49. This approach is similar to that of the Exports
Credit Guarantee Department which requires applicants for support
to warrant that neither they nor anyone acting on their behalf
have engaged or will engage in any corrupt activity in connection
with the supply contract.
The CBI told us that the draft Bill should not apply to overseas
subsidiaries because they were subject to the law of the other
50. We asked Professor Pieth, whether the draft Bill
would cover foreign subsidiaries of British companies. He told
us that the OECD Convention did not impose an international, binding
standard on coverage of foreign subsidiaries. He said:
"We are in the process of discussing whether
we should go further in the OECD to pick up also foreign subsidiaries.
Under certain circumstances, foreign subsidiaries would be covered
also in this framework because if it were proven that in the UK
somebody was aware -- that is where the intent issue comes back
again -- not corruptly and not with some malicious intent but
if they had knowledge that the UK company or its agent was involved
in bribing somewhere, then we would have a case to be run in the
UK under the territorial jurisdiction. You are covering some cases
of foreign subsidiary and agent behaviour but you are not tackling
it head on
51. Many witnesses have raised the issue whether
the draft Bill is intended to make 'facilitation' payments criminal.
As PricewaterhouseCoopers put it "it is not unknown in some
countries for public officials to abuse their position by demanding
payments from the unwary (or unlucky) for the granting of basic
We understand this phrase to mean a small bribe necessary to obtain
a service to which the payer is already entitled - the lorry driver
who has to pay the customs officer to cross a road border, the
businessman who has to include a donation to get his travel documents
passed by the immigration officer. In most cases it is assumed
that the service required would not be obtained without the additional
payment, so there is an element of extortion.
52. Several witnesses have called for such payments
to be treated as corruption and outlawed:
"The Corner House believes that the UK government
and law enforcement agencies should operate a zero tolerance for
facilitation payments, except in exceptional circumstances in
which the life of an employee may be at risk if a payment is not
made. The Corner House believes that if it does not do so, facilitation
payments could become a serious loophole, which could be used
by companies as a defence in court".
"What is 'small'? A payment of 1% may be considered
to be small, but it certainly is not small if it is 1% of a project
worth £5,000,000. What is 'normal practice' and who will
define 'normal'? Facilitation payments must be outlawed".
"Common law and UK legislation have never distinguished
'facilitation payments' from other bribes
the Government's position that it is unacceptable to apply different
standards abroad to those that apply within the UK. Petty corruption
remains unacceptable within the UK and the draft Bill rightly
makes no express distinction". 
53. On the other hand we were told:
"Intuitively, payments made in such circumstances
might be felt not to offend against justice or the public interest,
which the Bill (like any other law) aims to serve. In practice,
in spite of the potential defences under the Bill suggested above,
it appears that the maker of such payments could be caught under
"From the point of view of international competitiveness
and achieving a level playing field for UK companies with other
companies, CBI members would welcome a specific exemption or defence
for small facilitation payments, along the lines of that provided
in the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  for US companies.
This is especially important following the assumption of nationality
jurisdiction by the United Kingdom for corruption overseas in
the 2001 Act".
54. There appear to be uncertainties about the aim
of the draft Bill in respect of facilitation payments:
"Under Frequently Asked Questions No 5 on the
Trade Partners UK website the following is quoted:
not think it appropriate to make an exemption for 'facilitation
payments'. However, we do not envisage any circumstances in which
the making of a small 'facilitation payment', extorted by a foreign
official in countries where this is normal practice, would of
itself give rise to a prosecution in the UK".
"The definition of 'corruptly' in Clause 5 and
the need to prove 'belief' that an act was done or an omission
made 'primarily' in return for the advantage, raises uncertainties
as to whether some small facilitation payments may now be decriminalised".
(Transparency International (UK))
"The key distinction is that facilitation payments
are made to a person who is already under a duty to do something
and a facilitation payment is one which is designed to make him
either do that duty or do it more quickly or more efficiently
and this distinction, by the way, is taken in the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of the United States".
55. Ministers and prosecutors have made plain that
prosecutorial discretion will govern the operation of the law:
"The proper use of prosecutorial discretion
is one important way of ensuring that the line is correctly drawn
between morally questionable behaviour and criminal conduct".
(Serious Fraud Office)
"It is hard to envisage circumstances where
the CPS would prosecute a case involving a small payment made
as a result of extortion".
(Crown Prosecution Service)
"When the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security
Bill was going through, which has the extra-territorial bits of
this Bill, we in effect gave an indication that small facilitation
payments extracted by foreign officials in countries where this
is normal practice would not of themselves give rise to a prosecution
in the United Kingdom and we would be happy, when this Bill, in
whatever form it comes, was going through Parliament again, to
give a similar assurance".
