Examination of Witness (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
CHARLES CLARKE
MP
24 OCTOBER 2005
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen and thank you for coming to meet with us, Home Secretary.
This is the first of two evidence sessions in the initial phase
of our inquiry into counter-terrorism policy and human rights.
We are examining the human rights implications of the legislative
and non-legislative measures proposed by the government since
the bombings of 7 July and the attempted bombings of 21 July in
London. We are not investigating the events of those days or the
shooting of Mr de Menezes the following day, 22 July. Nevertheless,
for the avoidance of doubt, I should make clear at the outset
to our witnesses and to the press and public that discussion of
those events is in any event prevented by the sub judice
rules of both Houses. These rules prevent discussion in Parliament
of cases which are actually before the courts, including the Coroner's
courts. The aim of the rules is to safeguard the right to a fair
trial or a fair consideration of events at an inquest. It is also
important that Parliament and the courts give mutual recognition
to their respective roles and do not interfere in each other's
affairs. In addition to the matters I have already mentioned,
the sub judice rules apply to the actual case studies set
out in the briefing note submitted by Assistant Commissioner Hayman
to the Home Secretary on 6 October and other active criminal or
civil proceedings. It follows that there should be no discussion
of those cases and I will intervene if necessary to ensure the
sub judice rules are not broken. I hope everybody understands
why we cannot get into the detail of some of the things that have
been particularly in the news. Perhaps I could start, Home Secretary,
by asking you a general question and put the general point that
we very clearly recognise that the state is under various positive
obligations to take effective measures to protect the safety and
security of people within the jurisdiction against the threat
of terrorist attack and to bring the perpetrators to justice.
We also welcome your statements that in taking such measures the
government intends to comply with all of its international human
rights obligations. Can we also proceed on the basis that you
are in complete agreement with the declaration of the UN Security
Council, echoed by the Committee of Ministers at the Council of
Europe, that states must ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism complies with all their obligations under international
law, in particular, international human rights, refugee and humanitarian
law?
Mr Clarke: Yes.
I very much appreciate being invited to give evidence before the
Committee and before your chairmanship. We have had a number of
very good sessions and I am looking forward to continuing that
in this session of Parliament. I think the role of the Committee
is very important as we try and address these very difficult questions.
The short answer to your question is yes. I think it is important
that any legislation that we propose is consistent with both the
European Convention of Human Rights and also human rights law
in general. In terms of the United Nations, the declaration of
the Security Council in September of this year on terrorism I
think was a very powerful and important document which I subsequently
discussed with Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United
Nations, about how we could work to take it forward. I think the
best way to protect our human rights in this country is by ensuring
we take measures of the type that I am putting before Parliament.
Q2 Chairman: Can I go on to refer
to your speech to the European Parliament when you made a number
of proposals for countering the terrorist threat? You accepted
it was incumbent on the government, because we are advocating
change, to make the case that measures will in fact make a practical
difference. Do you accept that the same onus rests on the government
to demonstrate to the Parliament here that the necessity for the
measures it is proposing, for example in relation to the creation
of new criminal offences, by identifying the gaps in the law which
exist and providing evidence to demonstrate that the law's protection
against terrorism is inadequate?
Mr Clarke: I do accept that. In
fact, much of the current law that is proposed and has had its
first reading and will be debated in the Commons next Wednesday
of this week is designed to make our law compliant with the Council
of Europe proposals in relation to terrorism. The arguments, for
example, are clearly that if we are going to get to prosecution
of cases then offences such as acts preparatory to terrorism need
to be brought within the remit of the law. I very much accept
what you say. There is however quite an important qualification
to put into that, which is that we are working all the time to
prevent acts of terrorism and acts of terrorism succeeding, proving
that a particular legislative measure or a particular clause in
a Bill or a particular power is the single thing which has prevented
a particular event or proposed attack taking place. It is not
always easy and I do argue that there is a range of measures which
are needed to make it more difficult for terrorists and more easy
for us to protect our society. The basic test ought to be necessity,
as you implied in your question. I should say in candour that
proving necessity, which is a very strong word, in relation to
any particular measure is never easy.
Q3 Chairman: Can I ask you what assessment
you have made of the risk of tougher measures being counterproductive
in terms of perhaps pushing people towards those who would evilly
wish to recruit people for terrorist activities?
