Proceedings of the committee relating
to the report
SESSION 2002-03
DIE MARTIS, 25º FEBRUARII 2003
Present:
| Lord Archer of Sandwell
Viscount Bledisloe
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
Lord Carter
Lord Goodhart
Lord Howe of Aberavon
Lord Oakeshott of Seagrove Bay
Baroness O'Cathain
The Earl of Selborne
Lord Weatherill
| Mr James Arbuthnot
Mr Chris Bryant
Mr Kenneth Clarke
Dr Jack Cunningham
Mr William Hague
Joyce Quin
Mr Clive Soley
Mr Paul Stinchcombe
Mr Paul Tyler
|
The Joint Committee deliberate.
Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday
1 April at Ten o'clock.
DIE MARTIS, 1º APRILIS 2003
Present:
|
Lord Archer of Sandwell
Viscount Bledisloe
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
Lord Carter
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen
Lord Goodhart
Lord Howe of Aberavon
Lord Oakeshott of Seagrove Bay
Baroness O'Cathain
The Earl of Selborne
Lord Weatherill
| Janet Anderson
Mr James Arbuthnot
Mr Chris Bryant
Dr Jack Cunningham
Mr William Hague
Mr Stephen McCabe
Joyce Quin
Mr Terry Rooney
Mr Clive Soley
Mr Paul Stinchcombe
Mr Paul Tyler
|
Dr Jack Cunningham, in the Chair.
The Order of Adjournment is read.
The Proceedings of Tuesday 25 February are read.
The Joint Committee deliberate.
Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday
29 April at Ten o'clock.
DIE MARTIS, 29º APRILIS 2003
Present:
|
Lord Archer of Sandwell
Viscount Bledisloe
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
Lord Carter
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen
Lord Goodhart
Lord Howe of Aberavon
Lord Oakeshott of Seagrove Bay
Baroness O'Cathain
The Earl of Selborne
Lord Weatherill
| Janet Anderson
Mr James Arbuthnot
Mr Chris Bryant
Mr Kenneth Clarke
Dr Jack Cunningham
Mr William Hague
Mr Stephen McCabe
Joyce Quin
Mr Terry Rooney
Mr Clive Soley
Mr Paul Stinchcombe
Mr Paul Tyler
|
Dr Jack Cunningham, in the Chair.
The Order of Adjournment is read.
The Proceedings of Tuesday 1 April are read.
A draft Report is proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.
A draft Report is proposed by Mr Paul Stinchcombe, brought up
and read as follows:
"PART ONE : HOW TO RESPOND TO THE VOTES OF 4TH FEBRUARY 2003
Introduction
1. We began our First Report by reminding ourselves why, over
the past century, all attempts at reform of the House of Lords
have failed - it was because of the lack of agreement on what
was needed to replace the existing House. We went on, however,
to state our firm resolve to play our part in avoiding the repetition
of that history:
'...(W)e believe that there is now an historic opportunity
to enact a reform which will enable the second chamber to continue
to play an important and complementary role to the Commons, with
its future at last secure.'
2. And yet despite our early optimistic protestations to the
contrary, history is clearly in danger of repeating itself.
3. In particular, by our First Report this Committee put before
the Houses of Parliament seven options for the composition of
a reformed House of Lords ranging from an all-appointed second
chamber to one which was all-elected, with intermediate possibilities
of a hybrid House of Lords part-elected, part-appointed in different
proportions.
4. On 4th February 2003, however, the House of Commons rejected
each and every one of the options that was put before them. The
votes were as follows:
1. Fully appointed Rejected by 323
votes to 245 2. Fully elected Rejected
by 289 votes to 272 3. 80 per cent appointed/20 per cent
elected No division 4. 80 per cent elected/20 per
cent appointed Rejected by 284 votes to 281 5. 60
per cent appointed/40 per cent elected No division 6. 60
per cent elected/40 per cent appointed Rejected by 316 votes
to 253 7. 50 per cent appointed/50 per cent elected No
division.
5. So it is that, despite our early optimism, despairing voices
have urged this Committee to give in and give up.
6. There is, however, a serious inhibition on the powers of
the Joint Committee to dissolve itself by its own motion. In particular,
the reform of the House of Lords is a matter for Parliament, not
for the Joint Committee (and not for the Executive either). Through
resolutions of both Houses, it was Parliament that established
the Joint Committee as the vehicle to report to it on models of
potential reform of the second chamber. Having created the Joint
Committee by resolution, neither House of Parliament has yet resolved
to wind it up.