56. Some concern has been expressed that hospitality
could fall within the definition of corruption in the draft Bill.
Several witnesses urged that there should be a specific exemption
or minimum threshold for the offences so that reasonable corporate
hospitality and promotional expenditure would not be covered.
PricewaterhouseCoopers addressed this point thus:
"Arguably, the lack of a de minimis exemption
is mitigated by the definition of the term 'corruptly' in the
Bill, which requires that for any of the corruption offences to
have been committed, the person who acts as agent for another
must do so 'primarily' in return for (or in anticipation
of) an advantage. This means that, regardless of the value of
the advantage conferred, obtained or anticipated, the test of
whether an offence of corruption has been committed involves determining
whether the person receiving, or expecting to receive, the advantage
acts or acted primarily in return for that advantage. If such
is not the case, then even a substantial payment, gift or other
advantage is, on the face of it, neither corruptly conferred nor
57. The Minister told us:
"People give various sorts of hospitality in
the course of business. What is their intention in doing it? Obviously,
it is to get a good relationship with their potential clients
but not necessarily to make them make their decisions primarily
based upon lunch at Wimbledon rather than the merits of a particular
58. Several witnesses have queried whether standard
commission payments in the financial services industry would fall
within the definition of corruption in the draft Bill.
The Home Office told us that this might fall within the Bill if
the agent gave advice not in the best interests of the client
(principal) because of the commission received from a third party.
We understand that if the client consents to the payment of the
commission there would be no offence.
Public interest defence
59. The Newspaper Society were concerned that "newsgathering
practices could effectively be criminalized, thereby potentially
inhibiting investigative journalism".
They suggested that such conduct could be excluded from the definition
of corruption or that there should be a public interest defence.
60. The Crown Prosecution Service did not favour
such a defence "because it would open the door to all sorts
of spurious defences".
Transparency International (UK) pointed out that the public interest
was one of the factors taken into account when a decision to prosecute
of corruption offences
61. Although the Bill does not cover the administration
of prosecutions for corruption, we have received some evidence
that these offences could be prosecuted more effectively if this
responsibility was given to the Serious Fraud Office.
The Serious Fraud Office have dealt with 10 corruption cases since
1988, but have among their criteria for investigation a minimum
threshold for the sum involved of £1 million.
The Audit Commission told us that the average sum involved in
the cases reported to it is just over one quarter of that amount.
When asked if the SFO should take responsibility for all corruption
cases, the Attorney General told us:
"The Serious Fraud Office is a very important
and skilled organisation dealing with complex and serious fraud
which often does involve corruption, these two things do quite
frequently go together, but I would have some questions about
whether or not the office should be involved, for example, in
the sort of
..pedestrian corruption which does take place,
somebody slipping a backhander to the buying manager of a small
company in order to sell particular goods to that company. I am
not sure I would want the Serious Fraud Office to be taken up
dealing with that, that is a question of resources".
62. The Corner House has drawn our attention to the
brevity of the Home Office's statement on the financial and manpower
effects of the Bill and the absence of the normal Regulatory Impact
The expenditure effects, manpower consequences and regulatory
impact are all said to be 'negligible'. It is clear from other
evidence that companies and professionals will be affected to
some extent by the Bill.
The CBI made plain the burden on business:
"Our principal concern is that even sophisticated
companies with suitable resources are struggling with what this
Bill means, but the lay business community will not have confidence
that they can train and brief their staff that certain actions
will not cause them to fall foul of offence".
on evidence received
63. We have not so far commented on the evidence
received. In the following sections of the report we turn to our
conclusions. We are surprised, however, that legislation which
has been so long in preparation and the essential elements of
which have been the subject of extensive consultation by the Law
Commission and the Home Office, should attract such a range of
negative comment from a variety of sources at this late stage.
