Joint Committee on Draft Civil Contingencies Bill First Report

2  Definitions of Emergency


22. The term emergency is defined twice in the Bill, in clause 1 at the beginning of Part 1 (which applies only to England and Wales) and in clause 17 at the beginning of Part 2 (which applies to the whole of the UK).

23. In the Bill, an emergency is defined as a "serious threat" to:

24. Each of these "threats" is then defined in further detail:

  • A threat to human welfare ("welfare" under Part 2) includes a loss of human life, human illness or injury, homelessness, damage to property, disruption of the supply of food, water, energy, fuel or another essential commodity, disruption of communications, facilities for transport, medical, education or other essential services. This list is inclusive under Part 1 but not under Part 2.
  • A threat to the environment encompasses contamination with biological, chemical or radioactive matter or fuel oils, flooding, or disruption or destruction of plant or animal life.
  • A threat to political, administrative or economic stability includes disruption to the activities of the Government, the banks or other financial institutions, or to the performance of public functions.
  • A threat to security includes war, armed conflict or terrorism.

25. The major difference between the definitions is that Part 2 refers to a serious threat to "welfare" rather than "human welfare" as in Part 1, and that a threat to human welfare under Part 2 is not inclusively defined, as it is under Part 1. As the draft Bill uses basically the same definition in Parts 1 and 2, we have considered them as a single definition, except where we consider the points that distinguish them. We also consider, in paragraphs 27-28, the case for creating separate thresholds in each Part.

26. We have identified several issues of potential concern:

  • Use of same definition in both Parts
  • The breadth of the definition
  • The "triple lock" safeguards
  • Emergency as "threat to human welfare"
  • Issues of ambiguity.

Use of same definition in both Parts

27. As already noted, the definition of emergency is virtually identical in both Part 1 and 2, even though each Part serves entirely different purposes. Part 1 is concerned with the preparation of contingency plans, while Part 2 is concerned with events which could justify the invocation of emergency powers. However, the kind of major incident for which civil contingency plans should be prepared, under Part 1, will only rarely call for the use of emergency powers under Part 2. It is our view that the use of extensive emergency powers under Part 2 requires a higher threshold for action than that required under Part 1. We would therefore question the merit of using virtually identical definitions of emergency in both Parts.

28. The two Parts of the draft Bill serve different purposes and provide for qualitatively different action. We recommend that the Government include, in a sufficiently robust and objective clause, an additional set of criteria which must be satisfied before a declaration of emergency under Part 2 can be made. This would be in addition to the 'triple lock' test (see paragraphs 33-42 below).

Breadth of definition

29. The Government states that the definition is "designed to be highly inclusive, encompassing circumstances as diverse as severe flooding, a major chemical attack, disruption of fuel supplies and epidemics".[16] This approach would seek to enable flexibility and adaptability to be built into the legislative framework, which could then be used as authority to act decisively should novel or unforeseen events occur.

30. In our view, however, this "highly inclusive" approach has led to ambiguous terminology and unclear thresholds and triggers, raising concerns about the Bill's potential for misuse. In Part 1, which only enables government to issue regulations for the preparation of contingency plans, a lack of clarity about what constitutes an emergency may raise issues about resources and respective responsibilities of local Responders but is otherwise the less serious of the two outcomes. It does not separately prescribe action to be taken in crisis situations. Under Part 2, however, which would allow Ministers to declare a state of emergency and assume extensive and potentially draconian powers, the possible consequences of an insufficiently clear definition are of far greater concern.

31. As currently drafted, the definition of an emergency could include a wide range of events or situations. The Joint Committee on Human Rights' report has already identified a number of situations where emergency powers under this Bill could be deployed, including strikes, political protests, computer hacking, a campaign against banking practices or protests against genetically modified crops.[17] Witnesses and responses to the Cabinet Office consultation have commented that the definition is so wide as to encompass events which are already routinely dealt with by emergency services.

    "The definition as given in the Bill would include a number of events to which the emergency services respond every day".[18]

    "The definition as it stands does not include an element of scale and could therefore apply to a relatively minor road traffic accident or small fire".[19]

    "Under the current definition an emergency could be declared following the destruction of one property".[20]

32. We concur with the conclusion of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution that the current definition is unduly broad.[21]

"Triple lock"

33. The Government has sought to outline certain conditions that must be met before a state of regional or national emergency can be declared. These are described as the "triple lock" of seriousness, necessity, and geographical proportionality.[22] We believe that in order for this to be an effective safeguard against potential misuse, the triple lock must be significantly strengthened.

