Joint Committee On Human Rights

Joint Committee On Human Rights Nineteenth Report

3 The Convention in domestic law and policy

28. That the protection against torture is a fundamental principle of UK law was affirmed in the strongest terms by the House of Lords in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department. In affirming the inadmissibility before the courts of information obtained by torture by foreign agents abroad, the House of Lords stressed the domestic historical antecedents of the prohibition on torture, which are reinforced and informed by international human rights law standards, in particular those of UNCAT.

29. The judgments in that case go a significant way to addressing one of the two inconsistencies between domestic law and the Convention which were identified by the UN Committee Against Torture. These were the admissibility of evidence obtained by torture, and the defences available to the criminal offence of torture. The UN Committee recommended that:

the State Party should review, in light of its experience since its ratification of the Convention and the Committee's jurisprudence, its statute and common law to ensure full consistency with the obligations imposed by the Convention; for greater clarity and ease of access, the State party should group together and publish the relevant legal provisions.[51]

30. Ms Harman told the Committee that in response to the UN Committee and to this inquiry the DCA Human Rights Division had undertaken a further overview of the law against torture.[52] The DCA provided us with a helpful "grid" of relevant legislation, which is appended to this Report.[53]

Right of Individual Petition

31. Under Article 22 of the Convention, states may accept a right of individual petition to the UN Committee Against Torture, which can receive written communications from individuals alleging that their rights have been breached by the State Party, and can issue its "views" on the case. The Committee is not a judicial body, and its views on alleged breaches of the Convention, although authoritative, are not binding in either international or domestic law.

32. The UK has not accepted the right of individual petition under Article 22. Rights of individual petition to UN Committees were reviewed by the Government in a comprehensive review of international human rights obligations, which published its conclusions in 2005. The review decided that the UK should accept the right of individual petition under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), on a trial basis for two years, but should not at present accept rights of individual petition under other UN human rights treaties. In its Report on the conclusions of the Review, our predecessor Committee regretted that the remaining rights of individual petition under UN treaties had not been accepted, and recommended that the position in regard to those treaties should be reviewed at an early opportunity, in light of the experience with individual petition under CEDAW.[54] We support the recommendation of our predecessor Committee that early consideration should be given to accepting rights of individual petition under UNCAT, as well as other UN human rights treaties.

Optional Protocol to UNCAT

33. The Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT), which the UK became one of the first states to ratify in December 2003, provides for independent inspection of places of detention by national monitoring bodies designated by the State, as well as by a sub-committee of the Committee Against Torture. Under the Protocol, states are required to designate national monitoring bodies (Article 17); to guarantee their independence (Article 18) and to allow them access to places of detention (Article 19). Under the current arrangements for the inspection of places of detention, we understand that Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons would be a designated national monitoring body under OPCAT. However, the Police and Justice Bill, currently before Parliament, abolishes the office of Chief Inspector of Prisons and merges its functions with those of a number of other criminal justice inspectorates[55] to create a new office of Chief Inspector for Justice, Community Safety and Custody. The new Chief Inspector will retain the duty to inspect places of detention[56] as one of a wide range of functions related to the courts system, criminal justice system and immigration enforcement system.[57] Clause 25 of the Bill makes the Chief Inspector subject to ministerial directions to inspect, report or advise on matters related to the Chief Inspector's remit, and requires the Chief Inspector to have regard to such aspects of Government policy as the responsible Ministers may direct.

34. Baroness Ashton told us that the Government was entirely satisfied that the new Chief Inspector would be sufficiently independent and effective to be a national monitoring body.[58] She pointed out that the new inspector, in common with the current Chief Inspector of Prisons, would be an independent statutory office holder. The inspector would also be under a statutory duty, when staffing the inspectorate, to secure sufficient expertise and experience relating to the inspected systems and organisations.

35. Whilst we welcome these assurances, there is a risk that the new framework may not sufficiently guarantee the independence of the new Chief Inspector from the Government, that the standards used by the new Inspectorate will not be based on adherence to human rights principles and that the current focus of the Chief Inspector of Prisons on the welfare and treatment of prisoners could be diluted in the new broader inspectorate, all of which may have consequences for the effectiveness of the new body as a national monitoring mechanism under OPCAT. We are considering separately the overall effects on human rights protections for prisoners of the changes to the inspection system proposed in the Police and Justice Bill and will report in due course.

