Joint Committee On Human Rights Eighteenth Report


Annex B: Extract from Minutes of evidence taken before the Committee on 19 May 2004

Witnesses: Mr Ken Macdonald QC, Director of Public Prosecutions and Head of the Crown Prosecution Service, Mr Philip Geering, Director of Policy, and Mr Chris Newell, Director of Casework, Crown Prosecution Service, examined.

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Q42  Chairman: If we may, we will move on now to the review of counter terrorism powers. Mr Macdonald, you will be aware that in February of this year the Home Office published its discussion paper Counter Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society calling for a debate on whether there were any alternative measures available to replace Part 4 of the 2001 Act, and of course the Newton Report has strongly recommended the replacement of Part 4 with comprehensive, overarching legislation to deal with terrorism. Given the breadth of terrorism offences which already exist what would you say are the main obstacles to bringing prosecution for existing criminal offences?

Mr Macdonald: We have had some input into the legislation, the two most recent statutes in this area, and I think we did quite a lot of work on those. As you say, the criminal law covers a huge swathe of activity that could be described as terrorist, and it is not just the terrorism statutes, common law does it, and various other statutes do. Just as an example, the Terrorism Act proscription offences include membership, inviting support, addressing meetings, wearing clothing or displaying items. Terrorist property is controlled by making it an offence to fund raise or invite somebody else to use money or other property for terrorist purposes, to enter in or be concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or property is made use of; money laundering; the disclosure of material by the banks; interfering with information. Then terrorist offences themselves include: providing or receiving or inviting others to receive training or instruction in firearms; directing a terrorist organisation; possession of arms for a terrorist purpose; collecting or possessing a document or record likely to be useful to a terrorist: inciting acts of terrorism overseas. There is a jurisdiction section so that if you are involved in terrorist activity outside the UK and if is justiciable here it is an offence here, and added to by the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act is providing material information about acts of terrorism. We also have the common law and a large range of other criminal offences. There is an enormous amount of legislation that can be used in the fight against terrorism. Our interest as prosecutors is to prosecute criminal offences in the criminal arena according to the code tests and according to normal criminal trial rules. That is what we are paid to do and that is what we do.

Q43 Chairman: So you are effectively saying there are not enough laws at all?

Mr Macdonald: No, what I am saying is at the moment there is a great deal of legislation available to us. If you are asking me whether there are changes that can be made in the process, I think we may be getting into areas of policy which it is difficult for me to comment upon. If you are asking me whether, as I understand it, the legislation which exists at the moment provides us with weapons to fight terrorism, it certainly does. Whether Parliament thinks there are other weapons which we ought to be given to use in the fight against terrorism, if it is appropriate (as I am sure it is) to discuss it in the context of the fight against terrorism, if Parliament wants to do that then we will happily use any tools which we are given.

Q44 Chairman: There does seem to be quite a considerable discrepancy between the number of people arrested under the legislation and those who are ultimately convicted. Between 11 September 2001 and 31 January this year, as I understand it, 544 people were arrested under the 2000 Act, 98 of them were charged with offences, and six were convicted. Now, this does suggest there may be problems. I wondered whether this was due to evidential or any other problems you may wish to highlight?

Mr Macdonald: I think these are figures from the Home Office. As far as the six convictions are concerned that is six convicted so far. There are a large number of outstanding cases so it could potentially be misleading to be talking about 500 arrested, 98 prosecuted and only six convicted. There are a pretty large number of cases pending and, indeed, there are one or two cases going on at the Old Bailey at the moment. So far as the discrepancy between the number of people arrested and the number of people charged is concerned, as a prosecutor that does not surprise me at all. The test for arresting someone is reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officer. We are always consulted by the police as to what the charge should be. The test we apply to prosecute is the code test which is a much higher test. There is always going to be some wastage at that point. Indeed, one of the reasons we were given powers to select charges was to ensure that only the right cases were prosecuted. There is an additional factor as well. Quite often people who are arrested for terrorist offences are then prosecuted under other legislation. I am thinking in particular of a fairly large number of cases which have occurred throughout the jurisdiction in recent years of individuals who are arrested for terrorist offences, the terrorist aspect cannot be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the code tests but they are then prosecuted for various false document offences or credit card frauds and other related offences of fraud and theft and so on. So I am just urging you to treat with caution both the figures of 98 prosecuted because there will be many others prosecuted who were arrested for terrorist offences and prosecuted for something else, and particularly to treat with caution the figure of the six convicted because there are many people currently awaiting trial.

