Joint Committee On Human Rights Seventh Report


5 Potential solutions: legislation

96. The most radical approach to closing the gap in protection would be amendment of the Human Rights Act to rewrite the section 6 definition of public authority. It would also be possible to supplement the existing definition by scheduling or otherwise listing bodies or functions to which it applied. We now examine these alternatives.

Redefining public functions

97. Amending legislation could be introduced to re-word the general test of public authority status under section 6. Amongst others who support such an approach, the Law Society suggests that the Human Rights Act should be amended to expand the definition of public authority and that—

… any new definition should make clear that when a public body delegates functions that would otherwise be the responsibility of that public body to a private entity, those functions and the private body delivering them, are considered public for the purposes of the HRA. [96]

98. However, formulating a comprehensive test of public authority status, of general and wide application, would be a very difficult task, and such a test would remain subject to judicial interpretation. The original formulation was very carefully considered, and thoroughly debated. It is possible, indeed in our view likely, that any expanded definition would bring a new set of unintended consequences when the courts came to apply it, and that a new set of anomalies would begin to emerge. We are not convinced that any amendment to the wording of section 6(3)(b) could be devised which would be certain of achieving a more satisfactory application of Convention rights and duties than the current wording.

Scheduling "public authorities"

99. A second possibility would be to amend the Human Rights Act to schedule a list of public authorities to the Act. Such an approach was adopted for the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (supplemented by a power of Ministerial designation by subordinate legislation, and by the definition of all publicly owned companies as public authorities). The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 also schedules a list of public authorities subject to the general duty to promote race equality: similar provision is also made in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 in relation to the duty of public authorities to promote equality.

100. It is also argued that if a schedule listing individual bodies were considered to be too limiting, classes of organisations could be scheduled. Schedule 1 to the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 includes a number of general categories of organisations subject to the general statutory duty to promote race equality. In relation to education, for example, it includes the following—

46. Governing bodies of—

(a) educational establishments maintained by local education authorities;

(b) institutions within the further education sector (within the meaning of section 91(3) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992); or

(c) institutions within the higher education sector (within the meaning of section 91(5) of the Act of 1992).

47. The managers of a grant-aided school (within the meaning of section 135 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980).

48. The managers of a central institution (within the meaning of section 135 of the Act of 1980).

49. The board of management of a self-governing school (within the meaning of the Self-Governing Schools etc. (Scotland) Act 1989).

50. The board of management of a college of further education (within the meaning of section 36(1) of the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992).

51. The governing body of an institution within the higher education sector (within the meaning of Part II of the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992).

101. Our main objection to this approach is that it runs contrary to the whole scheme of the Act, a scheme whose generosity and flexibility we have emphasised again and again in this report. The application of section 6(3)(b) is about whether a function is or is not public. It is not about whether the body performing that function is itself in some way "public" in character. In many cases it will not be. The Human Rights Act identifies both pure and functional types of public authority. Scheduling organisations as "functional" public authorities under section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act would leave open the question of which of the body's functions were to be considered public, and would therefore bring little advance in certainty in the application of Convention rights.

102. This problem of identifying functions rather than bodies for a statutory purpose is not an issue in relation to the design of the Freedom of Information Act, the Race Relations Act (as amended) or the Northern Ireland Act. The scheme of those Acts does not appear to us to be transferable to solving the problem of the meaning of public authority under the Human Rights Act.

103. An additional though subordinate disadvantage of this approach is that although its purpose would be intended to introduce greater certainty in identifying which bodies came within the terms of section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act, a schedule of public authorities would, on its own, risk inflexibility and omission. The likelihood would be that bodies not specified would be presumed by the courts to fall outside of section 6.[97] This might possibly be remedied by employing a schedule alongside the current general provision on public authority, or alongside a power of ministerial designation (see below), but we have been presented with no plausible means of combining the two approaches in this way. It would be likely to result in a conceptual muddle.

104. We do not favour the idea of scheduling a list of "functional" public authorities to the Human Rights Act.

Designating "public authorities"

105. A related idea is that amending legislation could provide for organisations to be designated as public authorities in secondary legislation. A model for this approach is section 5(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, which provides for the Secretary of State to designate a body as a public authority for the purposes of that Act by order where it—

a)   appears to the Secretary of State to exercise functions of a public nature, or

b)   is providing under a contract made with a public authority any service whose provision is a function of that authority

106. This approach seems more promising, though it is open to the same objections on grounds of exclusivity as those we have outlined above in relation to a schedule of functional public authorities. However, even if reservations about the transferability of the scheme of the Freedom of Information Act to the Human Rights Act were set aside, it seems to us highly questionable whether, in the special area of the protection and vindication of rights, replacing judicial decision with executive decision would be appropriate. For these reasons we do not favour amending the Human Rights Act to allow designation by Ministers in subordinate legislation of particular bodies as public authorities for the purposes of the Act.

Designating "public functions"

107. A further option would be to provide either for the ministerial designation of particular functions as public for the purposes of section 6 of the Act, or to legislate separately to designate certain functions as those that are, or may be, public. For example, Shelter proposed that there should be legislation to state that registered social landlords or housing associations are independent bodies, but that certain of their functions are public functions. These functions, Shelter proposed, would include the management of housing developed with public subsidy or previously owned by a local authority, and the provision of services that discharge functions of a local authority or social services authority.

108. BIHR suggested in its evidence that, for example, functions pursuant to an arrangement under section 21 and 26 of the National Assistance Act 1948, could be designated as public functions. Legislation (or amending legislation) in other areas such as health or social care could likewise make clear that particular functions that the legislation allows to be contracted-out are to be considered as public functions for the purposes of the Human Rights Act.

109. This option for legislation would be workable in theory, although it would yet again carry the risk of the implication of exclusivity—the risk that those functions not so specified would not be considered by the courts to be public, even if section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act remained unchanged. Although we consider that the designation of public functions in legislation is a plausible approach to closing the gap in protection that has been opened by the decisions of the courts so far, we are not convinced of its desirability in practice.


96   Ev 50. Back

97   A concern expressed to the JCHR by Lord Falconer, see Joint Committee on Human Rights, Eleventh Report of Session 2002-03, Criminal Justice Bill: Further Report, HL Paper 118, HC 724, Ev 20. Back


 
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