Joint Committee on Draft Civil Contingencies Bill First Report

4 Human Rights Issues

137. In this chapter we deal with the human rights aspects of the draft Bill. Both the Defence Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights have commented on these issues and we have drawn on their work as well as taking oral and written evidence ourselves.[158]

Background constitutional principles

138. The human rights concerns arise most acutely in relation to Part 2 of the draft Bill (Emergency Powers). In this respect, the draft Bill replaces the Emergency Powers Act 1920, which was passed three decades before the United Kingdom ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and nearly eight decades before the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the Convention rights into UK law and provided for remedies in the UK courts. As a result of these developments, there is heightened attention and perhaps precision to the issue of infringement of rights than was previously the case. In addition, since 1920, wartime legislation and laws against terrorism have provided experience of the relevance of rights, the powers and limitations of judicial and parliamentary protection, as well as the relevance of mechanisms such as notices of derogation.

139. Of the constitutional principles which must be observed in civil contingency planning and in times of extreme crisis, disaster and emergency, the first we consider is the values of individual rights.[159] We deal below with other constitutional aspects of the draft Bill. These concepts closely correlate with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, as embodied in the Human Rights Act 1998. The Convention is evidently infused with the values of rights and, within that context, seeks to proffer principles such as:[160]

  • Legality - is there a clear and accessible legal basis for processes and powers on the part of public authorities, the basis of which can be tested?
  • Necessity - was the invocation of the public authority's emergency power which infringed rights strictly required in response to the threat or crisis, or could "normal" powers have been utilised?
  • Proportionality - even if new provisions are in principle necessary, were actions taken by public authorities proportionate to the threat or crisis which they are seeking to act against?

Relevant provisions of the Bill to be examined

140. The draft Bill itself does not appear to contain any specific encroachment on human rights - indeed, it contains specific protections for some Convention rights. But it is an enabling Bill under which regulations could be made which do breach such rights. The human rights organisation JUSTICE told us:

141. In an emergency, a derogation under Article 15 of the European Convention may at times be necessary. The country concerned has to establish that the necessary criteria are met. Article 15 states as follows:

    "In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law".

142. The main features of the draft Bill relating to human rights are as follows:

  • Regulations would be treated as primary legislation (i.e. Acts of Parliament) for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998.
  • Regulations could not be made which (a) required a person to provide military or industrial service (ECHR Article 4), (b) prohibited industrial action (Article 11) or (c) allowed a special tribunal to try offences (Article 6.1).
  • On the other hand, there is no specific protection for the human rights which should not be abrogated even in emergencies - the right to life (Article 2), freedom from torture (Article 3) and the ban on penalties for retrospective offences (Article 7).
  • It would be possible under the draft Bill for regulations to be made which breached the derogable rights to (a) freedom from detention without trial (Article 5), (b) respect for private and family life and the home (Article 8), (c) freedom of expression (Article 10), (d) freedom of assembly (Article 11) or (e) peaceful enjoyment of possessions (Article 1, Protocol No 1).
  • Confiscation or destruction of property could be permitted with or without compensation.
  • The creation of criminal offences with penalties of up to three months imprisonment.

143. These give rise to various questions:

  • What is the relationship between derogation under Article 15 and the exercise of powers under the Bill?
  • Is it reasonable to limit the possibility of human rights-based challenges to the regulations?
  • Would the restriction on compulsory industrial service hamper relief work?
  • Should there be protection for the essential non-derogable rights or more protection for the rights from which there may be derogations in emergency?

Treating secondary legislation as an Act of Parliament

144. Of all the human rights issues, most witnesses[162] regarded as the most serious the power in clause 25 to treat secondary legislation as if it is an Act of Parliament for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. The problem it seeks to address is as follows. In theory, a court might rule that regulations made under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Bill were invalid, or might grant an injunction against action being taken pursuant to them before the legal issues had been fully argued in court. This might occur within the seven days between the regulations being made and their being approved by Parliament. The scenario envisaged is therefore of a Government unable to respond effectively to an emergency because the courts have ruled their measures actually or potentially illegal.