Mr Clarke: We have made a great
deal of assessment of that particular question. We have worked
closely with the Muslim community in particular in this context
but more generally the faith communities in order to try and ensure
that, in so far as we can achieve it, the measures that we propose
could not lead to any generalised counter reaction. I believe
that is true of the measures that we are proposing, that they
do not lead to a counter reaction of any type which would make
it more difficult for us to protect ourselves against terrorists
and extremists who by definition are a very small minority within
a wider community. The same applies when one is talking about
a particular event or a particular situation. I answered the question
first with reference to the generality of proposed legislation
but of course, when you come to a specific measure as well, it
is very important to have in mind precisely the balance of considerations
that you have just stated. I have discussed in length with the
police that particular qualification and both they and the prosecutors
and others are exactly of the view that the balance that you set
out in your question is something that has to be in mind at the
time that any particular measure is proposed under this proposed
legislation or indeed under current legislation as well.
Q4 Chairman: Earlier this month there
was some speculation in the press that the government would consider
departing from the Human Rights Act, either through an amendment
to the Act or derogating, if it was found that the new proposals
were not compliant. Would you like to comment on whether in fact
that is what the government's intention is?
Mr Clarke: It is not what the
government's intention is. What we are doing—I said this
in the speech to the European Parliament which you referred to
a second ago as well—is seeking to inquire whether the jurisprudence
which has emerged, in particular the Chahal case, in the
European Court, is the jurisprudence which reflects the modern
situation in the best possible way. To that event, we have joined
a case which is taking place between an Algerian and the Dutch
Government in front of the European Court, with the agreement
of the Dutch Government, to ask the European Court to look again
at the Chahal judgment and how it would operate—I
emphasise not to withdraw from the Convention or to amend the
Convention or any other legal step of that kind, but to ask the
Court to reconsider its view on the Chahal judgment in
the light of the current circumstances. I am delighted to say
that a number of other European governments have also joined that
case to make the same request so I hope that in the reasonably
near future the European Court will consider whether the jurisprudence
which took place and concluded with the Chahal judgment,
you will recall by I think a 12:7 vote in the Court at that time
on that particular case, should be relooked at in the current
circumstances. I think that is the best way to proceed as far
as the European Court is concerned. It is also the case that we
are pursuing memoranda of understanding with a number of governments
with a view to providing a secure return to a particular country
without threat of violating Article 3 of the European Human Rights
Convention. I think agreements have already been concluded. I
hope more will be concluded. I hope the courts in this country
and ultimately the European Court will give due weight to such
agreements when they are made in looking at any particular case,
but of course the judges must independently make their own decision
in relation to that. The only generalised observation I would
make is that it seems to me important that when everybody, whether
it is politicians, lawyers, the media, whoever, looks at these
appalling cases and decisions that have to be made they also look
at it taking regard of the strong commitment of citizens throughout
this country that human rights apply also to the person travelling
on the underground to work, as they do to a person charged in
relation to a legal process. All those rights need to be taken
into account. I believe that the courts understand that very well
and will operate accordingly.
Q5 Lord Campbell of Alloway: I wholly
approve, if I may say so, and accept what you said about the attitude
of government to the European Court. It does not seem to me that
there is very much alternative to that if one is going to have
an effective development of the law but I wanted on that to try
and ask you a very simple question which is: what is the essence
of the gap which the clauses in this Bill are proposed to deal
with? Leave aside internet evidence. Leave aside evidence obtained
by torture which other Members of the Committee will no doubt
speak about. What is the essence of the need, on the assumption
that the measures taken are broadly compliant with the human rights
requirements?
Mr Clarke: The core of the Bill
from the point of view at which you ask the question is in clauses
five to eight, those dealing with preparation of terrorist acts,
training for terrorism, powers of forfeiture, attendance at places
for terrorist training. Those are the kind of measures which we
have not had explicitly in the law before that allow us to address
the circumstances which we face in certain other regards. In addition,
the proposed offences around encouragement of terrorism, effectively
clauses one and two of the Bill, make it an offence essentially
to incite terrorism in a variety of different circumstances. The
reason for carrying that through is again to protect human rights
rather than to attack them, I would maintain. I may not have understood
your question precisely but that would be the answer as I understood
the question. Did I miss the point that you were trying to make?
