Joint Committee On Human Rights Written Evidence


18. Memorandum from the National Union of Rail Maritime and Transport Workers

  I would like to commend to your Committee the Submission on the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights made by the Institute of Employment Rights on 31 March 2004, which was written by Professor Ewing and John Hendy QC.

  This union has suffered and been thwarted in its representation of its members by the denial of the right to strike in the UK which, as the Institute submission points out, is contrary to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Social Charter and the International Labour Organisation Conventions. On many occasions we have wished to support members in dispute with their employers but have been advised by our lawyers that, notwithstanding the moral legitimacy of the members' case, the unjust laws on industrial action would put the union into risk of legal proceedings, injunctions and the rest. In 2002, for example, we were the subject of an injunction upheld by the Court of Appeal because members could not be balloted because they had failed to tell the union they had changed jobs. I attach a copy of the law report NURMT v Midland Mainline (not printed here).

  The hideous complexity of the law on the definition of a trade dispute, the difficulties involved in the conduct of industrial action ballots, the rigours of the obligations to serve notices and the ease with which injunctions are granted against unions are well known. The Institute report makes clear how each of these features of UK law are in breach of our international legal obligations.

  I would like to draw particular attention though, to the fact that whilst the protection of the right of trade unions to call and support industrial action is very limited, for workers it is practically non-existent.

  The problem arises from the fact that in UK law all forms of industrial action constitute a breach of an individual worker's contract of employment allowing the employer to dismiss them. As the government stated in its 1998 Report to the International Labour Organisation ("UK Government's Reply to the Committee of Experts' 1996 Observation", para 6):

    "Under UK Law, individuals are almost invariably breaking their contracts under which they work when they take any form of industrial action, irrespective of whether the action is official or unofficial, or whether the action is lawfully or unlawfully organised. They can therefore be sued on an individual basis by employers for damages."

  This lamentable state of affairs is precisely the consequence of the absence of the right to strike in the UK. A strike (or industrial action less than a full stoppage of work) will be in breach of the contract of employment for two reasons.

  Firstly, the striker is failing to perform the contractual obligations to work and to obey lawful instructions. Secondly, by seeking to cause disruption to the employer's business, the striker is breaching the "implied term to serve the employer faithfully within the requirements of the contract") (Ralph Gibson LJ giving the judgement of the Court of Appeal in British Telecommunications PLC v Ticehurst" [1992] ICR 383 at 398D-399D). It is to be particularly noted that the taking of strike action is a breach of the employee's contract of employment, even where all the onerous obligations imposed on trade unions by Part V of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 have been fulfilled.

  Not only is a strike in breach of the worker's contract of employment. Because of the inevitable breach of the duty of faithful service, virtually all other forms of industrial action will breach the contract of employment including working strictly according to contract (Secretary of State v ASLEF (No 2) [1972] ICR 19, esp Buckley LJ at 62B-G, and see Denning MR at 54F-56E), or refusing to carry out some aspects only of contractual duties (Ticehurst above). The only exceptions might be where industrial action followed notice to terminate the contract of employment (Boxfoldia v NGA [1988] ICR 752), or where the strike consisted in not renewing contracts of employment (Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1), or where there was no obligation to work (Burgess v Stevedoring Services Ltd [2002] IRLR 210).

  The consequence of a strike being in breach of contract is severe for the worker in the UK. "Any form of industrial action by a worker is a breach of contract which entitles the employer at common law to dismiss the worker . . ." (Lord Templeman in Miles v Wakefield MDC [1987] ICR 368 at 389) or to refuse to pay wages (Wiluszynski v Tower Hamlets LBC [1989] IRLR 259) or to sue for damages (NCB v Galley [1958] 1 WLR 16). The employer's power to impose these penalties is not diminished to any extent whatever by the fulfilment by the trade union of its statutory obligations under Part V of the Act.

  The only protection for workers is a very limited right to claim reinstatement and/or compensation for unfair dismissal under Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996. That right is denied to any worker dismissed whilst participating in a strike which is not "official", ie supported by his or her union (s 237 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992). Where the calling of the strike is denied protection by reason of a failure to comply with s 219 (including ss 226-234A which require the pre-strike ballot ) of the 1992 Act, the consequences of the union making the strike official would be unlawful and restrainable by injunction and render the union liable in damages if sued. Consequently, the union will not make such a strike official or, if the strike commences, the union will be obliged to repudiate it in writing through the extremely onerous machinery of ss 20-21 of the 1992 Act. Any person thereafter striking in pursuit of the dispute would therefore be denied the right to complain of unfair dismissal if dismissed.

  S 16 and Schedule 5 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 inserted s 238A into the 1992 Act. This allows strikers to claim unfair dismissal only if they are engaged in industrial action which is protected by s 219 of the Act. If the strike turns out not to be protected by s 219, then strikers who are dismissed have no right to claim unfair dismissal, let alone succeed in such a claim. For those to whom it does apply, the section makes a finding of unfair dismissal automatic (s 238A (2)) but does not guarantee reinstatement. Reinstatement is a discretionary remedy granted in only 0.5% of successful unfair dismissal cases. Even where reinstatement is ordered, the employer is entitled to disregard it though it will have to pay extra compensation. A reinstatement is not mandatory and enforced by contempt of court procedures as are injunctions such as that granted against this union in Midland Mainline. Furthermore the unfair dismissal protection only lasts for eight weeks (subject to extension if the employer is unreasonable and, if the Employment Relations Bill becomes law, where there is a lockout). The total inadequacy of the eight week rule was demonstrated in the Friction Dynamics case recently.

  UK law requires protection of the individual worker's right to strike as the International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights made clear in their Reports on the UK in 1997 and 2002, referred to in the Submission of the Institute of Employment Rights. It is hoped that your Committee will endorse this view and ensure that such a law is introduced.

28 April 2004





 
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