145. Both the Defence Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights have said:

    "…this new provision should not be included in the Bill unless the Government can demonstrate a clear and compelling need for the additional powers which it provides".[163]

146. The Constitution Committee has told us:

    "We are not satisfied that the Government has demonstrated a compelling need for this departure from the structure for the protection of Convention rights created by the 1998 Act, and we consider that this approach would run the risk of creating an undesirable precedent".[164]

147. The ability of Ministers to make draconian regulations which breach human rights would not be entirely unfettered even with clause 25 remaining part of the Bill. The regulations would be subject to approval by Parliament within seven days and might not receive that approval. It would still be open to a court to declare that a regulation was incompatible with the Convention under section 4 of the Human Rights Act, though, as with primary legislation, this would not invalidate the regulation. The prospect of subsequent litigation might also act a deterrent. And regulations would still be subject to normal judicial review under the Civil Procedure Rule 54. Nevertheless, the Government recognises that the restraint imposed on striking down on human rights grounds under clause 25 would be an important departure from normal practice and so "believes that the case for its inclusion in the draft Bill is by no means certain".[165]

148. The effect of clause 25 is viewed with concern for three main reasons:

  • One is on grounds of precedent - that the Human Rights Act is a finely balanced statute[166] which governs the relationship between state and individuals - and should not be changed even in an emergency or, perhaps, especially in an emergency. Allied to the ground of principle is the fear of the slippery slope - that a precedent will be set which other legislation will follow, perhaps dealing with such serious issues as terrorism, serious frauds and drug trafficking.
  • The second is that in practical terms the value of rights is being diminished. It removes the possibility of the courts striking down the secondary legislation on grounds of incompatibility with Convention rights.
  • The third reason for criticism of clause 25 is simply that the curtailment under clause 25 is not necessary.

149. Three reasons may be adduced for questioning the need for clause 25:

i)  There is little evidence that judges are overly "activist" in dealing with challenges to emergency powers.

ii)  Judges are unlikely to prevent the Government taking action when the balance of convenience is against interfering with measures to protect public safety.

iii)  It is always possible for the Government to derogate from parts of the European Convention.

150. Though it is true that there has been some shift from the very deferential attitudes which tended to prevail in wartime,[167] the vast majority of challenges to emergency powers (for example against terrorism) have been rejected by the courts.[168] On this point we have been told by human rights experts:

    "The courts have been traditionally deferential towards the Executive in times of public emergency, that is in general the approach that courts have taken. That is true not just of the UK but other comparable jurisdictions, the United States as well. You will find a general attitude in common law jurisdictions that courts in times of emergency will give proper deference to the role of the Executive in making [the] regulations…".[169]

    "…there is nothing in our constitutional or legal history to suggest that our courts are anything other than deferential to the Executive and indeed to Parliament in times of national emergency or fear of national emergency".[170]

    "If the Government is coming to court for, say, emergency flood relief, the court will have regard to the balance of convenience and I question whether any UK court or High Court judge would ever strike down regulations that gave the Government power if needed to address a clear state of emergency".[171]

    "There can be no suggestion in reality that it would be realistic that the courts would wish to or be able to strike down in any serious and enduring way these regulations before Parliament had a chance to give them primary legislative effect".[172]

151. Nor are the judges very ready to grant injunctions even when they decide that a challenge is sustainable, recognising that the balance of convenience is against interfering with executive action intended to protect public safety.[173]

152. Finally, the possibility of derogation under article 15 of the European Convention must be considered quite feasible. This process takes little time - the Secretary General of the Council of Europe has to be notified after the derogation is made.[174] To give effect to the derogation in UK law, the Secretary of State has to make an order under section 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Government followed this path when bringing forward the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001. Derogations have persisted as a common feature of emergency and anti-terrorism legislation to prevent terrorism in Northern Ireland since 1968. If the circumstances demand some temporary encroachment on human rights, it could be argued that a derogation from the European Convention would be the most Convention-compliant way of proceeding.[175]

153. There is a further question mark concerning the necessity of clause 25. The issuance of a proclamation/declaration under clauses 18/19 is not subject to this provision and so is reviewable under the Human Rights Act. If it remains possible to challenge the legal basis of the emergency powers and thereby challenge every regulation issued, why should there be restraint on challenging an individual regulation? It is suggested that challenge to the exercises of clauses 18/19 should be possible, but should be subject to the same procedural safeguards as are mooted below as amendments to clause 25.