36. CAT further recommended in its Concluding Observations that consideration should be given to designation of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) as a monitoring body for places of detention in Northern Ireland under the Optional Protocol.[59] The CAJ and BIRW note in their evidence that this has not as yet been done. The NIHRC obtained access to Rathgael juvenile justice centre only after initiating a judicial review of the refusal to allow access.[60] In November 2005, the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) published a consultation paper which, while noting that other bodies already have responsibilities in this area, agreed to allow the NIHRC additional investigatory powers, including access to places of detention, but suggested that such powers could be subject to a number of conditions, such as a requirement to give notice of a visit.[61]

37. Mr Woodward told us that no decisions had yet been taken as a result of the consultation on the precise arrangements for the NIHRC's general power to access places of detention, and conditions which might be placed upon it, nor on whether the Commission would be designated as a monitoring body under the Optional Protocol.[62] We recognize the importance of ensuring that the NIHRC's functions in these respects take account of the roles of other bodies, such as the Prisoner Ombudsman. At the same time we consider that the Commission should be designated as a monitoring body in Northern Ireland under the Optional Protocol, with responsibilities focusing on compliance of places of detention with the UK's human rights obligations. We also consider that a power of unannounced inspection is important to the effectiveness of such a monitoring mechanism.

The prohibition on torture in Government policy development

38. Protecting the freedom from torture is a Government-wide responsibility, involving the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Northern Ireland Office amongst others. It is the Department of Constitutional Affairs, however, which has overall responsibility for compliance with UNCAT; which co-ordinates the periodic reports to the UN Committee Against Torture; and which is responsible for the Government's response to the UN Committee's Conclusions and Recommendations on the UK Report. Ms Harman described the role of the DCA as being to ensure that the substantive law complies with obligations under the Convention, and that the laws and procedures are effectively enforced.[63]

39. Some evidence we received suggested that beyond the negative obligation to refrain from acts of torture, the Government, or parts of Government, might not sufficiently appreciate the positive obligations under UNCAT to protect against acts of torture by others, both within and outside the jurisdiction.[64] Instances cited in support of this include the Government's argument—rejected by the House of Lords—in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, that the non-incorporation of UNCAT into domestic law allowed for the admittance before SIAC of evidence obtained by torture abroad; the controversial proposals to rely on diplomatic assurances to deport people to countries which practise torture; and the lack of detailed official inquiry into allegations of the use of UK airports in "extraordinary renditions", all issues which we consider further below in this Report.

40. Ms Harman stated that the DCA was responsible for ensuring that the substantive law complied with human rights obligations, and that procedures to protect rights were enforced effectively.[65] On issues relevant to UNCAT compliance such as, for example, the use of diplomatic assurances against torture, she said she would expect the issues to be discussed at official level between the DCA and other relevant departments, although departments such as the Home Office and Foreign Office would also have their own legal advice on the relevant international standards.[66]

41. In our view, the central responsibility of the DCA for compliance with the Convention against Torture requires it to have a clear role in overseeing compliance with the Convention by all Government Departments. Given the significance, under the Convention Against Torture, of positive obligations to protect against torture, including obligations to train and provide information, to investigate, to enforce laws that protect against torture and to prevent removals to face torture or the use of evidence obtained by torture, it is important, in our view, that the DCA should be proactive in advising and guiding the work of other Government Departments in relation to obligations under the Convention. We consider that the DCA, as the department with central responsibility for the Convention Against Torture, should be proactive in providing guidance and advice on Convention obligations to other Government Departments, in particular in relation to the positive obligations of departments to take steps to prevent, and to investigate, acts of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.

42. In ensuring that obligations, in particular positive obligations, under the Convention Against Torture, are fully appreciated throughout Government, the proposed new Commission for Equality and Human Rights should also have an active part to play. It will be an important part of the Commission's function to promote the protection of human rights, to scrutinise Government policy and practice for compliance with both negative and positive obligations under the Convention Against Torture, and to recommend measures to enhance protection of rights under the Convention where appropriate.

