Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill Written Evidence


DCH 21 Professor Peter Edge

Francene Graham,

Joint Committee on Draft Charities Bill,

Scrutiny Unit, Room G10

7 Mill Bank,

London SW1P 3JA.

11 June 2004.

Dear Francene Graham,

Submission on the Draft Charities Bill.

Please find enclosed a brief submission to the Joint Committee on this Bill, accompanied by two supporting articles as background materials.

Yours sincerely,


Professor Peter W. Edge.

Submission to the Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill, 11 June 2004.

1. Professor Peter W. Edge is Professor of Law at Oxford Brookes University.

Background.

2. The Cabinet Strategy Unit recommended that any presumption of public benefit for particular heads of charity should be abolished; and that public benefit would need to be shown for all charities. They considered that an essential characteristic of public benefit was "that the pursuit of the institution's purposes will in fact benefit the public in a manner that can be determined objectively" (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit: "Private Action, Public Benefit: Charitable Status", section 4).

3. The Strategy Unit considered the application of the public benefit test to charities for the advancement of religion. They recognised that religious organisations might face an increased evidential burden. In a key section: "[t]hey might have to show (unless this was self-evident) that their teachings and principles, if adhered to, were more likely to make members conduct themselves as responsible members of society, and that membership was open to the public at large. Benefit would either be direct through the holding of services and through teaching or indirect through the example of adherents. It could be made clear, for the avoidance of doubt that worship which is open to the public is considered for public benefit, even if it is not possible to empirically prove that those who attend have benefited."

4. The Strategy Unit drew a significant distinction: "It is not intended that these proposals should prove to be a problem for established religions. But the change could make it easier for the Courts and the Charity Commission to justify the non-acceptance as charities of bodies connected with fringe religions where on balance there is evidence of harm".

5. In a response the Government noted the assurances as to public religious rites, and additionally added: "[r]emoving the presumption of public benefit will not affect the continuing charitable status of religious organisations that carry out missionary and evangelistic work" ("Charities and not-for-profits: A modern legal framework", 3.19).

6. The most relevant clauses of the Bill are cl.2 and cl.3. Clause 2(2)(c) details the advancement of religion as one of the heads of charity; while 2(2)(e) refers to the advancement of citizenship or community development. Clause 3(2) clarifies that "it is not to be presumed that a purpose of a particular description is for the public benefit". The will trump existing law, as made clear in clause 3(4). The explanatory note to the Bill adds that this will abolish the presumption of public benefit for relief of poverty, advancement of education, and advancement of religion, putting all charities on the same footing.

Difficulties with the proposed law.

7. The Strategy Unit's analysis that public benefit requires objectively determined benefit to the public poses especial problems in relation to the advancement of religion. By emphasising the finding of public benefit free of presumptions, the Bill would require organs of the State to become involved in discussing whether the advancement of a particular religion in a particular way will benefit the public. This has a number of undesirable consequences.

8. The State has renounced the jurisdiction to make findings as to metaphysical reality. When considering the overall benefit of advancing a religion, the State will therefore need to proceed on the basis that all claims are correct (including contradictory claims); all claims are incorrect; or that the validity of no metaphysical claim is to be considered in assessing public benefit. The third approach is the most likely to be adopted. Charitable status will therefore be awarded exclusively on the basis of secular public benefits, when contributors to the charity will often have made the contribution on the basis of the metaphysical benefit.

9. Once metaphysical benefits have been discounted, there exist two general arguments for deriving public benefit from religious organisations.

10. First, the incidental argument that religion provides a motivation for activities leading to secular benefit. If these activities produce benefit, however, then this would appear to be the case regardless of motivation. An emphasis on the religious motivation for a secular benefit links two distinct elements together - elements that need not be linked.

11. Second, the character argument that religion provides society with members who are in some way more useful to society than they would otherwise be. Given the diversity of religious belief, values, and practice in the United Kingdom identifying the character traits built by all religions may be problematic. In any case, given the absence of any presumptions in assessing public benefit, the State would need to engage with each religious organisation to identify what characteristics involvement with the organisation are likely to promote; and whether these are desirable in society. The principal disadvantage here is that this will lead to excessive entanglement between the State and religious organisations.

12. A particular danger in relation to this entanglement is that some religious organisations may receive unequal treatment. This has already been hinted at in the suggestion that established religions will not be threatened by the law, but that fringe religions may be easier to deal with. Given the work to date of the Charity Commission in relation to religious charities, there is a real danger that the social stigmatisation of some religious organisations will be converted into differential legal treatment. If the test is to be applied evenly, however, then large, established religious communities may need to justify their values at length. For instance, some communities excluding women from access to particular offices of spiritual and community leadership may need to demonstrate the beneficial effect of their values taken as a whole.

13. A third difficulty with citing personal transformation as public benefit is that members of other religious communities may see the transformation quite differently. The United Kingdom is a religiously heterogeneous society. Charitable status carries with it important financial benefits, effectively providing a State subsidy for charities. In relation to religious charities, this can effectively require individuals to support through the tax system religious organisations they passionately believe to be in error, to be effecting damaging personal transformation.

Conclusions.

14. The emphasis on public benefit in the Bill is entirely justified, when it is remembered that charitable status carries with it significant financial benefits, in effect constituting a State subsidy to the activity. Applying public benefit analysis seriously to the advancement of religion, however, will lead to an increased level of State entanglement in the activities of religious organisations, and in particular carry with it the risk of unjustified differential treatment of religious communities already vulnerable because of their unpopularity, novelty, or small size.

Background materials attached.

Edge P., 1995, "Charitable status for the advancement of religion: An abolitionist's view", Charity Law and Practice Review 3(1), 28.

Edge P. and Loughrey J., 2001, "Religious charities and the juridification of the Charity Commission", Legal Studies 21(1), 36.


 
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