34. A number of consultation responses and the Defence Committee's report[23] echo our own concern that the triple lock is not readily identifiable within the draft Bill and that Ministers are not statutorily obliged to assess a situation against the triple lock criteria before declaring an emergency.[24]

35. The Government has told us that the triple lock is reflected in various clauses in Part 2, including clauses 17, 18, 19 and 21.[25] Given the confused and hurried circumstances in which an emergency is likely to be declared, when the only guidance to the Government of the day may be the legislation itself, it is vital that safeguards against misuse are made as clear on the face of the Bill as possible. We do not believe that scattering the three issues across the Bill gives it the clarity, visibility or importance necessary for a major safeguard against misuse.

36. In the light of the above, we welcome the Minister's statement when he gave evidence on 16 October. Although he declared himself satisfied that the triple lock was as robust in its present form as it would be in a single clause, he nevertheless agreed:

    "there is no reason why the triple lock cannot be gathered together from the various clauses of the draft Bill and presented in a single clause and if the Committee were so minded to recommend it, that would be something that would weigh heavily in the Government's deliberations about translating this from a draft Bill into a Bill that would be introduced in due course".[26]

37. We recommend that the triple lock should be explicitly stated in a single or adjoining clauses on the face of the Bill, rather than mentioned in discrete sections. It should be a statutory condition that the triple lock test is applied before a declaration of emergency can be made.

38. We believe that the triple lock tests, as drafted, are insufficiently objective or clear to create a robust safeguard. Clauses 17 and 21 refer to the seriousness of a threat or effect, clauses 18 and 19 require that a proclamation/declaration is necessary, and clause 21(4)(f) contains the principle of proportionality in geographic terms. We consider these tests to be defective in the following respects:

  • There is no express requirement of objectivity in any of the tests. The absence of the word "reasonableness" does not rule out review, for example, by the courts. However, it would signal a more rigorous standard of the exercise of powers and ex post facto review if it were to be included. We do not consider it to be acceptable that the existence of these conditions is exclusively for the Government to discern at will.[27]
  • The term "necessity" is left unexplained, except in clause 21(4)(e) where it is specified that the use of legal powers and resources normally available without the invocation of the Civil Contingencies Bill will not be sufficient to deal effectively with the emergency. These notions should apply to other appropriate clauses in the Bill.
  • Proportionality is explained in purely geographical terms. However, we consider that proportionality should also apply to the exercise of powers at three key points: when an emergency is declared, when the regulations are issued and when the regulations are applied. We are concerned about a 'one size fits all' approach, which might see powers triggered that are not proportionate to the emergency occurring. The notion of proportionality has been inserted into other recent legislation dealing with the rights of the individual, including the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001[28] and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.[29]

39. We recommend that the triple lock include a test which measures whether the use of powers is proportionate to the nature of the emergency, as well as providing for geographical proportionality. The test of "reasonableness" should be inserted into the triple lock. The "seriousness" test (see paragraph 58) should be made more robust, given that "serious" is not defined anywhere in the Bill. The opening phrase in clause 21(4), "without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)(a)" should be removed.[30] It is confusing and can only undermine what is otherwise the clear intent of clause 21(4). Unless these recommendations are followed, there is a substantial risk that the idea of the triple lock in the Consultation Document[31] will remain little more than rhetoric.[32]

40. Additionally, as drafted, the triple lock seems to act as a mechanism to 'weed out' non-emergency situations which the overly broad definition of an emergency has inadvertently caught. We recognise its potential value as an additional threshold that must be surmounted before a declaration of emergency can be made, but the triple lock is not a substitute for an undesirably loose definition of emergency.

41. The Minister in charge of the Bill told us that the Government was considering putting a more explicit trigger on the face of the Bill. He suggested three possibilities: including a proportionate scale of emergency, "where a threat to a portion of the community or the community itself is deemed to be one of the criteria having to be met"; better defining the notion of serious; or an additional test that could be added to the Bill, perhaps "linked to the exercise of Responders in circumstances of emergency". [33]

42. We welcome this response. While we acknowledge the concept of a triple lock as an additional threshold, it cannot replace the need for a clear, objective and proportionate definition of an emergency.

