DMH 21 DAVID HEWITT
THE DRAFT MENTAL HEALTH BILL
A SUBMISSION
TO THE
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE
DAVID HEWITT
David Hewitt is a solicitor, and a partner in Hempsons,
where he specialises in mental health law (and in particular,
in the impact of the ECHR on the Mental Health Act).
NOTE
David Hewitt is a solicitor, and a partner in Hempsons,
where he specialises in mental health law (and in particular,
in the impact of the ECHR on the Mental Health Act).
For the last five years, David has represented NHS bodies and
health care practitioners. However, for 13 years prior to that
he represented mental health patients and their families.
Since 1995, he has been a member of the Mental Health Act Commission.
He is also on the editorial board of the Journal of Mental Health.
This submission is made in a personal capacity.
David Hewitt
Hempsons Solicitors
Portland Tower
Portland Street
Manchester
M1 3LF
Tel: 0161 228 0011
Fax: 0161 236 6734
E-mail: d.hewitt@hempsons.co.uk
1. Is the Draft Mental Health Bill rooted in a set of unambiguous
principles? Are these principles appropriate and desirable?
1.1 The Draft Mental Health Bill seems to be motivated by
two distinct, even contradictory, desires: to create new rights
while also addressing the perception that the public believes
itself to be at risk.
1.2 The Government has not given a proper explanation of why
a new Mental Health Act is necessary. Even before the new Draft
Mental Health Bill, the Green Paper,[1]
the White Paper[2] and
the 2002 Draft Bill[3]
suggested six motivating factors:
(a) There is a need to up-date the principles upon which
mental health law is based.[4]
The elimination of the Approved Social Worker ('ASW') will undermine
one of the key principles of the Mental Health Act 1983 ('MHA
1983'): balancing the 'medical' and the 'social' models of mental
illness.
(b) MHA 1983 no longer reflects the way mental health services
are delivered.[5]
If more patients are cared for in the community, that may be because
there are too few beds for them. The Government has failed to
explain why this reason makes it necessary to make the changes
it has proposed.
(c) MHA 1983 has failed to protect patients and the public.[6]
This reason is at the heart of the proposals. However, although
it has asserted as much, the Government has not explained how
the lack of a broad definition of 'mental disorder', for example,
or the presence of the 'treatability test' have placed the public
in danger. In fact, most of the (many) inquiries of recent years
suggest that there are other reasons for patient suicides and
homicides, reasons that the Draft Mental Health Bill does not
address.
(d) Professionals have an inadequate knowledge of mental
health legislation.[7]
Why does it require a new Mental Health Act to cure this
deficiency? Wouldn't the answer be to provide more and better
training on the existing Act? The one group of professionals
that does receive specialist training in mental health
- ASWs - will see its role weakened under the next MHA.
(e) MHA 1983 has a too narrow conception of 'treatability'.
See below.[8]
(f) The introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 has created
new obligations.[9]
There is nothing in the ECHR to require all decisions to apply
compulsion to be taken by an independent judicial body. Nor
would the ECHR appear to require a broader definition of 'mental
disorder' or 'relevant conditions' that are themselves broad and
abolish the 'treatability test'.
1.3 The Government need not introduce a new Act; it could
make all the truly necessary changes by amending MHA 1983. It
did so before, when it introduced Supervised Discharge[10]
and reversed the burden of proof in MHRT proceedings.[11]
2. Is the definition of Mental Disorder appropriate and
unambiguous? Are the conditions for treatment and care under
compulsion sufficiently stringent? Are the provisions for assessment
and treatment in the community adequate and sufficient?
2.1 The definition is unquestionably broader than the one
in MHA 1983. It does seem wide enough to cover epileptics
and drunks. It might also cover those who have sustained traumatic
damage to a fully developed brain (who are not caught by the current
Act).
2.2 The Government believes psychopaths are escaping detention
because they can't be treated.[12]
It is wrong. If MHA 1983 is correctly applied, there are few
circumstances in which those suffering from mental disorder (as
currently defined) cannot be 'treated':[13]
(a) The current definition of 'treatment' is very wide,[14]
and it is preserved in the Draft Bill.[15]
(b) The definition has been widened by the courts,[16]
so that now, its purpose "may extend from cure to containment".[17]
(c) These widenings have been sanctioned by the European Court
of Human Rights.[18]
2.3 Third Condition: Due to a shortage of resources,
compulsory treatment has long been confined to those who suffer
from serious and enduring mental illness, which they often manifest
by harming or neglecting themselves or endangering others. Now
and for the first time, compulsion will be confined to such people
as a matter of law.