Q45 Chairman: Okay. You referred just now to the police responding to reasonable suspicion. How would you say this could apply in the case of a legitimate public protest like somebody wanting to demonstrate against an arms exhibition and then being arrested under the terrorism legislation?

Mr Macdonald: We do not tell the police who to arrest and who not to arrest. In the case that you are talking about the divisional court, the higher court, the administrative court indicated that the use of the arrest power was appropriate in that case. I do not think it is for me to comment on whether it is appropriate for the police to arrest or not arrest particular people. Once the police arrest people and bring the case to us we will then make a decision about whether it is appropriate to charge individuals and we will advise the police about what steps they might take to secure evidence, but I would be very reluctant to answer questions about whether it is appropriate for the police to arrest people in particular circumstances.

Q46 Chairman: And could you just tell us what you would say were the obstacles to prosecuting these offences, given the scope that you have just talked about?

Mr Macdonald: There are one or two areas one could look at. Custody time limits are difficult in terrorist cases because, as you know, custody time limits require someone to be brought to trial within a period of time unless that is extended. We have lost cases from time to time when we have not been able to prepare them within what the court tells us is reasonable time because of the sheer bulk of work involved. Some of these are massive, massive investigations. I have been in these cases myself when I was at the bar and these are huge cases and they are very complex. The new sort of terrorist cases are much more complex than the old IRA cases. They contain a lot of evidence from abroad, a lot of evidence of card transactions, and a lot more circumstantial evidence. They are more complicated to investigate and they are more complicated to prosecute so the custody time limits are things we sometimes find difficult to meet in these cases. I think the use of video evidence from abroad would be something that if it were available and it is not for me to say whether it should be available prosecutors would be perfectly content to use. A lot of these cases have international links and you will have a group of people prosecuted in this country who have links with people all over Europe and sometimes in North America, and sometimes there are people in custody in other jurisdictions who could potentially be witnesses in our cases, and sometimes we cannot get them into this country. I think the real answer to your question is that the sort of new powers which are proposed in serious crime cases in the SOCA White Paper, One Step Ahead: 21st Century Strategies to Defeat Organised Crime. Terrorism is organised crime and amongst the powers which again it is not for me to say whether they should be introduced or not but which we would be content to use if they were would be powers to interview under compulsion, by which I mean powers such as the Serious Fraud Office have to interview individuals and to have them produce documents on the Strasbourg principles so that the material cannot be used against that individual but can be used to gain evidence against others. That sort of power would certainly, if Parliament thought it appropriate to enact it, be used by prosecutors. I think we need to think much more about plea bargaining in these sorts of cases. I think we need to think more about the possibilities of immunising accomplices, offering immunity in exchange for evidence. I think these sorts of process changes and again it is not for me to say whether they should be enacted—if Parliament were persuaded they should be enacted, in my judgment as a prosecutor, they would be things we would be content to use in these cases.

Q47 Lord Judd: Intercepted communications obviously play a major part in this action against terrorism. Would a relaxation of the current absolute ban on the use of intercept material enable more prosecutions to be brought successfully for terrorism offences?

Mr Macdonald: There is a review going on at the moment. There is review to which the Home Office is contributing, various agencies are contributing, we are contributing, and other interested parties are as well, and we will obviously await the results of that review with interest. I think what I can say is if there is in existence probative and admissible evidence prosecutors always want to use it. Whether that evidence which you describe ought to be admissible is a matter on which Parliament will have to decide. We recognise as prosecutors that there are genuine competing interests on both sides of this argument and there are strong arguments on both sides. Prosecutors of course will always use probative, admissible evidence if it is available.

Q48 Lord Judd: Is there a problem about reliability of evidence of this kind and is there an issue of the protection of sources?

Mr Macdonald: I think there are various arguments being deployed. Obviously protection of sources is an argument being deployed. There is a policy review going on into this at the moment and we are contributing to it so I am reluctant to get, if I can avoid it, too much into this debate. All I can really say is where there is probative and admissible evidence we use it.

Q49 Lord Judd: You do.

Mr Macdonald: Well.

Q50 Lord Judd: My first question was do you think if we move forward in this area this would bring more cases to a satisfactory and positive conclusion?

Mr Macdonald: I would have to analyse intelligence data to answer that question and give you an answer based upon that, and I do not think it would be proper to do that.

Q51 Lord Judd: Right. Do you think looking at how this might be done it would be possible to modify the rules governing disclosure of evidence so that the prosecution would not be obliged to disclose intercept evidence or its existence unless they chose to rely on it, or would this be an insuperable obstacle to relaxing the absolute ban?