Emergency as the 'threat to human welfare'

43. In Part 2, the definition of emergency refers to a serious threat to "welfare", rather than "human welfare". The Government has told us that there is no qualitative difference between the two definitions, but that "parliamentary counsel said that he would have used the same terminology if he could but he felt the difference in structure meant a different wording was needed".[34] While there may be different structures between the two Parts of the Bill, we are not convinced that the search for drafting elegance is sufficient reason for minimising the importance of the threat to human welfare.

44. We therefore recommend that the term "human welfare" be explicitly incorporated into the definition of emergency in both Parts of the Bill.

45. Under the Emergency Powers Act 1920, an emergency is defined as an event which has or may interfere with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, light or transportation, thereby depriving all or part of the community of the essentials of life.[35] The Bill significantly widens this definition; a threat to human welfare constitutes but one of many components, and is not a prerequisite for all eventualities. Threats to the environment, to political, administrative or economic stability, or to the security of the UK can be regarded as an event justifying the deployment of emergency powers, whether or not they represent a threat to the people.

46. Civil rights experts have told us that this definition strays too far from the core basis of what an emergency is:

    "There may be room for slight improvement on the 1920 definition, but not the extended broad definition of public emergency that is offered in this Bill, which does not cut to the heart of the kind of emergency, the basic threat to existence for significant numbers of people should be the only scenario that is sufficient for ousting parliamentary jurisdiction".[36]

    "We are not defending the language of the 1920 Act as perfect, but the core concept is one of ensuring public safety and physical well being".[37]

47. We consider that the core of an emergency, particularly one meriting substantial emergency powers, is the threat to human welfare. We cannot envisage justifying the use of potentially draconian emergency powers if there was no demonstrable threat to human welfare. Including this as a key component of the definition of emergency would further ensure that the use of emergency powers would be limited to protecting the welfare of the population, rather than the welfare of the state. This issue is explored further in paragraph 49.

48. We recommend that the definition of an emergency is re-drafted to reflect that an emergency is a situation which presents a threat to human welfare.

Political, administrative or economic stability

49. Clauses 1(1)(c) and 17(1)(c) extend the definition of an emergency to include an event or situation which presents a threat to political, administrative or economic stability. This could include disruption to the activities of the Government, banks or other financial institutions, or to the performance of public functions. Emergency powers could therefore be triggered by events which threaten the essentials of life for the government, as well as events which threaten the essentials of life for the community. These two points of focus are not necessarily compatible. In protecting the government, emergency powers could potentially be used against the civil population.

50. No distinction is drawn in this clause between essential and non-essential functions. As drafted, a serious threat of disruption to a non-essential government activity or public function could activate the use of emergency powers. In a worst-case scenario, "the Government could, in principle, declare a state of emergency and suspend all primary legislation if faced with potential political instability".[38] It has also been pointed out that:

    "political, economic or security issues…are an unnecessary duplication and are simply one of the many events or situations which would require an emergency to be declared under the first two criteria of the definition due to the disruption to human welfare or the environment".[39]

51. While we do not envisage that the present Government, or any political party represented in Parliament, plans to trigger emergency powers in the event of a threat to its own existence, it is imperative in this Bill, as in other proposed enabling legislation, that such hostages to fortune should not be left available for deployment against future generations.

52. We have grave reservations about allowing enabling legislation to contain exploitable opportunities that could give the government of the day the power to protect its own existence when there may be no other threat to human welfare. We recommend that this clause should only remain in the Bill if it can be demonstrated that situations occurring under it will also present a threat to human welfare or safety. It should only cover those threats to human welfare caused by disruption to essential services.

Educational Services

53. One of the threats to human welfare is identified as one that causes or may cause disruption of educational services. While events that may cause disruption to educational services are serious matters, they do not necessarily constitute an automatic threat to human welfare. Education is not included as a basic essential of life in the European Convention on Human Rights, nor are educational services considered 'essential' in international labour law.[40] In evidence, the Minister said that he could not think of an example where disruption of educational services would warrant the use of emergency powers and signalled his willingness to re-consider its inclusion.[41]

54. While education is an important service, we can see no reason why a threat to educational services should, of itself, warrant the use of extensive emergency powers. We therefore recommend that educational services should be removed from clauses 1(2)(h) and 17(2)(h).