2.5 Fourth Condition: this says that a patient will
be subject to the fewest restrictions consistent with his/her
needs. However, it won't apply in the case of an adult "who
is at substantial risk of causing serious harm to other persons."
[19] This exception
is justified neither by fact or experience, nor by the Government's
own rationale.
2.6 The Fourth Condition and the proposal for 'non-resident'
compulsion could be seen as examples of the 'least restrictive
alternative' principle.[20]
This is how the Government would like them to be seen. In its
over-view document it says: "The intention of allowing patients
to be under formal powers in the community is to provide greater
flexibility to practitioners so that the principle of least restriction
can be put into effect".[21]
However, in the White Paper, the Government noted that under
MHA 1983, "powers to require compliance with treatment are
linked to detention in hospital". This, it said,
"does not [
] support the processes of individual care
planning that are needed to ensure that compulsory treatment will
result in good health outcomes for patients and reduced risk.
At the moment clinicians have to wait until patients in the community
become ill enough to need admission to hospital before compulsory
treatment can be given. This prevents early intervention to reduce
risk to both patients and the public".[22]
The Government could be accused - not, perhaps, for the first
time - of trying to appeal to two different, even antipathetic,
constituencies.
3. Does the Draft Bill achieve the right balance between
protecting the personal and human rights of the mentally ill on
one hand, and concerns for public and personal safety on the other?
3.1 The definition of 'carer' may not be sufficiently precise
to avoid confusion or argument.
3.2 Even when selected without controversy, a patient's carer
might come into conflict with his/her Nominated Person ('NP').
There would appear to be nothing in the Draft Bill to indicate
how any such conflict is to be resolved.
3.3 The Draft Bill purports to compel the sharing of information
about patients who are subject to compulsion. However, it provides
no new powers - or protections - in that regard and (particularly
in the case of the police) may raise expectations it cannot fulfil.
4. Are the proposals contained in the Draft Mental Health
Bill necessary, workable, efficient, and clear? Are there any
important omissions in the Bill?
4.1 The Draft Bill of 2002 contained detailed and robust safeguards
for compliant, incapable patients who were not subject to compulsory
powers.[23] Those safeguards
have been omitted from the 2004 Draft Bill. The Government says
this is because they have been shifted to the Mental Capacity
Bill, but that is not so: the Mental Capacity Bill does not provide
for the appointment of a NP for such patients,[24]
nor does it give them the right to a care plan[25]
or to apply to a tribunal.[26]
4.2 Following HL v United Kingdom, this deficiency
must be addressed. The common law does not provide a lawful basis
upon which incapable patients can be admitted to hospital.[27]
In fact, the safeguards that the European Court of Human Rights
('ECtHR') held to be necessary to comply with ECHR, Article 5
- and which it found to be lacking in the common law - resemble
those set out in the 2002 Draft Bill.[28]
6. Are the safeguards against abuse adequate? Are the
safeguards in respect of particularly vulnerable groups, for example
children, sufficient? Are there enough safeguards against misuse
of aggressive procedures such as ECT and psychosurgery?
6.1 The proposals concerning ECT beg at least two significant
questions:
(a) Is the requirement for consent (in the case of a capable
patient) motivated by concern over the efficacy or effects of
ECT? If so, is it appropriate that ECT may be administered to
in-capable patients without their consent? Is it appropriate
for ECT to be administered at all?
(b) Why are capable patients fit to refuse ECT but not anti-psychotic
medication?
7. Is the balance struck between what has been included
on the fact of the draft bill, and what goes into Regulations
and the Code of Practices [sic] right?
7.1 It is unfortunate that so much has been left to documents
that have not yet been published. For example:
(a) It is not possible to comment conclusively upon proposals
for the appointment of the NP without knowing whom the relevant
regulations will 'disqualify' and why.[29]
(b) There are several areas of mental health practice in which
staff are in need of clear, comprehensive guidance. One of those
areas is seclusion. However, there is no indication that such
guidance will be provided in the Code of Practice.
9. Is the Draft Mental Health Bill in full compliance
with the Human Rights Act?
9.1 The ECtHR has declined to give a definitive interpretation
of what it means to be of "unsound mind".[30]
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that every use of compulsion
on a person who is thought to meet the new, broad definition of
'mental disorder' will comply with ECHR, Article 5(1)(e).