Evidence obtained by torture

43. Article 15 of UNCAT establishes the prohibition on the use of evidence obtained by torture in legal proceedings. It states:

Each state party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.

44. The Concluding Observations stressed the unequivocal nature of the Article 15 UNCAT prohibition on evidence obtained through torture and expressed concern at the then legal position, which allowed information obtained by torture abroad, without the involvement of British agents, to be admitted in evidence. CAT recommended that the UK should "reflect in formal fashion, such as legislative incorporation or by undertaking to Parliament, the Government's intention as expressed by the delegation not to rely on or present in any proceeding evidence where there is knowledge or belief that it has been obtained by torture".[67] It further recommended that the UK should provide a means for individuals to challenge, in any proceedings, the legality of any evidence plausibly suspected of having been obtained by torture. In its response to CAT, the Government said it did not consider it necessary to take further legislative or other measures to prevent reliance on evidence which might have been obtained by torture.[68] It also cited the House of Lords judgment in A(FC)v Secretary of State for the Home Department[69] as providing that appellants or special advocates before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) could raise the issue of whether evidence might have been obtained by torture and that SIAC was under a duty to investigate this if it considered that there were reasonable grounds to suspect this might be the case.[70]

45. In that case, detainees held under the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act, challenging their detention before SIAC, alleged that evidence presented against them had been obtained through the use of torture by officials of foreign states, acting outside of the UK. The Court of Appeal had previously held that evidence obtained through the use of torture by foreign agents without the involvement of UK authorities was admissible. In December 2005 the House of Lords overruled that decision, relying on both the common law tradition, and domestic and international human rights law, to establish that any evidence established to have been obtained by torture was inadmissible. The House of Lords divided, however, on the test to be applied in determining whether evidence was sufficiently tainted to be excluded.

46. The majority view on the latter question was set out in the leading judgement of Lord Hope.[71] He considered that it was the responsibility of the detainee to raise the issue of torture evidence before SIAC, but given the restrictions applying to applicants to SIAC it would be "wholly unrealistic to expect the detainee to prove anything, as he is denied access to so much of the information that is to be used against him". Therefore, once the issue of torture evidence has been raised, the onus should pass to SIAC which, if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that torture has been used, must investigate the matter further.[72] In order to exclude the evidence, SIAC must be satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the evidence was obtained by torture. A risk, even a real or substantial risk, that the evidence may have been obtained by torture will be insufficient to exclude it, although it may be taken into consideration by SIAC in assessing the weight to be given to the evidence. The majority's concern was that any other approach effectively required the Government to prove a negative: it would be "unrealistic to expect SIAC to demand that each piece of information be traced back to its ultimate source and the circumstances in which it was obtained investigated so that it could be proved piece by piece that it was not obtained by torture".[73] In arriving at this test, Lord Hope relied in part on the text of Article 15 UNCAT which requires only that evidence should be excluded where it is "established" that it has been obtained by torture.[74]

47. The minority, led by Lord Bingham,[75] held that, given the procedural handicaps applying to applicants before SIAC, "if SIAC is unable to conclude that there is not a real risk that the evidence has been obtained by torture, it should refuse to admit the evidence." To impose a higher standard would in his view mean that "despite the universal abhorrence expressed for torture and its fruits, evidence procured by torture will be laid before SIAC because its source will not have been 'established'"[76] and would undermine the efficacy of UNCAT.[77]

48. We warmly welcome the House of Lords' affirmation of the prohibition on torture, and the inadmissibility of torture evidence, as fundamental principles of UK law. In affirming this principle, the judgments of the House of Lords have gone a considerable way to addressing our concerns, and those of the UN Committee, that evidence obtained by torture could be relied on in the UK courts.

49. The practical implications of the House of Lords' decision on the procedures for establishing that evidence has been obtained by torture have yet to be tested before SIAC. The test established by the judgment carries an obvious risk that lack of information about the provenance of evidence will lead to evidence which has in fact been obtained by torture being admitted before SIAC. For the SIAC duty of inquiry to be meaningful, SIAC must be able to access adequate information on the provenance of the evidence concerned. This means it is vital, in the event of a challenge to evidence before SIAC, that the intelligence services and other Government agencies obtain and supply to SIAC the fullest possible information about the circumstances in which evidence passed on to them by foreign intelligence agencies has been obtained.