Issues of ambiguity

Seriousness of "a threat"

55. As the Bill currently reads, the existence of an emergency is judged according to the seriousness of a "threat", rather than the seriousness of a potential outcome: "it attempts to define the causes rather than the effects of the emergency".[42]

56. This seems to be at odds with the approach in other legislation. The definition of 'terrorism' in the Terrorism Act 2000 requires a threat of action involving serious harm, rather than a serious threat of action involving harm.[43] Slightly to our surprise, the Cabinet Office told us that parliamentary counsel has advised "quite clearly that the natural meaning of the term serious threat to human welfare is a credible threat with serious consequences".[44]

57. In the interests of clarity, we recommend that the Bill makes explicit that the test of the existence of an emergency is judged according to the seriousness of its potential or actual consequences to human welfare.


58. An emergency is deemed to exist according to whether a threat is "serious". Yet the Bill does not provide any explanation of what "serious" is held to mean. This term has been described as "open to differing interpretations and… difficult to quantify".[45]

    "I would definitely like to see some sort of elucidation of what is implied by "a serious threat". That can mean many different things to different people".[46]

    "The term "serious threat" is woolly and therefore guidance is necessary to determine what would trigger an event that was considered to be a "serious threat". Without guidance or a stronger definition within the Bill, there may be inconsistency of approach across the country".[47]

59. Dealing with Disaster, the Cabinet Office's guidance to emergency planners and local Responders, defines a major emergency as an event or circumstance "…on such a scale that effects cannot be dealt with by the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations as part of their normal day to day activities".[48] There has been wide support in consultation responses for including this definition in the Bill or using it, in Part 1, to replace the existing definition:

    "The simple, single paragraph definition from Dealing with Disaster is perfectly adequate. We can think of no situation, listed in the bill's definition, which it could not be deemed to cover".[49]

    "The definition contained in Dealing with Disaster gives a far clearer trigger for a major emergency".[50]

60. The Minister told us that the drawback of this definition was that it was a "relative notion of disaster", which could be deemed to be conditional, according to the capacity of the emergency services in the area. He did however, signal his willingness to consider defining the term "serious".[51]

61. We would suggest that emergencies are, by their very nature, relative. One reason an incident may develop into a crisis is the inability of existing capabilities to contain it. We do not propose that the definition in Dealing with Disaster should form the sole basis of a definition of an emergency, but it is an example of the sort of threshold that should be crossed before the need for special legislation is considered.

62. We recommend that the Dealing with Disaster definition of a 'major emergency' be inserted into the Bill as one definition of the term 'serious'.


63. Under the draft Bill, an emergency can be declared if there is a threat to political, administrative or economic stability. We have heard that the term 'stability' is inadequate for creating a clear and objective threshold:

    "From an emergency planning perspective I would like to see [the issue of stability] more closely tied to issues of human welfare so that we do not get drawn too far into the political sphere".[53]

64. In response to our request for a definition of "stability", the Minister told us:

    "The inclusion of Political, Economic and Administrative Stability is indicative of our desire to draw up a definition that reflects the full range of emergencies we might face in the future - an inherently unpredictable element. This comprehensive approach was endorsed by consultation.

    This and other elements of the definition will be limited once we have a threshold in place".[54]

65. We recommend that the term "stability" is explicitly defined within the Bill, with reference to our recommendation that the core of an emergency is the threat to human welfare.


66. An event or situation which presents a threat to the welfare of a population is defined in both Part 1 and Part 2 by a list of consequences, including loss of human life, homelessness and human injury. In Part 1, a threat to human welfare is restricted to the list outlined on the face of the Bill: "an event or situation presents a threat to human welfare only if it involves, causes or may cause…".[55] In Part 2 however, the list is a guide only: "an event or situation presents a threat to the welfare of a population if, in particular, it involves…" (emphasis added).[56]

67. It is our concern that the term "in particular" leaves the definition of emergency entirely open-ended, at the mercy of a range of interpretations, and therefore potentially open to abuse. According to this wording, a Minister can determine the criteria by which an emergency is judged to exist, and accrue significant emergency powers accordingly. Given that the definition of human welfare is limited in Part 1, it is surprising that it is left open-ended in Part 2, where the more serious powers can be triggered.

68. The Minister has told us that "this is not deemed to be an exhaustive list, but rather is an illustrative example of what we were endeavouring to do which was, where possible, to be explicit with people as to the range of possible reach of the legislation as drafted".[57] In reply to further questioning he said "a balance has to be struck … but there are very clear limits on the powers of the Secretary of State or government acting under the draft legislation as presently drafted, the foundation of that of course being the triple lock."[58]

69. We are not convinced that the definition of emergency should incorporate such a degree of latitude, or that the safeguards are robust enough to protect against possible misuse. We therefore recommend that the words "in particular" be removed from clause 17(2).

