Joint Committee On Human Rights

Joint Committee On Human Rights Third Report

Appendices

Appendix 1: The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill

Letter from the Chair to Rt Hon David Blunkett, Secretary of State for the Home Department

The Committee is considering how to report to each House on the above Bill. It has carried out an initial examination of this Bill and would be grateful for your comments on the following points raised by our Legal Adviser. Our startingpoint is of course the statement made under s.19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998; but I should make it clear that the Committees remit extends to human rights in a broad sense, not just the Convention rights under the Act.

Clause 2: Offence of entering the UK without a valid immigration document

Two issues arise: first, compatibility with Article 31.1 of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1951) (hereafter "the Refugee Convention"); secondly, compatibility with Article 6 of the ECHR.

1. The Refugee Convention

Article 31.1 of the Refugee Convention (which, as you know, binds the United Kingdom in international law and gives rise to a legitimate expectation under English administrative law that claimants to refugee status will be treated in accordance with its provisions[50]) provides that States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorisation, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

Clause 2 of the Bill would, as you know, make it an offence punishable after trial on indictment by imprisonment for up to two years or an unlimited fine or both for a person, when first interviewed by an immigration officer after arrival in the United Kingdom, not to have with him an immigration document which is in force and satisfactorily establishes his or her identity and nationality or citizenship and those of any dependent child accompanying him or her.[51] Although there would be a defence available to a person who can prove that he or she and any dependant child is an EEA national or has a reasonable excuse for not being in possession of an appropriate immigration document, deliberate destruction of the document would not be a reasonable excuse unless the person could prove that the destruction was for a reasonable cause or outside the control of the person charged, and does not include a situation where the person intends the destruction to delay the making or resolution of a claim to asylum, or to increase the chance of success, or to comply with the instructions or advice of a person who advises on or facilitates immigration to the United Kingdom.[52]

Article 31.1 allows states to impose criminal liability on people seeking refugee status who enter without authorization:

a. who do not come directly from the place where they allege they have suffered persecution;

b. who fail to present themselves to the authorities without delay; or

c. who fail to show good cause for their unauthorized entry or presence in the country.

However, even allowing for the defences, clause 2 would impose liability on some people who fall outside those three categories. The way in which the Bill is framed is likely to make it difficult for asylum-seekers to discharge the burden of proving such an excuse. They would carry the burden of proving what happened in a country where he or she was allegedly suffering persecution or in transit. There may be little or no evidence of these matters apart from the asylum-seeker's word. Clause 2 is likely to affect a very large number of asylum-seekers, and there seems to be a real risk that the defence will fail to protect a significant proportion of them, giving rise to a real risk that the United Kingdom will fail to discharge its obligations under Article 31.1 of the Refugee Convention. The Home Affairs Committee has drawn attention to the importance of making it clear on the face of the Bill that there would be a 'reasonable excuse' where the person had no practical way of obtaining valid documents, and to the risk that the Bill could criminalize genuine refugees fleeing persecution who are compelled to travel on false or invalid documents.[53]

Question 1. In the light of these considerations, why does the Government consider that the provisions of clause 2 are likely to allow asylum claimants to be dealt with in accordance with Article 31.1 of the Refugee Convention?

2. ECHR Article 6

Placing on the accused the burden of establishing a defence to a charge, instead of requiring the prosecution to prove all elements necessary to guilt, is capable of engaging the right to a fair hearing in the determination of a criminal charge under ECHR Article 6.1, read together with the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty under Article 6.2. The Government accepts this, but argues that it is justifiable to impose this burden on the accused because 'it is a justified and a proportionate response to the legitimate aim of the statute in accordance with Strasbourg and domestic case law'.[54]

The case law establishes that it may be justifiable to reverse the burden of proof in some circumstances, even if the result is that the defendant has to disprove what would normally be regarded as a central element in the offence, such as intent. Whether it is permissible will depend on the circumstances of each case. If the provision gives rise to a presumption which is effectively irrebuttable by the defendant, there will be a violation of Article 6.1 and 6.2 because the accused will have been denied the opportunity for a fair hearing. On the other hand, a presumption against the accused can be justified if it is kept 'within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence'.[55]

Question 2. Why does the Government consider that reversing the burden of proof would be a proportionate response to the legitimate aim, particularly having regard to clause 2(5) (which limits the circumstances in which a defendant would be able to claim to have had reasonable cause for destroying documents)?

