Joint Committee on the Draft Gambling Bill Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 380 - 399)

TUESDAY 13 JANUARY 2004

JOHN HEALEY MP

  Q380  Lord Wade of Chorlton: You also stated that "The erosion of the traditional boundaries between discrete gambling activities may raise questions about the suitability of the current tax structure and also raises issues around compliance costs and the administrative efficiency of such a system", also referring to specific issues relating to remote gambling and casino taxation. What is your timetable for addressing these issues and which do you think is the most challenging of the two?

  John Healey: The timetable is rather as I indicated to the Committee earlier on—at least at this point, as far as one can anticipate it. It is important to get the principal regulatory decisions confirmed, and that is certainly impossible to do definitively until this Committee has passed its judgment. That would suggest that options for any tax reform that may be appropriate would have to follow decisions on regulation, which would suggest that any legislation (which would, of course, be a matter for the Finance Bill) would not be feasible before 2005. As I said earlier, it would need to be aligned with the progress of settling and introducing deregulatory reform that  the Committee is looking at. I hope the memorandum, to some extent, has pointed to the dilemmas and tensions that both deregulation and some of the trends in the industry throw up for us in tax terms. Essentially, as Members of the Committee will know much better than I do, the structure of gambling taxation has really evolved in silos. We have six different, essentially, gambling taxation regimes. There are, in some ways, some strengths from such a system: it allows us, for instance, to take account of particular competitive costs or circumstances that one might find in one part of the industry if not in the other. So the pressure on the general betting activity from the movement on to the Net and offshore is very different to the sort of pressures that there are on the bingo industry, and it is possible to make taxation decisions that reflect that. On the other hand, as I mentioned in the memorandum, with new activities such as remote gambling, the question really arises, do we treat these as an online facet of an existing silo—in other words, an online variant of betting or an online variant of bingo—or do we come up with a different regime which is essentially about online activity, so that you may have different types of activity, physical bingo and online bingo, treated for tax purposes in a different way? It is not easy to resolve. There are other more difficult, generic questions, to answer your point directly, if I can, Lord Wade. The question of how we deal with VAT, if there is any radical reform across the board; whether or not there is a case, as some argue, for unitary rates irrespective of the gambling activity; whether indeed there is a good case for one-roof regimes where, with resort silos or resort casinos, for example, you are likely to have a number of differently taxed activities located in one place, and the potential complexity there for businesses to comply with having a number of different activities taxed in different ways at different rates in the same location does throw up some questions that, frankly, I have not faced before. I think the most difficult question we face, actually, is none of those, although I would suggest they are all complex and the Committee will well understand that. I think the most difficult question that we face would be how we look to reform regimes to reflect new developments in the industry whilst, at the same time, weighing the concerns of established activities and established businesses. I think for me a cautionary point into this is the wide range of views that we have had in response to the consultation we did on amusement machine licence duty, where it is quite clear that any possible reform is likely to have a highly differential effect with a very wide range of winners and losers. I think you could scale that up when you consider the regime of gambling duties right across the board. That, I think, will be the Government's—in fact for all of us wanting to see a way through this—most difficult issue to resolve.

  Q381  Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: In the interests of transparency, Mr Chairman, I think I should probably start by saying sympathetically to    the Economic Secretary that I held his   responsibilities in the middle-1980s and, incidentally, in the context of Customs & Excise most pleasurably. Do the tax yield implications of substitute expenditure enter into the tax planning of the Treasury in the matters which we are discussing today? If so, has Customs & Excise already started work on what that substitute expenditure might be? Secondly, and I am not really asking about the dimensions of substitute expenditure, because I see those as what the eventual regulatory process is, but I am asking whether analysis has been done of the sectoral areas in the economy which would generate that substitute expenditure.