7. The Joint Committee firmly believes that it does not
have the capacity to wind itself up. The Committee was established
by the Houses of Parliament and not by itself. Accordingly, it
is not for us but for the Houses of Parliament to determine the
Committee's fate.
The options: wind-up the Joint Committee or give it a renewed
mandate
8. There are two options for the future of the Joint Committee
which Parliament could decide upon - winding the Joint Committee
up or asking it to continue and complete its work.
Four reasons for giving the Joint Committee a renewed mandate
9. For the following four reasons we believe that if Parliament
were to accede to counsels of despair and dissolve the Joint Committee,
that would amount to a lamentable failure of Parliamentary resolve.
Indeed, it would mean that Parliament had either colluded with
- or surrendered to - a divided executive and an obstructionist
House of Lords to prevent the latter's reform, when its reform
was the sole purpose for which Parliament actually established
the Joint Committee.
1. Restoring the credibility of Parliament
10. Commentators have already noted the unusual voting patterns
of certain Honourable and Right Honourable Members as highlighted
by Early Day Motions 686 and 689. As those Early Day Motions reveal,
several Honourable and Right Honourable Members of the House of
Commons appear to have voted in an inconsistent fashion, leading
- to a contrived rejection by the Commons of certain democratic
models put before them on 4th February. In addition, commentators
have also noted the fact that some Right Honourable Members of
our own Joint Committee spoke powerfully in debate in the House
of Commons in favour of a largely elected second chamber and then
conspicuously failed to vote for it.
11. Such behaviour inevitably adds to the political cynicism
in the country, to the growing belief that there never was a firm
intention on the part of Parliament to take the reform of the
House of Lords remotely seriously.
12. If Parliament were to confirm this impression by resolving
to wind the Joint Committee up, the credibility of Parliament
itself would be seriously undermined. Moreover, there could not
be a worse time for Parliament to play so dangerous a game with
the public's confidence in our democratic processes - the people's
disengagement with politics is already such that mayoral candidates
have been elected on joke platforms. Turnout is at an all-time
low - down from 77.7% in the 1992 General Election to 59.4% in
2001, a loss of some 7 million voters in under a decade. Turnout
in other elections is already far lower. The risk must be very
real that turnout at the next General Election will be less than
50%. If it is, the legitimacy of democratic government itself
will be in question. The opportunity for reforming the House of
Lords is one which could reverse that trend, and to opt instead
to undermine yet further the public's confidence in Parliament
would be an act of monumental folly.
13. The first reason for Parliament asking the Joint Committee
to continue its work is that to do otherwise would reinforce the
cynicism that the public already feels in our Parliamentary processes.
Indeed, if Parliament were to vote to wind the Joint Committee
up it would undermine the credibility of Parliament itself.
That would be a very grave mistake to make.
2. Filling the leadership void
14. As earlier indicated, the reform of the House of Lords
is a matter for Parliament not the executive. Nonetheless the
Joint Committee cannot help but note that despite the governing
party's manifesto commitment at the last General Election,
'to completing the House of Lords reform and make it more representative
and democratic, while maintaining the House of Commons' primacy',
the votes on 4th February - and the comments made in the run-up
to the debate - reveal that the cabinet itself is deeply divided
as to the best way forward.
15. In addition, analysis of the votes cast in the House of
Commons on 4th February reveals that these divisions run right
through both the governing party and the official opposition.
16. The second reason for Parliament asking the Joint Committee
to continue its work is that with the executive split, with the
major political parties deeply divided, and with the governing
party thereby in danger of not being able to deliver on a firm
manifesto commitment, there is an absence of political leadership
on the issue of the reform of the House of Lords. This is a void
that only the Joint Committee is positioned to fill. We believe
that if the Joint Committee were to fail to fill that void it
would be abdicating the responsibilities vested in it by Parliament.
3. Preventing an unacceptable constitutional settlement
17. The Joint Committee is - as stated immediately above -
the only vehicle by which the reform of the House of Lords can
currently be progressed. If it were wound-up by Parliament that
vehicle for reform would thereby be abolished. We would then be
left with the status quo - a hybrid second chamber whose membership
was very largely appointed but in smaller part there by accident
of birth. This model is universally condemned and has been made
to look even absurd of the recent election by the second chamber
of a replacement hereditary peer from a candidate list of 81 former
hereditary peers. It was precisely because the status quo was
thought repugnant that the Houses of Parliament established the
Joint Committee to preside over its reform, and to allow the status
quo to stay by default will serve only to bring the second chamber
into further disrepute.
