Joint Committee on the Draft Gambling Bill

Joint Committee on the Draft Gambling Bill First Report

11 Betting and bookmakers

495. The draft Bill will impact on the betting industry in several ways, both directly and indirectly. Modernisation of the legislation covering betting will see the removal of the demand test for betting offices and the relaxation of restrictions surrounding advertising.

496. Removal of the 'demand test' may lead to changes in the structure of the industry. There have been concerns that this could lead to a proliferation of bookmakers on the high street. Equally, it may result in the continuation of a recent trend that has seen the major players consolidating their premises and concentrating efforts on improving the appearance and attractiveness of their shops. Bookmakers may be adversely affected by the increased number of licences they may require as a result of the proposals for personal licensing,[727] which is covered in another chapter of this Report.

497. The Association of British Bookmakers argued that definitions of "bookmaking" and "bookmaker" should be included in the draft Bill for the sake of clarity.[728] We are content that the current common law definition is sufficient, although this is something that may need to be revisited at a later stage by the Department, particularly if the Government pursues our recommendations on betting exchanges. The definitions of "betting" and "gaming" in Clauses 6 and 7 were also queried, particularly in the context of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs) and betting exchanges, both of which are dealt with in other chapters of this Report.

498. The greatest impact on UK bookmakers is likely to arise from the deregulation and expansion of other areas of the gambling industry, particularly casinos,[729] remote gambling and betting exchanges[730] (as to which see Chapters 8 and 12 and paragraphs 503 to 547 respectively). Future treatment of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs) or FOBMs will also be crucial. This is covered in Chapter 10.

499. We have already noted the Government's intention that the Bill should be future-proof. In a fast moving sector such as betting in general and remote betting in particular, the Government must take steps to ensure that new developments are covered as appropriate by operating licences issued under Clause 53, whether these are general betting operating licences (Clause 53(2)(c)), or betting intermediary operating licences (Clause 53(2)(e)). Furthermore, the conditions issued under these categories by the Gambling Commission under Clauses 62 to 64 of the draft Bill should reflect developing circumstances. Towards the end of our inquiry, the Committee heard of a number of developments. One of these involved the establishment of licensed betting exchange shops in Scotland. We understand that this was the subject of an unsuccessful legal challenge by William Hill bookmakers. However, we have no authoritative source to comment further on the possibility that brokers may lawfully act on others' behalf to place and lay bets on betting exchanges. It is important that such developments are covered as part of the regulatory framework.

500. The point was made by the Association of British Bookmakers that the provision of betting shops in casinos would displace business from bookmakers. This is a natural market process, to which the ABB admitted it had no objection.[731] We note that it could have a significant impact on existing premises and, more seriously, draw betting shop clients into a Category A gaming machine environment, which could have implications for problem gambling.

501. Under Clause 143 of the draft Bill casino premises would be entitled to offer both bingo and betting. We consider that such activities should be ancillary to the casino's core and traditional gaming activities. We would not, therefore have concerns about large or resort casinos offering betting. However, we consider that Clause 143 should be amended to enable local authorities to prevent small casinos offering betting. We would expect this discretion to be exercised in accordance with strict guidance issued by the Gambling Commission pursuant to Clause 17, which should take account of the proximity of existing betting shops.

502. Much of the evidence we received from the Association of British Bookmakers,[732] the National Joint Pitch Council[733] and the National Association of Bookmakers[734] (which represent the interests of on-course bookmakers) concentrated on the arrangements to be made for licensing betting exchanges, which are dealt with in the next section of this Report.

Betting Exchanges

503. Betting exchanges enable punters to bet directly with each other, rather than with bookmakers. The operator matches opposite bets and takes a commission from the winner. It has no interest in the outcome of the bet. [735]

504. Exchanges, the largest of which is Betfair, have recently become an important and lucrative element of the gambling industry. Existing operators have all sought and been granted bookmakers' permits and arrangements have been made for them to pay gross profits tax on the commissions they receive.

505. There is nothing inherently perverse about the fundamental concept of betting exchanges where individuals may wager against each other on the future result of an event. Modern technology has now made this possible on a scale previously unforeseen through the agency of the exchanges.

506. Clause 8 of the draft Bill provides for betting exchanges to be covered by a specific licence permitting the holder to establish betting markets and to receive and hold monies on behalf of its users. They will be bound by general licence conditions but will also be prevented from initiating bets in any way on the exchange and may not permit their customers to identify themselves to each other.