70. Under the draft Bill, emergency powers can be triggered by a threat to "another essential commodity" and "other essential services". These terms are not defined in the draft Bill and seem dependent on Ministerial interpretation, to be determined at an unspecified date, potentially far in the future.

71. In his written response, the Minister said:

    "The use of 'essential' in the draft Bill should be taken to have its usual meaning - necessary.

    It is difficult to predict what will be essential in the future, just as there are essential commodities today which would not have been judged to be so in the past. The 1920 Act was reflective of its time - for example there is no reference to computers or electronic communications. Ultimately, the inclusion of this language is intended to 'future-proof' the legislation."[59]

72. While we recognise that the Government wishes to leave the definition wide enough to "cover the full spectrum of current and future events and situations",[60] we suggest that this degree of latitude leaves the Bill wide open to possible misuse. The phrases "another essential commodity" and "other essential services" should be removed from the Bill. Any amendments to the Bill which may become necessary in the event of future, unforeseen events, should be enacted through proper parliamentary procedure, not left to the discretion of the Government of the day.

Overlapping Responsibilities

73. The definition of a threat to human welfare includes a disruption to an electronic or other system of communication[61] and disruption to the supply of water, energy or fuel.[62] Utility companies have raised concerns about the risk of overlap between Category 1 Responders' duties and their own statutory responsibilities, outlined in other legislation.

    "Firstly, we believe disruption of BT's network on its own rather than as a by-product of a wider serious incident which involves several Category 1 and 2 Responders is something that we have the expertise and the process to deal with as BT, regardless of the causes of disruption… Government Responders are unlikely to have the required knowledge, skills or expertise to direct the details of a telecommunications recovery".[63]

    [The definition] "introduces a parallel and potentially conflicting set of requirements to those already governing electricity distribution network operators, hindering consistency via the possibility of fragmented debates. It significantly exacerbates the potential problems on ambiguity of roles and duties of local authorities".[64]

74. We have heard that the utility companies have an existing statutory duty to undertake emergency planning for their areas:

    "Electricity distribution network operators are already subject to extensive statutory and license requirements which deal with contingency planning, network resilience and response to failures of electricity supplies. These are common nationally set requirements, on which the DNOs[65] are regulated, and are required to adhere to".[66]

    "United Utilities sees little advantage in being a Category 1 Responder. In both the water and electricity sectors, the regulatory environments require us to have the contingency plans and do the risk assessments already that the requirements under the draft Bill and the emphasis on Category 1 Responders' duties would bring. So a lot of that proposed Category 1 accountability exists already within those two sectors".[67]

    "BT have got detailed continuity plans which go from sustaining its cashflow down to a major mobile exchange capability to restore a smoking hole scenario".[68]

75. We recommend that the existing statutory responsibilities of the utility organisations are cross-referenced in accompanying regulations, to ensure that there is no ambiguity or overlap in emergency responses.


76. As the Defence Committee's report has already stated, the definition of public functions in Part 2 does not include the UK Parliament, although it includes Ministers and the devolved administrations.[69] The National Assembly for Wales, although included in Part 2, does not appear in Part 1, although this Part covers both England and Wales.

77. We recommend that the UK Parliament should be included in Part 2 and the National Assembly for Wales and the UK Parliament be included in Part 1.


78. Under the draft Bill an event may present a threat to the environment if it causes, or may cause, contamination of land, water or air with fuel oils. Concern has been raised that these terms are overly restrictive or inadequately defined:

    "This definition of oil would appear to be unnecessarily restrictive as it would only apply to those refined products that are used as fuel in large power plants...A broader definition to cover all eventualities would be provided by replacing 'fuel oils' with 'oil' or 'oil and its derivatives'".[71]

79. A similar definition to this is used in other legislation, including the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.[72]

80. There are also concerns about the definition of water, including threats from offshore events. For example, Gloucestershire County Council Fire and Rescue Service recommended that, "the definition of the word 'water' needs clarification because of the implications relating to local authority and shoreline clean up".[73] Bristol City Council was concerned that "'water' should include… riverine, estuarial and seawater".[74]

81. We recommend that the Cabinet Office consider making clearer the definition of oil and water, in the light of the concerns that the Committee has heard.

