Joint Committee On Human Rights Fourth Report


Bills drawn to the special attention of each House


Government Bills

1 Civil Contingencies Bill
Date introduced to the House of Commons

Current Bill Number

Previous Reports

7 January 2004

House of Commons 14

15th Report of Session 2002-03

Background

1.1 The Civil Contingencies Bill is a Government Bill, introduced to the House of Commons on 7 January 2004. The Minister for the Cabinet Office and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Mr Douglas Alexander MP, has made a statement of compatibility with Convention rights under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Explanatory Notes to the Bill have been published.[1] They deal with the Government's view as to the effect of the Bill on Convention rights at paras. 69-76.

1.2 The Bill is intended to provide a coherent and up to date legislative framework for dealing with public emergencies. The Bill follows on from a draft Bill, published for consultation in the 2002-03 Session. We considered the draft Bill, and reported our view of the human rights implications to each House.[2]

1.3 The draft Bill was also considered by a number of other committees, including the House of Commons Defence Committee,[3] the House of Lords Constitution Committee,[4] and an ad hoc Joint Committee.[5] These committees expressed few serious concerns (if any) about Part 1 of the draft Bill which dealt with the responsibilities of local bodies for preparing for emergencies. We thought that this Part raised no significant threat to human rights.[6]

1.4 By contrast, all the committees which considered the Bill had serious reservations about Part 2 of the draft Bill. This provided for the executive to exercise very widely drafted emergency powers when an emergency has been declared by Her Majesty in Council or a Minister.[7]

1.5 Clause 25 of the draft Bill provided that a regulation made under Part 2 would "be treated as if it were an Act of Parliament" for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. This would have deprived people of legal remedies for an extensive range of potential violations of human rights. The Government particularly invited comments on whether it would be appropriate to have such a provision in legislation.

1.6 We endorsed the view of the Defence Committee that "this new provision should not be included in the bill unless the Government can demonstrate a clear and compelling need for the additional powers which it provides".[8] We concluded—

    We strongly disapprove of any attempt to extend the range of instruments which have to be treated as primary legislation so as to make them exempt from the need to comply with Convention rights. It provides a way of allowing the executive to legislate, before seeking parliamentary approval, in ways which are known or believed to be incompatible with Convention rights, while denying victims of violations the right to obtain an effective remedy from a court or tribunal. In our view, regardless of the context, the effect of this legislative technique is objectionable on human rights grounds.[9]

1.7 After considering a number of safeguards in the draft Bill, we continued—

    We accept that it might be difficult to settle on the right balance between individual rights and the public interest when an emergency occurs. Nevertheless, even in an emergency we cannot approve of an approach to legislating (particularly granting delegated legislative powers) which would deprive people of important safeguards for their fundamental rights, and even remove the legal necessity for the legislator to give proper consideration to those rights when making delegated legislation….

    We conclude that the provisions of Part 2 of the Draft Bill would, if enacted, give rise to a significant risk that regulations could be made which would violate, or authorise a violation of, Convention rights, without any judicial remedy being available for a victim of the violation. As the Bill makes no provision for any other effective remedy before a national authority, it would also be likely to lead to a violation of the right to an effective remedy before a national authority for any violation of a Convention right, under ECHR Article 13 (which does not form part of national law, but binds the United Kingdom in international law and is enforceable before the European Court of Human Rights).[10]

1.8 In its response to the reports of the Joint Committee on the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill and the Defence Committee,[11] the Government said as to these matters—

    The Government has very much appreciated the care and attention with which the [Joint] Committee [on the Civil Contingencies Bill] has considered this difficult issue. The Government has also found the comments on this point in the reports on the draft Bill from the Defence Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights very useful and has read with interest the comments of the Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, the Transport Committee and the [Lords] Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in their memoranda to the Committee. The Government has also had very fruitful discussions with consultees on this issue.

1.9 In the light of this, the Government has decided not to include this provision in the Bill.[12] We welcome this decision.