507. The status of exchanges, and the fiscal and regulatory arrangements that apply to them, have proved to be one of the most controversial areas of our work, and were the subject of a great deal of media attention during the later stages of our inquiry. We received evidence that they could pose risks to the integrity of racing and other sports as well as to the public, and comments that those who lay on exchanges should be subject to the same fiscal and regulatory regime as bookmakers; points which were firmly rejected by the operators and users of exchanges, as set out in greater detail below. It is also clear that the exchanges pose a serious challenge to the business model of the existing bookmaking industry.

508. Our view, on which we expand in the following paragraphs, is that betting exchanges are an example of a low-cost, high turnover, form of remote gambling. Their success reflects a shrewd business model, and we note that Betfair was awarded the Queen's Award for Enterprise in 2003.

509. Furthermore, we found the exchanges we dealt with to be helpful witnesses. Betfair in particular supplied us with important information on a confidential basis. It would be highly unfortunate if, as a result of this legislation, betting exchanges decided no longer to base themselves in the United Kingdom, and steps must be taken to avoid this.

510. At the same time, however, the Government must ensure that the exchanges are regulated effectively so that the integrity of sports events is maintained and that consumers placing bets on the exchanges are protected. Questions have been raised about the integrity of certain sports in the light of suspicious patterns detected by betting exchanges and urgent action must be taken. The involvement of the exchanges themselves, the DCMS, the Gambling Commission and the sporting regulators will be crucial.

511. We believe that the best way of achieving a balance between these points is to ensure that those using the exchanges to lay bets professionally are identified, regulated, made subject to the appropriate levy arrangements, and have their status checked. There is an opportunity here in that the audit trail produced by betting exchanges is far superior to that produced by ordinary bookmakers, as acknowledged by the Chief Executive of the Association of British Bookmakers.[736] We expand on this in the sections below.

512. It is worth noting at this point that some of the issues in terms of laying bets on betting exchanges also apply to spread betting, which is not to be regulated by the Gambling Commission under the terms of the draft Bill. We have already recommended that this should be subject to review by the Government after five years, and suggest that this review should include a consideration of the impact of sports spread betting on event integrity.

The fiscal and regulatory regime

513. The ABB and others, including the National Joint Pitch Council, argue that the layers of bets on Betting Exchanges fall within the definition of bookmakers under Section 55(1) of the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 and that they should, therefore, be required to be licensed as such.[737]

514. At the time of publication of the November policy document, DCMS took the view that it was not necessary for the users of betting exchanges to be licensed, because the licence conditions proposed for betting exchanges would be sufficient to ensure that the aims of gambling regulation could be achieved without the administrative burden of regulating the user: "the Government believes it quite unnecessary to license betting exchange customers. That would constitute superfluous over-regulation."[738] It reflected this position in the draft Bill.

515. Licensing for the users of betting exchanges has become an issue for two reasons: the fiscal regime applicable to layers, and the possible misuse of betting exchanges by those with inside information. We deal with these two issues in turn.

Taxation and the horseracing betting levy

516. We were presented with varying analyses of this subject. The ABB's memorandum set out its view of the differential in tax and levy paid by those who lay on betting exchanges and traditional bookmakers: "Under the current […] regime for betting exchange transactions […] revenue to the Government [is generated] only on the commission paid to the betting exchange. This commission is typically a maximum of 5% of the layer's profit, although likely to be less for large players such as this. [Tax] at 15% is then charged only on this commission, not on the customer's gross profit. This amounts to maximum revenue to the Government of only £3.38. By contrast, under the current […] regime a traditional bookmaker must pay [tax at] […] 15% of gross profit. On the same winnings of £450, this amounts to revenue to the Government of £67.50, being 15% of his £450 gross win [...] Therefore, on a betting exchange, the transaction will generate a maximum of only 1/20^th of the […] revenue for the Government."[739] The ABB added that it took the view that the same differential applies to the payment of the levy to British horseracing.

517. This analysis was, however, disputed by Betfair in a submission to us which we received at a very late stage in our deliberations. The submission noted that the ABB's analysis was incomplete because traditional bookmakers offset their gains:[740] "It is […] hugely misleading to suggest that a bookmaker will pay £15 when a customer loses £100, for the following reason: the customer who loses £100 does not do so in isolation. If he did, bookmaking would be the fastest way to becoming a millionaire. The reality is that when one customer loses £100 to the bookmaker, another one wins £85 from the bookmaker, which the bookmaker can offset before he pays any tax. The differential between the two is therefore how the bookmaker makes his money. He does not make it on the £100."