18. The third reason for Parliament asking the Joint Committee
to continue its work is that the Joint Committee believes that
to surrender our responsibilities now would leave the nations
and regions of the United Kingdom with a constitutional status
quo which is not remotely acceptable - a hybrid second chamber
with the majority there only through the exercise of patronage
and the minority there only by reason of the accident of their
birth. The Joint Committee does not believe that it should condemn
the constitution of the United Kingdom to such a settlement.
4. Fulfilling the original mandate
19. The Joint Committee notes, also, that it has not yet fulfilled
the mandate it was originally given. In particular, the Joint
Committee was established by the Houses of Parliament:
'... to report on options for the composition and powers of
the House of Lords and to define and present to both Houses options
for composition, including a fully nominated and fully elected
House, and intermediate options'.
In purported fulfillment of the above, the Joint Committee has
- so far - presented to both Houses certain options. As we have
noted above, none of these have commanded the support of the House
of Commons. There are other options - however - which the Joint
Committee has not yet even considered nor allowed either House
of Parliament to vote upon. In particular, we have not given any
consideration whatsoever to any option of either indirect election
or election by secondary mandate.
20. In the premises it is evident that the remit for which
Parliament first established the Joint Committee has not yet been
fulfilled. In these circumstances it would be obviously premature
to dissolve the Joint Committee.
21. The fourth reason for Parliament asking the Joint Committee
to continue its work is that despite the breadth of our remit
'to report on options for composition... of the House of Lords',
we have conspicuously failed to report to either House in respect
of any option of indirect election or election by secondary mandate.
Conclusions on the options for the Joint Committee
22. For all of these reasons, the Joint Committee invites
the Houses of Parliament not to wind the Joint Committee up but
to give it instead a renewed mandate to continue to consider options
for the reform of the House of Lords which might reconcile the
differences of opinion which the recent votes in the House of
Commons dramatically exposed.
PART TWO : THE PREFERRED NATURE OF THE RENEWED MANDATE
The options: minor revision or radical reform
23. The Joint Committee appreciates, however, that the
votes on 4th February 2003 in the House of Commons indicate the
scale of the task that now confronts it. If all past attempts
at reform of the House of Lords have been broken by the failure
to agree on its replacement, the rejection by the House of Commons
of every single option for reform that we proposed by our First
Report shows that disagreement still continues.
24. Indeed, the scale of the apparent disagreement inevitably
tempts us to ask the Houses of Parliament to invite the Joint
Committee to consider first those areas in which the recent debates
indicate the disagreements to be less serious - removing the remaining
hereditary peers, improving the current system of appointment,
considering the size of the second chamber, the age at which Lords
might retire, and whether they should be remunerated.
Three reasons for favouring radical reform
25. However, the Joint Committee believes that - for the
following three reasons - it would be a grave mistake for the
Joint Committee to continue to meet only to tinker with minimalist
measures, not properly to debate radical reform.
1. Legitimising the illegitimate
26. The first reason is that any Bill which simply addressed
issues of peripheral concern would run the risk of legitimising
the illegitimate, leading to the greater longevity of the Lords
as it is currently and unacceptably composed. Whilst perfection
should never be the enemy of the good, it must always be the enemy
of the bad.
2. Practical difficulties
27. The second reason is that there would be real difficulties
in getting a minimalist Bill through either House of Parliament.
The Commons would likely reject the reforms as insufficient and
the Lords reject any Bill that expelled the remaining hereditary
peers. Moreover, even if such a Bill could be enacted a real question
has to be asked as to whether it would be worth the Parliamentary
time taken to pass it.
3. Fulfilling the original mandate
28. The third, and perhaps most important, reason is that
minor tinkering with the more obvious failings of the status quo
would not remotely address our wholesale failure to fulfill our
original mandate properly to consider and report upon the options
for potential reform of the House of Lords - not the least of
which are the models of indirect election or election by secondary
mandate which we have thus far ignored.
The Joint Committee's responsibility for past failure
29. The Joint Committee accepts its share of responsibility
for the current state of affairs. In our First Report we should
have addressed the principled objections which Honourable and
Right Honourable Members held against direct election, appointment
and hybridity and endeavoured to develop constitutional models
which might meet those concerns. We avoided that entire debate.