Q6 Lord Campbell of Alloway: No,
that is fair enough, Secretary of State, and I understand what
you are saying. In what way is our extant law deficient in that
regard? Is it seriously deficient?
Mr Clarke: We are in a difficulty
of judgment here and it is this: it does not take very many people
working together or very many plots, if I can put it like that,
to create a very real threat for all of us, so we need where there
is a plot or a plan to commit a terrorist act to have whatever
plans we can to deal with that particular threat when it comes.
There have been occasions before 7 July and indeed after where
there have been potential attacks being prepared which we have
been able to stop, I am glad to say. It is not an enormous number
of such attacks but even a small number of such attacks is a very
material threat to our whole civilisation, as we saw on 7 July
and, to a lesser extent, 21 July. I do not wish to imply that
there is an enormous number of such cases, but I do wish to imply
that that such cases exist and we need to strengthen our law to
deal with them. We are not attacking the human rights, if this
is your question, of a very large number of people; we are talking
about a very small number of cases. The evidence we have demonstrated,
for example, on the controversial aspect of the 14 days before
charge, is of a very small number of cases being involved at that
point.
Q7 Lord Campbell of Alloway: What
I find it difficult to identify is where the extant law is deficient
and would be substantially improved by the proposals in this Bill.
We have a conspiracy law. I will not go through the panoply of
the laws but the extant law broadly speaking, properly applied,
is said to be—it seems to me to be so—broadly satisfactory,
apart from the concessions I have made.
Mr Clarke: I understand the concessions
you have made. I have tried to answer. I obviously have not answered
to your satisfaction. When we talk about preparing terrorist acts,
that is quite explicitly an offence which we name, which is not
included in the current legislation. Training for terrorism, clause
six of the Bill: a person commits an offence if he provides instruction
or training in any of the skills mentioned in subsection (3) and
so on. There is a whole set of issues. These are things which
are not in the current law which we are proposing be included
in the current law. I may not have understood you completely correctly.
If you then ask is this a substantial group of people caught in
this—let us give another example—attendance at a place
used for terrorist training. If somebody goes to a place used
for terrorist training, at the moment that is not of itself a
breach of the law of this country. We are proposing that it should
be a breach of the law of this country.
Q8 Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I want
to cover some specifics on the glorifying of terrorism. I think
we quite understand what you have said about the parts dealing
with acts preparatory to terrorism and the need for new offences.
I appreciate that you have improved the position since the draft
Bill by making glorification of terrorism dependent upon direct
or indirect incitement to terrorism. I think the Committee still
has some concerns, first of all, about the necessity for Clause
1 and the related clauses about proscription. So far as the existing
criminal offences are concerned, they seem to us to be very wide.
I will not go through them now. It may be not convenient for you
to answer my question right now but perhaps you could write to
us. We cannot see exactly what the gap is on glorification that
needs to be filled by the new offences.
Mr Clarke: I am happy to write
if my answer is not satisfactory to the question you put, but
my understanding is very clear. It is that at the moment the law
outlaws incitement to commit a particular terrorist act. If you
say, "Please will you go and blow up a tube train on 7 July
in London?" I believe the current law deals with that particular
situation. If however the law simply says, "We think blowing
up tube trains is a good thing" for the sake of argument,
or, "We encourage everybody to go and blow up tube trains"
or, "We encourage a particular group of people to go and
blow up tube trains", that is not of itself currently incitement
in terms of the current legislation, as I understand it. The purpose
of Clause 1 of the Bill is to outlaw and make illegal that generalised
incitement to terrorist acts of that type. I think that is a very
reasonable thing to do. Why? Because I think that there are forces
that exist who seek to draw people, like some of the people who
committed those acts on 7 July, into their web, as it were, by
inciting or glorifying terrorism in general rather than by inciting
people to commit a particular act. It is that difference between
the general incitement and/or glorification rather than the specific
act which I believe this clause of the Bill is designed to address.