Clause 6: assessing the credibility of a claimant

Under clause 6 of the Bill, a "deciding authority", when determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a person who makes an asylum claim or a human rights claim, would have to "take account of" any behaviour of the claimant which the deciding authority thinks is designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, or obstruct or delay, or which otherwise damages the claimant's credibility.[56] Behaviour likely to conceal information, etc., is to include failure without a reasonable explanation to produce a passport, or production of an invalid passport, or destruction, alteration or disposal of a passport, ticket or other travel document, and failure without reasonable explanation to answer a question.[57] Furthermore, under clause 6(3) a failure to make an asylum or human rights claim while in a "safe country" would automatically be treated as damaging the claimant's credibility, regardless of the circumstances.[58]

Clause 6(3) seems to require an authority to make an unreasonable assumption about credibility. There is no reason to suppose that a person is not worthy of belief on any matter merely because he or she preferred to make a human rights claim in the United Kingdom rather than in another country. The failure to take make the claim in another country might cast doubt on certain statements, but cannot rationally be said to damage the claimant's credibility in relation to all statements. Clause 6(3) thus imposes an inference of damaged credibility regardless of the circumstances and the nature of the statement in relation to which credibility falls to be assessed. Requiring a deciding authority to make an irrational inference might appear to compromise the fairness of the decision-making process. So far as human rights claims are concerned, the failure to provide a fair hearing would engage ECHR Article 13 (right to an effective remedy before a national authority for alleged violations of Convention rights).

Question 3. Why does the Government consider that clause 6(3) would be compatible with ECHR Article 13 in so far as the clause would require a deciding authority to infer that a person making a human rights claim, who has not taken advantage of a reasonable opportunity to make the human rights claim in a safe country, has thereby damaged his or her credibility?

Clause 7: failed asylum-seekers: withdrawal of support

Clause 7 of the Bill would allow the Secretary of State to deprive an asylum seeker who has a dependent child as a member of his or her household of the right to claim support after the asylum claim has been rejected and before he or she has been removed from the country.[59] In effect, the failed asylum-seeker and his or her dependant children could be left without any source of support.

Any dependent child of the asylum-seeker would be liable to be taken into the care of the local social services authority, which would continue to have responsibility for providing accommodation for the child under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 if the adult claimant were to be unable to provide it. This would engage the right to respect for family life under ECHR Article 8.1. It has been held that the Secretary of State, when withdrawing support from a claimant, may have to justify the action in terms of ECHR Article 8.2.[60]

The most problematic question seems to be whether clause 7 represents a proportionate response to the need to ensure that failed asylum seekers leave the country. The following factors seem to be relevant.

First, as the Home Affairs Committee noted (and considered to be unsatisfactory), the Government is unable to estimate the number of families who might be affected.[61]

Secondly, the clause does not lay down any procedure to be followed before deciding to remove support.

Thirdly, there is an alternative to the withdrawal of support under clause 7: the families could be removed compulsorily before plunging adults into destitution and children into care. It does not seem unreasonable to expect the Government to identify those families who are likely to become destitute if support is withdrawn as people who should be compulsorily removed as a matter of urgency without the need for support to be withdrawn and the family split up.

Fourthly, the Home Affairs Committee has concluded that the measures in clause 7 are likely to be counter-productive.[62]

Question 4. In the light of these considerations, why does the Government consider that the interference with the right to respect for private and family life, which would be a likely consequence of withdrawing support under clause 7, would be proportionate to the legitimate aim of removing people who are unlawfully within the United Kingdom?

Question 5. Does the Government consider that the proposals in clause 7 comply with the United Kingdom's obligation under CRC Article 3.1 to make the best interests of children a primary consideration in all decision-making which affects them, and if so, why?

