Joint Committee On Human Rights Written Evidence


21. Memorandum from UNISON

  I understand you have received a Submission on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from the Institute of Employment Rights, written by Professor Ewing and John Hendy QC and dated 31 March 2004.

  In supporting that submission, UNISON would like the Committee to take into account the difficulties experienced by the members of our union when trying to organise what we believe was legitimate industrial action in two specific cases—the first against Nottingham City Council, the second involving University College London NHS Trust.

  The details of both cases are included in the enclosed document. We very much hope that the evidence we provide of the problems experienced by UNISON and its members will assist your Committee in deciding whether UK law meets its international obligations.

  1.  UNISON welcomes the inquiry by the Joint Committee on Human Rights into the failure of the United Kingdom to comply with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. UNISON believes that the government should comply with international obligations (especially in this case where they have been voluntarily entered into). It is also UNISON policy that trade union rights in this country should comply with minimum international obligations. These obligations are set out clearly in the ICESCR, ILO Conventions and the Council of Europe's Social Charter of 1961. It is well known that the United Kingdom is in breach not only of the ICESCR, but also ILO Conventions 87 and 98, and the Social Charter of 1961.

  2.  UNISON understands that the Joint Committee seeks views on the following questions:

    —  Is there a case for incorporation of guarantees of economic social and cultural rights in UK law? Can the Covenant rights be adequately protected without incorporation?

    —  Can you provide evidence of areas where you believe the lack of such guarantees leads to lesser or unsatisfactory protection of economic social and cultural rights, such as to breach the UK's obligations under the Covenant?

  In dealing with these two questions in this submission, we confine our attention specifically to the right to strike. As the Joint Committee pointed out in its press release, the CESCR recommends that the right to strike be incorporated in legislation and that strike action should no longer entail the loss of employment, in accordance with Article 8.1 (d) ICESCR. For details about the scale of Britain's failure to comply with international obligations relating to the right to strike, UNISON would draw the attention of the Joint Committee to the submission by the Institute of Employment Rights which we support.

INCORPORATION OF GUARANTEES OF ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN BRITISH LAW

  3.  UNISON believes that the right to strike should be formally recognised and enforced in British law. At the present time the taking of industrial action is a breach of contract by those taking part. The organising of industrial action is also tortious on the ground that the organisers are interfering with the trade, business or employment by unlawful means. This is the case even though the industrial action may have been provoked by the unlawful conduct of the employer (such as the unilateral variation of terms and conditions of employment) for which the existing law provides no effective redress. A trade union can be restrained by injunction (or interdict) from organising unlawful industrial action, and can be required to pay damages as well as the legal costs arising out of any litigation for exercising what is recognised by international law and acknowledged by the Court of Appeal as a "fundamental human right": London Underground Ltd v NUR [1996] ICR 170, at p 181.

  4.  It is true that there is protection against dismissal for those taking part in a strike. But this applies only in the case of a lawful strike, a term which is narrowly defined in a way which is in breach of UN, ILO and Council of Europe of standards. In any event the protection has unequivocal protection for only eight weeks, again in apparent breach of international standards. It is also true that there is a statutory immunity from tortious liability for those who organise industrial action, and that such immunity has existed since 1906. But there are two problems with the immunity approach as a way of giving legal protection to industrial action. The first is that it can provide immunity only from known liabilities. This means that as new torts are invented by the courts, there is no protection, even though the union may have satisfied balloting and other obligations imposed by legislation. The second problem is that the immunity is too narrow and safeguards the exercise of a fundamental human right only in very limited circumstances. Thus in order to be protected by immunity, the action

    —  Must be taken in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.

    —  Must satisfy detailed balloting and notice obligations.

    —  Must not constitute secondary or solidarity action.

EVIDENCE OF AREAS WHERE THE LACK OF PROPER GUARANTEES LEADS TO UNSATISFACTORY PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, SUCH AS TO BREACH THE UK'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE COVENANT?

  5.  The failure to comply with international legal obligations directly affects UNISON and the human rights of our members. An example of this earlier this year is provided by an unreported case in which Nottingham City Council obtained an interim injunction in the High Court against UNISON. The injunction was later overturned on our application—on narrow grounds. One of the reasons the injunction was first granted was that UNISON was allegedly involved in breaching the employer's statutory duty. Inducing breach of statutory duty is a tort rarely referred to, and there is no immunity from liability in relation to this tort in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s 219. This is an extremely important matter and UNISON is concerned that this cause of action could be deployed against us and other public sector unions in the future with devastating effect. An effective and clearly defined right to strike would protect trade unions from litigation of this kind.

  6.  Another example of how the failure to comply with international legal obligations is provided by University College London NHS Trust v UNISON [1999] ICR 204 (CA). Here UNISON was restrained by injunction from taking industrial action because it did not fall within the current narrow definition of a trade dispute in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s 244. UNISON challenged this restriction on our human rights by making a complaint about a violation of article 11 of the ECHR. The application was ruled inadmissible. However, the fact that industrial action could not be taken in the circumstances of the UCL NHS Trust case was a breach of other international human treaties which—unlike the ECHR—provide clear and specific protection for the right to strike. Thus in an unusual move, the Social Rights Committee of the Council of Europe has specifically referred to this case in its criticisms of the United Kingdom for its breach of article 6(4) of the Social Charter (which expressly protects the right to strike):

  The Committee considers that the right to strike or take other industrial action in the United Kingdom is subject to serious limitation. The notion of a trade dispute, as defined in Section 244 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, is limited to disputes between workers and their employer. Accordingly, secondary action is not lawful, effectively preventing a union from taking action against the de facto employer if this is not the immediate employer. The Committee notes that the courts have interpreted the law so as to also exclude action concerning a future employer and future terms and conditions of employment, in the context of a transfer of part of a business (University College London NHS Trust v UNISON [1999] ICR 204). The scope for workers to defend their interests through lawful collective action is thus excessively circumscribed in the United Kingdom. (Emphasis added)

  (Council of Europe, Social Rights Committee, Conclusions XVI—1, p 18)

CONCLUSION

  7.  UNISON considers it to be wholly unacceptable that British law on the right to strike should continue to be governed by common law liabilities with their origins in Victorian times. A modern legal system—informed by a modern human rights culture—would ensure that fundamental social rights were effectively protected in accordance with minimum standards established by international human rights treaties. It should not be possible for an employer to obtain an injunction (which the union has to discharge) on the specious ground that industrial action constitutes a tort which no one had ever thought about. Consequently it is UNISON's view that there should be a right to strike as required by the ICESCR. This should mean that any dismissal of a worker for exercising this right should be void, and that trade unions should not be liable in tort or any other ground for organising such action.

  8.  In terms of the content of any such right, UNISON believes that this should meet the minimum standards established by the ICESCR, the ILO, and the Council of Europe. We are at a loss to understand why there should be any difficulty about this and why Britain's shameful record of violation of fundamental social rights should not be urgently addressed. The current position is all the more extraordinary in light of the fact that the United Kingdom continues to subscribe to these obligations. We understand that the British government has signed the Council of Europe's Revised Social Charter of 1996, as well as the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998. Both of these instruments protect the right to strike, either directly or indirectly. In committing itself to these instruments, the government surely has some commitment to their contents. It seems hardly credible that the government would sign these instruments (a) in ignorance of their provisions, or (b) indifferent to its obligation to ensure that domestic law complied with their terms.

10 May 2004





 
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