50. Although the effect of the majority judgment is that SIAC is not required to exclude evidence even where it is satisfied that there is a substantial risk of it having been obtained by torture, it may retain a discretion to exclude such evidence. The judgment of the majority concerns the scope of the exclusionary rule in Article 15 UNCAT. It decides that there is no requirement to exclude where there is a substantial risk of evidence having been obtained by torture, but it does not decide that there is no discretion to exclude.

51. We agree that there ought not to be an onus on the Government to prove that evidence was not obtained by torture. But where a credible allegation of torture has been raised, and SIAC is satisfied that there is a substantial risk that the evidence was obtained by torture, then SIAC has a discretion not to admit that evidence. In our view, such an approach does not amount to requiring the Government to prove a negative. Rather, it requires the appellant to satisfy SIAC that the allegation that the evidence was obtained by torture is credible. It also requires SIAC to be satisfied that there is a substantial risk of the evidence having been obtained by torture. The judgement will in our view need to be interpreted and applied in a way which avoids imposing an obligation on the Government to prove a negative, and giving meaningful practical effect to the purpose behind Article 15 of UNCAT, namely that evidence obtained by torture must not be used in legal proceedings.

Use of information obtained by torture

52. In a witness statement sworn in the House of Lords in A(FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Director General of the Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller,[78] makes clear that information from dubious sources is, in practice, made use of by the security services, where there is a risk that it may have been obtained by torture. Dame Manningham-Buller states that "where the reporting is threat-related, the desire for context will usually be subservient to the need to take action to establish the facts, in order to protect life." In other words, the need to act swiftly to protect life precludes the possibility of ascertaining whether the intelligence has been obtained by torture. She gives the example of intelligence received from the Algerian intelligence services, derived from questioning of a detainee, Mohammed Meguerba, to the effect that there existed a plot to use ricin in London "in the next few days".

53. The judgment of the House of Lords leaves open the possibility that information which may have been obtained by torture or ill-treatment by foreign agents may be used in intelligence or law enforcement operations, in particular to take preventative measures to protect against imminent terrorist attack; though it may not be admitted in evidence in any subsequent legal proceedings.[79] Although the ambit of protection under Article 15 UNCAT is not entirely clear, it appears to draw a similar line in prohibiting the use of evidence obtained by torture in "any proceedings" without any specific reference to intelligence or law enforcement action.

54. We heard oral evidence from Redress, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to the effect that the use of information obtained by torture in any law enforcement operation, even to avert an imminent attack, would undermine the absolute prohibition on torture, and would encourage and risk complicity in acts of torture by foreign agents.[80] In supplementary written evidence following that oral evidence session, Redress and Human Rights Watch accepted that where such information was received in the form of a hypothetical tip-off about a major terrorist attack it should be verified in order to prevent loss of life. They also considered, however, that there was a duty to make inquiries of the foreign intelligence agency concerned as to the circumstances in which the information was obtained and how it came into the hands of UK officials, and to establish whether there has been any complicity by UK officials in an act of torture.[81]

55. We accept that UNCAT and other provisions of human rights law do not prohibit the use of information from foreign intelligence sources, which may have been obtained under torture, to avert imminent loss of life by searches, arrests or other similar measures. We cannot accept the absolutist position on this subject advanced by some NGOs when human life, possibly many hundreds of lives, may be at stake. Indeed, where information as to an imminent attack becomes available to the UK authorities, their positive obligation to protect against loss of life under Article 2 ECHR may require them to take preventative action, even when they suspect that the information may have been obtained by use of torture. However great care must be taken to ensure that use of such information is only made in cases of imminent threat to life. Care must also be taken to ensure that the use of information in this way, and in particular any repeated or regular use of such information, especially from the same source or sources, does not render the UK authorities complicit in torture by lending tacit support or agreement to the use of torture or inhuman treatment as a means of obtaining information which might be useful to the UK in preventing terrorist attacks.[82] Ways need to be found to reduce and, we would hope, eliminate dependence on such information. There is in our view a significant difference between using information from sources suspected of being involved in torture to avert a terrorist act and using it in court proceedings.