  John Healey: May I say, Lord Brooke, that I entirely agree with your view of the very special responsibility it is to be Customs Minister. It is a very special service with an extraordinary range of responsibilities and some first-rate staff. I appreciate the distinction you draw between questions on the principle of substitution diversion rather than our ability to judge the dimensions of that at this stage. The short answer is yes, it figures very significantly, not just because it is a potentially (as the industry will recognise and do recognise in their Pion consultants' study) significant dimension for us but, also, because the government's own approach to additionality is set out in the Green Book, and that applies right across the spectrum of taxation decisions. So, to quote the Green Book here, the effect on net employment and net output is likely to be much smaller than the direct employment and output effects of a particular project. The industry is attempting to do this in its own study producing both the net and gross impact. Now, we are still at an early stage—and I think probably the industry would say in their own workings as well—of trying to assess the likely dynamics of any diversion. The industry study, and it is certainly a plausible belief, is that there is likely to be some diversion of existing gambling activity, particularly from some of the new business models, the new resort-style casinos. I think it is plausible, also, to believe there is likely to be some substitution and diversion from other forms of leisure activity. I certainly know that in my own area in Yorkshire, where we are looking at, potentially, a development which could encompass a new resort-style casino operation, some of the existing leisure operators from tourist attractions to cinemas, to bowling alleys and theatres are all concerned about the potential substitution effect. From the Treasury point of view, our first task is to try and bottom out the data, convince ourselves that the assumptions that we might build into any model are as sound as they can be, and then ultimately make any tax decisions based on that work concerned principally with making sure that we see the net impact rather than any gross impact as the yardstick by which we make those judgments.

  Q382  Mr Meale: Can I start, Minister, by firstly saying that it is refreshing to hear a Treasury Minister actually use the phrase "tax scale increases might lead to impoverishment of those least able to pay." I think that is very refreshing from the Treasury, responsible for doing that. The difficulties about modelling, which you mentioned a little bit earlier, on tax-type modelling within the department, there has been much criticism over the year, particularly by Customs & Excise, that they use a particular type and range of modelling based on the Oxbridge tax modelling techniques. It is refreshing to hear you say those things early on about "a new way forward, a new analysis". Are you going to rely upon the age-old methods of tax-gathering rather than, as I say, this new innovative and quite radical dimension that you mentioned earlier about looking at the industry, how it is going to affect it and base it much more on the needs of the industry and those that work in it rather than gathering tax?

  John Healey: I am not familiar with the particular Oxbridge modelling, Mr Meale, whatever that is.

  Q383  Mr Meale: Can I just say, Minister, if you have any doubts you might reflect and go back to Customs & Excise and have a look at how they did it on beer and whisky. That might give you a clue.

  John Healey: As it happens, part of my other responsibilities means I am looking very closely at the various modelling in the whisky industry and spirits industry at the moment. I think the memorandum sets out, and the Members of the Committee know full well, that the sort of reforms that we put in place in the taxation regimes in a number of the gambling sectors already were closely based on analysis modelling before we made the decision to go ahead. None of those, as far as I am aware, rest solely on an Oxbridge model of that. I would suggest that we are constantly, both in this field and more generally in Customs, ready to refine the modelling that we use, whether it is tobacco, gambling, alcohol or indeed VAT. Secondly, we have quite widely shared the assumptions that we have made that underpin the modelling that we undertake in order then to arrive at the sort of taxation decisions that we have made. We will follow the same principle of approach with the issues that we now face on this.

  Q384  Mr Page: Minister, you mentioned taxation being carried out in silos and developed in silos. My question is, I think, an almost impossible question for you to answer but it is just to get your thoughts on how the Treasury is approaching these matters. You mentioned that we have new gambling activities coming in and you mentioned the betting exchanges and things like that. As we all know, the casino operators desperately want to know what is the taxation regime in order to determine their investment. So, in short, what I would like to know is what work is being carried out not for today and not for the model of the day but the model for the future? What anticipation is being made of future possible trends so that we can have a taxation regime (I use the word "future-proof" rather loosely) that is not subject to change unless necessary and one that the industry can then work with with a degree of confidence and invest with a degree of confidence?