Rather than attempt to reconcile the differences of Honourable
and Right Honourable Members, we simply afforded them the opportunity
to restate their previous positions.
30. We were wrong to narrow the debate as we did, reducing
a complex series of constitutional issues to the two alternatives
of an all-elected and all-appointed second chamber (which we were
obliged to present in any event) and a baffling series of arbitrary
arithmetic options in-between. The Houses of Parliament should
have been asked to debate not numbers but principles - legitimacy,
primacy, expertise and, above all, participation. We needed to
give Parliament the chance to do more than choose between varying
proportions of members elected and members appointed, we needed
to afford them the opportunity to consider the potential means
of election to the second chamber. We failed to do so.
31. We accept that our First Report will have left many Honourable
and Right Honourable Members confused when they addressed those
options on 4th February. In particular, through failing in our
First Report to deal explicitly or at all with the issue of indirect
election or election by secondary mandate, the Joint Committee
denied those who supported such options any chance to vote for
them. Moreover, some in this position - perhaps many - voted for
an appointed second chamber instead of one which was elected,
either in the mistaken belief that indirect election and/or election
by secondary mandate was in fact a method of appointment; or because
they feared that a vote for an elected chamber might yield a directly
elected chamber with which they strongly disagreed. We accept
that we should not have put Honourable and Right Honourable Members
is so invidious a position.
The way forward
32. For all of the above reasons, the Joint Committee believes
that Parliament should give it a fresh mandate to do the job it
should have done first time - to report on options for the reformed
composition of the House of Lords which have not thus far been
considered, including the options of indirect election and election
by secondary mandate.
PART THREE : THE OBJECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE TO APPOINTMENT, DIRECT
ELECTION AND HYBRIDITY
The context for further consideration: the objections to past
options
33. The context within which the Joint Committee must proceed
to consider the options of indirect election and election by secondary
mandate is necessarily provided by the objections in principle
which were raised by Honourable and Right Honourable Members against
the options which previously we reported to the House.
34. The Joint Committee accepts, therefore, that it must take
proper cognisance of the votes of the House of Commons on 4th
February when it conducts its future work. In particular, the
Joint Committee acknowledges that the options of 100% direct election,
100% appointment, and the range of hybrid chambers in-between
have all been rejected.
35. The Joint Committee believes that - in the light of those
votes - it must investigate the detailed reasons why the House
of Commons rejected all of the above options and consider whether,
and if so how, those objections might best be accommodated. After
all, it is those objections which lie behind the position we are
in. Even if - as individuals - we do not agree with all of those
objections, it is incumbent upon us at least to understand them.
Otherwise we will never bridge the divisions of principle which
separate us, so to achieve a broad consensus on reform.
1. The objections to direct election
36. Those Honourable and Right Honourable Members who object
to a directly elected second chamber do so - principally - because
they believe that a directly elected second chamber would fundamentally
undermine our bicameral system of Parliament, one which only works
if one House has primacy over the other.
37. In particular, they note that for centuries the Lords
had primacy over the Commons because the landed aristocracy were
perceived to be superior to the lower social orders. They note
- further - that it was only with the advent of democracy that
the Commons attained its primacy. They therefore conclude that
democracy conferred upon the Commons a legitimacy with which the
unelected Lords could never compete, and that this democratic
legitimacy was the source of primacy. From this analytical premise
they argue that history compels the view that if the second chamber
was to be directly elected it would have legitimacy equal to that
of the Commons and would one day assert itself against the Commons,
challenging its primacy.
2. The objections to appointment
38. Those Honourable and Right Honourable Members who object
to an appointed second chamber also believe that it is democracy
which brings legitimacy. However, they argue that this cannot
possibly justify a second chamber being composed by appointment
for that would make the second chamber illegitimate by design
- a constitutional settlement which is absurd. They assert, moreover,
that an appointed second chamber will be illegitimate however
expert its members and however they are appointed: if the power
of appointment is placed in the hands of an Independent Appointments
Commission we will have patronage by the great and the good; if
that power is placed in the hands of political parties we will
have cronyism.
39. They argue - moreover - that there is no point in reforming
the House of Lords unless it is to make it more democratic: it
was because the hereditary peers were an affront to democracy
that they were removed; and we now have to deal with the equally
undemocratic life peers. They accept that democracy does not equal
legitimacy but assert that it does confer it, that it affords
two vital constitutional protections - government by consent and
government by representatives. They conclude that in the democratic
age it is simply inconceivable that we should now turn away from
democracy and embrace patronage instead.