Q9 Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Could
I then ask how on earth we can secure reasonable legal certainty
in the definition? The definition at the moment is, I am sure
you will agree, extraordinarily broad because it talks about glorifying
the commission or preparation, whether in the past, in the future
or generally, of the offences and then glorification includes
any form of praise or celebration. If you take the old ANC problem,
for example, if I were to make a speech publicly saying, "I
admire the ANC for the armed struggle during apartheid and I would
now say that there are other situations in the world where democracy
has completely failed and where the only alternative is the armed
struggle", as I read it, I would be committing a serious
criminal offence punishable by seven years' imprisonment. How
do we enable the citizen to know with reasonable certainty what
statements of that kind are or are not criminal?
Mr Clarke: It was put to me by
somebody the other day that arguing for change was of itself a
breach of the legislation. I do not think that can possibly be
the case. There is no intention that that should be the case.
I do not believe the current wording allows that to be the case
in any respect whatsoever. You then come to what are the means
of change which are advanced. I will not bore the Committee with
this now but I have a view about how the world has developed in
these situations over the past 30 years which means that we can
talk about this in a slightly different way than we could 30 years
ago, simply because democracy is so much more widespread around
the world and because most of the democratic changes which have
taken place have taken place as a result of political action rather
than any kind of "military" action. If one were to say
to me, "Is blowing up a tube train, a bus or whatever in
order to achieve this change, whatever it might be, something
that is acceptable to advocate?" I would say no.
Q10 Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I
am sure we would all agree with that but my question really is
narrower than that. Would you agree with me that with serious
criminal offences there needs to be reasonable legal certainty
about what acts do or do not constitute crimes? Is it not important
therefore, if you do agree, to have a definition in Clause 1 read
with the other bits of the Bill that gives reasonable legal certainty?
Mr Clarke: In principle I certainly
agree with you. I do not mean this in a cavilling or a debating
way but there are a very wide number of legal opinions even in
these Houses of Parliament on what would or would not be a particular
offence in a whole variety of types of circumstance. There are
a whole range of legal arguments which comes in on all sides of
that argument. Would I would acknowledge to you, Lord Lester,
is that if the argument is that we can achieve greater legal certainty
by amending the legislation in a way which took us towards greater
certainty I would look at any proposals of that type. The argument
that says we somehow should not bother ourselves if people are
inciting terrorism in general and it is not really a matter which
we can define clearly enough in law; therefore we had better leave
it alone I could not associate myself with. I think it is necessary
to try and address that.
Q11 Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Can
I finally ask a question which is related to this? We are also
talking about proscribing organisations for glorifying terrorism.
Are there really quite serious free speech implications when you
close down an organisation which has a political mission that
may include an armed struggle in an evil and unspeakable country?
I do not mean bombing civilians but let us say killing members
of the military using their own guerrillas to do so, whether in
Latin America or Iran.
Mr Clarke: If the argument were
to be that it is acceptable somehow to blow up a bus in Tehran
or blow up a military post in Tehran, for the sake of argument,
I simply do not accept that. I do not think that is the way in
which change comes. If you look at a wide range of different circumstances
I can substantiate that in reality. If it is argued that glorification
or incitement to terror is a necessary concomitant of the ability
of somebody to speak freely about the process of political change
in a given part of the world, I would need that to be proved because
I do not think it is the case. I think it is perfectly possible
to argue for change in Iran without saying that terrorist acts
are the way to do it.
Q12 Baroness Stern: Can I ask you
about the definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 which
is very wide ranging? Any violence, including damage to property,
designed to influence the policy of any government anywhere in
the world. That being the definition, is it your view that anybody
who advocates political violence in any state, no matter how brutal
or repressive, will be committing the offence of encouraging terrorism?
For example, if somebody in Uzbekistan said, "Let's go and
pull down the posters of the repressive president" that is
presumably damage to property. In your view, is that advocating
political violence?
Mr Clarke: No. I do not think
pulling down posters is political violence. Blowing up a bus,
to give that example again, is political violence. I agree with
you—this is where I concede a point to Lord Lester in the
question he asked—that the question of where on this spectrum
between tearing down a poster and blowing up a bus a particular
act falls can in some circumstances be difficult. I do not think
it is as difficult as it seems. To suggest that tearing down a
poster is terrorism simply would not be substantiated by anybody
in any circumstances. To suggest that blowing up a bus is not
terrorism, on the other hand, would also be very difficult to
argue. Though I agree it is possible in this great range of potential
acts that one could conceivably describe to say there are some
in the middle of this range where there could be an area of difficulty
of judgment, I do not think most acts would have any difficulty
of definition at all.