  John Healey: The principle of trying to devise a regime that is future-proof is an important ambition. I mentioned earlier in my comments that on the one hand the industry quite understandably wants as great a clarity on future tax structures and rates as it possibly can, because it is an element of the investment decisions they are going to now need to make. I quite appreciate that and I also quite appreciate why they are arguing for as low a rate as possible in the context of this discussion. They are also concerned, and this certainly came through in the evidence on the amusement machine licence duty and more generally, that we do not make decisions about tax changes now which we thoroughly overhaul in a couple of years' time. The ability now to get them right with a degree of certainty and stability for the longer-term future—the sort of time periods that investment decisions and returns need to be planned over—I think is an important duty and responsibility on my part as the Minister responsible for this. Whether or not and to what extent it is possible entirely to future-proof such decisions is a more complex and more open question. Clearly, one of the drivers in the sectors, generally, recently, has been technology and it is likely to remain a very important dynamic of change. In many ways, Mr Page, I think technology creates more difficult questions for those responsible for regulation than it does, perhaps, for taxation. If I may explain as follows: essentially, the broad principles on which we base the approach to taxation decisions that we take in particular taxation regimes are largely consistent and largely continuous. So, for instance, with indirect tax systems in gambling we generally place the liability to account and pay for gambling duties on the business rather than the player, and I do not see that changing. On the other hand, in regulation, if you look at what is happening in betting, whereas in the past bets could only be placed either on courses or on licensed premises, the technology has enabled betting exchanges to grow up, presenting if you like a number of headaches for the regulators without a change in regulation. It is in fact strictly, one could argue, an "illegal" activity. Secondly, it creates some quite serious challenges to the integrity of some of the sports with which it is associated. Thirdly, in the end, the capacity for such activity to move offshore and on to the web means ultimately it is possible to   evade that regulation and indeed taxation altogether. So a very central issue, an important concern, and responsibility which I take seriously and will be a feature of the work we do, but in the end probably the implications of the regulation are perhaps more profound and more difficult for the regulatory regime rather than the taxation regime.

  Q385  Mr Page: I am very grateful for your answer. The only small point I would bring to your attention is that intelligent anticipation would have given us a gross profits betting tax rather than the other duty, and that would have meant that a lot of companies would not have started to move offshore, they would have stayed onshore. I am very grateful for the tax change, I think it has been a tremendous advantage, but that is the sort of thinking to the future which I think we must do so we do not have the migration of companies and activities from our shores and the loss of the duties and the taxation benefits.

  John Healey: It may be a fair area for argument as to whether or not we acted quickly enough, but I would just suggest to you, Mr Page, we did act at that point, by doing so we were able to bring what was going offshore back onshore both through the change in the taxation regime and in discussion with the industry—

  Mr Page: I am not knocking it, I am saying thank you very much, but if the thought had been there in the first place we would not have had to get out of the hole we got into.

  Chairman: We did hear in the previous session that some support for gross profit tax is a means to doing precisely what Mr Page says. Unfortunately you were not here to hear that but the transcript will be available.

  Q386  Lord Mancroft: Minister, the Treasury could, with a little bit of luck, be quite a significant beneficiary from this new legislation. How much has the potential for increased revenue as a result of the change to the gambling industry been a motivator for this new legislation? What contact has there been between the Treasury and the DCMS on this specific issue?

  John Healey: The possibility of increased revenue to the Treasury has not been a motivator in the design and framing of the deregulation proposals. Beyond that, I am not aware of any discussion within Government in which the possibility of substantial revenue gains to the Treasury forms a part of the consideration in how to design the deregulatory regime proposed in the draft Bill. The motivations for the legislation I think are quite clearly set out and I do not need to rehearse those. From the Treasury point of view, we strongly support what we would regard as sensible deregulation and we do so generally because it contributes to our broader objective, the Treasury and Government objective, of increasing the productivity and potentially the activity within the economy. So those are the motivations, and the potential for any increased tax revenue has not formed a part of that, though the potential for revenue risk and revenue loss to the Treasury will form a part of the work I now do.

  Q387  Lord Mancroft: I think that is a very helpful answer. What assurances can you give that the right balance will be struck between securing revenue for the Exchequer whilst at the same time encouraging investment and innovation, which will be one of the keys to the success of this legislation?

  John Healey: It will indeed be one of the keys to the success of the legislation and the design of any tax reform which may be aligned to it, Lord Mancroft. Clearly we have a responsibility to ensure that a fair contribution towards general exchequer revenues is made from the industry in the future, but clearly we also have a very strong concern in the Treasury to promote and see stronger economic growth in the UK, and striking the right balance will be one of the central decisions and judgments that we will need to make.

  Q388  Jeff Ennis: Taxes on gambling are often seen as regressive. Do you have concerns that increasing the opportunities to gamble will effectively be increasing a regressive tax?