Clause 8: additional investigatory powers for immigration officers

Clause 8(1) and (3) would allow immigration officers to exercise powers of arrest without warrant, and of entry, search and seizure after arrest, in respect of certain offences unrelated to immigration matters if they come across evidence of the offences in the course of an immigration investigation. The offences would be:

a. conspiracy to defraud;

b. bigamy;

c. making a false statement, or aiding or abetting such an offence, contrary to the Perjury Act 1861;

d. in Scotland, knowingly giving false information to a district registrar of births, marriages and deaths;

e. theft;

f. obtaining property by deception;

g. obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception;

h. false accounting;

i. handling stolen goods;

j. obtaining services or evading liability by deception;

k. in Scotland, fraud, uttering and fraud, and reset;

l. forgery;

m. using, copying or using a copy of a false instrument; and

n. making false documents.[63]

The proposed extensions to these powers engage the right to liberty (ECHR Article 5), the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence (ECHR Article 8), and (in relation to search of the person) the right to be free of degrading treatment (ECHR Article 3). It is not clear why the powers are to be extended to these offences, or why they are not to be exercisable in relation to other offences. It is not clear how far immigration officers would be subject to safeguards which apply to the police when investigating such crimes, including: training in the use of the powers in the context of Code B of the Codes of Practice made under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; the statutory disciplinary code which applies to the police; arrangements for independent investigation of complaints against police officers arising from the use of the powers; and the supervision of complaints by the Police Complaints Authority. Although the Immigration Service would be bound by the obligations arising under the Human Right Act 1998, victims of an alleged abuse of power might not be able to challenge abuses of the powers in court or obtain compensation, because of the restrictions on remedies proposed in clause 10 of the Bill.

This seems to give rise to a significant risk of violations of Convention rights, including those under ECHR Articles 5 and 8, while the absence of remedies may give rise to a violation of ECHR Article 13 where the alleged wrong amounts to a violation of a Convention right and of ECHR Article 6.1 when it consists of a violation of a civil right or obligation.

Question 6. In the light of this, why does the Government consider that there would be sufficient safeguards against abuse of the powers proposed in clause 8 (including expertise among immigration investigators in investigating the kinds of offences listed, training in the use of the powers and the application of the relevant Codes of Practice, independent investigation of complaints, supervision by the Police Complaints Authority, and availability of judicial remedies) to meet the requirements of ECHR Articles 5.1,5.5, 6.1, 8, and 13?

Clause 10: changes to the appeal system

Clause 10 of the Bill would replace the present, multi-tiered system for making and reviewing or appealing against immigration decisions with a single-tier Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. In addition, clause 10(7) would introduce a new section 108A into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 which would cut off all appeals to and judicial review by the ordinary courts in immigration matters (although the Special Immigration Appeal Commission would be unaffected). It would also exclude habeas corpus applications in immigration cases. The only exceptions would be cases where a person is challenging a certificate allowing his or her removal to a safe country and treating the person's claim in this country as unfounded, or is alleging that a member of the Tribunal has acted in bad faith, in which case the High Court would be able to entertain an application for judicial review (proposed new section 108A(1)-(3)). It follows that there would generally be no right to challenge a decision of the single-tier Tribunal on the ground that it has acted incompatibly with a person's Convention rights.

At this initial stage in its consideration of the Bill, the Committee is particularly concerned about proposed new section 108A(4). This would provide that section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, allowing a claim to be brought in a court on the ground that a public authority has acted in a manner incompatible with the Convention rights, would have effect subject to the provisions of proposed new section 108A(1)-(3). Section 7(1) of the 1998 Act is fundamentally important to the scheme of the Act and the system of protection for Convention rights. It provides that a person claiming to be the victim of a violation by a public authority of a Convention right may bring proceedings against the public authority in "the appropriate court or tribunal", or rely on the Convention right in any legal proceedings. The effect of proposed new section 108A(4) of the 2002 Act would be that there would be no "appropriate court or tribunal" where it is alleged that the proposed new Tribunal has itself acted incompatibly with a Convention right, save for a request to the Tribunal itself to review its decision under proposed new section 105A.