Q13 Baroness Stern: Do you consider
that the broadness of this offence—it may not be tearing
down posters but suppose it is breaking the windows in the Ministry
of the Interior—is going to stop people discussing and debating
what to do about trying to restore democracy in oppressive regimes?
Mr Clarke: In most cases it is
a question of establishing rather than restoring democracy in
the world at the moment because the striking feature of the world
over my lifetime has been that, over whole swathes of the world,
eastern and central Europe, southern Europe, South Africa, southern
Africa, Latin America, central America, a democratic regime is
now far more commonplace than was the case 35 years ago. I certainly
think it is perfectly reasonable to have discussions about the
right way to make change in any given circumstance but then you
say to me what is my attitude to inciting changes in terrorist
methods and my attitude is against it. I think the law should
be against it.
Q14 Lord Judd: You have an onerous
responsibility to protect the people of Britain against terrorism
and that is a human rights obligation. In doing that you must
not inadvertently, it seems to me, aggravate the danger. If there
is somebody in Britain saying that the daily experience of people
in Chechnya for example is harassment, torture, brutality, disappearances,
there is plenty of evidence that this is done by state agents—you
can say acting without authority but who knows?—and who
will in that situation say, "Look, there really is no alternative;
we have to be able to do something to combat what is happening
to our people", is not the dividing line here a bit difficult?
Mr Clarke: We always find ourselves
in very difficult language about this. The language you used in
your question just now was, "do something to combat"
the evils that you describe by hypothesis and perhaps in reality
in Chechnya. There is absolutely nothing in this legislation of
any description which says that people should not do something
to combat an ill of that kind. If however you then say that it
is not just doing something to combat; it is blowing up a school
in Chechnya, for example, which is not so far from reality; do
I think that is an acceptable way for people to advocate change
in relation to Chechnya, no, I do not. I do not think blowing
up that school Bezna, whatever you say about the Russian relationship
with Chechnya, was an acceptable way for people to proceed. I
think that advocating terrorism in those circumstances, killing
children and so on, is not an acceptable way to proceed and I
think it should be outlawed.
Q15 Lord Judd: We would all agree
that to blow up a school is despicable, heinous and also politically
misguided because it is totally counterproductive in terms of
the cause which people may claim justifies it; but there are lots
of other things that people in desperation may feel they have
to do against, for example, organs of the state because of what
the organs of the state are doing to them. This is where it seems
to me you have to be very careful that you are not actually aggravating
frustration, aggravating the desperation of these people into
situations in which they can be manipulated by extremists.
Mr Clarke: I 100 per cent agree
with that and that is why I answered Mr Dismore's question in
the first tranche of questions in the way that I did. Extreme
care has to be taken using the proposed powers in this legislation
both in general—ie, the passage of legislation itself, the
way it is passed and the way it is discussed—and also in
particular when it comes to any particular proposition I agree
with you very much indeed. One of the most damaging things would
be to have any growth of frustration, alienation or whatever word
one cares to use, as a result of the application of the legislation.
I just want to make one further point, perhaps particularly for
you, Lord Judd, with your distinguished record of fighting for
democracy over many years in relation to many parts of the globe.
I do think we are dealing with a terrorism here that is qualitatively
different from the anticolonial, the freedom struggles, which
were in a sense the characteristic of the 20th century and were
the children of enlightenment thinking; compared to the kind of
terrorism we are now trying to address, for example, on 7/7 and
elsewhere which is not about some kind of liberation struggle,
where there has been an argument about what the appropriate tactic
might be, but is actually about the destruction of every part
of our democracy and to destroy all the advances since the enlightenment.
It is to destroy a free Parliament, a free economy, a free society
and so on.
Q16 Lord Judd: This legislation is
about action anywhere in the world.
Mr Clarke: Indeed. I simply give
the context that I think we should bear in mind the particular
form of terrorism which we are particularly trying to address
at this time.
Q17 Lord Plant of Highfield: I would
like to ask you a couple of rather specific questions about the
draft Bill. The first is to do with the role of intention and
the second is to do with the idea of danger. You have said in
the House of Commons on 20 July that you wanted to create an offence
of indirect incitement to terrorism which will enable the UK to
ratify the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.