  John Healey: The principle that underpins the regulation of course and therefore the general Government approach to this is that adults generally have to take responsibility for what they do and are responsible for their actions, and one of the objectives of the deregulation is to increase the choice of these type of activities which may be available to people. I suppose my principal concern as a Treasury Minister is that the product that people chose to consume, the activities they choose to engage in, are fairly taxed, based on a belief that it is both fairer and a better balance if Government levies taxes on consumption as well as income, and that it is a better balance more likely to put in place a regime which properly gives incentives to work, to save and also to invest. On the concern you have about gambling duties being regressive, it is certainly true that gambling duties are one of the more regressive taxation regimes—although not as regressive as tobacco for instance—but I think probably I would suggest a sense of perspective here. It is generally thought people are by and large not spending a great deal on gambling activities. If you look at the statistics, households on average in this country spend £3.70 a week on gambling activities, £2.50 of which is with the Lottery. So that gives me really some grounds for not worrying too much about that as a problem. I would worry much more if we were not able to put in place across the rest of the taxation system the sort of provision we, for instance, have for zero-rated VAT on food and children's clothes, essentials which people do need, and if the taxation rates are too high are indeed seriously regressive, particularly when attached to essentials rather than if you like discretionary activities which clearly gambling falls into.

  Q389  Jeff Ennis: Generally speaking, there is broad all-party support for this over-arching Gambling Bill which will be welcomed when the gambling legislation comes in. Are you concerned at the fact that the potential expansion into gambling appears to be more industry-led, shall we say, than demand-led? Is that a concern for you as a taxation minister?

  John Healey: No. I would expect the industry to be leading the arguments in the current context, number one. Number two, the industry would expect me to treat those with close scrutiny. Number three, some of the reforms we have put in place to individual silo regimes if you like in the gambling field have liberated and encouraged individual demand rather than simply an expansion of supply. Clearly the impact of the reform of betting duty has had that effect. I expect the reform of bingo duty to have a similar effect. So I think we can see some important demand drivers in this field, not just the interests of the producers and suppliers.

  Q390  Lord Faulkner of Worcester: I wonder if I could take issue with your first reply to Jeff Ennis about the regressive nature of gambling and just share an anecdote with you; more than an anecdote, an experience? I was in Australia in October and I was taken around a large number of gambling outlets in Melbourne and Adelaide and what distinguishes the Australian scene from Britain is the enormous proliferation of what are called clubs and hotels which are populated with poker machines. These are located almost exclusively in the working class areas of those cities and they appeal to people who do not have a lot of money, people who receive benefits, and they are very close quite often to the places where benefits are paid out, and they get their benefits from the equivalent of post offices and they go into the bars and play on these machines. I tackled somebody there who was a university professor and said, "Aren't you worried about the incidence of gambling in your state?" and he said, "I'm not worried about it, because the gambling pays for things I like to do and if we did not have the gambling I would have to pay more taxation." I found that a very hard attitude to understand. What I am concerned about with your first reply to Jeff Ennis is that you would appear to be sanctioning that sort of approach where the complete freedom for adults to gamble is paramount and the social considerations of who is doing the gambling and the effect the gambling is having on people seem to come second. I am sure I am misrepresenting you, but I would like to give you an opportunity to correct that.

  John Healey: I am very grateful for the opportunity. Clearly none of us is looking at complete freedom for adults to gamble. The whole nature of the Bill and the Government's approach to this balances and puts in place the sort of safeguards which may be required to stop such problems getting out of hand. My argument is that is properly and most effectively a matter for regulation and questions of access rather than taxation. Gambling duties do indeed make a significant and important contribution to the general exchequer, £1.3 billion plus about a third of a billion on VAT and corporation tax as well, but it is essentially for the provisions in this Bill and the judgments which are made on regulation rather than the judgments which are made on taxation which will help deal with what is clearly a legitimate fear, particularly if it has been proved in practice in parts of Australia, and certainly with your experience, Lord Faulkner, something which the Committee will consider very carefully, as indeed the Government will.

  Q391  Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: Minister, like Lord Faulkner, I will follow up on a question Mr Ennis asked you, and I am thinking particularly of his last question where he raised the motivation and pressure for the legislation, where it came from, and you answered him. Large-scale gambling developments seem to be much more popular with local people when there is a possibility of generating benefits for local communities. Given this seems to be the case, would you consider permitting the use of a local levy or a hypothecated tax?

  John Healey: I think we can all understand, and certainly in your days as a constituency MP you will understand, Lord Brooke, as acutely as any of us do representing constituencies, that where a significant development of any nature is proposed in a local area, the local community and local authority look to see what potential gain there may be and benefit for the area. That is an established part of the planning system in a sense, looking for planning gain as part of any development. On the question of localised tax regimes, the short answer is no. I hope that is clear!

