Joint Committee On Human Rights Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)

19 MAY 2004

MR KEN MACDONALD QC, MR PHILIP GEERING AND MR CHRIS NEWELL

  Q1 Chairman: Mr Macdonald, welcome. I am pleased to see that you are accompanied by Mr Philip Geering who is the Director of Policy at the CPS and Chris Newell who is the Director of Casework at the CPS. Thank you for coming to appear before the Joint Committee on Human Rights today as part of several of our inquiries: first of all in relation to the defence of "reasonable chastisement", where we are currently looking at issues in relation to the Children Bill; deaths in custody, which is one of the inquiries we are currently conducting; and also the Committee's response to the Home Office consultation on counter-terrorism powers, particularly in relation to difficulties encountered in prosecuting such cases. If I may start with the issue of the possible abolition of the defence of reasonable chastisement, you must be aware that this is likely to surface in connection with the Children Bill which is currently going through Parliament and, as I have just said, we ourselves will be reporting on this Bill in the near future. We would be very interested to know from your perspective, from a prosecuting perspective, what difficulties there might be if the current defence of reasonable chastisement were to be abolished. I focus particularly on problems in relation to the evidential test and the public interest test because I think the last thing most people would want would be a situation where adults were going to be prosecuted for mild smacking of their children.

  Mr Macdonald: I have seen a proposed amendment which I think was drafted by Peter Carter which abolishes the defence of reasonable chastisement and, quite clearly, this outlaws batteries and assaults in all but very exceptional circumstances—to prevent crime, for safety reasons and so on and so forth. My view is that that amendment criminalises all batteries against children except those which are excluded within the terms of the amendment. What we are being asked to say is whether if that were the situation we would develop a policy which meant that adults who simply smacked children in the way that you describe would not be prosecuted. Our response is that Parliament needs to frame its legislation to achieve the result it wants to achieve and it needs to understand that if it approves that amendment it will be criminalising battery against children, that will be the reality. We have some difficulty with Parliament expecting us to determine through our Code for Crown Prosecutors what public policy ought to be. We think the legislation should be sufficiently certain. The reality is that we would have to have some sort of policy about this but I think it would be inconceivable for us to draft a policy that would be so wide as to say that minor assaults on children would never be prosecuted because there clearly could be circumstances where they would be. One might posit an example of a child who was mentally handicapped or a child who was subjected to sexual abuse or other forms of assault. So we would not and could not draft guidance which would absolve all minor acts of battery against children from criminal prosecution. That said, the reality is that, just as most minor assaults against adults are not prosecuted, I suspect most minor assaults against children would not be either, although it is not an entirely accurate analogy because children are much more vulnerable than adults so the fact that adults are not regularly prosecuted for minor assaults where the victim is an adult does not mean there would not be prosecution more frequently when the victim is a child. So far as the tests are concerned removing the defence of reasonable chastisement clearly means that the evidential test can be passed more easily because one of the things Crown prosecutors have to factor in when considering whether the evidential test is met is possible defences and how compelling they are likely to be. If that defence goes, then the evidential test so far as minor assaults is concerned might be passed more easily and prosecution in appropriate circumstances could be more likely. So far as the public interest test is concerned, I think we are hesitant about a proposal which would invite us to say that the public interest test can do this job for Parliament rather than Parliament doing the job itself. One solution to this, of course, would be to abolish the defence of reasonable chastisement in all offences except common assaults. That is a possibility and that would have the merit, it seems to us, of the legislation being more certain. I do not want to repeat myself but I think we are a little uneasy at the idea that Parliament can fudge this issue and expect us to sort it out.

  Q2 Chairman: What you are saying is if there is to be some public interest test, it is for Parliament to determine what the parameters of it are?

  Mr Macdonald: It is for Parliament to determine whether minor slaps to children are criminal assaults or not. That is the bottom line and if the Peter Carter amendment is adopted it does that; it says that even minor assaults against children—although we can allow for de minimus smacking—are criminal acts by that amendment. We cannot say now before the legislation is even passed that we would never prosecute those kind of assaults. There clearly would be circumstances in which we would although, as I said earlier, they would probably be very rare.

  Q3 Chairman: You seem to be saying that assaults on adults can be dealt with in terms of severity because, as you said, there are many occasions when an adult would effectively assault another and it would not result in a prosecution and it is possible for the CPS to deal with those kind of issues but not to deal with them when they relate to children because children are more likely to be smacked. Is that what you are saying?