The Structure of the Bill

1.10 The substantive provisions of the Bill, like those of the draft Bill, are in two Parts.

1.11 Part 1 is concerned with local arrangements for civil protection. In our view, those give rise to no human rights issue requiring to be drawn to the attention of either House.

1.12 Part 2 would confer emergency powers, including the power to make regulations. 'Emergency' is defined in clause 18. Clause 19 would confer a power on Her Majesty by Order in Council or, in cases of great urgency, a senior Minister of the Crown,[13] to make emergency regulations if satisfied that conditions set out in clause 20 are satisfied. Those conditions are—

a)  that an emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur;

b)  that it is necessary to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency (for example, because existing legislation could not be relied on to be effective, or would entail serious delay); and

c)  that the need is urgent.

1.13 The permitted scope of such regulations is defined in clause 21. The scope is very wide, and several of the tests for deciding whether regulations have been properly made are subjective to the Minister. For example, regulations may be made if the maker "is satisfied" of certain matters (clause 19(1), (2) and (5)(b)), and the regulations "may make any provision which the person making the regulations thinks is for" one of the permitted purposes. The regulations would therefore not be easily challengeable in judicial review proceedings on the ground that the preconditions have not been met unless it could be shown that the person making the regulations would, in concluding that the conditions were met, have been so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion (the test known in administrative law as "Wednesbury unreasonableness") unless an enhanced standard of review is applicable because human rights are affected.

1.14 Of the other provisions, clauses 26 and 27, making provision for parliamentary scrutiny of regulations, are significant. We welcome the fact that, unusually, it would be possible for Parliament to amend the regulations on a motion to approve them (see clause 26(3)). This should allow Parliament to offer some protection against use of the regulation-making power in a way that would violate human rights.

The Bill's other implications for human rights

1.15 So far as relevant to human rights issues, clause 21 (3) of the Bill reads as follows—

    (b) provide for or enable the requisition or confiscation of property (with or without compensation);

    (c) provide for or enable the destruction of property, animal life or plant life (with or without compensation);

    (d) prohibit, or enable the prohibition of, movement to or from a specified place;

    (e) require, or enable the requirement of, movement to or from a specified place;

    (f) prohibit, or enable the prohibition of, assemblies of specified kinds, at specified places or at specified times;

    (g) prohibit, or enable the prohibition of, travel at specified times;

    (h) prohibit, or enable the prohibition of, other specified activities;

    (i) create an offence of—

       (i) failing to comply with a provision of the regulations;

       (ii) failing to comply with a direction or order given or made under the regulations;

       (iii) obstructing a person in the performance of a function under or by virtue of the regulations;

    (j) disapply or modify an enactment (other than a provision of this Part) or a provision made under or by virtue of an enactment;

    (k) require a person or body to act in performance of a function (whether the function is conferred by the regulations or otherwise and whether or not the regulations also make provision for remuneration or compensation);

    (m) make provision (which may include conferring powers in relation to property) for facilitating any deployment of Her Majesty's armed forces; …

1.16 The regulation-making power conferred by clause 21(3)(b) to (i), (k) and (m) potentially engages a wide range of human rights, including the right to the peaceful enjoyment of property,[14] the right to liberty,[15] and the right to freedom of assembly and association.[16] The Government recognizes this.[17] The question is whether the Bill and the surrounding legal framework contain adequate safeguards against possible violations of the rights.

1.17 The Government argues that there are adequate safeguards. It draws attention to a number of matters.[18]

a)  The regulations would be subject to the constraints contained in the Human Rights Act 1998.

b)  Regulations may be made only if it is necessary to make provision for the purposes of preventing, controlling or mitigating any aspect of the emergency (clause 20(3).

c)  Provision may be included in regulations only if the person making the regulations considers that the provision is in due proportion to the emergency (clause 22(1)(b)).

d)  Regulations may not require a person, or enable a person to be required, to perform military service (clause 22(3)(a)).

e)  Regulations may not prohibit, or enable the prohibition of, participation in or any activity in connection with a strike or other industrial action (clause 22(3)(b)).

f)  Regulations may not create an offence which is punishable without trial before a magistrates' court or sheriff, or alter criminal procedure (clause 22(4)(b) and (d)).