Mr Macdonald: The way the system works at the moment under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (CPIA) is that we disclose to the defence all the material upon which we intend to rely in the trial. We also disclose to them any material which, in our judgment, undermines our case or supports their case. So if we have material that we do not intend to rely on but which does not undermine our case or support their case, it is not discloseable under statute. The reality of the situation is that one would be considering material which was material that we would be intending to rely on, I suppose, otherwise it is of no interest to us. Equally, if we are not intending to rely on it and it does not help the defence or undermine our case, it is of no interest to the defence either. It is simply irrelevant to any issue in the case.

Q52 Lord Judd: I understand the embarrassment with which you are faced and I use that word in the technical sense of embarrassment, but would it be right to say that there is a sense of frustration sometimes because you are fairly convinced that successful prosecution is possible but under the rules as they obtain at the moment you cannot reach that successful prosecution?

Mr Macdonald: All I can say is that we are contributing to this review as an independent prosecuting authority and expressing our views as persuasively as we can.

Q53 Lord Judd: What about hearsay evidence in this context?

Mr Macdonald: The rules relating to hearsay evidence have been relaxed by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and I think the clauses which deal with that will be implemented next year. I cannot remember which clause it is but effectively the judge is going to be given much more power to introduce hearsay evidence in circumstances where the maker of the statement which is sought to be introduced is not available for a variety of reasons and where the judge thinks it is appropriate and fair to do so. As prosecutors we feel that this will broaden the extent to which hearsay evidence can be used in criminal trials and I think what we want to do is to see the effect of that before we rush out and make statements about further reform. I think you will find the rules relating to hearsay are relaxed to quite a degree by the statutory change. As I say, I do not think it is going to be implemented until next year but I think it will make a change and of course that will give us the possibility of introducing pieces of evidence which we would not.

Q54 Lord Judd: It sounds to me as if you as a lawyer have certain anxieties about this?

Mr Macdonald: About what?

Q55 Lord Judd: About the relaxation.

Mr Macdonald: I did not say that.

Q56 Lord Judd: You did not say that; you said something that made me feel that. You do not?

Mr Macdonald: No.

Q57 Lord Lester of Herne Hill: As you know, the Newton Committee of Privy Councillors looked into this on the part of Parliament and faced the same dilemma as the Home Secretary as to how one could possibly avoid detaining people indefinitely without trial derogating under the European human rights legislation rather than modifying our procedures in order to be able to bring effective prosecutions using sensitive intelligence material of a kind that could not be shown to the accused. The recommendation that the Newton Committee made unanimously was that we should be a bit less common law minded and think more about an inquisitorial approach, at any rate at the initial stages. Although they did not say this there were two options that we have been thinking about, and I am hoping I can coax out of you something other than it is a matter for Parliament because I think in this area your expertise, both as a distinguished member of the Bar in your past incarnation and now would be really helpful. The first of the two options that were being suggested was French - I hope none the worse for that—where there would be an independent security-cleared judge as the investigator, the juge d'instruction (which happens not only in France but elsewhere on the Continent) and the second is the Scottish model of a more proactive investigation led role for the procurator fiscal or your own office. Do you consider first of all either option would somehow be incompatible with the glory of the English common law system or could it be grafted upon our system without tearing the fabric of it? The next question I will ask is which of those two options, if you were asked by Parliament to choose, would you think was the more compatible with the traditional role of the English prosecutor, the idea of a juge d'instruction or the idea that you would be more like the procurator fiscal in Scotland?

Mr Macdonald: As I have said, we are moving to a system of giving prosecutors more power in the system to the extent they do in other jurisdictions. When I say prosecutors I mean the prosecuting authority, not barristers. Traditionally we have given the prosecuting authority a very passive role since its creation in 1986. The initial idea was that the police would investigate a case, charge the suspect, pass the file to the CPS, the CPS would review it, and if there was a more than 50 per cent chance of conviction pass it to a barrister. We have moved on a lot from there and we are going to move much more quickly in a fundamental way to giving prosecutors more power to be making the decisions which lawyers ought to make. I do not think there is anything inconsistent between that and an adversarial system; indeed it is perfectly consistent with it. Some of what you may be looking for will come out of that. If we get the powers to be a bit more involved in plea bargaining, to immunise witnesses, to conduct interviews under compulsion, the power to interview witnesses pre-trial, all these directions in which we are moving will have, if we get that process, some benefit. So far as the juge d'instruction is concerned I am not an expert on French law. I have to say I do not understand how that system would protect from disclosure the material which it is intended to. As I understand the idea of this it is to protect sensitive material from disclosure to the defence. As I understand the French system, and I am not an expert, the defendant in the French system is entitled to see the file, the dossier, and it is difficult to imagine a system in which you could have a dossier that simply did not contain sensitive material but which then went to a trial judge and he or she saw it without the defendant ever seeing it. I have to say it is a matter for Parliament, Lord Lester, but I am not sure I understand how this model solves the problem which it is designed to solve, that of protecting sensitive material from disclosure.