3. The objections to hybridity
40. Those Honourable and Right Honourable Members who object
to a hybrid chamber - part-directly elected, part-appointed -
do so because they consider that constitutional stability demands
that all members have the same standing, that none is more legitimate
than others.
41. They point to the fact that, at present, all members of
the House of Lords owe their presence to patronage - their mandate
is by appointment, not one peer has the legitimacy which democratic
election confers. They therefore argue that introducing a directly
elected element into the second chamber will create a chamber
of conflicting mandates and that such a chamber would be fatally
unstable.
Summary of objections
42. In summary, it has been argued that all three of the
principal options are objectionable in principle - that direct
election will threaten the supremacy of the House of Commons;
that appointment will not be a democratic expression of the will
of the people; and that a hybrid House will be a fudged compromise
which is constitutionally unstable. Moreover, the votes cast
in the House of Commons - whereby all of the options were rejected
- indicate that a majority of that House attribute real weight
to all of these objections.
PART FOUR : WIDENING THE DEBATE - INDIRECT ELECTION AND ELECTION
BY SECONDARY MANDATE
Responding to the objections by widening the debate
43. The Joint Committee considers that in the light of
these objections and their reflections in the votes cast on 4th
February, we must now recast this entire debate. Our purpose must
be to wrestle with the objections to the past options we have
put forward and endeavour to devise an electoral model which meets
them - one which is democratic, which will lead to a membership
which will make it both effective and legitimate, but which will
ensure that the second chamber neither duplicates the composition
of the Commons nor receives a mandate from the electorate which
allows it to challenge the Commons' primacy. This - indeed
- is the course of action we expressly anticipated in paragraph
3 of our First Report:
'Once both Houses have had the opportunity to debate and vote
on the options which we set out here, we shall... need to consider
such differences as may exist between the expressed views of the
two Houses and the means by which, and the extent to which, they
might be brought closer together.'
44. In order to take this bold agenda forward the Joint
Committee will - firstly - need to look to models of indirect
election to the second chamber and/or of election by secondary
mandate, models which - as we have already noted - are not even
canvassed in our First Report.
45. Moreover, in reporting to the Houses of Parliament
on the possible models of indirect election or election by secondary
mandate, we must continue to be guided by the five qualities which
the Joint Committee has always considered to be desirable in a
reformed second chamber:
· Legitimacy
· Representativeness
· No
domination by any one party
· Independence
· Expertise
46. In addition, however, the Joint Committee
must also bear in mind the need to re-engage the electorate so
that they not only participate in our democracy more fully but
begin once more to trust it, own it, and even cherish it. In particular,
at a time of falling voter turnout the Joint Committee believes
that Lords reform is the only issue presently before Parliament
which has the ability to re-engage the public in our democratic
process. We must take full advantage of the opportunity this affords
us.
Models of indirect election and of election by
secondary mandate
47. There are at least three models of indirect
election and election by secondary mandate which the Joint Committee
could consider: functional constituencies; indirect regional elections;
and election by secondary mandate. We briefly describe those
models below.
1. Functional constituencies
48. Under the functional constituency model,
members would be elected to the second chamber by discrete representative
groups (Local Authorities, TUC, CBI, small business, banks, doctors,
teachers, lawyers, environmentalists, the disabled, ethnic minorities,
faith groups, etc.,) so ensuring democratically elected members
in the second chamber with real expertise (and a greater likelihood
of independence) covering the range of departmental responsibilities.
2. Indirect regional elections
49. Under the indirect regional election model,
members would be elected by those already elected to Local Authorities
and Regional Assemblies so that the second chamber would have
democratic roots and be geographically representative, but with
members who would not have the prime mandate of directly elected
MPs.
3. Election by secondary mandate
50. Under the model of election to the second
chamber by secondary mandate, MPs would continue to be elected
by the first past the post system but each vote cast at the general
election would carry with it a secondary mandate for the second
chamber, adding additional weight to the votes cast at those elections.
Members would then be elected to the second chamber according
to regional lists and in proportion to the votes cast within each
of the 12 regions and nations of the United Kingdom.[21]
Preliminary thoughts on the models of indirect
election
51. The first two of the above three options
have already been criticised in some quarters, including in the
debates on 4th February. In particular, it has been argued
that the functional constituency model would narrow the electoral
base to the vested interests so that we would create a Parliament
of lobbyists. Likewise, the model of indirect regional elections
has been criticised because the regional agenda is too undeveloped
and because - again - it does not encourage participation on the
part of the electorate.
