11. Submission from The British Psychological
Society to the JCHR's inquiry into counter-terrorism policy and
human rights
The British Psychological Society welcomes the
opportunity to contribute to the inquiry by the Joint Committee
on Human Rights into the subject of counter-terrorism policy and
human rights.
Our comments will address both developments
in counter-terrorism policy in the UK since 7 July 2005, including
the measures discussed by the Prime Minister at his press conference
on 5 August 2005, and the provisions of the Terrorism Bill (as
published on 12 October 2005). We would also like to draw the
Joint Committee's attention to our previous submissions in these
areas.
We believe that our particular area of expertise
is most appropriately focused on the issues of `encouraging and
glorifying' terrorism. These issues arise in both the proposed
powers of the Home Secretary and the provisions of the draft Terrorism
Bill. We also wish to comment on the extension of the period of
detention by judicial authority.
We note that the Terrorism Bill published on
12 October 2005 (and announced by the Home Secretary, Charles
Clarke on 6 October 2005), includes several amendments from previous
versions. The original specific offence (Section 2 of the previous
draft) of "glorification of terrorism" has been deleted.
This is welcome, but we note that "glorification" remains
within the new Section 1 of the Bill. The issues of psychological
perspectives on "glorification", "intent",
"incitement" and "encouragement" therefore
remain worthy of discussion.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Psychology has a wealth of evidence regarding
processes of persuasion and social influence (e.g. Cialdini, 2001).
A critical conclusion from this literature is that influence is
not purely in the hands of the source or promulgator of information.
Rather, the potential for influence lies in the nature of the
relationship between the source and target, and in the wider context
within which the relationship exists (Abrams & Hogg, 1990).
THE TERRORISM
BILL
The offences listed in the provisions of the
Terrorism Bill are very broad and cover issues that can clearly
be distinguished in psychological terms.
The list:
Encouragement of terrorism
1 Encouragement of terrorism
2 Dissemination of terrorist publications
(3 Application of ss 1 and 2 to internet activity
etc.)
(4 Giving of notices under s 3)
Preparation of terrorist acts and terrorist training
5 Preparation of terrorist acts
6 Training for terrorism
(7 Powers of forfeiture in respect to offences
under s 6 )
8 Attendance at a place used for terrorist
training
Offences involving radioactive devices and materials
and nuclear facilities and sites
9 Making and possession of devices or materials
10 Misuse of devices or material and misuse
and damage of facilities
11 Terrorist threats relating to devices, materials
or facilities
12 Trespassing etc. on civil nuclear sites
covers five psychologically different issues:
Acts (items 9, 10, 11, and 12), Preparation, training or practical
support for such acts (items 2—in part, 5, 6, and 8) , Encouragement
of acts through the dissemination of publications or otherwise
(items 1 and 2—in part) and Glorification of terrorism (elements
of items 1 and 2).
We wish to make a number of points specifically
relating to issues 1 and 2.
In general terms, many of the terms used in
the draft Bill are either vaguely defined or have multiple meanings.
Observers may well disagree as to the meaning of terms such as
"encourage", "incite", "glorify"
and even "information". In particular, for psychologists,
terms such as "encouragement" or "incitement"
refer to the speaker's intentions and to the likely or possible
effects of statements on the audience. It is very difficult to
judge—and certainly to judge beyond reasonable doubt—what
a person intended and what the effects of any statements may be.
When the known disputes (even at the level of the United Nations)
about the definition of "terrorism" itself are also
considered, the possibility for judicial inconsistency is great.
DISSEMINATION OF
INFORMATION VS
ENCOURAGEMENT
The draft Bill, as it stands, deals with two
different issues in Section 2—the provision of information
and the encouragement of terrorism. Thus, Section 2(2)b deals
with "information of assistance in the commission or preparation"
etc, whereas Section 2(2)a deals with "direct or indirect
encouragement". These should be separated.
The elements of Section 2 that deal with dissemination
of information as encouragement and glorification—subject
to our other caveats below—should be clearly distinguished
from those elements of Section 2 that deal with dissemination
of information of practical utility. These two issues are different
in psychological terms.[82]
ENCOURAGEMENT AND
GLORIFICATION
The issues of "encouragement" and
"glorification" of terrorism are essentially psychological.
These are combined in Section 1 as a single offence, (we presume),
because they are believed materially to increase the likelihood
of terrorist acts being committed. They are, therefore, psychological
in their mode of action—they are offences because of the
psychological effect they might have on others. Encouragement
and glorification are, however, very different from each other.
Encouragement
Psychological evidence on social influence (Cacioppo
& Petty, 1986) and older work on obedience and conformity
(Asch, 1951, Milgram, 1974) suggests that social pressure from
peers or by figures of authority—may sometimes increase
the probability of conformity to an instruction or group norm,
even when this is antisocial or involves negative behaviour. The
boundary between "instruction" and "encouragement"
is a fine one. If a group opinion leader says "I think we
should" do something, that is likely to be adopted as a norm,
and to be a "prescriptive" norm (see Cialdini, 2001,
also Abrams, Marques, Bown & Henson, 2000). Personal relationships
between the encourager and the actor (House, 1981) and the personal
authority of the encourager (Milgram, 1974) are also highly pertinent.
"Encouragement" per se, however,
is not guaranteed to lead to a particular act being committed
(we know that encouragement to give up smoking does not lead to
a smoke-free nation). This is especially true if the encouragement
comes from a minority source (e.g. one person advocating extremist
action in the context of the wider peer group resisting such action).
