Joint Committee On Human Rights

Joint Committee On Human Rights Nineteenth Report

9 Use of AEPs in Northern Ireland

171. In its Concluding Observations in 1998[238] on the UK's third periodic report the UN Committee raised a concern about the use of plastic bullet rounds as a means of riot control and recommended that such use be discontinued. The latest Concluding Observations noted as a positive aspect the fact that they had not in practice been used since September 2002.[239] Since those Concluding Observations were issued, however, the latest version of the baton round, the Attenuating Energy Projectile (AEP), has been fired by both the police and the army in response to serious rioting on a number of occasions. The police fired 21 AEPs on 12 July and 11 on 4 August 2005. In a series of incidents between 10 and 13 September 2005, the police fired 249 AEPs and the army 140.[240] The Chief Constable said that AEPs had only been fired against individual aggressors and in accordance with strict authorisation procedures.[241] The PSNI's human rights advisers confirmed this in oral evidence

172. The weapon popularly known as the plastic bullet has undergone continuous development over the past 30 years. Rubber bullets were first used in Northern Ireland as a means of crowd control in 1970. The plastic bullet, also known as the plastic baton round, was introduced in 1974. A new form of plastic bullet called the baton round was introduced in 2001. Most recently, AEPs were introduced in June 2005. Although these developments in the weapon have been presented as reducing its potential for injury, their claims to provide less lethal alternatives have been disputed.

173. Since they were first used in Northern Ireland , rubber and plastic bullets have caused 17 deaths,[242] and a large, though undetermined, number of injuries. Injuries documented as a result of plastic bullets include brain damage, loss of eyes, fractured jaws, multiple bone fractures, spinal injuries, and post-traumatic stress disorder.[243] There has been a particularly high rate of injury of children.[244] There is clearly a potential for injury caused by baton rounds to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.

174. It is not clear how many injuries resulted from the firings of AEPs during the summer of 2005, though BIRW states that a large proportion of those involved in the riots were children, and cites press reports of child injuries. Figures have been released for the number of people hit by AEPs fired by the police (but not by those fired by the army): police AEPs hit 12 people on 12 July; 12 on 4 August; and 187 between 10 and 13 September.

Human Rights Advisers' Report

175. The report of the human rights advisers to the Northern Ireland Policing Board on the policing of the Ardoyne and Whiterock Parades in July and September 2005 was published in December 2005.[245] It concluded that the issue, deployment and use of AEPs in the Ardoyne Parades in July were within PSNI guidance and compliant with the Human Rights Act.[246] AEPs had been deployed only after rioters were seen throwing blast bombs from nearby roofs, and when it was clear that officers could not control the situation by (a) taking cover (b) withdrawing or (c) dealing with the situation using other less lethal methods of control. In relation to the Whiterock parade the report found that the issue, deployment and use of AEPs following petrol and blast bomb attacks against the police was, in general terms, within the PSNI guidance and compliant with the HRA, given the serious and sustained attack faced by the police.[247] In everything the human rights advisers had observed, they considered that the PSNI's procedures ensured that in general proportionate responses were made to the level of violence encountered by the police.[248]

AEP guidance

176. Plastic bullets have not been used as a means of crowd control anywhere in the UK outside Northern Ireland. Both ACPO guidance, and the PSNI's own guidance makes clear that AEPs are not suitable for crowd control. The PSNI guidance states that: "The AEP has not been designed for use as a crowd control technology but has been designed for use as a less lethal option in situations where officers are faced with individual aggressors whether such aggressors are acting on their own or as part of a group".[249] It goes on to acknowledge however that AEPs may in practice be used in crowd control situations: "The issue, deployment and use of AEPs in a public order situation will be subject to authority levels and command measures of the highest integrity".[250] Wherever AEPs are used, "The AEP is intended for use as an accurate and discriminating projectile, designed to be fired at individual aggressors".[251]

177. The PSNI Code of Practice on the Use of AEPs states that: "every effort should be made to ensure that children are not placed at risk by the firing of an AEP. This is particularly relevant in public order situations where children may be amongst a crowd and be placed in danger should an AEP miss its intended target."