56. In our view, the fundamental importance of the obligations on the UK concerning torture makes it incumbent on the intelligence services to move beyond the essentially passive stance towards the methods and techniques of foreign intelligence agencies described in Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller's witness statement. In Canada, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service ("CSIS") is under a statutory obligation to notify the Government of any arrangements for sharing information with any foreign intelligence agencies. Those liaison arrangements are also subjected to independent scrutiny by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Review Committee, a statutory body external to the intelligence agencies and at arms length from the Government. We do not necessarily suggest this as a model, but we do draw attention to the greater degree of formality in the making of arrangements between domestic and foreign intelligence services and to the fact that such arrangements are subjected to independent scrutiny. In our view, the need to use information which has or may have been obtained by torture could be significantly reduced if the UK intelligence services took a more proactive approach when establishing the framework arrangements for intelligence sharing with other intelligence agencies, by making clear the minimum standards which it expects to be observed and monitoring for compliance with those standards, and if there were some opportunity for independent scrutiny of those arrangements.

Co-operation with foreign interrogators abroad

57. At the UN hearing on the UK Report under the Convention, questions were raised about the presence of UK officials at interrogations by US officials, in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere. The Intelligence and Security Committee, in a report issued towards the end of the last Parliament, concluded that the security service personnel deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay were not sufficiently trained in the Geneva Conventions, nor were they aware which interrogation techniques had been banned in the UK, though it noted that by September 2004, the security services had issued appropriate guidance to staff involved in interrogations.[83] Recent press reports have alleged that British intelligence officials were present at interrogations of terrorism suspects in Greece where it is alleged that the suspects were beaten and threatened with death.[84] The Foreign Secretary has denied the allegations.[85] The High Court recently found that certain intelligence information about two British residents detained in Guantanamo, who were arrested in the Gambia and allege that they were tortured while in U.S. custody in Kabul and Baghram Air Base, was communicated to the authorities of another country by the UK security and intelligence services, and that either directly or indirectly this came into the hands of the U.S. authorities.[86]

58. The UN Committee recommended that the UK:

"ensure that the conduct of its officials, including those attending interrogations at any overseas facility, is strictly in conformity with the requirements of the Convention and that any breaches of the Convention that it becomes aware of should be investigated promptly and impartially …"

59. Where officials do not attend an interrogation, but supply questions to foreign interrogators, ensuring that such interrogations comply with the Convention is likely to be impossible. In her witness statement before the House of Lords, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller states that the UK authorities provided questions to the Algerian authorities to put to Mohammed Meguerba, the detainee being questioned about the ricin plot. She states that "because of the potential importance of what he was saying, British police officers sought direct access to him, but that was not permitted by the Algerian authorities. Instead, questions were provided to the judicial authorities in Algeria through a formal letter of request, and Meguerba was formally examined on them at length by the Chief Examining Magistrate in Algiers."

60. In working co-operatively with foreign intelligence agents, whether relying on information supplied by them, attending interrogations, or providing information to enable their apprehension or to be used in such interrogations, safeguards are required to ensure that UK officials do not support or become complicit in the use of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. In Canada, one of the central questions for the Arar Commission is to determine precisely what role was played by Canadian security and intelligence officials and police in providing intelligence information to the US authorities which led to Mr Arar being arrested as he passed through the U.S. and rendered to Syria where he was tortured. We note that very similar questions are raised by the recent finding by the High Court that the UK security and intelligence services provided intelligence information about two British residents to the Gambian authorities which then directly or indirectly found its way into the hands of the U.S. authorities, who it is alleged subjected them to torture. In our view it is essential that the facts about the precise role played by the UK security and intelligence services in analogous cases be authoritatively determined through the oversight of the Intelligence and Security Committee. For the future, the UK security and intelligence services must take all feasible steps to ensure that information exchanged with foreign intelligence services has not been obtained from, and will not be used in, acts which would be regarded as human rights violations.[87] If this is not done, such co-operation is likely to imply active or tacit approval of the use of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, such as might render the UK complicit in such acts.

