Joint Committee on the Draft Gambling Bill Written Evidence


Memorandum from Sporting Index (DGB 24)

1.  INTRODUCTION

  1.1  This submission is in response to the Joint Committee's request for further information as part of its enquiries into the draft Gambling Bill.

  1.2  Sporting Index was founded in 1992 and, even though there is little in the way of published data about the sports spread betting industry, it is unanimously recognised as being the market leader in sports spread betting with an estimated sixty per cent share of the market. There are currently three other UK based spread betting firms and it is believed that another one will launch into the market soon. It is, however, the only business to focus solely on sports; the others, and indeed the industry, derive the majority of their revenue from financial spread betting.

2.  WHAT IS SPREAD BETTING?

  2.1  Spread betting is currently defined under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as a contract for difference that is a gaming contract. It therefore differs fundamentally from a fixed odds bet in that the ultimate outcome for the client can fluctuate very widely in value with the upside or downside often not being known to the client at the outset. With spread betting a client only nominates a unit stake, for example so many pounds per goals or per run, often without limiting his financial exposure. This is a particular feature of a contract for difference which is a type of derivative product.

  2.2  With fixed odds betting, if a client places a sum of money on a horse, the stake is all that can be lost. Consequently, the risk profile is very different from spread betting where the potential for unlimited losses requires a much greater degree of regulation than fixed odds betting. The clients tend to differ in profile from the traditional fixed odds clients.

3.  HISTORY OF REGULATION

  3.1  Spread betting firms have been regulated for over 15 years, in the first instance by the Securities and Futures Authority (formerly the Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers), until it merged with the Securities Association to form the Securities and Futures Authority in 1992. Since December 2001 the firms have been regulated by its successor, the Financial Services Authority ("FSA").

  3.2  Any firm that wishes to undertake spread betting in the UK has to be authorised by the FSA prior to setting up in business. The authorisation process is extremely thorough and can take several months. The FSA aim to ensure that the firm and its key staff are fit and proper, that there is sufficient capital to support the business and that there are adequate, documented, controls in place. All client funds are segregated, capital adequacy controls are imposed and rigorous "know your client" and anti-money laundering controls required to be followed.

  3.3  As a result of the extensive cooperation between Sporting Index and the FSA over the last 11 years, the regulators have an extensive knowledge of sports spread betting, Sporting Index and the rest of the participants in the industry. The FSA has been involved with all aspects of Sporting Index's business and is able to both regulate and advise in equal measure.

4.  THE FSA AND THE SPREAD BETTING INDUSTRY

  4.1  The FSA is there to maintain confidence in the spread betting industry, promote public understanding of it, ensure that clients are given an appropriate degree of protection and reduce the scope for financial crime. It has developed a detailed regulatory framework to ensure that these objectives are met. In doing so its staff have built up considerable experience and understanding of the industry and the FSA has been a vital factor in ensuring that the firms which currently exist are scrupulous in assessing clients' credit worthiness and are responsible in their marketing of spread betting to prospective clients. All Sporting Index's published literature and advertisements carry appropriate risk warnings.

  4.2  Broadly speaking, Sporting Index complies with the FSA's standard rules in respect of financial spread bets in the same way as other similar regulated firms are required to do so. There are no rules written specifically for Sporting Index as its products are identical to other financial derivative products, even though the underlying market differs. This is in much the same way as similar products are traded on markets as diverse as the FTSE 100, gold, pork bellies or the retail house prices index.

  4.3  Sporting Index reports financial information to the FSA on a monthly basis and is subject to regular inspection by them. It has a separate Compliance Department with a nominated Compliance Officer and Money Laundering Reporting Officer to ensure that appropriate standards of regulatory compliance are adhered to within the commercial environment which the company operates.

  4.4  Moreover, unlike fixed odds betting businesses, Sporting Index is unable to accept everyone as a client even if they have the financial wherewithal to spread bet. The verification procedures are stringent and off-putting in a practical and commercial sense to prospective clients.