178. A number of concerns have been raised in evidence about the army and PSNI guidance on the use of AEPs, in particular that whilst police guidance accepts that AEPs are not suitable for use in riot control, army guidance considers AEPs to be "public order control equipment". BIRW also pointed out that there is an apparent discrepancy concerning the part of the body at which AEPs may be aimed. Police guidance states that AEPs should be aimed at the belt buckle, whilst army guidelines state that AEPs should be fired below the ribcage.

179. The PSNI told the Committee in oral evidence that on the latter point there was no practical difference between the police and army guidance. Assistant Chief Constable McCausland pointed out that both the police and the army worked on the principle that no more force should be used than was absolutely necessary and stated that in any case: "any difference that exists … between the ACPO guidance and the military guidance is a difference in relation to how the two organisations work. The Committee must remember that the Army guidance applies throughout the world." He emphasised that: "If the military are deployed in support of the police, there is a very, very good liaison" between the two.[252]

180. Lieutenant General Brims informed us that outside the UK the army used baton rounds, not AEPs, for public order purposes.[253] Generic rules of engagement, which did not alter depending on the theatre, governed the use of these baton rounds outside the UK. The generic guidance has been modified for the army's use of AEPs in Northern Ireland to alter the distances from which it is safe to fire them, and if AEPs were to be authorised for use in other theatres the guidance could be expected to change accordingly.[254] In all theatres, the MoD told us, baton rounds could only be used where there was no other less forceful alternative to prevent violent disorder.[255] We were also told that trials had yet to be conducted to confirm acceptable performance of AEPs in climatic extremes outside the UK.[256] Given the evidence we have heard about the diminished risks of injury arising from the use of AEPs in comparison with previous versions of baton rounds, we recommend that the army should actively consider switching to a practice of use of AEPs in public order situations outside the UK.

181. The use of AEPs in Northern Ireland raises clear human rights concerns in principle. We are of the view that use of AEPs against individual aggressors in riot situations, but not for riot control purposes, can be justified in human rights terms as a proportionate response to serious violence which threatens the lives of police or the public. Use of AEPs, both generally and in individual cases of firing, should continue to be subject to close scrutiny to ensure that these conditions are met. It is important that there is clarity and consistency in the guidelines which apply to use of AEPs in Northern Ireland by the police and the army. We also consider that there is a case to strengthen the guidelines to clarify that AEPs should only be used in circumstances where live fire could otherwise be used.

Investigations into use of AEPs by the army

182. A further issue relates to the accountability of the army for the use of AEPs in Northern Ireland. The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland investigates every use of AEPs by the PSNI in Northern Ireland, but the remit of the Police Ombudsman does not extend to the actions of the army in Northern Ireland and there is no equivalent body which routinely investigates each use of AEPs by the army, although an Independent Assessor of Military Complaints Procedures has been appointed and has published a report on the firing of plastic bullets by the army.[257] Members of the public may complain to the independent assessor where they feel that their complaint has not been adequately dealt with through the army's internal procedures, but in practice it appears that complaints have not been brought.[258]

183. Shaun Woodward MP in oral evidence considered that there was an arguable case for the remit of the Police Ombudsman to be extended to investigate the use of AEPs by the army in Northern Ireland,[259] while acknowledging that ultimately this was a matter for the MoD to consider. We recommend that consideration be given to extending the Police Ombudsman's remit in this way.

238 Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 17 November 1998, A/54/44 Back

239 Concluding Observations, op. cit., para 3(a) Back

240 Plastic Bullets: A human rights perspective, page 13 Back

241 Q 204 Back

242 Ev 110-138, Plastic Bullets: A human rights perspective, Sept 2005, table pp. 3-5 Back

243 Ibid., pp. 5-11 Back

244 NIHRC/Omega Foundation Report for the NIHRC, March 2003 Back

245 Northern Ireland Policing Board, Report on the Policing of the Ardoyne Parades 12 July 2005 and the Whiterock Parade 10 September 2005, Keir Starmer QC and Jane Gordon, December 2005 Back

246 Ibid., paras 82-83 Back

247 Op cit., para 249 Back

248 Q 188 Back

249 Para 2(4)(a) Back