518. Rob Hartnett from Betdaq and Mark Davies from Betfair noted during evidence to the Committee that betting exchanges pay Gross Profits Tax on the same basis as commercial operators,[741] and also make contributions to the horseracing industry. [742] The British Greyhound Racing Board acknowledged that while Betfair had "hardly done any greyhound sponsorship […] it is not entirely their fault because we have never been able to make up our mind whether we want to take their money or not."[743]

519. On the basis of individual contributions, Mr Davies asserted: "There is no tax on punters in this country. There is no tax on punters when they bet on Betfair, whether they bet on an outcome to happen or not to happen, and there is no tax on punters at William Hill, whether they bet on an outcome to happen or not to happen. The call from our commercial competitors at the moment is that those who bet on Betfair on an outcome not to happen, those who lay, in Betfair's terminology, should be taxed. That would mean that you could walk into your high street this afternoon and you could bet that England would not win [Euro] 2004 and you could do so without paying tax, but to express that same view on Betfair, you would be classified as a layer and you would be taxed. Nobody is suggesting that you, as a passenger, should pay anything different on one airline from any other and nobody should be suggesting that you, as a punter, should be paying differently with one betting operator than with any other."[744]

520. A week before we formally agreed our Report, the Chancellor of the Exchequer referred, as part of his budget speech, to a review of "the tax treatment of betting exchanges and their clients."[745] We look forward to learning of the Treasury's assessment of this complex situation.

Betting exchanges and the integrity of sports

521. The Committee received evidence from the Association of British Bookmakers[746] and key organisations in the horseracing industry, for example the National Trainers Federation[747] and the Jockey Club,[748] that betting exchanges pose a risk to the horseracing industry in the United Kingdom.

522. The Association of British Bookmakers argued that [betting] "exchanges are eroding and under present plans will continue to damage, this country's reputation for firm and sensible regulation of gambling".[749] The Jockey Club stated that "The problems associated with the misuse of inside information and the potential corruption of sports events are exacerbated by the emergence of betting exchanges […] which have expanded the ability to lay a horse to lose."[750] The British Greyhound Racing Board also expressed concern about the potential impact on greyhound racing.[751]

523. The degree of risk posed was questioned by some within the sport, the exchange companies and their users. The National Trainers' Federation concluded "Our own view is therefore that the current level of damage to integrity is limited. However, the fact remains that the opportunity and incentive [for improper interference in the outcome of a race] has increased enormously."[752] The difference in opinion within the horseracing sector was summarised by Peter Savill, of the British Horseracing Board, in the following terms: "Mr Foster [of the Jockey Club] says that betting exchanges highlight the problem, but I think betting exchanges exacerbate the problem." [753]

524. The concerns centre on the fact that betting exchanges present an opportunity for those with 'inside information', which may be acquired improperly, to make a profit from the uninformed punter, by allowing customers to place bets that a particular horse will lose. It is argued that this presents a temptation for owners, trainers, jockeys and others working in the industry to compromise the integrity of racing.

525. Specific worries have been expressed in the United Kingdom about an increasing number of suspicious betting patterns and incidents where odds on horses have changed significantly between bets opening and the race taking place. There were a number of articles in the press in early March 2004, particularly concerning the horses Ballinger Ridge, running at Lingfield on 2 March, and Ice Saint, running at Fontwell on 8 March.

526. Clive Reams, representing the organisation Racefax, stated that "I would say that the betting exchanges are used on a daily basis by those with inside information to make a profit from less informed punters. To take the second part of the question and I have produced a report that underpinned that, I would say it is so widespread that minor incidents occur not just on a daily basis but almost on a race by race basis. The exchanges have made it very easy for anyone connected to a horse to profit from the knowledge that they have even though that horse may not win on that particular day. The range of candidates for that is extensive, from the owner to the stable lads' girlfriends or whatever."[754]

527. Similar concerns have been expressed in Australia. No betting exchanges have been licensed there, and state governments are trying to dissuade Betfair from accepting bets on Australian racing at all. The recent 'Betting Exchange Task Force Report', made to the Australian Racing Ministers Conference, stated that "the two most significant issues associated with betting exchanges are the enhanced levels of risk (both real and perceived) to the integrity of the Australian racing product, and the likelihood of substantially diminished commercial returns to the racing industry and to State, Territory and Commonwealth governments."[755] The Committee also received evidence from the Asian Racing Federation, stating that "it is the view of our Executive Council that betting exchanges are incompatible with the best interests of racing and should be prohibited from operating on our sport."[756]