154. It should be noted, however, that clause 25 does not remove all possibility of legal challenge or even striking down. Under the normal principles of judicial review, it remains possible to challenge either the secondary legislation itself or, and probably more likely, any executive actions taken under it as ultra vires under the Civil Procedure Rule 54, and the individual action (but not the validity of the regulations) can still be challenged as in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998.

155. Assuming that there persists a remote risk of the courts frustrating the ability of the Government to cope with an emergency, we have considered what other legal devices might be available to avoid the consequent disruption which might arise.

  • One possibility is that a court should not be able to implement any finding of invalidity until there had been an opportunity for the exhaustion of all appeal processes. Normally, this power to stay its decision pending an appeal would be at the discretion of the court,[176] but legislation could delimit that discretion, and this interference with normal judicial discretion would still be preferable to the total abolition of Human Rights challenge.
  • Another possibility would be to provide for a stay pending the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny. On this scenario, rather than awaiting the exhaustion of appeal processes, the courts might fix a set time (say 40 days) for suspension of a judgment sufficient for Parliament to take action by way of amending regulations.
  • An additional option to both of the foregoing would be to provide for some changes to judicial process. For example, it might be suggested that challenges to the legality of such regulations could only be made directly to a higher judicial body - the High Court at least, or perhaps even to the proposed Supreme Court. In addition, challenges could be fast-tracked.

156. We conclude that the Government has not demonstrated a clear and compelling need to treat regulations under the Civil Contingencies Bill as having the status of Acts of Parliament for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. At most, there may be a need for some procedural changes, such as a fast track process within a higher court, plus a compulsory stay on the enforcement of any court order until the appeal is exhausted. We welcome the Government's willingness to reconsider this matter.

Protections for human rights currently mentioned within the Bill

157. Three specific human rights are protected under the draft Bill. Regulations could not be made which:

158. The restriction in clause 21(4)(a) on requiring people to undertake "military or industrial service" in an emergency has been the subject of some adverse evidence on behalf of ACPO to the Committee:

159. But work in the nature of a "function" may be required under clause 21(3)(k), and one may interpret "function" to mean limited specific work rather than continual employment as in a "service". It is probably unwise to go further and remove clause 21(4)(a) since it reflects Article 4 of the European Convention, a non-derogable right under the European Convention, and forced civilian labour may also contravene the Geneva Convention.[178] On the other hand, the wording of Article 4 is elaborated in Article 4(3) as expressly not including, "(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community". "Emergency" is interpreted widely, and certainly covers situations other than what normally would be viewed as a "disaster".[179]

160. It has next been drawn to our attention that the restriction on regulations prohibiting strike or other industrial action in clause 21(4)(b) is more narrowly drawn than the equivalent provision in the 1920 Act. Section 2(1) of the latter prevented regulations being issued to make it an offence "to take part in a strike, or peacefully to persuade any other person or persons to take part in a strike." This raises the possibility that it could be made unlawful under the Bill for specific groups to take part in industrial action.[180]

161. Next, the interplay of clause 21(3)(k) and clause 21(4)(b) could be clarified.[181] Clause 21(3)(k) could be invoked to impose new forms of statutory duty which could then be breached by industrial action, liability for which would fall outside the normal scope of immunities for industrial action. The regulation of peaceful picketing[182] could also be clarified by adding a specific regulation-making power under clause 21(3) and removing picketing from the ambit of clause 21(3)(f), so that the matter can be specifically signalled and debated.

162. The Minister told us:

    "It will not be possible for emergency regulations to prohibit individual groups from taking part in industrial action… The effect of this provision is the same as under the 1920 Act. We were keen as much as possible to seek to reflect what is a settled position from the 1920 Act".[183]

163. Section 2(2) of the Emergency Powers Act 1920 provides that regulations shall not alter any existing procedure in criminal cases.[184] This is not replicated in the Bill. We can imagine that issues of venue and time-limits may have to be altered in an emergency. The Minister made plain that any emergency regulations affecting criminal jurisdiction would have to be consistent with the right to a fair trial in Article 6 of the ECHR.[185]

164. We recommend that the Bill should provide that regulations shall not alter any existing procedure in criminal cases in any way which is inconsistent with Article 6 in the Human Rights Act.