The criminal offence of torture: the defence of lawful authority, justification or excuse

61. One point on which UK legislation has been alleged to conflict with the Convention against Torture is in the defences available to the crime of torture under the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which creates the crime of torture, gives effect to the requirement under Article 4 UNCAT to ensure that all acts of torture are offences under the criminal law. Article 2 of UNCAT further requires states to take effective measures to prevent torture and stipulates that no exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a justification for torture. Article 2.3 states that "an order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture."

62. Two defences available under the Criminal Justice Act call into question compliance with these standards. Under section 134(2) there is a defence of "lawful authority, justification or excuse" to a charge of torture. Under section 134(5), where the offence of torture is committed outside the UK, such a defence applies if the law of the jurisdiction in which the offence is committed provides lawful authority, justification or excuse for the actions concerned.

63. The Government has suggested in the past that the defences in section 134 are necessary because of the very wide definition of torture under the Criminal Justice Act, which encompasses unintentionally inflicted pain occasioned in the performance of official duties, and is thus wider than the definition of "torture" (as opposed to inhuman and degrading treatment) in the Convention. In presenting oral evidence to the Committee, however, Ms Harman did not consider that the meaning of torture under the 1988 Act differed, or was intended to differ from that in the Convention: "it is supposed to be no wider and no narrower".[88]

64. The defences under section 134 have further been justified on the basis that the application of the Human Rights Act ensures that they will be applied so as to be human rights compatible. Under section 3 of the Human Rights Act, the courts would be required to interpret section 134 compatibly with the right to freedom from torture (under Article 3 ECHR), if necessary restricting the effect of the defence. Questions have been raised however, as to whether section 3 HRA would allow the courts to read down section 134 as regards crimes of torture committed outside the jurisdiction, for example in Iraq or Afghanistan.[89] Following a recent decision of the Court of Appeal,[90] it is now established that the Human Rights Act does apply to persons outside the jurisdiction who are in the custody of British troops, though it does not apply to civilians killed by British troops whilst at liberty in an occupied territory which is not under effective UK military control. A section 3 interpretation would therefore apply, at least, in criminal proceedings against British soldiers abroad accused of torture crimes against persons in their custody.

65. It is not clear how the courts would approach the interpretation of the defence under section 134, and NGOs critical of the defence accepted that there were to date no cases in which the defence had been applied so as to defeat a prosecution. However, Redress told us that the defence could pose a problem in the future.[91]

66. Ms Harman said that the intention behind the Criminal Justice Act 1988 had been to put into law the precise obligations undertaken the previous year when the UK ratified the Convention Against Torture.[92] In light of the concerns expressed by the UN Committee amongst others that the Act might not sufficiently accord with the terms of the Convention, the Government were reviewing the defences available under section 134, to ascertain whether any form of amendment or clarification of the legislation was required. The Government was committed to ensuring that the letter as well as the spirit of the 1988 Act accorded with the Convention.[93]

67. We welcome the Government's decision to review the effect of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and the defences to the crime of torture contained in it, in order to seek to reflect the UK's obligations under UNCAT more clearly. We also note and welcome the fact that the Government no longer appears to be relying on the argument that the defences are justified by the greater width of the definition of torture in the 1988 Act than in the Convention.

51 Concluding Observations, op. cit., para 5(b) Back

52 Q 139 Back

53 Ev 87 Back

54 Seventeenth Report of Session 2004-05, Review of International Human Rights Instruments, HL Paper 99, HC 264, para 27. The Government's response to that Report was published in our Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, Government Responses to Reports from the Committee in the last Parliament, HL Paper 104, HC 850 Back

55 Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary; Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service; Her Majesty's Inspectorate of the National Probation Service for England and Wales; Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Court Administration. Clause 29 of the Bill. Back

56 Clause 23 Back

57 Clause 22 Back

58 Ev 85 Back

59 Para 5(m) Back

60 Ev 110 Back

61 Northern Ireland Office, Consultation Paper, The Powers of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, November 2005, paras 51-56 Back

62 Ev 90 Back