528. Betfair responded to these concerns by pointing out that it has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Jockey Club to report suspicious betting patterns,[757] which both sides agree is working successfully. Christopher Foster, Executive Director of the Jockey Club, stated in oral evidence that "There is very close co-operation between our security department and Betfair in particular and there is a great willingness on the part of Betfair to try and root out malpractice."[758] We also received written evidence from the Football Association which made clear that participants in the game are forbidden to bet on matches in which they have a direct interest.[759]

529. Mark Davies of Betfair, giving oral evidence, added that betting exchanges had not created the problem, but were merely making movements in odds more visible: "I think there are no new regulatory questions that we raise as an operator or that are raised by our customers. I think it is quite clear that we are raising the fight against corruption and for evidence of that I would cite the fact that bookmakers have recently followed our lead in signing a memorandum of understanding which puts in place a much better structure for the Jockey Club to be able to access information. The reason that you are hearing the negative comments is there has been a lot of talk about the price of horses and the length of them and people are equating that with corruption, and I think that is a step which is completely wrong to take. This is now a free market where all of the prices on both sides of the market are visible to everyone. Previously one set of people could see all of the prices and another set could not […] People have pointed to 171 horses which Clive Reams organisation Racefax has identified as being potentially problematic. People comment on drifting horses when they lose, they do not comment on drifting horses that win. In 2003 more than 1,700 horses on Betfair compared with 171 Clive Reams pulled out, drifted out, lengthened in price to more than double their price and won, some of which were absolutely extraordinary examples. At Stratford in October a horse called Boing Boing went from 7-1 to 80-1 and won by 10 lengths […] It is not a question of the horse drifting that applies to corruption any more than it is true than when you suddenly put a speed camera on a road and you discover that 20 cars were speeding overnight you have suddenly increased speeding, what you have done is put in place something that allows you to see what has happened." [760] This point was endorsed by users of betting exchanges.[761]

530. The Government's position is that "it is only right that sports regulators take the leading role in controlling the betting behaviour of participants in their sport."[762] However, the Committee received evidence that this was unrealistic because of the anonymity of those placing bets on betting exchanges and the high volume of such bets. The Jockey Club stated in written evidence to the Committee that "criminal behaviour linked to racing is a matter for the police and for the Gambling Commission when it is linked to betting malpractice".[763]

531. The Gaming Board stated in a supplementary memorandum to the Committee that "we believe the Commission will need the power, in licence conditions, to require exchanges to monitor their sites for unusual/suspicious betting patterns, to investigate those found and to report concerns to the GC, the ability to investigate and act in the cases of those concerns that the exchanges bring to its attention, up to and including prosecution, the ability to require exchanges to take steps to deny access to certain classes of punter (eg horserace trainers and jockeys) and the right to exchange information with the relevant supervisory bodies for the activities (such as the Jockey Club and other sports regulators) when any mischief occurs so that such a body can act against those it is responsible for regulating." [764]

532. In our view there are no general issues arising from people laying, or backing, horses on betting exchanges recreationally. We accept the arguments of Betfair that it would be unreasonable to subject all layers to a particular tax, levy or regulatory regime, as was initially suggested by the Association of British Bookmakers[765] and "in an ideal world" by the British Horseracing Board.[766] This would simply drive the exchanges offshore by unnecessarily increasing the regulatory burdens upon them. The policy of the Association of British Bookmakers seems to have modified in this regard, as its most recent submission, to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, suggested that only customers "operating outside the parameters of recreational laying activity" should be affected by the provision to pay tax on profits.[767]

533. We do not, however, accept, that those using the exchanges to lay professionally, effectively earning a living, should be entitled to the same exemption. We were told by the National Association of Bookmakers that several of its members were operating as de facto bookmakers on the exchanges.[768] Whilst we note the points made to us on this issue by users of exchanges,[769] the Committee believes that anyone using the exchanges as a de facto bookmaker should be registered and taxed accordingly.

534. Lord McIntosh of Haringey, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, acknowledged that there was a difference between recreational and non-recreational layers on the exchanges and challenged the Committee to come up with a suitable definition.[770] The Committee has concluded that the transparent audit trail of exchanges makes it entirely feasible to identify these users by reference to the volume and frequency of the bets they lay on exchanges. We refer to this group as Non-Recreational Layers (NRLs).

