Joint Committee On Human Rights Sixteenth Report


4. Memorandum from the Equal Opportunities Commission

Introduction

The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) is grateful for this further opportunity to share with the Joint Committee our thinking to date on the powers and proposed structure of the Commission on Equality and Human Rights (CEHR). This memorandum is in response to the call for evidence made by the Joint Committee on the 8th June 2004. That call for evidence asked for submissions on the differences between the proposals of the Government's White Paper and the Joint Committee's own report on related matters. This memorandum concentrates on two specific issues, namely the differences between the White Paper and the Joint Committee's 11th Report on the issues of:

Accountability

Enforcement Powers

The comments on these two specific issues should be read in the context of the EOC's memorandum in response to the Joint Committee's previous call for evidence.

In particular, the EOC believes that a consistent set of function and powers across equality and human rights is essential if the CEHR is to fulfil its remit. It is worth reiterating why the EOC takes that view, namely that

Consistent functions and powers should assist the CEHR in taking an holistic approach to its remit

Consistent functions and powers will enable CEHR to concentrate to effectively tackling whatever task it has in hand without being unduly distracted by legal debates or challenges about whether it is acting on equality or on human rights grounds.

This second point is of particular relevance in discussing the proposed enforcement powers of the CEHR.

Accountability and Independence

In its 11th Report Session 2003/2004, the Joint Committee recommended that the statutory design of the CEHR should adopt and adapt the arrangements for guaranteeing the independence and accountability used for the Parliamentary Commission for Administration, the National Audit Office and the Electoral Commission. That recommendation arose from the Committee's concern that the standard model of Non-Departmental Parliamentary Body (NDPB) accountability was not a sufficient outward and visible guarantee of independence from the Government to be appropriate to a National Human Rights Commission or proposed Single Equality Body. In contrast, the Government's White Paper at paragraph 5.1 confirmed that the CEHR will be a NDPB in paragraphs 5.19 and 5.20 of the White Paper under the heading "Accountability and Independence". The Government confirmed that the CEHR:

will operate within the standard framework setting out relationships between government departments and NDPBs

will agree a management statement with its sponsor department

will work closely with a number of government departments who have an interest in issues on which the CEHR is working; and

will be held to account by Parliament through the requirement for the Secretary of State to lay its annual report before both Houses of Parliament.

The EOC's view is that these arrangements are not enough in themselves to ensure the necessary independence from government. Safeguards for its independence will be of particular relevance to a body whose role relates to the compliance by public authorities with human rights standards. The EOC's position, as set out in the previous memorandum to the Joint Committee, is that we would like to see consideration of the creation of a Parliamentary Committee concerned with equality at Westminster so that (as suggested by the Joint Committee's 11th Report) a closer relationship could be built up between the CEHR and Parliament.

There are also other factors that could help support the independence of the CEHR, in the event of a hostile or unsympathetic environment in the future. It will be important that the appointed Commissioners are of a high calibre and seen to be credible and independent voices. The CEHR will also have to attract sufficient support from its partners and stakeholders in the voluntary sector, and from employers, trades unions and media, in order for them to defend its role and independence, should that come under threat.

One of the most common means of sidelining equality bodies, however, as is shown from international experience, is through inadequate initial resourcing or subsequent resource cuts.[59] The EOC would like to see some form of safeguard to ensure that the funding levels for the CEHR are subject to appropriate scrutiny. Whichever mechanisms are put in place ought to aim to prevent any repetition of the current imbalance in the funding between the existing three commissions, and provide a clearer rationale for linking resources to roles.

It is also of immediate and urgent relevance to this question that sufficient resources for the first years of the CEHR are set aside in the current spending round, particularly given the complication of the existing shared funding responsibilities between three government departments.

Enforcement Powers

In its previous memorandum to the Joint Committee, the EOC set out its views on the human rights related powers which a CEHR should have. The EOC's view differs from that of the Joint Committee and the White Paper in some respects, most importantly in the EOC's view that a power to carry out "named person investigations" on a human rights issue would be an appropriate tool for the CEHR to have. The reasons for that view are set out on page 3 of the previous memorandum.

The EOC's view on the human rights related powers of a CEHR remain as set out in the previous memorandum. The comments in this memorandum are limited to those areas where there is a difference between the recommendations made by the Joint Committee in its 11th Report and the White Paper. The main points of difference are:

the limiting of the CEHR's power to arrange for the provision of conciliation services to disputes relating to discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities, services and education (and not in cases of breach of human rights by public authorities).

The inability of the CEHR to bring judicial review proceedings in relation to human rights cases.

In addition to these specific points, there are areas where the White Paper does not specifically deal with issues raised in the Joint Committee's recommendations, for instance the suggestion that the CEHR and the Legal Services Commission should agree a memorandum of understanding which allows consultation to take place on the formulation of criteria for strategic funding of human rights cases.

The Question of Conciliation

The Joint Committee recommended that the CEHR should have a general power to support alternative dispute resolution approaches to allegations of breaches of human rights by public authorities. The Joint Committee saw this as a quid pro quo for the restriction on support for individuals bringing human rights cases. The White Paper, however, proposes that the CEHR will be empowered to arrange for the provision of conciliation services in disputes related to discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities, services and education (paragraph 4.21 of the White Paper). The reason given for this distinction is that it is consistent with the approach proposed by the White Paper for supporting HRA litigation, i.e. since human right issues can already be raised in any court or tribunal and legal aid may be available, there is no requirement for the CEHR to support cases under the HRA. It is not clear why the availability of a litigation route to resolving a dispute should preclude the provision of a conciliation service. The approach in other areas, for example in the employment sphere, is to encourage alternative dispute resolution even where there is a readily accessible route to litigation through the Employment Tribunal. The limitation of a conciliation service to discrimination cases or discrimination cases with a human rights dimension would lead to a difference in treatment of an individual's dispute based on the technical label applied to it. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the EOC is concerned that distinctions of this kind will hamper the effectiveness of the CEHR in achieving a holistic approach to equality and human rights and, on a more specific level, may lead to legal challenges and technical hurdles to the resolution of disputes involving the rights of individuals.

Judicial Review

The Joint Committee's Report recommended that the CEHR should have a power to seek judicial review of the policies or actions or omissions of a public authority where it has reason to believe that such policies or actions or omissions have resulted, or are likely to result, in a violation of convention rights. The White Paper does not include such a power. The White Paper rejects the notion that the CEHR should be able to take "hypothetical cases" where it would be useful to clarify points of law. The EOC's experience is that judicial review provides an extremely useful tool for addressing matters of fundamental legal principle that require clarification. The memorandum from the Centre for the Study of Human Rights at the London School of Economics responding to the Joint Committee's previous call for evidence points out that such clarification can in the long run deter potential litigants from recourse to the courts. There is also a strong argument that clarification of the law is beneficial both to individuals and to those organisations seeking to comply with the law. The EOC believes that the power to seek judicial review in this way is a fundamental tool in the promotion of human rights as a framework of core values and in monitoring the workings of the HRA.

June 2004


59   A Single Equality Commission, Lessons from Abroad, O'Cinneide EOC 2002, pp. 47-52. Back


 
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