11 Ev 111 CBI DCB 17 para 3 Back
Ev 31 McKittrick DCB 4 para 4.1 Back
Ev 165 DCB 26 part 2(a) - OECD Secretariat Back
Ev 153 DCB 19 para 17 (George Staple) Back
Q373 (Prof Pieth) Back
Q10 Mr Rodmell Back
Q367 (Prof Pieth) Back
Ev 2 DCB 18 para 3.5 Back
Q56 Mr Wardle (SFO) Back
Q57 Sir David Calvert-Smith (DPP) Back
Ev 74 DCB 27 para 7 Back
Ev 16 DCB 13 (SFO) Ev 17 DCB 15 Para 1.2 (CPS) Back
Ev 2 DCB 18 para 3.2 Back
Prevention of Corruption Bill 18 April 2002 [B19-2002] Back
Ev 163 DCB 31 paras 3.2 and 5.1 Back
Ev 75 DCB 27 para 14 Back
Ev 98 DCB 30 para 7 Back
Ev 165 DCB 26 2(a) line 17-19 Back
Ev 2 DCB 18 para 3.4 Back
Ev 155 DCB 20 para 9 Back
Ev 142 DCB12 Back
Q740 (John Cridland) Back
Q446 (Lord Falconer) Back
Ev 153 DCB 19 para 17 (George Staple, Clifford Chance) Back
Ev 2 DCB 18 para 3.4 (Transparency International (UK) Back
Q743 (CBI) Back
Q464 (Lord Falconer) Back
Ev 17 DCB 15 para 1.1 Back
Ev 139 DCB 9 Section 1 lines 3-11 Back
Ev 140 DCB 9 Section 2 lines 12-14 Back
Annex 1 Back
Ev 165 DCB 26 Part 2 (b) Back
Ev 142 DCB 12 (Drago Kos) Section 2 (text in the Bill) Back
Q 694 (Mr Cridland) Back
Ev 155 DCB 20 para 11 Back
Q63 (Mr Wardle) Back
Q66 (Sir David Calvert-Smith) Back
Q505 (Lord Falconer) Back
Q648 (Mr Justice Silber) Back
Ev 3 DCB 18 para 3.12 (Transparency International) Back
Ev 142 Part 2 DCB 12 (GRECO) Back
Q356-8 (Professor Pieth) Back
Ev 136 DCB 7 para 6 (Khawar Qureshi) Back
"Trading in influence" is defined in the Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption as: "intentionally,
the promising, giving or offering, directly or indirectly, of
any undue advantage to anyonewho asserts or confirms that he or
she is able to exert an improper influence over the decision-making
of [domestic public officials, members of domestic public assemblies,
foreign public officials, members of foreign public assemblies,
officials of international organisations, members of international
parliamentary assemblies, and judges and officials of international
courts] in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage
is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request,
receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such
an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not
the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence
leads to the intended result." Back
Cm 4759 p21 Back
Ev 128 DCB 1 para 6.1 Back
Ev 3 DCB 18 para 3.12 Back
Ev 142 DCB12 Back
Q125 Ev 29 (Sir David Calvert-Smith) Back
Q525 and footnote (Lord Falconer) Back
Q116-8 (Sir David Calvert-Smith) Back
Q116 (Sir David Calvert-Smith) Back
Ev 3 DCB18 para 3.13 Back
Ev 28 DCB1 paras 7.1 - 7.2 Back
Ev 50 DCB 16 para 40 Back
Q27 (Mr Cockcroft and Mr Carver) Back
Ev 4 DCB 18 para 4.3 Back
Ev 4 DCB 18 para 4.2 Back
Ev 141 DCB 10 para 9 Back
Ev 149 DCB 16 para 37 Back
Ev 129 DCB 1 para 8.3 Back
Ev 31 DCB 4 para 4.2 Back
Ev 3 DCB 18 para 3.10 Back
Ev 149 DCB 16 para 37 (PricewaterhouseCoopers) Back
Ev 113 DCB 17 para 2(b) Back
Ev 31 DCB 4 para 4.2 Back
Ev 3 DCB 18 para 3.10 Back
Q690 (Mr Berkeley) Back
Ev 16 DCB 13 (Serious Fraud Office) Back
Ev 17 DCB 15 para 1.6 Back
Q526 (Lord Falconer) Back
Ev 113 para 2 (d) DCB 17 (CBI) Ev 138 DCB 8 (Newspaper Society) Back
Ev 149 DCB 16 para 32 Back
Q516 (Lord Falconer) Back
Ev 144 DCB 14, Ev 152 DCB 19 Back
Q477 (Lord Falconer) Back
Ev 138 DCB 8 Back
Ev 18 DCB15 para 1.7 Back
Ev 3 DCB18 para 3.11 Back
Ev 4DCB 18 para 4.4 Back
Ev 16 DCB 13 Annex 1 Back
Ev 159 DCB28 para 6 Back
Q574 (Lord Goldsmith) Back
Ev 130 DCB 1 Back
Ev 30 DCB 4 (Bob McKittrick) Ev 144 DCB16 (PricewaterhouseCoopers)
Ev111 DCB 17 (CBI), Ev 2 DCB 18 (Transparency International (UK)
Q694 (Mr Cridland) Back