52. Notwithstanding the evident strength of
the objections to the first two of the options, we believe they
should not be dismissed out of hand and that the Joint Committee
should at least be invited to consider whether they merit more
detailed analysis.
Preliminary thoughts on the model of election
by secondary mandate
53. We also believe that the Joint Committee
should consider the merits of the alternative option of election
by secondary mandate. Indeed, our preliminary view is that this
model passes successfully and comprehensively our guiding tests
of legitimacy, representativeness, no domination by any one party,
independence and expertise.
54. In particular:
· Legitimacy
- Since the second chamber would be elected
by a genuine expression of the will of the people, it would be
legitimate. However, its legitimacy would be one step removed
from that conferred by the direct election of MPs so that the
primacy of the Commons would be preserved.
· Representativeness
- Members elected by secondary mandate would be elected by regional
lists and would therefore be geographically representative.
· No
domination by any one party - As the secondary
mandate would be proportional, the Government of the day would
not be able to command a majority in both Houses of Parliament.
· Independence
- Since the secondary mandate would be
proportional, smaller parties would be able to secure election
to the second chamber. In addition, and as we canvassed in our
First Report, independence could further be secured by regulating
such matters as the ability to stand for re-election either to
the Commons or the Lords, length of tenure, and the capacity of
members of the Lords to be made a Minister.
· Expertise
- Experts, often unwilling to stand for direct election, would
be far more likely to stand if they could be elected from Regional
Lists and pursuant to a secondary mandate. Depending upon the
rules of the various political parties, they could be voted onto
lists by party activists in local primaries.
55. Moreover, the model of election by secondary
mandate carries with it the possibility of reinvigorating our
democracy - by adding weight to the votes we already cast instead
of imposing another tier of elections on an electorate already
suffering from election fatigue. Currently, the only votes
that count in the General Election are those that are cast for
the winning candidate. Under the secondary mandate system all
votes would count. That could be a critical advantage in times
of rapidly declining electoral turnout and falling public confidence
in the democratic process. In addition, it also addresses -
and in terms - the critical issue: how to maintain the primacy
of the Commons whilst ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the
Lords.
56. We note - moreover - that we have received
a letter expressly asking the Joint Committee to put this option
before Parliament for debate - alongside other methods of indirect
election - from a number of individuals and think tanks with a
long-standing interest in constitutional reform: Billy Bragg;
Karen Bartlett (Director, Charter 88); Matthew Taylor (Director,
IPPR, in a personal capacity); Will Hutton, Chief Executive, The
Work Foundation; Tom Bentley (Demos); Karen Chouhan (Director,
1990 Trust); Nicholas Boles (Director, Policy Exchange); Anthony
Rowlands (Chief Executive, Centre for Reform); Martin McIvor (Director,
Catalyst, in a personal capacity); Ed Mayo (New Economics Foundation);
Anthony Barnett (Open Democracy, in a personal capacity); and
Dan Plesch.[22]
Incremental radicalism
57. We note - finally - that although this
solution would amount to a radical reform of the existing constitution,
it is incremental in its radicalism. In particular, it requires
no new elections to be held. Indeed, it would be possible to re-establish
the House of Lords within a very short period of time according
to this model since we already know the results from the last
General Election and, therefore, the proportions of votes cast
in favour of each of the political parties in each of the regions
and nations of the United Kingdom.
PART FIVE : CONCLUSIONS
The opportunity that remains
58. For all of the above reasons the Joint
Committee believes that - despite the inevitable cloud of pessimism
cast by the votes on 4th February - it may yet be possible to
agree a broad consensus on the best way forward. In particular,
it is conceivable that we might meet the concerns of those who
fear a challenge to the supremacy of this House by making sure
that the second chamber does not have the mandate to make that
challenge; meet the concerns of those opposed to patronage by
ensuring that places in the second chamber derive from votes cast
by the electorate; and meet the concerns of those opposed to a
hybrid House by indirectly electing the entire membership of the
second chamber or by electing them all by secondary mandate.
59. There remains before us an historic opportunity
to enact a reform which will enable the second chamber to continue
to play an important and complementary role to the Commons, with
its future at last secure. Parliament can - if it has the will
- rescue reform of the House of Lords from the long grass. Moreover,
for so long as this is possible and options for reform remain
which have not yet been considered and which might command support,
the Joint Committee must be ready to consider and report upon
them.