16   The Draft Civil Contingencies Bill Explanatory Notes, para 41, p27. Back

17   Fifteenth Report 2002-03 HC 1005 HL Paper 149 14 July 2003, 3.11. Back

18   Q 36 Mr Goldsmith (ACPO). Back

19   Memorandum from the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea, Ev 264, question 1. Back

20   Memorandum from the East Riding of Yorkshire Council, Ev 209, question 1. Back

21   Memorandum from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Appendix 1, para 6. Back

22   Consultation Document, chapter 5, para 19, p28. Back

23   Seventh Report 2002-03 HC 557 2 July 2003, para 64, p23. Back

24   Memorandum from Torbay Council, Ev 275, question 16; Memorandum from Dudley Metropolitan Council, Ev 205, question 16. Back

25   Clauses 17 and 21 refer to the seriousness of a threat or effect, clauses 18 and 19 require that a proclamation be necessary, and clause 21 (4)(f) contains the principle of proportionality in geographic terms. See Questions for the Bill Team, Appendix 9, question 8.  Back

26   Q 250, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

27   This seems to be suggested in the Consultation Document, chapter 5, para 20, p 28. Back

28   See the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, sections 17 and 19. Back

29   The use of powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is qualified by the inclusion of the sub clause "that the taking of the action is proportionate to what the action seeks to achieve", see sections 5,22,23,28,29,32,49, 51,55 and 73-5. Back

30   Memorandum from David Bonner, Ev 178, para 15. Back

31   Chapter 5, para 19, p 28. Back

32   See also Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2002-03 (HC 557), para 64. Back

33   Q 243, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

34   Q 241, Ms Lane (Legal Advisor, Cabinet Office). Back

35   The Emergency Powers Act 1920 defines an emergency as "[an event] of such a nature as to be calculated, by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life". Back

36   Q 197, Ms Chakrabarti (Liberty). Back

37   Q 197, Dr Metcalfe (JUSTICE). Back

38   Memorandum from Liberty, Ev 87, para 20. Back

39   Memorandum from the East Riding of Yorkshire Council, Ev 209, question 1. Back

40   Memorandum from David Bonner , Ev 178, para I. Back

41   Q 294, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

42   Memorandum from the East Riding of Yorkshire Council, Ev 209, question 1. Back

43   Terrorism Act 2000, Part 1. Back

44   Q 240, Ms Lane (Legal Adviser, Cabinet Office). Back

45   Memorandum from CACFOA, Ev 32, question 1. Back

46   Q 83, Mr Davies (Leeds City Council). Back

47   Memorandum from Tees Valley Chief Executives Group, Ev 272, question 1. Back

48   Dealing with Disaster, Cabinet Office, revised 3rd edition, 2003, para 1.5, p1. Back

49   Memorandum from NCCP, Ev 243, question 1. Back

50   Memorandum from Kent and Medway Towns Fire Authority, Ev 227, question 1. Back

51   Q 243, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

52   Q 197, Dr Metcalfe (JUSTICE). Back

53   Q 83, Mr Davies (Leeds City Council). Back

54   Further Letter from Douglas Alexander MP, Minister of State, Cabinet Office, Ev 124. Back

55   Clause 1(2). Back

56   Clause 17(2). Back

57   Q 248, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

58   Q 249, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

59   Further Letter from Douglas Alexander MP, Minister of State, Cabinet Office, Ev 124. Back

60   Consultation Document, chapter 2, para 7, p 13. Back

61   Clause 1(2)(f). Back

62   Clause 1(2)(e). Back

63   Q 321, Mr Turner (British Telecom). Back

64   Q 321, Mr West (Western Power Distribution). Back

65   Abbreviation for Distribution Network Operators. Back

66   Q 321, Mr West (Western Power Distribution). Back

67   Q 323, Mr Miller (United Utilities). Back

68   Q 353, Mr Turner (British Telecom). Back

69   Seventh Report 2002-03 HC 557, para 18. Back

70   Memorandum from NCCP, Ev 243, question 1. Back

71   Memorandum from the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd, Ev 226, para 3.8. Back

72   The Merchant Shipping Act 1995 definition is: ""oil" means oil of any description and includes spirit produced from oil of any description, and also includes coal tar;" and "oil residues" means any waste consisting of, or arising from, oil or a mixture containing oil" (clause 151(1)). Back

73   Memorandum from Gloucestershire County Council Fire and Rescue Service, Ev 221, question 1. Back

74   Memorandum from Bristol City Council, Ev 188, question 1. Back

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