Annex 1
ANALYSIS OF
RELEVANT CASE
MATERIAL FOR
THE JOINT
SCRUTINY ON
THE DRAFT
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
BILL
Goodwin v the Patent Office (1998)
Dr Goodwin was dismissed from his post as a
patent examiner after complaints from female staff of disturbing
behaviour. He is a paranoid schizophrenic. He brought a complaint
under the DDA.
Dr Goodwin gave evidence that he had auditory
hallucinations which interrupted his concentration. The employment
tribunal held that he failed to come within the definition of
a "disabled person" and thus was not protected by the
Act, because it did not consider that the impairment had a substantial
adverse effect on his normal day-to-day activities. Although the
tribunal accepted that the hallucinations affected Dr Goodwin's
ability to concentrate on his work and reduced his pleasure in
watching television, it held that the effect on his normal day-to-day
activities was not substantial. The tribunal found that he was
able to "perform his domestic activities without the need
for assistance, to get to work efficiently and to carry out his
work to a satisfactory standard."
Dr Goodwin took his case to an Employment Appeal
Tribunal (EAT). The EAT held that the employment tribunal had
erred in law. They noted that Dr Goodwin was unable to carry on
a normal day-to-day conversation with work colleagues, which was
good evidence that his capacity to concentrate and communicate
had been adversely affected in a significant manner. The EAT added
that "it seemed to us most surprising that any tribunal could
conclude that a person admittedly diagnosed as suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia and who had been dismissed partly because
of what one might call bizarre behaviour, consistent with that
diagnosis, fell outside the definition. . ." The EAT upheld
the appeal, substituted their own finding that Dr Goodwin was
a disabled person under the Act, and sent the case back to a new
tribunal so that the hearing could proceed.
This case, as well as showing how a person with
schizophrenia clearly comes within the meaning of the definition
of disability, also provided useful guidelines for future tribunals
to follow.
Samantha Morgan v Staffordshire University (EAT
2001)
This concerned a woman with a mental impairment
(described as stress and anxiety, and clinical depression) which
ultimately led her to resign from her job and claim constructive
dismissal. The tribunal ruled that Ms Morgan did not have a clinically
well-recognised illness. Ms Morgan had produced GP notes
recording her symptoms, and confirming that she was
being treated with medication for depression. On appeal the decision
was upheld by the EAT.
Guidance given by the EAT (which now provides
a standard for other tribunals to follow) suggests the following
ways in which a person may prove their disability:
— proof of a mental illness specifically
mentioned as such in the World Health Organisation's International
Classification of Diseases (WHOICD);
— proof of a mental illness specifically
mentioned as such in a publication "such as" the WHO
classification;
— proof by other means of a medical
illness recognised by a respected body of medical opinion.
The tribunal said "there is no good ground
for expecting the tribunal members (or Employment Appeal tribunal
members) to have anything more than a layman's rudimentary familiarity
with psychiatric classification. Things therefore need to be spelled
out."
The EAT's decision was based on standards of
evidence, not an exclusion of people in Morgan's circumstances.
It provides useful guidelines for future hearings.
East Sussex County Council v Mr D Hancock (November
2003)
This was an appeal against a preliminary hearing,
held to determine whether the Applicant was a disabled person.
Mr Hancock is a recently retired teacher formerly
employed by the Respondent, and citing disability discrimination
(the circumstances of which are as yet unknown). It is common
ground that he suffers from mixed anxiety and depression and this
was confirmed by a consultant psychiatrist as being clinically
well recognised. There was no dispute that it was long term.
Disagreement centred over whether the illness
had a substantial effect on day-to-day activities. A consultant
psychiatrist gave evidence to the Tribunal, (he had not examined
Mr Hancock for the purposes of the hearing, but for an entirely
different reason in connection with eligibility for a company
pension scheme). Some of his evidence did not support the Applicant's
testimony, and even though there was no other evidence in support
of the Applicant, the ET nevertheless found in the Applicant's
favour.
The Respondent appealed on the grounds that
it was not possible to know from the ET's written reasons, why
the Applicant had succeeded in his claim. The EAT agreed that
the ET had not given its reasons for coming to the conclusion
that it had done. They therefore remitted the case back to a new
ET. The issues that will have to be decided will be, whether at
the material times, such disorder led to or had a substantial
effect on day-to-day activities. The EAT decided that that matter
will have to be decided afresh but can be decided at the same
time as the question as to whether there was unfavourable treatment.
This case is purely a case about procedure and
does not in itself point to any conclusion on the definition of
disability in the DDA.
In this particular case it would not have made
a difference had the precise terms of the definition of disability
been worded any differently—the case fell down on a technical
point, namely the failure of the ET to provide an adequate written
explanation of their decision.
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