  Mr Macdonald: No, you can have a situation where one adult smacks another and there is clearly no public interest in prosecution, there is no injury, the person who is slapped is not really bothered about it, and there is no public interest in taking a case like that through the courts. That might often be the case with children but it equally might not be because children are much more vulnerable and there are all sorts of situations in which children who are smacked might be damaged by it (psychologically if not physically) and there might be cases of that sort where Crown prosecutors will say, "This was just a smack but I am going to prosecute because there is public interest in prosecuting." What I am saying to you is that we could not devise a policy which would mean that minor slaps were never prosecuted; we simply could not do it.

  Q4 Lord Lester of Herne Hill: As I understand what you are saying, Mr Macdonald, what you are saying is if the amendments were made more sophisticated in the way that you have suggested, and in fairness it was available for common assaults, that in your view would achieve reasonable legal certainty and in terms of policy it would go a long way to meet the objectives of Mr Carter?

  Mr Macdonald: That is right. Can I explain why I say that? So far as we have been able to discover through a trawl, in the year ending May 2003, there were nine cases of assault on children in which the defence of reasonable chastisement was raised and there were four acquittals. These are cases where the violence was, in our view, strong enough to require a prosecution, in some cases quite bad violence. If a Crown prosecutor was looking at a minor slap or smack of the sort we are talking about and there was available to the defendant the defence of reasonable chastisement, because it was permitted still by the amendment, the chance of that case being prosecuted once that defence had been factored in would be very, very low indeed because the overwhelming likelihood is in the light of that defence and in the light of the minor nature of the assault there would an acquittal, so you would not get past the evidential test because there would be no realistic prospect of conviction. If you take away reasonable chastisement there is a slightly stronger bias in favour of prosecution or a slightly stronger likelihood that the evidential test is passed.

  Q5 Lord Campbell of Alloway: Mr Macdonald, you are saying, are you not really, that you retain the discretion that you always had in all cases on a de minimus affair? That is a question of discretion and that must always remain with the prosecuting authorities; it always has done.

  Mr Macdonald: Yes.

  Q6 Lord Campbell of Alloway: But if you retain that discretion there is no reasonable cause to do away with what they call reasonable chastisement?

  Mr Macdonald: That is a matter for Parliament; it is not a matter for us.

  Q7 Lord Campbell of Alloway: And that is for Parliament to decide.

  Mr Macdonald: I am being asked what I think the effect would be in terms of prosecution practice if the defence were abolished. I am not expressing any view about whether it should be or not.

  Q8 Chairman: Do you find the least bit persuasive the Scottish Parliament solution which I gather specifies particular implements or body parts or age thresholds in determining these issues?

  Mr Macdonald: We already have guidance from the Court of Appeal in the case of H about the circumstances in which reasonable chastisement could work. I think it is a mistake to be overly prescriptive actually. It is quite difficult to think of circumstances in which a weapon is used against a child and the appropriate offence would be common assault. I suppose you could strike a child with a weapon and cause no injury at all, but I think all of our experiences would be that where an adult uses a weapon against a child that is conduct which most people believe should be criminal under all circumstances.

  Q9 Chairman: How do you define a weapon?

  Mr Macdonald: I am thinking in terms of a piece of wood or a bar and that it is a matter for people's judgment, it is a matter for Parliament's judgment as to whether it wants to criminalise that.

  Q10 Lord Judd: I always say at this point I am not a lawyer, I am just a layman who looks to the law for protection and the rest. If the law is to work well does it not necessitate that there is a culture which the law is supporting, and whether or not appropriate wording was found in whatever form, if it were envisaged that in certain circumstances parents could slap a child, this sends a confusing message to the public? It is not saying that slapping or hitting children is wrong; it is saying there are certain circumstances in which it is permissible. Does that not, whatever the wording, make your task more difficult because of the knock-on effects?

  Mr Macdonald: I think there are always uncertainties. Except in the most open and shut cases, whenever you try to apply the code test, the public interest test, there are often considerations and arguments on both sides. I really cannot express an opinion here about what I think Parliament should do. All I can say to you is that although I suspect prosecutions would be very rare, if the question is: could you issue guidance saying slaps are not to be prosecuted? the answer is we could not do that. Indeed, it would be fairly meaningless guidance and difficult for prosecutors individually to interpret exactly what was meant by it because it would have of course subsidiary questions.

  Q11 Chairman: It might be helpful if for those of us who are not lawyers you could clarify the difference between common assault and battery.