  Q392  Chairman: The clearest thing this morning!

  John Healey: Let me explain. There are probably five concerns I have with the proposition. The first is that hypothecation of that sort constrains the capacity and ability of Parliament to determine the distribution of Government spend. Secondly, gambling duties make an important contribution to the general tax revenues used for a variety of purposes. Thirdly, there are serious questions about the proposition we should treat gambling in a different way from other forms of business. Fourthly, there is a risk of substantial volatility in the tax-take where it is based simply on a single or a small number of businesses in the local area. Finally, there is a concern about equity in that some areas clearly are in a better position to attract such activity than others. For those reasons, that is not an approach or a structure to taxation in these circumstances that I am attracted to.

  Q393  Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: All of us, I think, on the Committee greatly admire the candour of a Treasury Minister saying what you said at the beginning of the answer, and I can hear myself saying a number of the things you subsequently said. Against that background, and I ask in the context of another topical area out of curiosity, why did the Treasury in the context of higher education arrangements let payments in Scotland go back into a trust rather than go back into the Treasury? One of the consequences of that of course was to make it an attractive proposition to the Scots, that in fact their higher education was going to benefit.

  John Healey: The answer is simply devolution. This is a devolved area of policy-making that is a responsibility for the Scottish Parliament, and that is the system they have put in place there. With gambling taxation, we have a unified UK regime at present. It is not, I have to say, Lord Brooke, a dimension to the potential tax issues we may face, and I cannot really consider it. I am not obviously immediately attracted either to devolution or disintegration of a unified UK tax regime on gambling. The answer on fees of course is devolution.

  Q394  Chairman: But it has been put to us that if you want to have significant regeneration of seaside resorts, such as Blackpool, were they to be able to   take up the opportunity of becoming an international casino resort, there would have to be investment from the companies setting up those casinos into the local infrastructure. Is this something that the Treasury has taken a view upon? It may not necessarily be done through hypothecated tax, but is it your judgment it could be done through planning agreements?

  John Healey: It would indeed need investment. It would not, as I have suggested to the Committee, need a local levy or hypothecation in that way. Conceivably, it could be encouraged through the planning regime, it could conceivably be encouraged at local authority level, it could also be a matter that Regional Development Agencies concerned about projects of strategic economic importance in their region would be interested to take a view on. To use the metaphor I suggested to the Committee earlier, planning policy, the way these sort of issues are dealt with, is one of those chairs which needs to be brought to the table of the deregulation in the Bill.

  Q395  Chairman: But you accept that the tax regime obviously has a bearing on how generous the investing casino company could be?

  John Healey: The tax structure and tax rates are likely to form—and certainly the industry would argue it is an important dimension—a dimension in their ability to prepare convincing investment plans. That is clearly a relevant factor.

  Q396  Mr Meale: Minister, as you know, the DPM has been involved over the last few years in quite a number of cases where the principle of hypothecation of tax has actually been supported. The London Underground, public-private partnerships, there is a whole range of them. We have been told the betting yield from this will be £2.2 billion, which is a considerably large amount of money, and we have also been told that probably there is going to be investment in only three or four areas which are going to have to bear the brunt of all that. We have seen examples elsewhere in the world, particularly New York State but elsewhere, where tax revenues and profits have been hypothecated to stay in a particular area to deal with that. Bearing in mind these previously different approaches to hypothecation, for instance in airport areas and taxes gathered from fuel at airports, why can we not look at the concept of these communities—as I say, there are not going to be many of them—actually retaining some of this revenue?

  John Healey: To be honest, I am not sure some of the designated funding streams, whether PFI credits or PFI partnerships or regeneration projects which are designated and targeted at particular areas like the New Deal for Communities or the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, constitute hypothecation under the auspices of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. However, I think there are often better ways of getting resources into local areas that require major projects or require regeneration than looking to the tax regime to do it. You ask a more general question, why can local authorities not hold on to some of the essentially business tax returns from the companies in their area. One of the five problems I have with this proposition of a local levy for resort-style casinos is that it would be a return to the local authority and local people based on perhaps a single or a very small number of companies. In fact, you may have seen in the Pre-Budget Report the Chancellor delivered in December before Christmas confirmation that the Government will introduce what we are calling a local authority business growth incentive. This is where all local authorities stand to gain additional funding based on the increase in economic activity in their areas. If we had had that in place over the last three years, it would have been worth a total of an extra £1 billion to local authorities. It seems to me to be a similar principle you are interested in but a much more stable and sustainable base on which to stay, "We want local authorities to take a greater interest in the economy and the health of the labour market in their area", where they are playing a part in local economic growth, than there are rewards in order to incentivise and give that proper attention. I would suggest that is a better and more stable and sustainable way of doing the sort of thing you are looking for than simply looking at a rather narrow sector with a very small number of potential companies and looking to follow that model with them.