In general, these are worthwhile safeguards. However, the following concerns remain.

RELIEVING REGULATIONS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998

1.18 There are two ways in which the regulations might seek to exclude, or have the effect of excluding, the obligation under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to act in a manner compatible with Convention rights. We raised these points with the Government in a letter dated 21 January 2004 from our Chairman to the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Mr. Douglas Alexander MP.[19] The Government's response came in a letter from the Minister dated 30 January 2004.[20] We now consider the matters in the light of the Government's response.

Regulations disapplying substantive provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998

1.19 First, the regulations might include a provision which purports to disapply the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Government took the view that such regulations would be invalid. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill say—

    Clause 21(3)(j) enables regulations to "disapply or modify an enactment or a provision made under or by virtue of an enactment"….Having taken Parliamentary Counsel's advice on how the normal principles of the construction of delegated powers would apply to this particular provision, it is not possible to envisage circumstances in which this power would lawfully enable regulations to make a substantive amendment to a "constitutional enactment", such as the Human Rights Act.[21]

1.20 This was amplified in the Government's response to our questions. The Minister made the following points:

a)  that the legislation would be read by courts in the light of a number of interpretative assumptions, such as the assumption that Parliament did not intend the power to be used unreasonably or for an improper purpose;

b)  that the clause does not contain an express power to disapply or modify what Laws LJ in Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council[22] called a "constitutional statute", such as the Human Rights Act 1998, so there are no clear words to suggest that Parliament intended the power to be used for that purpose;

c)  that if words expressly excluding any power to amend the Human Rights Act 1998 were to be included in this Bill, powers enacted in other legislation without such express words might be interpreted as permitting such amendments.

1.21 We accept that the words of clause 21(3)(j), standing alone, would not be likely to be interpreted as enabling regulations to be made making a substantive amendment to, or disapplying, the Human Rights Act 1998. We also accept proposition a) above. However, we consider that clause 21(3) as a whole might well be interpreted as allowing regulations to disapply or modify the 1998 Act. We do not think that the Government's arguments give sufficient weight to the opening words of clause 21(3): "Emergency regulations may make provision of any kind that could be made by Act of Parliament or by the exercise of the Royal Prerogative; in particular, … ". The provision which can be made by Act of Parliament includes the amendment or disapplication for particular purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998.

1.22 We note the Government's recognition of those judicial authorities which hold that there are some statutes of such constitutional significance that Parliament cannot be taken to have intended that they can be amended or repealed unless Parliament has expressly stated that intention. This is obviously potentially important for the effective protection of human rights. We hope that it will be possible in due course to identify the statutes or statutory provisions which should be regarded as having constitutional status for this purpose. However, we think that the opening words of clause 21(3) are capable of being read as expressly conferring a power to modify or disapply even a constitutional statute such as the Human Rights Act 1998, and we do not consider that the words of clause 21(3)(j) can properly be read as a limitation on the generality of the opening words of clause 21(3).

1.23 We are not persuaded that specifically limiting clause 21(3) to exclude power to make regulations modifying or disapplying the Human Rights Act 1998 would lead to other power-conferring provisions which do not contain such words of exclusion being interpreted as allowing regulations to modify or disapply the 1998 Act. Most power-conferring statutory provisions do not contain words expressly permitting regulations to do anything which could be done by Act of Parliament. Clause 21(3) does, and is therefore in a very special position.

1.24 We therefore consider that the wide opening words of clause 21(3) represent a threat to human rights. We recommend that the clause should be amended to reflect the Government's intention that the clause should not authorise regulations to modify or disapply the Human Rights Act 1998, and we draw this to the attention of each House.