165. Clause 21(3)(l) allows regulations to confer jurisdiction on a court or tribunal, including a tribunal established under the regulations. The Minister was asked[186] whether there had been consultation with the Council on Tribunals and subsequently replied that the Government had not yet done so but, in the light of our concerns, would be consulting the Council.[187] It was also put to him that the Council on Tribunals "as a general policy, has advised very strongly against the creation of any court or tribunal otherwise than by primary legislation". The Minister undertook to bear the point in mind.[188]

166. We recommend that the Cabinet Office put in place arrangements to ensure that the Council on Tribunals is properly consulted about clause 21(3)(1) and that the arrangements to create possible new courts or tribunals are set out in detail in regulations published in draft (see paragraphs 193-196).

Protections for non-derogable human rights not currently mentioned in the Bill

167. The draft Bill contains some protection for human rights which can legally be suspended in an emergency but, aside from the partial protection for article 4 above (on forced labour), not for those from which member States cannot derogate under the European Convention, article 15. It could be argued that it is unnecessary to repeat in the draft Bill that regulations may not be made which interfere with the right to life (article 2), freedom from torture or punishment (article 3), and protection from retrospective criminal offences (article 7) because those principles are already enshrined in the Convention and enforceable under the Human Rights Act 1998.[189] But uncertainty could arise concerning the relationship between the Civil Contingencies Bill and the Human Rights Act because of the existence of clause 25. In most cases, the rules of interpretation in section 3 of the Human Rights Act should ensure its predominance over the later regulatory legislation arising under this Bill, but there is left an area of uncertainty as to how judges will react in an emergency. Furthermore, without such mention, it is difficult to see how the claim that the Bill is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights[190] is sustainable, since powers to breach the Convention are granted. It might also be useful to mention the requirements of international humanitarian law.

168. We conclude that the intention of the draft legislation would be clearer if clause 21(4) included among the prohibitions on the making of regulations a prohibition on regulations which would breach any of the Convention rights from which it is not possible to derogate or any provision in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocols thereto of 1977.

Protections for other derogable human rights not currently mentioned in the Bill

169. In a genuine emergency it is accepted that some human rights which are normally respected may have to be curtailed or suspended. Since they are not among the rights listed in clause 21(4) or the rights protected from derogation under the ECHR, the following rights are most at risk from being adversely affected by regulations made under the draft Bill:

i)  freedom from detention without trial (Article 5),

ii)  respect for private and family life and the home (Article 8),

iii)  freedom of expression (Article 10),

iv)  freedom of assembly (Article 11) or

v)  peaceful enjoyment of possessions (Article 1, Protocol No 1).

170. We have not received strong evidence that these liberties should enjoy any additional form of protection under the Bill. Dr Eric Metcalfe of JUSTICE did confirm that historically the rights which have been most vulnerable in emergencies were due process, liberty, freedom of assembly and freedom of speech.[191] Much would depend on what regulations were made under Part 2 of the Bill. In response to questions about offences against these regulations, Ms Chakrabarti of Liberty said:

    "All of these …tie back to an holistic scheme where we would like the definition of 'emergency' to be more limited, there to be greater scrutiny and the courts to have full jurisdiction…".[192]

171. Probably the strongest case could be made for rights to free expression. It is arguable that special protection should be given to the protection of means of communication of public information. So, the powers of the authorities to interfere with media such as newspapers should be subject to special restraint. This idea would follow other legislation, such as the Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 10 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 13. However, no arguments were put to this effect.

Derogation and the Bill

172. Questions arise concerning the relationship between the ability to declare an emergency on a regional basis and the wording of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which envisages an emergency threatening the life of "the nation". The onus is on the state concerned to establish that there is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation and that the derogation is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Of course, not every invocation of the Civil Contingencies Bill will require resort to a derogation under Article 15. Nor is it a requirement of Article 15 that the emergency and emergency powers must be national - most derogations since 1951 within the United Kingdom have been confined to the region of Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the effect must be that a different range of regulations is possible when a localised crisis affects the national position and a localised crisis which does not. This could be reflected in the Bill to avoid error and to ensure due consideration.