That seems to be your aim. You also said in the same statement
on 20 July, "Indirect incitement, when it is done with the
intention of inciting others to commit acts of terrorism—that
is an important qualification—will become a criminal offence."
Given that you want to sign the Convention and your own initial
statement about the Bill that you were planning to introduce did
insist on the idea of intention—as you said yourself, it
was an important qualification—I am now rather puzzled why
in Clause 1 of the Bill there is no specific reference to intention.
As it is presently defined, the state of mind which must be proved
by the prosecution is knowledge or belief that members of the
public are likely to understand the statement as a direct or indirect
encouragement or other inducement to an act of terrorism; but
that falls far short of a requirement of a specific intention
to incite the commission of a terrorist offence. I wonder if you
could tell us exactly why this strong insistence on intention
in your 20 July statement seems to have evaporated somewhat in
the Bill. Perhaps it might be useful if I outline the second question.
In the Council of Europe Convention there is a reference to not
only intention to incite but also "causes a danger that one
or more such terrorist offences might be committed." There
is a problem I think in the sense that the idea of danger has
also ebbed away in the Bill. I wonder, firstly, why this is so
in both the intention and the danger case and, secondly, what
implications those circumstances will have for signing the Council
of Europe Convention.
Mr Clarke: That is a very interesting
pair of questions. Our assessment is that we have drawn up the
clauses in a way which enables us to implement the Convention
correctly. It is a qualification I always make and will do so
in the House as well: if there is a better wording either in the
Commons or Lords which makes this point, we are certainly happy
to look at it. There is no intent to use that word on my part
to shift the ground between 20 July when I made that statement
in the Commons to which you refer and the publication of the Bill.
As far as the requirement to show intent, our analysis is that
an absolute requirement for intent could render the encouragement
or glorification offence virtually useless, since proving that
somebody has intent, if he or she denied it, would be almost impossible.
The efficacy of the clause in those circumstances would be very
difficult. That is why we have set out the requirement that the
person publishing the statement or causing another to publish
it knows or believes or has reasonable grounds for believing that
the statement is likely to be understood as encouraging terrorism.
If there were a concern and if you are articulating a concern
that the way we have done it leads to a doubt as to whether we
could sign the Convention, I would be concerned about that but
our view is that that is not the case. I am sure that is one of
the matters we will discuss; similarly in the case of the danger
issue. It is exactly the same issue. If the court takes the view
that this test is met—that, is that the public to whom it
is addressed reasonably could have understood as an encouragement
that acknowledges that the statement has contributed to creating
a climate where such acts may be considered as legitimate to carry
out and therefore has caused a danger to the public—in those
circumstances, the question of whether or not the statements have
actually encouraged others to commit, prepare or instigate a specific
act is not relevant. It may be that distinguished lawyers might
say we have not framed this in the right way to meet the signing
of the Convention but there is absolutely no intention to do that.
The intention is to try and create a law which can be enacted
and which is consistent with the European Convention.
Q18 Lord Plant of Highfield: It is
a jolly good thing in life generally to change your mind when
you think you are wrong. Would it be fair to say that your 20
July statement saying that intention was an important qualification
was an error in a sense and that your thinking has evolved since
then; or do you think Clause 1 somehow embodies what you said
on 20 July?
Mr Clarke: In the light of your
question I shall certainly re-examine the wording of what I said
on that occasion. As I speak now, I do not feel inclined to acknowledge
any change in line because I do not think there has been but I
will certainly look at my wording carefully to see if that interpretation
could legitimately be made.
Q19 Dr Harris: Returning to Baroness
Stern's question about the breadth of the offence, given that
the definition of terrorism includes serious damage to property
and indeed the threat of such, is it the case in your view that
the sort of domestic terrorism or actions that we see from animal
rights extremists would very firmly come under the ambit of this
Bill and indeed that definition?
Mr Clarke: It is not targeted
specifically at that type of terrorism but I certainly think animal
rights terrorism is something that has to be attacked. I do think
it was a terrorist act to burn down the buildings in Oxford which
the animal rights organisations did, if that is what you are referring
to. In the case of "domestic terrorism" the blowing
up of the Nat West Tower in London was a terrorist act against
property.
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