  Mr Macdonald: Assault is putting someone in fear of violence; battery is actually causing them violence. The technical legal definition of a common assault if it is battery is the laying of hands on someone without leaving an injury, so it is an application of force. Assault does not have to be an application of force; assault can simply be a threat of force. I hope that is clear.

  Chairman: We move on now to the issue of deaths in custody.

  Q12 Mr Stinchcombe: I just wonder how concerned you are as the Director of Public Prosecutions that there have been so few prosecutions following deaths in custody even after coroners' verdicts of unlawful killing?

  Mr Macdonald: Well, it is clear this is a litmus public confidence issue for us and for the state itself, it seems to me, and I understand why you ask the question. I want to try and contextualise this if I can and tell you something about my experience since I have been in this post, and I took up post at the beginning of November. It is clear that a disturbingly high number of people die in custody every year, there is no doubt about that and there is no doubt there are many and varied causes of death. Some people die from drug ingestion or alcohol poisoning, some die of natural causes, some commit suicide. The reality is that in a very significant number of cases the medical experts cannot agree about cause of death and that is a source of perennial problems for the prosecuting authorities. Undoubtedly, some people die in custody following a period of physical restraint by police officers. This is a particular issue of difficulty and it is particularly difficult because experts never seem to be able to agree on the terms of "restraint asphyxia" or what is called I believe "excited delirium" as to whether these syndromes exist or whether they apply in a given case. Sometimes it is possible to point to weaknesses in the system and to mistakes that were made and things not done as they should have been done, but that does not mean a criminal offence has been committed. It is the experience of the prosecuting authorities that it is very rare to discover evidence in these cases that a criminal offence has been committed. Sometimes it is possible to find evidence that a criminal offence might have been committed and then there are often very great difficulties of causation. The law presents a difficulty as well. Gross negligence manslaughter requires us to prove the defendant owed a duty of care, which is usually quite easy, that that duty was breached, which is usually quite easy, that the breach was more than a minimal cause of death, which can be quite difficult, particularly if the experts disagree, and the breach was so bad that it was grossly negligent such that it should be a crime, and that is always likely to be difficult when you are talking about the sort of individuals who are defendants in these cases. We do prosecute people for manslaughter, but the truth is we do not prosecute very many. From January 2002 to May 2004 there were 97 cases assembled by the   prosecution authorities in which potential prosecutions were thought to be on the cards. Five of these were prosecuted. These were our strongest and best cases and every single one resulted in an acquittal. Since 1999 there have been four other defendants prosecuted by the prosecuting authorities following deaths in custody—three police officers and one doctor—all acquitted. I think when Judge Butler looked at decision-making in the CPS since 1994 he looked at 11 or 12 cases and he found in all bar two, I think, he was satisfied that the right decision had been made. I think he thought that one should have been prosecuted. It was and resulted in an acquittal. I absolutely understand the anxiety which this question expresses, which is how can so many people die without there being crime somewhere in the system, but we have to as prosecutors look at what the evidence is, apply the code tests, and prosecute where we think it is appropriate. The fact that we lose even our strongest cases suggests to me that there are some serious questions to be asked about whether there are as many criminal offences in these situations as people think.

  Q13 Mr Stinchcombe: You have just mentioned the evidence upon which you have to make these decisions. Are there any particular inhibitions to the gathering of evidence when there is a death in custody? If so, what are those inhibitions and what might be done to remove them?

  Mr Macdonald: We work closely with the police; and when we are discussing terrorism I would like to say something about the charging initiative which means us taking over responsibility from the police for selecting charges in criminal cases and indeed working with them and advising them at the early stages. Of course we are not in at the beginning of these investigations and it is in the nature of them that when the incident occurs the scene is not always immediately secured. There is a concept in criminal investigation of a "golden hour", which is the first hour after the incident, when evidence is most easily and effectively gathered. So far as investigations are concerned, I think we welcome very much the setting up of the IPPC and, as you know, the IPPC will have within its ranks a body of investigators so that it will be conducting investigations itself into these sorts of incidents, and we welcome that and we have already negotiated and virtually signed a protocol with them about our initiative. I have met with Nick Hardwick and John Wadham on two or three occasions, as has Chris Newell, to discuss this initiative. That is an advantage. If you are asking me about how we see investigations at the moment I think we are broadly satisfied with the way in which investigations are carried out. That is not to say investigations carried out by one police force on another will necessarily command as much public confidence as investigations carried out by the IPPC, and I have no doubt that was what informed public policy and guidance.