Interference with property rights without compensation

173. The draft Bill provides for the requisition, confiscation or destruction of property, animal life or plant life with or without compensation (clause 21(3)(b)). Witnesses told us there was no reason why compensation should not be paid,[193] that to leave it in doubt would be problematic,[194] or that they could not think of a situation where the Government would not want to pay compensation.[195] The police view was:

    "…if I were a police constable who had to requisition property or state that property would be destroyed, it would make my life a lot easier if I could say to the person who owned it, 'You will be compensated for it.'".[196]

174. The need for compensation arises, unless excused in very exceptional circumstances, under article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention. [197] The Government has pointed out that compensation is not always appropriate in cases where property is covered by insurance or the owner's negligence or malicious action is a factor in its destruction.[198] But clause 21(3)(b) is not confined to these instances. In any event, this invocation of private insurance should trigger a duty on government to ensure that suitable cover is available, on the precedents of the Pool Re (commercial property cover against terrorism) and Troika (commercial airline cover against terrorism) insurance schemes. The Government also pleads that it has not in this respect changed the wording from the 1920 Act.[199] Yet, the 1920 Act was passed before the presumption in favour of compensation was accorded by the Human Rights Act.

175. The Minister told us:

    "Government should not be in a position… to say that there should be effectively a blank cheque from the public purse in all circumstances".[200]

    "it is absolutely and categorically not the case that there are no circumstances in which the Government would offer compensation under the Bill".[201]

176. We conclude that if property is to be taken without compensation, then it should be specified that (i) the taking is still in compliance with Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention and (ii) that steps are taken to ensure that insurance is available for any loss.

Creation of criminal offences

177. Clause 21(3)(i) of the Bill provides that regulations made under it may create criminal offences for non-compliance with those regulations or obstruction of enforcement officers. Clause 21(4)(c) prohibits the creation of other offences by regulation, while clause 21(4)(d) limits the punishments for offences to a scale 5 fine or up to three months imprisonment. As already mentioned, the created offences must be tried before normal first instance courts. No evidence has been presented against such a power, save that it be noted that the offence may be tried on indictment or summary process instead of summarily only, as under the 1920 Act.[202]

158   Seventh Report 2002-03 HC 557 2 July 2003 and Fifteenth Report 2002-03 HC 1005 HL Paper 149 14 July 2003. Back

159   See especially the summary provided by the Council of Europe, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism (Strasbourg, 2002). Back

160   These are rightly emphasized by the Memorandum from the West Yorkshire Police (as lead for Regional Resilience Yorkshire and Humber Region), Ev 279, p.4. Back

161   Q 223, Dr Metcalfe (JUSTICE). Back

162   See for example Memorandum from Liberty, Ev 87, para 32. Back

163   Seventh Report 2002-03 HC 557 para 68 and Fifteenth Report 2002-03 HC 1005 HL Paper 149 para 3.25. Back

164   Memorandum from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Appendix 1, para11. Back

165   Consultation Document chapter 5 para 36 p 30. Back

166   QQ 213 and 217, Ms Chakrabarti (Liberty). Back

167   Note by Christopher Barclay, House of Commons Library - Legal Challenges to Emergency Powers, Appendix 12. Back

168   See especially Brind and obiter of Hoffman in Rehman. It may be noted that, albeit from an earlier era, there has only ever been one reported successful challenge in the history of the Emergency Powers Acts 1920-64. That challenge occurred in Smith v Wood, (1927) 43 TLR 178. concerning the prosecution of union officials for threatening to withdraw safety cover at a coal mine, a prosecution depending on a regulation which was unlawful as it effectively made it an offence to take part in a strike. Back