5.  SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS IN RELATION TO DRAFT POLICY FOR REFORM

  5.1  It is clear that any new regulator, such as the Gambling Commission, would have to spend a great deal of time acquainting itself with not only Sporting Index and the sports spread betting industry, but also the complex nuances of trading derivative products. Spread trading is a niche area which requires monitoring by many different departments within the FSA. Given the complexities already involved for the Gaming Board in its evolution to the nascent Gambling Commission, we consider that adding the regulation of derivatives to their workload may create confusion and undermine one of the Gambling Bill's central objectives: that is, to protect the consumer. It could certainly lessen the protection afforded to the public if regulation was not stringently applied, but damage the industry irrevocably if that application is too zealous.

  5.2  Sporting Index fervently believes that the different risk profile of its products, as well as the specialist market place in which it operates, differentiates it from all other forms of betting and endorses DCMS's current intention in the Gambling Bill to confine spread betting to separate regulation. Whilst the cost to Sporting Index of complying with FSA regulation is substantial, it is a price worth paying to protect the industry's integrity and the customer.

  5.3  Spread trading is not gambling; it is a derivative product based around a market which just so happens to be sport. It can therefore safely exist as an online complementary product in gambling/gaming venues as well as non-gambling/gaming venues just the same as other online products and provided it is underpinned by the comprehensive regulation of the FSA, its supply should not be restricted by regulations applicable to gambling products.

  5.4  Sporting Index remains concerned however that products similar to spread trading are "disguised" as fixed odds products by simply disaggregating the end result as a fixed odds price. In situations such as these (eg range betting) the FSA has no control and the clients are left extremely vulnerable without either regulations to fall back on or, currently, the force of law. If Sporting Index is to accept the financial and regulatory burdens associated with maintaining market order, these imitation products should be brought within the remit of the FSA. Failure to do so will prejudice client protection and undermine the industry, Therefore Sporting Index would suggest that although the Gambling Bill has excluded the definition of a fixed odds bet, it should be explicit that products such as range betting be brought under the provisions of the FSA regulation.

  5.5  Moreover, Sporting Index is also subject to stringent FSA advertising regulations. Once again, these are designed to warn the unsuspecting of the nature of the product on offer. Sporting Index finds that these are a deterrent to attracting new business but acknowledges their value and welcomes the protection afforded to clients. Products such as range betting should not escape such regulation, thereby allowing suppliers to lure unsuspecting and vulnerable users into use of products which are more volatile than the customer is led to believe.

  5.6  The FSA has extensive knowledge and experience of supervising Sporting Index's capital adequacy, credit management and, most important, protecting its clients. Sporting Index fully endorses the DCMS's current view that the regulation of spread betting should be outwith the scope of the Gambling Bill. Moreover, whilst the DCMS has made it clear that this is subject to review, any re-evaluation of this should be deferred for, say, five years to allow the Gambling Commission time to bed down before embarking on reviewing this extremely complex area. Any review would necessarily need to examine spread betting in general (ie both financial and sport) and determine an overall policy for this product set, as well as the individual markets (eg sport or financials) which utilise the product.

CONCLUSION

  Spread trading is a derivative product. Although it is founded upon sports markets, these markets are in many ways the most transparent and verifiable markets available. Results and performances are available for all to see and integrity is key to their future success. Risks and rewards are high in spread trading and the nature of the users sophisticated. The FSA appears to Sporting Index to remain the most logical regulatory environment. Spread trading can be a complementary product to other gambling and gaming products, although the client base is normally different. Sporting Index agrees with the DCMS that the gambling de-regulation should not undermine market growth further by dual regulation or by subjecting spread betting to any regulation that applies to gambling products; it would be the same as trying to make betting and gaming operators subject to FSA regulation. However, regulation must prevent hybrid products from exploiting loopholes that currently exist.

  Finally, Sporting Index would suggest that a review of the FSA status as regulator of both financial and sports spread trading not take place until five years after the Gambling Commission has been incorporated and begun its considerable obligations under the Gambling Bill.

December 2003


 
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