  Mr Meale: I am not looking for it at all, I am just posing the question.

  Q397  Lord Faulkner of Worcester: A quick question on the regulatory impact assessment, Minister. The Cabinet Office guidance says that an RIA should contain an assessment of the benefits and costs of a proposal as the central analytical component of the RIA, yet the one produced by the DCMS on this Bill does not contain any monetary assessment of the benefits of the proposals. Do you think it should?

  John Healey: Clearly setting monetary assessments of the potential benefits of future changes is difficult. It is complex, it is uncertain, it requires sometimes heroic assumptions which, whether it is a potential investor, a potential developer or a Government, one does one's best to try and narrow down and ground as much as possible. In fact, the RIA does have an important feature, and it is on page 19, in paragraph 1.78, where it suggests that the projected annual average increase in net expenditure on gambling would rise by at least £500 million over the period 2004-05 to 2008-09. That is probably around 6 per cent of the £7.8 billion that was last year spent on gambling. So there are figures in there. There is that specific figure which was, at the stage the Government prepared the regulatory impact assessment, our best estimate. Part of the work, to bring the Committee back to our starting point, that now needs to be done by formalising the work between DMS officials, Treasury officials and Customs officials, is to see whether or not we can get a more reliable and more robust assessment, if you like, of the potential economic impact. Clearly, after this Committee has made its recommendations, and in advance of any legislation, an up-dated regulatory impact assessment would and will be produced, and that will draw on any sounder economic modelling that we are able to produce within Government.

  Q398  Chairman: That Option 3, as you point out, does produce that figure but it does also suggest that other costs might be a potential reduction in income for good causes by the National Lottery, and possible costs for the NHS and other agencies. Are there any figures available to the Treasury which you can share with the Committee as to what those costs might be? From our first evidence session this morning, there is some concern that the Bill could have an adverse impact on National Lottery proceeds, for example. It might be something you want to look at and write to us on.

  John Healey: I can answer you now, Mr Chairman. I regret we do not have hard figures, and this in a sense refers us back to the proposition Lord Brooke was questioning me about. The principle and plausible assumption that there is going to be substitution and some diversion I think is sound. Our ability to assess the dimensions, as Lord Brooke put it, still requires further modelling work but it is clearly something we will be doing.

  Q399  Lord Donoughue of Ashton: Minister, provisions in the draft Bill will extend the use of credit cards for gambling purposes. Surely such easy credit card use will significantly increase the levels of gambling and will significantly increase the levels of problem gambling, because it makes possible rapid gambling, chasing losses and gains beyond the real resources of many individuals involved, with the consequential increase in consumer debt which many commentators—the Treasury, I do not know—consider already high. Do you have any concerns about this? Is it right for the Government actually to promote these consequences?

  John Healey: The Government is concerned about this. I would suggest to the Committee it is reflected in the nature of the deregulation proposals which are part of the draft Bill, where the extension of the scope to use credit cards or credit in this area is actually rather restricted. So that is the first point. The second is that much of the work that the consumer protection part of the Department of Trade & Industry has been doing is relevant in more general terms to these sort of concerns, and the Department of Trade & Industry may have some valuable information to provide the Committee on the sort of plans in the Consumer Credit White Paper and other safeguards which we are putting in place. On the general debate which is being conducted at the moment about levels of debt, in the context of a stable and steadily growing economy, in the context of record historic levels of employment, in the context of interest rates being close to their lowest levels since the 1950s and inflation low and stable, I would suggest to the Committee that in many ways the debt that people generally now have is affordable in a way that in previous periods it was not. For me, the important measure of that is the proportion of interest payments which households have to make, if you like, as a proportion of their disposable income. Figures for total interest payments are now just 7.1 per cent of disposable income compared, for instance, to a rate in 1990 which was over 15 per cent.


 
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