  Q14 Mr Stinchcombe: Are you satisfied with the willingness of officers to give evidence as to what has happened?

  Mr Macdonald: Since I have been in post I have reviewed four or five cases of death in custody in which the decision has been taken not to prosecute (and there are a number pending which I have not reviewed) and I have seen no signs in those that there was any reluctance on the part of the police officers to give evidence. Indeed, these were cases that were pretty clear-cut. I do not know if Mr Newell has something he would like to add to that?

  Mr Newell: Can I just add to that, Chairman, if the question is aimed at the reluctance of officers who are under suspicion being interviewed, then I am sure that it is our regular experience that they would decline to answer questions, which of course is their right, and that may mean we are unable to get one side of the story, but of course that is a right which is afforded to any suspect being questioned in relation to any offence and if that frustrates or is thought to frustrate or is seen to frustrate an investigation that is a logical consequence of the right to silence.

  Chairman: It is the only side of the story because the other side of the story is dead.

  Q15 Mr Stinchcombe: Just one final matter for my part, you have mentioned already problems in securing public confidence given the failure to prosecute in so many of these cases and you have also mentioned the closeness of the working between the Crown Prosecution Service and the police. Do you think that there is a problem with that closeness of the relationship whereby people do not have confidence that it is completely independent?

  Mr Macdonald: No I do not and the fact that the Prosecution Service has been given by Parliament in the Criminal Justice Act the responsibility (taken over from the police) for selecting charges in criminal cases and is required to work more and more closely with the police is a sign that Parliament has confidence in us to act independently. I would like to say this: the independence of the prosecution service is absolutely fundamental to public confidence in it. The prosecution service has to be an independent prosecuting service and certainly so long as I am DPP it will be; it will be fiercely independent. The fact that we work with the police and advise them on investigations does not mean that we direct them, it does not mean we control investigations, and it does not mean they control us, and I stress over and over again to my prosecutors that the advice they give the police will be firm and independent advice. If it is advice that is unpopular to the police then so be it. I accept the thrust of what you are saying, which is if we are not independent we will not command public confidence, so that is why we are going to be independent.

  Q16 Lord Campbell of Alloway: Could I take this a little further, Mr Macdonald. Rightly, you are stressing the independence of the IPPC in this context to seize documents or enter premises. They will have, no doubt, the confidence of the public but would it be acceptable to you that they should be given responsibilities for making recommendations as to whether to prosecute or not? Not the decision, the decision being of course elsewhere, but that they should, having collected documents and having assessed the position to make a recommendation?

  Mr Macdonald: I do not think that would work because of the nature of the relationship between us which is going to be determined by the protocol. We are going to be working with the IPPC in the closest way from the start of these investigations. We are going to be a team working together and I think it is inimical to that team concept if one side makes an   independent recommendation of its beliefs to   another. Parliament has decided that the prosecuting authority should acquire this new power and it is important that it is prosecuting lawyers who determine what charges should be in the criminal justice system, and that is going to bring enormous process benefits. It has already shown in the pilot areas in which we run it an increase in convictions of 15%, an increase in guilty pleas of 30%, and a decrease in discontinuances of some 59%. The reason is we select the right charges, they are professionally selected, and those cases are more professionally progressed. I think it would send out quite the wrong signal to say that in the case of a particular type of offence that system should not apply, and indeed this was a matter which was considered by the Attorney General in his review and firmly rejected. I do not think it is something Liberty wants to progress either.

  Q17 Lord Campbell of Alloway: Could one not turn it the other way round, Mr Macdonald? It would be very unlikely, would it not, that the CPS would prosecute unless the IPPC were in agreement with them?

  Mr Macdonald: I think it is almost inconceivable that we would be prosecuting in a situation where the IPPC thought that we should not.

  Q18 Lord Campbell of Alloway: That is what I am saying.

  Mr Macdonald: I think it is going to be a close working relationship and I have spoken at length with the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the IPPC and I am quite sure we are going to have a very close working relationship.

  Q19 Lord Campbell of Alloway: Could consideration be given to what I am suggesting? I need not repeat it, but I think it could be formalised and if you were to formalise it, it could only attract even more respect from the public.

  Mr Macdonald: Of course.

  Chairman: I am sorry to have to say to you, Mr Macdonald, if you could just hold the answer to Lord Campbell's question in your head, there is a division in the Commons and I shall have to suspend the Committee for ten minutes to enable us to vote.

The Committee suspended from 5.01 pm to 5.10 pm for a division in the House.


 
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