60. Parliament - and especially the democratically
elected Commons which is supreme - must now assert itself against
the unworthy coalition of those who would not reform the House
of Lords at all. History will not look kindly upon our efforts
if we fail that test of our resolve. Rather, we will appear willing
players in a pathetic Parliamentary farce. That is an outcome
we must do everything in our power to avoid.
61. We therefore ask the Houses of Parliament
to give us a renewed mandate, so that the reform of the House
of Lords might finally be completed.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
PART ONE : HOW TO RESPOND TO THE VOTES OF 4TH
FEBRUARY 2003
(i) The Joint Committee firmly believes that it does
not have the capacity to wind itself up. The Committee was established
by the Houses of Parliament and not by itself. Accordingly, it
is not for us but for the Houses of Parliament to determine the
Committee's fate.
(ii) There are two options for the future of the
Joint Committee which Parliament could decide upon - winding the
Joint Committee up or asking it to continue and complete its work.
(iii) For the following four reasons we believe that
if Parliament were to accede to counsels of despair and dissolve
the Joint Committee, that would amount to a lamentable failure
of Parliamentary resolve. Indeed, it would mean that Parliament
had either colluded with - or surrendered to - a divided executive
and an obstructionist House of Lords to prevent the latter's reform,
when its reform was the sole purpose for which Parliament actually
established the Joint Committee.
(iv) The first reason for Parliament asking the Joint
Committee to continue its work is that to do otherwise would reinforce
the cynicism that the public already feels in our Parliamentary
processes. Indeed, if Parliament were vote to wind the Joint Committee
up it would undermine the credibility of Parliament itself. That
would be a very grave mistake to make.
(v) The second reason for Parliament asking the Joint
Committee to continue its work is that with the executive split,
with the major political parties deeply divided, and with the
governing party thereby in danger of not being able to deliver
on a firm manifesto commitment, there is an absence of political
leadership on the issue of the reform of the House of Lords. This
is a void that only the Joint Committee is positioned to fill.
We believe that if the Joint Committee were to fail to fill that
void it would be abdicating the responsibilities vested in it
by Parliament.
(vi) The third reason for Parliament asking the Joint
Committee to continue its work is that the Joint Committee believes
that to surrender our responsibilities now would leave the nations
and regions of the United Kingdom with a constitutional status
quo which is not remotely acceptable - a hybrid second chamber
with the majority there only through the exercise of patronage
and the minority there only by reason of the accident of their
birth. The Joint Committee does not believe that it should condemn
the constitution of the United Kingdom to such a settlement.
(vii) The fourth reason for Parliament asking the
Joint Committee to continue its work is that despite the breadth
of our remit 'to report on options for composition... of the House
of Lords', we have conspicuously failed to report to either House
in respect of any option of indirect election or of election by
secondary mandate.
(viii) For all of these reasons, the Joint Committee
invites the Houses of Parliament not to wind the Joint Committee
up but to give it instead a renewed mandate to continue to consider
options for the reform of the House of Lords which might reconcile
the differences of opinion which the recent votes in the House
of Commons dramatically exposed.
PART TWO : THE PREFERRED NATURE OF THE RENEWED
MANDATE
(ix) The Joint Committee appreciates, however, that
the votes on 4th February 2003 in the House of Commons indicate
the scale of the task that now confronts it.
(x) Indeed, the scale of the apparent disagreement
inevitably tempts us to ask the Houses of Parliament to invite
the Joint Committee to consider first those areas in which the
recent debates indicate the disagreements to be less serious -
removing the remaining hereditary peers, improving the current
system of appointment, considering the size of the second chamber,
the age at which Lords might retire, and whether they should be
remunerated.
(xi) However, the Joint Committee believes that -
for the following three reasons - it would be a grave mistake
for the Joint Committee to continue to meet only to tinker with
minimalist measures, not properly to debate radical reform.
(xii) The first reason is that any Bill which simply
addressed issues of peripheral concern would run the risk of legitimising
the illegitimate, leading to the greater longevity of the Lords
as it is currently and unacceptably composed. Whilst perfection
should never be the enemy of the good, it must always be the enemy
of the bad.