The Government says that the Lord Chancellor would be able (if he wishes) to make rules providing for such a challenge to go to a court or tribunal specified in the rules,[64] but does not explain the source of the power. It probably refers to the power in section 7(2) and (9)-(13) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to make rules identifying particular courts or tribunals as the appropriate court or tribunal to hear claims under section 7(1) of the 1998 Act. However, any rule purporting to allow a challenge to a court would, if the Bill is enacted, be invalid and void, because it would be subordinate legislation which would be incompatible with the primary legislation contained in proposed new section 108A(1) to (3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

A provision restricting a key element in the system of remedies for violations of Convention rights set out in the Human Rights Act 1998 gives rise to deep concern. It would allow the immigration and asylum process to operate outside normal arrangements for protecting Convention rights. Any step which immunizes an area of public administration in this way sets a dangerous precedent.

The Government argues that the proposals are compatible with the Convention rights: "… article 13 does not require the provision of multiple tiers of appeal. What it requires is access to an independent national authority with powers to provide effective redress. The single tier Tribunal will meet this test. It is wholly independent of the initial decision-making body. The single tier tribunal will provide an effective remedy as article 13 requires and will safeguard appellants' Convention rights including those referred to in articles 3 and 8."

In order to allow the Committee to assess the Government's assertion that the Tribunal would provide an effective remedy for people alleging violation of Convention rights, the Committee needs certain information about the resources which would be made available to the Tribunal.

Question 7. What are the Government's estimates of:

(a) the number of full-time and full-time-equivalent members who would be appointed to the proposed Asylum and Immigration Tribunal;

(b) a statement of the current number of full-time and full-time-equivalent adjudicators and members of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal;

(c) the current number of staff of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the adjudicators;

(d) the current member and staff costs of the adjudicator and Immigration Appeal Tribunal system; and

(e) the estimate of member and staff costs for the first year of operation of the proposed new Tribunal?

One effect of making the Tribunal the final arbiter of a claim that it has acted incompatibly with a Convention right would be to deprive the victim of a remedy from an independent tribunal. To be effective for the purposes of ECHR Article 13 a remedy must be available from a national authority which is independent. The Tribunal would not appear to be independent when deciding whether its own decision or conduct had violated a Convention right.

Question 8. Why does the Government consider that it would be compatible with ECHR Article 13 to restrict review by and appeal to the courts so as to make the proposed Tribunal the final arbiter of a claim that it has itself violated a Convention right?

It is not clear from the Bill what remedies the new Tribunal would be able to award if it finds that a person's Convention rights have been violated. If the Tribunal would not have power to issue injunctions or award damages or order the payment of compensation in civil proceedings, preventing recourse to the ordinary courts in human rights cases would give rise to a significant risk of violating ECHR Article 13.

Question 9. Why does the Government consider that the restriction of recourse to the courts, coupled with the absence of a power for the Tribunal to give a full range of remedies (including injunctions and damages) for violations of human rights, would be compatible with the right to an effective remedy for alleged violations of Convention rights as required by ECHR Article 13?

Clauses 11 and 12: restricting rights to appeal, and "safe countries" for removing asylum seekers

The Committee has previously reported on earlier proposals (in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill of 2002) for lists of countries which should conclusively be presumed to be safe. It drew the attention of each House to its view that 'the presumption that a country is safe is of questionable validity',[65] and that the restriction of any right of appeal against a decision that a human rights or asylum claim is clearly unfounded until the claimant has left the country would undesirably weaken legal protection for the rights of asylum-seekers and human rights claimants.[66] At that time, there was no proposal to exclude access to judicial review in immigration and asylum cases. Now the threat posed by restricting rights of appeal is even more acute, because of the proposals in clause 10 of the current Bill to restrict access to the courts. I draw this matter to your attention.

Clause 13: removal of power to grant bail

Clause 13 would remove the power of a court under paragraph 2(1) (2) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 to grant bail to a person who has been recommended for deportation following conviction of an offence, and to a person who is detained having been notified that the Secretary of State intends to make a deportation order against him.