535. We heard evidence questioning whether existing bookmakers should be able to use the exchanges,[771] whether as NRLs or not. As long as these bookmakers are entering the moneys they make into their trading account, they will be satisfying the necessary requirements for taxation and the levy. They are also, of course, already subject to the current 'fit and proper' test.

536. However, in order to prevent any misuse of the exchanges, we recommend that the Gambling Commission takes steps to ensure that where existing bookmakers are using the exchanges, or causing others to operate on them on their behalf, that this is treated as part of their regulated activity.[772]

Non-recreational layers

537. In our view these users, at least in the first instance, are only likely to be identified retrospectively. A betting pattern above a certain threshold needs to be established. The submission by the ABB to the Economic Secretary to the Treasury[773] suggests registration at £1,000 per month profit from laying, or an activity level of 60 lays a month. Betfair, when giving oral evidence to the Committee, referred to the fact that 0.71% of its accounts were "active customers who made more than £15,000 last year [from backing and laying]",[774] having previously referred to the fact that it has 200,000 registered clients.[775] This implies that around 1,400 people are making this amount of money on the exchange.[776]

538. We believe that it will be necessary to have regard to the amount laid as well as the frequency of laying. We saw on our visit to Betfair examples of individuals laying a large number of bets on a single event in a short space of time so as to benefit from fluctuating price movements, but only generating a very small profit. At the other extreme, the Committee has noted the recent publicity surrounding the laying of substantial sums on the outcomes of minor horse races, wholly out of proportion to the value of the race; we believe that activity of this latter nature should trigger the immediate interest of the Gambling Commission.

539. Setting the level of the threshold will be a task for the DCMS once it has established firm policy objectives for the regulation. It will then require consultation and co-ordination with the Gambling Commission and the exchange companies. We anticipate that HM Treasury's review of the tax treatment of betting exchanges and their clients will also include consideration of these criteria. The Government will then have to give some thought to how this system would work in practice.

540. The Committee is anxious to protect from unnecessary regulatory requirements, genuine recreational users of exchanges, including those who choose to lay bets. We suspect that the vast majority of such users back or lay relatively modest sums of money. However, the Committee suggests that there will be some users who, by the very nature and frequency of the sums they lay, cannot be said to be recreational.

541. The Committee recommends that DCMS should consult the exchanges on whether a ceiling on the sum which may be laid "recreationally" would be appropriate. We are also attracted to the idea that all transactions above a certain level should automatically be reported to the Gambling Commission to assist the Commission's monitoring of integrity. Such arrangements could be included either in regulations or codes of practice.

542. In any event we think it likely that the Inland Revenue may wish to impose regulatory requirements on the exchanges as part of any money laundering or taxation arrangements for non-recreational layers as is the case with banks and other financial institutions.

Regulation

543. Once a non-recreational layer has been identified, we believe that he or she should be registered with the Gambling Commission. Any registered layer who is found cheating, or in breach of sporting codes, should have their registration cancelled and be prohibited from using a UK-based betting exchange for a set period of time. In addition we would encourage the Gambling Commission to initiate prosecutions as appropriate. Regulation could also be put in place to render certain categories of user, such as those covered by the rules of the Jockey Club and other sporting bodies, ineligible to be registered. Employees of betting exchanges should also be prohibited from using the exchanges.

544. We have no wish to put in place unduly onerous obligations on the operators of betting exchanges. However we believe that the image of the exchanges has been tarnished, however unfairly, as a direct consequence of the fact that they were the preferred betting medium in a number of recently publicised cases involving suspicious betting patterns. We therefore believe it is in the interests of the exchanges to work with the Government and the Gambling Commission on these issues.

545. We therefore recommend that betting exchange operators should be made responsible, as part of the conditions attached to their operating licences under Clauses 62 to 65 of the draft Bill, for the operation of a system of registration of Non-Recreational Layers and the transmission of information to the Gambling Commission about such users. We note that if betting exchanges are also to be treated as a collecting agency, their own accounting practices will become more expensive, costs which they may have to transfer to those using the exchanges, though we think this cost would be marginal.