9.2 The Draft Bill would diminish the force of the Code of
Practice. It provides that the Code may be dis-applied in certain
circumstances[31] or
in the case of certain patients,[32]
and that hospitals and practitioners need only "have regard"
to it.[33] This represents
a very different view of the status of the Code than the one put
forward by the Court of Appeal in the Munjaz case.[34]
The Court held that the Code must be respected unless there was
"good reason" for departing from it. The Code must
have such force, the Court decided, so that the interventions
it covered could be said to be "prescribed by law" and
so comply with ECHR, Article 8. If the Code is stripped of such
force, there is, once again, the prospect of challenge under the
HRA 1998 (and not just in respect of the practice of seclusion).
9.3 At first sight, the proposals for the appointment of the
NP seem sensible. However, a patient's choice of NP may be disregarded
by the AMHP if the person chosen is 'unsuitable'.[35]
The Draft Bill does not suggest that this loaded word will be
explained, or that guidance as to 'unsuitability' will be given,
in rules, regulations or the Code of Practice. It gives the AMHP
far too great a discretion; so much, in fact, that there might
be a breach of undertakings the Government gave to the ECtHR.[36]
David Hewitt
11 October 2004
1 Department of Health, Reform of the Mental Health
Act 1983: Proposals for Consultation, November 1999, Cm 4480 Back
2
Department of Health and Home Office, Reforming the Mental
Health Act - Part I: The new legal framework, December 2000,
Cm 5016-I; Department of Health and Home Office, Reforming
the Mental Health Act - Part II: High risk patients, December
2000, Cm 5016-II Back
3
Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill, June 2002,
Cm 5538-I; Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill:
Explanatory Notes, June 2002, Cm 5538-II; Department of Health,
Draft Mental Health Bill: Consultation Document, June 2002,
Cm 5538-III Back
4
Green Paper, para 1.3 Back
5
Green Paper, paras 2.5-2.7; White Paper, para 2.6 and Executive
Summary, para 4 Back
6
White Paper, Foreword, Executive Summary, para 2,
and paras 1.14 & 1.15, 2.6, and 2.13 & 2.14 Back
7
Green Paper, para 2.8; White Paper, paras 1.14 and 2.6 Back
8
See para 2.2, below Back
9
White Paper, paras 2.9, 3.8 and 5.1, and Executive Summary,
para 7; Draft Mental Health Bill 2002, Consultation Document,
para 2.2, Annex, and Partial Regulatory Impact Assessment,
Option 1, number 1 Back
10
Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act 1995, c 52 Back
11
Mental Health Act 1983 (Remedial) Order, SI 2001 No 3712
Back
12
White Paper, paras 1.15, 3.3 & 3.5, and Executive Summary,
para 2; Draft Mental Health Bill 2002, cl 2(6), and Consultation
Document, para 2.11 and Annex Back
13
David Hewitt, Treatability Tests, Solicitors Journal, 4
October 2002, pp 886 & 887 Back
14
MHA 1983, s 145(1) Back
15
cl 2(7) Back
16
R v Canons Park Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex parte A
[1994] All ER 659, CA; R v Secretary of State for Scotland
1998 SC 49, 2 Div Back
17
Reid v Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] 1 All ER
481 Back
18
Reid v United Kingdom, Application No 00050272/99, Judgment,
20 February 2003 Back
19
cl 9(7) Back
20
See, for example: MHA 1983, s 3(2)(c); Department of Health, MHA
1983 Code of Practice, March 1999, para 1.1 Back
21
Department of Health, Improving Mental Health Law, September
2004, para 3.35 Back
22
2000, Cm 5016-I, para 2.14; emphasis added Back
23
Draft Bill (2002), Part 5 Back
24
Draft Bill (2002), cl 127 Back
25
Draft Bill (2002), cl 129-134 Back
26
Draft Bill (2002), cl 136 Back
27
Application no 45508/99, Judgment of 5 March 2004 Back
28
Ibid, para 120 Back
29
Draft Bill, cl 232(4)(a) Back
30
Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 Back
31
cl 1(4) Back
32
cl 1(6) Back
33
cl 1(2) Back
34
R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust; R (S) v Airedale NHS Trust
[2003] EWCA Civ 1036 Back
35
cl 232(5) Back
36
JT v United Kingdom [2000] 1 FLR 909; FC v United Kingdom
(1999) App No 37344/97 Back
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