(xiii) The second reason is that there would be real
difficulties in getting a minimalist Bill through either House
of Parliament. The Commons would likely reject the reforms as
insufficient and the Lords reject any Bill that expelled the remaining
hereditary peers. Moreover, even if such a Bill could be enacted
a real question has to be asked as to whether it would be worth
the Parliamentary time taken to pass it.
(xiv) The third, and perhaps most important, reason
is that minor tinkering with the more obvious failings of the
status quo would not remotely address our wholesale failure to
fulfill our original mandate properly to consider and report upon
the options for potential reform of the House of Lords - not the
least of which are the models of indirect election or election
by secondary mandate.
(xv) For all of the above reasons, the Joint Committee
believes that Parliament should give it a fresh mandate to do
the job it should have done first time - to report on options
for the reformed composition of the House of Lords which have
not thus far been considered, including the options of indirect
election and election by secondary mandate which we have thus
far ignored.
PART THREE : THE OBJECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE TO APPOINTMENT,
DIRECT ELECTION AND HYBRIDITY
(xvi) The context within which the Joint Committee
must proceed to consider the options of indirect election and
election by secondary mandate is necessarily provided by the objections
in principle which were raised by Honourable and Right Honourable
Members against the options which previously we reported to the
House.
(xvii) In summary, it has been argued that all three
of the principal options are objectionable in principle - that
direct election will threaten the supremacy of the House of Commons;
that appointment will not be a democratic expression of the will
of the people; and that a hybrid House will be a fudged compromise
which is constitutionally unstable.
PART FOUR : WIDENING THE DEBATE - INDIRECT ELECTION
AND ELECTION BY SECONDARY MANDATE
(xviii) The Joint Committee considers that in the
light of these objections and their reflections in the votes cast
on 4th February, we must now recast this entire debate. Our purpose
must be to wrestle with the objections to the past options we
have put forward and endeavour to devise an electoral model which
meets them - one which is democratic, which will lead to a membership
which will make it both effective and legitimate, but which will
ensure that the second chamber neither duplicates the composition
of the Commons nor receives a mandate from the electorate which
allows it to challenge the Commons' primacy.
(xix) In order to take this bold agenda forward the
Joint Committee will - firstly - need to look to models of indirect
election to the second chamber and/or of election by secondary
mandate, models which - as we have already noted - are not even
canvassed in our First Report.
(xx) Moreover, in reporting to the Houses of Parliament
on the possible models of indirect election or election by secondary
mandate, we must continue to be guided by the five qualities which
the Joint Committee has always considered to be desirable in a
reformed second chamber:
· Legitimacy
· Representativeness
· No
domination by any one party
· Independence
· Expertise
(xxi) There are at least three models of indirect
election and election by secondary mandate which the Joint Committee
could consider: functional constituencies; indirect regional elections;
and election by secondary mandate.
(xxii) The first two of the above three options have
already been criticised in some quarters, including in the debates
on 4th February.
(xxiii) Notwithstanding the evident strength of the
objections to the first two of the options, we believe they should
not be dismissed out of hand and that the Joint Committee should
at least be invited to consider whether they merit more detailed
analysis.
(xxiv) We also believe that the Joint Committee should
consider the merits of the alternative option of election by secondary
mandate. Indeed, our preliminary view is that this model successfully
and comprehensively passes our guiding tests of legitimacy, representativeness,
no domination by any one party, independence and expertise.
(xxv) Moreover, the model of election by secondary
mandate carries with it the possibility of reinvigorating our
democracy - by adding weight to the votes we already cast instead
of imposing another tier of elections on an electorate already
suffering from election fatigue. In addition, it also addresses
- and in terms - the critical issue: how to maintain the primacy
of the Commons whilst ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the
Lords.
(xxvi) We note - moreover - that we have received
a letter expressly asking the Joint Committee to put this option
before Parliament for debate - alongside other methods of indirect
election - from a number of individuals and think tanks with a
long-standing interest in constitutional reform.
(xxvii) We note - finally - that although this solution
would amount to a radical reform of the existing constitution,
it is incremental in its radicalism. In particular, it requires
no new elections to be held. Indeed, it would be possible to re-establish
the House of Lords within a very short period of time according
to this model since we already know the results from the last
General Election and, therefore, the proportions of votes cast
in favour of each of the political parties in each of the regions
and nations of the United Kingdom.
21 See, for example, the pamphlet by Billy Bragg A
Genuine Expression of the Will of the People - a viable method
of democratic Lords reform. Back
22
See, Appendix 1 Back
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