Sporting levy

546. The Committee also believes that non-recreational layers should be contributing more in terms of sporting levies. Once a user has been assessed as 'non-recreational' they should be required to pay levies to particular sports over and above the commission they pay to the exchange. The precise amount of this will be subject to the negotiations that apply to particular sports. Sporting bodies will therefore need to ensure that betting exchange companies, and relevant users, are included in all appropriate levy consultations. We note that a court case last year concluded that the Horserace Betting Levy Board's decision setting the levy to be paid by betting exchanges was not fair and not lawful, in part because "the approach taken […] on the issue of consultation was seriously flawed."[777]

Voiding of bets and cheating

547. On 7 October, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, DCMS, announced proposals that the Gambling Commission would be given the power to freeze bets that it believed to be unfair and to void them if they were. The power would be available where the Commission had reason to suspect that there had been unfair activity in relation to a particular event and that an individual has sought to profit from it. It would only be available where a transaction had not been settled. Once frozen, the Commission would investigate the events surrounding the bet and, if satisfied that some improper activity has taken place, would have the powers to void the bet and return the stakes to the participants.

548. The Committee questioned the effectiveness of this provision[778] and in the latest set of clauses published in February, DCMS extended the provision beyond bets that were not settled immediately. We welcome this change in policy by DCMS.

549. The draft Bill also includes a Clause, Clause 30, on cheating. Clause 30(3) states that "Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) cheating at gambling may, in particular, consist of actual or attempted deception or interference in connection with - (a) the process by which gambling is conducted, or (b) a real or virtual game, race or other event or process to which gambling relates."

550. We heard somewhat confusing evidence on the question of whether the use of "inside information" falls within this definition from Lord McIntosh of Haringey, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, DCMS, during the following exchange with Viscount Falkland:[779]

"Could I ask Lord McIntosh to be a bit more precise and tell us exactly how he perceives betting when a bet is unfair? If I could help him, supposing somebody gets information at a cocktail party on a Sunday that a horse is sick for a Monday and he lays against that horse, as it were, on the betting exchange.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: That is cheating.

Q1749 Viscount Falkland: That is cheating?

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: Yes."

551. This runs contrary to our understanding, and that of other eminent witnesses, for example Peter Savill of the British Horseracing Board who, when given a similar scenario, stated: "My view would be that there has been no malpractice because, as we said earlier, horseracing and betting on horses is very much tied up inextricably with inside information. The moment you arrive on a racecourse there will be 50 people coming up and telling you what is fancied and what is not and all the reasons."[780]

552. We believe that DCMS should review the wording of Clause 30 and redefine the offence of cheating, assessing in particular whether there is a case for incorporating the misuse of information into this definition in such a way that does not catch the long-standing practice of sharing information, as described by Mr Savill.

553. The combination of these clauses means that if there are continued questions about the underlying integrity of certain sports, there could be a rush of court cases relating to bets. We note a telling comment from the Select Committee on Betting Duty of 1923, which reported that when in the nineteenth century bets could be enforced by an action at law: "Causes to enforce bets became very numerous, and […] the Judges, grudging the amount of time consumed upon what were often exceedingly frivolous wagers when other more important causes were awaiting trial, took upon themselves to postpone all actions of this kind until the rest of the business had been disposed of or, in the words of Lord Ellenborough, 'until the courts had nothing better to do.'"[781]

554. Lord McIntosh of Haringey, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, DCMS, when giving oral evidence to us, confirmed that the Gambling Commission would have to address this issue with sporting bodies of all kinds.[782] The Gaming Board told us that the Commission would need "the right to exchange information with the relevant supervisory bodies for the activities (such as the Jockey Club and other sports regulators) when any mischief occurs so that such a body can act against those it is responsible for regulating."[783] This is exactly the kind of information exchange to which we have already referred in the context of non-recreational layers on betting exchanges. As a further example, we note that substantial measures are already taken in greyhound racing, for example by ensuring that when greyhounds arrive at NGRC licensed race courses they are inspected by a qualified vet, and monitored for weight change, a practice we wholeheartedly endorse.[784] We note that the British Greyhound Racing Board is making efforts to ensure that all tracks conform to these standards.[785]

555. We therefore believe that DCMS should take immediate steps to work with sporting bodies in an effort to ensure that those who participate in sports understand the dire consequences of any involvement in illegal betting, whether with traditional bookmakers or on betting exchanges. The detail of this regulation is not a matter for us, but in the context of this Bill it is vital that this consultation takes place.

727 Part 6 of the draft Bill Back

728 Ev 206, para 2.1 Back

729 Q 612 Back

730 Q 613 Back

731 Q 612 Back

732 Ev 206 Back

733 Ev 211 Back

734 Ev 735 Back

735 For a further explanation of the operation of betting exchanges, including the term 'to lay', see para 523. Back

736 Q 638 Back

737 Q 638 Back

738 DCMS, Draft Gambling Bill: Policy document, Cm. 6014 - IV, November 2003, para 4.25 Back