Q58 Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I think the notion is that it should be a two part process, that an investigating judge, who is entirely independent and therefore commands public confidence, should see the entire dossier including material that may not be able to be used in a criminal process and, having done that, should then pass it to the second stage of the trial and that would provide greater confidence in the ability of the prosecution to go forward. Then there would be the problems about public interest immunity and what the accused could see and whether there could be a SIAC type procedure and so on. That is the notion—that one way of making it a bit easier and to command confidence would be to have that ability, either in your office or with an independent judge at that stage.

Mr Macdonald: I certainly do not take the view that because something comes from another jurisdiction it cannot be fitted into ours. I am sorry to be unhelpful but I am reluctant to express a view in a hearing like this about this because we simply have not had enough time to think about it and to tease out what the pros and cons are. As prosecutors we are always open to process changes and, I repeat, just because something comes from another jurisdiction does not mean it cannot work here. We are open to all constructive debates. I agree with what Roger Smith, the Director of Justice, said when the Home Office announced this consultation that he thought debate was a good thing. We as prosecutors think debate is a good thing, too. The Home Office has announced, as I understand it, an inquiry or review of international practice to see whether there are foreign models which we could usefully employ here. We are not resistant to that at all. If models can be found which help to ease this situation, then so much the better.

Q59 Lord Campbell of Alloway: It is worth considering. Your answers have been most interesting and helpful. Going back to Lord Judd's problem with the intercept evidence, which will not be admissible certainly because unless it was disclosed to the accused he could not be cross examined on it, at the initial stage in France it would not be quite as we propose because the judge would be security cleared. If you are going to have a first stage rather akin to the French system you are going to have a security cleared judge who will see all the evidence and interrogate the accused but perhaps not expressly referring to it. Then when he has made his recommendation to proceed and if there is a case, then it goes to another judge who does not see that evidence. Therefore, it is a very complicated affair and it is very difficult to deal with it unless one has a clear pattern as to what is to happen because Lord Judd was on to something of some considerable importance but does not know how it works in the public interest applications and one thing and another, but you have got to take that on board and you have to have (and you have in a sense) a new procedure under the SIAC Trust.

Mr Macdonald: There is a complexity arising in this respect, it is true. I think there are two things to say. First of all, I stressed under CPIA we do not disclose and we should not disclose to the defence material upon which we do not intend to rely unless it undermines our case or helps theirs. There can be a wealth of sensitive material which we simply do not disclose. Prosecutors in making these decisions are making quasi judicial decisions. They are independent of government, they are not controlled by politicians, and they are making decisions about what to give the defence and what not to give the defence routinely. Thus not all sensitive material which is unearthed in an investigation has to be given to the defence under our system; it is only that which either proves the prosecution case and is going to be relied upon or undermines it or assists the defence case as set out in the defence case statement. So far as public disclosure is concerned the House of Lords in H and C has stressed again the golden thread of disclosure of material to defendants. Lord Steyn said that the defendant's right to disclosure is an inseparable part of his right to a fair trial. We are living in very difficult times but we must not lose sight of that principle. We as prosecutors are loyal to that principle in criminal trials and we are rigidly loyal to due process in that sense, which is why it is important for us to maintain our independence and important for us to remember our independence and adhere to our principles of impartiality and fairness when we are making all these new legal decisions we are being called upon to make. We as prosecutors are interested in safe convictions in which the public can have confidence.

Q60 Chairman: Are there any other ways in which you think there is scope for enhancing or developing your role which might help overcome the obstacles to prosecuting terrorist offences?

Mr Macdonald: I have already highlighted the procedural changes which I think will help us to do that. By that I mean the enhancement of the prosecutor's role and the handing over to the prosecutor of all the legal decisions which obviously should be made by lawyers and in the past have not been. If Parliament decides to enact the sorts of powers which are thought appropriate in the case of the fight against organised crime, I think all of these are ways of giving prosecutors potentially the ability to do their job better and more effectively and are as relevant to terrorism as they are to other forms of serious crime.

Chairman: Thank you very much for coming before us today. Thank you, Mr Geering and Mr Newell. Order, order.




 
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