Regulations amending primary legislation

1.25 The opening words of clause 21(3) would appear to allow regulations to amend primary legislation, including Acts of Parliament. The Human Rights Act 1998, section 21(1), defines "primary legislation" for the purposes of that Act as including "an order or other instrument made under primary legislation … to the extent to which it … amends any primary legislation". Section 3(2)(b) of the Act provides that an incompatibility with a Convention right "does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation" (as defined in section 21). If a piece of "primary legislation" in this extended sense is incompatible with a Convention right, the only legal remedy is a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Act. A declaration of incompatibility, like the incompatibility itself, "does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given" (section 4(6)(a)).

1.26 It seems, therefore, that a regulation which amends primary legislation would itself be primary legislation to that extent. Such a regulation could not be quashed or set aside in legal proceedings on the ground that it violates a Convention right.

1.27 In its response to the Committee, the Government told us that it did not intend to produce a situation in which regulations, even if they amend an Act of Parliament, would be treated as primary legislation for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 and so would be valid notwithstanding an incompatibility with a Convention right. We were informed that the Minister is considering whether additional action is needed to make this clear.

1.28 We welcome this, and hope that the drafting of the clause will be amended to reflect the Government's intention in this respect. We draw this to the attention of each House.

THE RIGHT TO BE FREE OF FORCED LABOUR

1.29 The Government suggests that the Bill may engage the right to be free of forced labour, under ECHR Article 4.2.[23] ECHR Article 4.2 provides: "No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour". As noted above, the Government draws attention to clause 22(3)(a) of the Bill as a safeguard for that right. Clause 22(3)(a) provides that emergency regulations may not require a person, or enable a person to be required, to perform military service. The Government comments: "This will ensure that rights under [ECHR] Article 4.2 (prohibition on forced labour) are not infringed".[24]

1.30 We have come to the conclusion that there is no significant risk that regulations could interfere with rights under ECHR Article 4, for two reasons.

a)  First, Article 4.3 states, "For the purpose of this Article the term 'forced labour' shall not include: … (b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service; …". It follows that the exclusion from the Bill of a power to make regulations requiring, or enabling someone to require, a person to perform military service goes beyond the protection necessary under ECHR Article 4.2.

b)  Secondly, Article 4.3(c) excludes from the definition of forced labour "any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community".


1   Bill 14-EN Back

2   Fifteenth Report of Session 2002-03, Scrutiny of Bills and Draft Bills: Further Progress Report, HL Paper 149, HC 1005. Back

3   Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2002-03, Draft Civil Contingencies Bill, HC 557 Back

4   See Report from the Joint Committee, footnote following, Appendix 1: Memorandum from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, pp. 85-87. Back

5   Joint Committee on the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill, Session 2002-03, Draft Civil Contingencies Bill, HL Paper 184/HC 1074. Back

6   Fifteenth Report, op cit., para. 3.4. Back

7   On the proposed meaning of 'emergency', the declaration of an emergency and the power to make regulations during an emergency, see ibid., paras. 3.6-3.19. Back

8   Fifteenth Report, op cit., para. 3.25, quoting Defence Committee, op cit., para 68. Back

9   ibid., para. 3.26. Back

10   ibid., paras. 3.33, 3.35. Back

11   Cabinet Office, The Government's Response to the Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill, Incorporating the Government's Response to the Report of the House of Commons Defence Committee on the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill, CM 6078 (London: TSO, 2004). Back

12   ibid., p. 14. Back

13   Senior Ministers are the Prime Minister, any of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, and the Commissioners of HM Treasury: clause 19(3). Back

14   ECHR Protocol No. 1, Article 1. Back

15   ECHR Article 5. Back

16   ECHR Article 11. Back

17   Bill 14-EN, para. 72. Back

18   ibid., paras. 73-75. Back

19   See Appendix 1a. Back

20   See Appendix 1b. Back

21   Explanatory Notes, op cit., para. 76. Back

22   [2002] EWHC Admin 195, [2003] QB 151, DC. Back

23   Explanatory Notes, op cit., para. 72. Back

24   Explanatory Notes, op cit., para. 75. Back


 
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