Question 10. Why does the Government consider that a system which denies detainees the right to apply to a court for bail, or to obtain judicial remedies (including compensation) for a violation of a Convention right by the proposed new Tribunal, would be compatible with the right to compensation for a violation of ECHR Article 5 (see Article 5.5) and the right to an effective remedy by an independent authority guaranteed by Article 13?

Clause 14: Power to require cooperation of deportees

Clause 14 would allow the Secretary of State to require a person to take specified action, including providing information, documents, identification data and cooperation, in order to facilitate that person's deportation or removal by enabling a travel document to be obtained for the person. Failure to cooperate would be an offence. The clause as drafted would enable the administration to abuse the power by demanding information and cooperation which can then be used to facilitate the person's deportation later, and to allow the Secretary of State to require any person to cooperate even if that person is in no danger of deportation or removal, with refusal to cooperate being an offence. This seems to be capable of engaging the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence under ECHR Article 8.1.

The powers of the Secretary of State and the definition of the offence could be drawn more tightly in order to target the particular mischief at which the clause is directed, namely the difficulty of arranging necessary travel documents to allow people to be removed or deported without the assistance of the person in providing information needed to obtain a travel document on their behalf from the person's Embassy or High Commission.[67] As it stands, it is not clear how one can be confident that such a widely drawn provision would operate in a way that would be proportionate to a pressing social need so as to be "necessary in a democratic society" for a legitimate aim under ECHR Article 8.2.

Question 11. Why does the Government consider that clause 14 as currently drafted is sufficiently focused on the mischief to make it a proportionate interference with the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article 8?

Clause 15: electronic monitoring

Clause 15 would allow electronic monitoring to be imposed on an applicant for immigration to complement a residence restriction or as a condition for immigration bail, or as an alternative to a reporting restriction. This engages the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article 8.1. Although the step may be justifiable under Article 8.2 as being in accordance with the law and being necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime (illegal immigration), there would be no power to challenge the decision to impose a monitoring requirement, because of the restriction on remedies contained in clause 10.

Question 12. Why does the Government consider that the remedies for abuse of the power to impose a requirement of electronic tagging under clause 15 would be sufficiently comprehensive to meet the requirement for an effective remedy before a national authority under ECHR Article 13 where the tagging infringes the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article 13, and the right to have access to a court under ECHR Article 6.1 when the tagging infringes a civil right (such as the right to be free of assault)?

Clause 16: Search warrants for the Immigration Services Commissioner

Clause 16 would amend the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, introducing a new section 92A allowing a JP to issue a search warrant allowing the Immigration Services Commissioner to enter and search premises where there are reasonable grounds for believing that an offence under section 91 of the Act (provision of immigration advice or services by an unregistered person) has been committed, that there is likely to be evidence on the premises of substantial value to the investigation of the offence, and that one of a number of conditions is met. Proposed new section 92A(7)(c) would make the power applicable to material even if it consists of items subject to legal professional privilege or the categories of confidential or journalistic material known as excluded material and special procedure material under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

The provisions of proposed new section 92A engage ECHR Articles 6 (right to a fair hearing), 8.1 (right to respect for private life, home and correspondence) and 10.1 (right to freedom of expression). Confidential material is protected under ECHR Article 8.1, and lawyer-client communications attract particularly strong protection: any interference must be justified by reference to specially compelling considerations if it is not to violate Article 8.[68] The European Court of Human Rights recognizes that the ability to communicate freely and privately with one's legal adviser an essential element in a fair trial, so interfering with lawyer-client communications may violate ECHR Article 6.1.[69] The right to legal professional privilege is similarly protected as a fundamental right under English common law.[70] Where the material sought or seized is journalistic material, even if it is not confidential it is protected by ECHR Article 10, which protects journalists' working materials and sources of information as part of the protection for a free press which is regarded as essential to maintaining freedom of expression in a democratic society.[71]