169   Q 190, Dr Metcalfe (JUSTICE). Back

170   Q 213, Ms Chakrabarti (Liberty). Back

171   Q 217, Dr Metcalfe (JUSTICE). Back

172   Q 215, Ms Chakrabarti (Liberty). Back

173   E.g. A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502. Back

174   Q 209, Ms Chakrabarti (Liberty) & Dr Metcalfe (JUSTICE). Back

175   The deferential judicial stance is also shared by the European Court of Human Rights, wherein most challenges to the special laws in Northern Ireland, perhaps the closest analogy which can be found, have failed. A notable exception was Brogan v United Kingdom (App.nos. 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85, Series A, No 145-B, (1989) 11 EHRR 117, but that judgment is hardly a convincing example of the courts causing havoc to the security forces. In that case, the European Court of Human Rights determined that there had been a breach under Article 5 arising from a failure to provide within a reasonable time judicial review of the necessity for detention in police custody under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984. The outcome was the lodging of a notice of derogation and no legislative change (or more than minor changes in operations) until the Terrorism Act 2000, over a decade later. It may be conceded that the derogation did not apply to international terrorism and so would become problematic post September 11th if the law had not been altered by the 2000 Act, though there is again always the device of derogation and indeed a further derogation allowing the alternative to police detention pending charge of detention without trial (under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part IV) is now in operation. Back

176   Q 220, Dr Metcalfe (JUSTICE). The courts do exercise this discretion, most notably in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502. Back

177   Q 65, Mr Goldsmith (ACPO). See also Memorandum from ACPO, Ev 21, under "Further matters for consideration". Back

178   But compare the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949 art.51: The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted. The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to work unless they are over eighteen years of age, and then only on work which is necessary either for the needs of the army of occupation, or for the public utility services, or for the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation or health of the population of the occupied country. Protected persons may not be compelled to undertake any work which would involve them in the obligation of taking part in military operations. The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to employ forcible means to ensure the security of the installations where they are performing compulsory labour. The work shall be carried out only in the occupied territory where the persons whose services have been requisitioned are. Every such person shall, so far as possible, be kept in his usual place of employment. Workers shall be paid a fair wage and the work shall be proportionate to their physical and intellectual capacities. The legislation in force in the occupied country concerning working conditions, and safeguards as regards, in particular, such matters as wages, hours of work, equipment, preliminary training and compensation for occupational accidents and diseases, shall be applicable to the protected persons assigned to the work referred to in this Article. In no case shall requisition of labour lead to a mobilization of workers in an organization of a military or semi-military character. Back

179   For example, in Iversen v Norway, service in northern Norway could be imposed upon dentists because of a shortage of volunteers. Likewise, a requirement that those holding shooting rights should participate in the gassing of foxholes to control rabies was upheld in S v Germany. Back

180   Memorandum from K Ewing, Ev 213, para 8. Back

181   Memorandum from G Morris, Ev 241, p.3. Back

182   Memorandum from G Morris, Ev 241, p.3. Back

183   Q 256, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

184   Memorandum from D Bonner, Ev 178, para 13. Back

185   Q 292, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office) Back

186   Q 291, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office) Back

187   Further Letter from Douglas Alexander MP, Minister of State, Cabinet Office, Ev 124. Back

188   Q 293, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

189   Compare the more extensive list of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Scrutiny of Bills and Draft Bills (2002-03 HC 1005) para 3.31. Back

190   Consultation Document, chapter 5, para 30, p 30. Joint Committee on Human Rights (HL Paper 149/HC 1005) para 3.35. Back

191   Q 223, Dr Metcalfe (JUSTICE). Back

192   Q 232, Ms Chakrabarti (Liberty). Back

193   Q 226, Ms Chakrabarti (Liberty). Back

194   Q 109, Ms Lowton (Camden Borough Council). Back

195   Q 121, Mr Davies (Leeds City Council). Back

196   Q 63, Mr Goldsmith (ACPO). See also Memorandum from Oxfordshire County Council, Ev 254, para18. Back

197   Following the cases of the Holy Monasteries v Greece Application no. 13092/87 ; 13984/88, Ser A 301A, and Loizidou v Turkey, 25781/94, 2001-IV it is difficult to envisage such a taking under standing law as opposed to the heat of an event being held to be legitimate. Back

198   Q 252, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

199   Question for the Bill Team, Appendix 9, question 38. Back

200   Q 252, Mr Alexander (Minister of State, Cabinet Office). Back

201   Ibid. Back

202   Memorandum from D Bonner, Ev 178, para13. Back

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