To justify an interference under ECHR Articles 8.2 and 10.2, the interference must be shown to be 'necessary in a democratic society', ie a proportionate response to a pressing social need. Where a power to interfere with rights under ECHR Articles 8 and 10 is conferred, "the implementation of the measures must be accompanied by effective safeguards which ensure minimum impairment of the right to respect for his correspondence. This is particularly so where … correspondence with the [complainant's] legal advisers may be intercepted."[72]

Question 13. In view of the level of seriousness of the offence of offering immigration advice and assistance, and any safeguards against improper use of the power by the Commissioner, why does the Government consider that proposed new section 92A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which would be inserted by clause 16 of the Bill, and particularly 92A(7)(c) making possible search for and seizure of lawyer-client communications, other confidential material of a personal nature, and journalistic material, would be a justifiable interference with ECHR Articles 6.1, 8 and 10?

Clause 20: fees for immigration applications

Clause 20 proposes a power for the Secretary of State to set fees for applications and certain other processes which exceed the cost of determining the application or undertaking the process. In particular, the Secretary of State would be allowed to calculate the level of the fee by reference to the potential benefits which the Secretary of State thinks are likely to accrue to the applicant if the application is successful or the process is completed.[73] This could allow the Secretary of State to impose very high fees, on the footing that the right to British nationality, leave to remain in the United Kingdom, or (perhaps most of all) a work permit are economically valuable, even if the application is not being made for economic reasons.

Question 14. Does the Government consider that fees calculated on the basis set out in clause 20(1) and (3) would not impact on poor people in such a way as to be incompatible with the right to be free of discrimination on the ground of property under Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and if so, why?

In view of the progress of the Bill the Committee wishes to report your responses to the above questions, and its conclusions on them, at as early a date as possible. The Committee would therefore be grateful for a reply by 22 January at the latest.

6 January 2004

Appendix 2: The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill

Letter from Chair to Rt Hon David Blunkett, Secretary of State for the Home Department

The Committee is considering the above Bill, and would be grateful for your comments on the following point raised by its Legal Adviser. Our startingpoint is of course the statement made under s.19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998; but I should make it clear that the Committees remit extends to human rights in a broad sense, not just the Convention rights under the Act.

Clause 5 of the Bill would allow an adverse inference of guilt to be drawn from the failure of a defendant charged with murder or manslaughter to give evidence if:

1. the defendant is also charged with an offence contrary to clause 4 of the Bill (failure to protect child or vulnerable adult against a threat of unlawful violence which leads to death) in respect of the same death; and

2. it would be proper to draw an adverse inference of guilt in relation to that offence by reason of section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

The use of adverse inferences from silence engages the right to a fair hearing in the determination of criminal charge (ECHR Article 6.1) and the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law (ECHR Article 6.2). This has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as preventing a court from convicting a defendant where the inference from silence is the only or main evidence of the defendant's guilt: see for example Murray v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29, Condron v. United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 1 and Beckles v. United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 13.

The Explanatory Notes to the Bill, paragraph 38, suggest that the effect of clause 5 is that 'a defendant may not be convicted solely or mainly on the basis of an inference from silence'. However, the words in parentheses at the end of clause 5(1), '(even if there would otherwise be no case for him to answer on that charge)' indicate that, in cases falling within clause 5, a judge, when deciding under clause 5 whether to leave a case to the jury, would be able to take account of an inference from silence alongside the prosecution's evidence. The same would apply to a court or jury when assessing the defendant's guilt or innocence.

It follows that there will always be some significant evidence which tends to fix the defendant with responsibility for the death before an inference can be drawn, but a conviction could be based on the inference taken together with less evidence than would suffice to allow the inference to be drawn at all, or to allow a case to be left to a jury, in an 'ordinary' case under section 35 of the 1994 Act.

In the light of this, why does the Government considers that clause 5 would not allow a conviction to be based mainly (but not wholly) on an inference from a defendant's failure to give evidence, and why accordingly there is no probability of a violation of ECHR Article 6?

The Committee would also be grateful for an indication of what representations you have received in connection with this Bill in relation to human rights issues, and to what specific points those representations were directed.