The fact that influence from groups has much more impact than
influence from lone individuals suggests that convicting individuals
may be extremely difficult because, if they have been at all effective,
they will have had the support of others, and therefore would
be highly unlikely to be solely responsible for the encouragement.
Psychologists would argue that such encouragement
is a relatively weak, and certainly indirect, influence on final
behaviour. Given the complexities of defining the mechanism that
makes attempted encouragement actually encouraging, the decision
to outlaw "encouragement" seems likely to be almost
impossible to implement on a reasonable basis.
As well as the considerable variability in individual
skills at persuasion, group-based norms, and individuals' vulnerability
to persuasion, psychology has identified a large number of perceptual
and decision stages that will be required before a potentially
encouraging source of influence causes a person to act in a particular
way. General statements of encouragement—in the contexts
of widespread public condemnation of terrorism—are likely
to very ineffectual, and indeed may even have the reverse effect
(as attested to by research on thought suppression—Bargh,
1992).
It follows that caution should be exercised
if an offence of "encouragement" is to be retained.
Moreover, in such a case, it follows that care should be taken
to ensure that "encouragement" refers to a direct communication
to a potential actor, and that the communication must have a specific
and explicit goal. If a clause such as Section 1(1)b were to be
retained, therefore, it should be amended to remove the words
"or indirect"—to leave the issue of direct communication
alone.
Intent
The issue of intent (which we believe is also
commented upon by other respondents) is important here. In psychological
terms, as outlined above, there is a clear difference between
general, indirect statements—the impact of which on a potential
actor could only be via their attitudes and beliefs concerning
(in this case) terrorism, and specific, direct, statements to
a potential actor—the impact of which could indeed alter
their behaviour.
In addition to focusing Section 1 on "direct"
encouragement, therefore, the British Psychological Society welcomes
the fact that Section 1 of the draft Bill includes the requirement
that, for an offence to be committed, the person must "know
or believe, or have reasonable grounds for believing, that members
of the public to whom the statement is or is to be published are
likely to understand it as a direct [...] encouragement or other
inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts
of terrorism or Convention offences" (grammar changed and
"or indirect" deleted).
We are not lawyers, and therefore do not know
whether this wording constitutes a test of "intent".
Psychologically, however the twin issues of a "direct"
communication in the "knowledge or belief" that the
recipient will understand this to be an encouragement to action
are important. We recommend that the Bill be drafted to ensure
such a distinction between the expression of (contemptible) views
to a general audience and the intentional and direct encouragement
of terrorist acts. In addition, however, we assume that the purpose
is to refer to an expectation on the part of the communicator
that the act of encouragement or persuasion would actually be
effective. A person who makes a highly controversial speech may
do so more to provoke a counter reaction from their enemies than
to encourage specific acts among followers or other members of
their own groups.
Glorification
The justification for outlawing "glorification"
(in Section 1(2)a and elsewhere) is understandable, but in psychological
terms is meaningless without a proper context.
Whereas encouragement is a direct communication
to a potential actor, "glorification" is an indirect
communication. It is fair to say that "glorification"
may (or is intended to) alter the collective or individual belief
systems or attitudes of other people such that the resulting change
in their views concerning terrorism may increase the likelihood
of the acts being committed. Again, psychological science (especially
the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour) tells us
that the adoption of certain attitudes does indeed make some acts
more likely. However, this is only true if these attitudes are
held more strongly than counterveiling attitudes and there are
no stronger sources of influence from social norms, and there
are sufficiently weak practical barriers to action.
Therefore, there are very important caveats
here. The linkage of actions covered by this Bill to terrorist
acts is tenuous. Thus, acts (9-12) are directly associated with
terrorism. Preparation for such acts (5-8) is clearly closely
allied to the acts themselves. Encouragement, even direct encouragement,
is one further stage removed. Glorification is further removed
still. Glorifying (exalting or celebrating) terrorism does not
impact on a potential actor directly—in the manner that
encouragement can. Importantly, the same words, phrases or images
may glorify (and potentially encourage) emulation by people who
already sympathise with the perpetrator's values and goals, but
may result in rejection and opposition from those who do not.
Therefore, a critical issue is not just the content, but also
the intergroup context within which a supposedly glorifying episode
takes place (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). In addition, glorification
of one's own group does not necessarily imply hostile acts towards
others (Brewer, 1993, Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Therefore,
it could be argued that exalting terrorists does not necessarily
imply any specifiable inducement of others to engage in terrorist
acts. Without the personal and authoritative links that would
render the behaviour of the individual "direct" "encouragement"
as outlined above, psychological science would strongly suggest
that glorification of terrorism would merely add to the generality
of public views on terrorist acts that would be a partial influence
on behaviour. It would be extremely difficult to establish any
direct or unalterable causal link to acts of terrorism.
For these reasons, the British Psychological
Society strongly welcomes the Home Secretary's decision to delete
earlier Section 2 from the draft Bill.
However, several points remain. First, Section
1(1)b(ii) should be amended to refer only to `direct' encouragement
(and the same issue should be addressed elsewhere in the Bill—Section
1(2), Section 2(2)a, Section 2(3), Section 2(4), Section 3(7)a,
Section 3(8)). Second, we would wish to ensure that the term "glorification"
does not appear anywhere in the Bill (Section 1(2)a and 1(2)b,
Section 2(4)a and 2(4)b, Section 3(8)a and 3(8)b, Section 20(2),
Section 21).
EXTENSION OF
PERIOD OF
DETENTION BY
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Section 23 of the Bill extends the period of
detention for terrorist suspects without charge to three months.
In previous submissions in regard to anti-terrorism provisions,
the British Psychological Society (2004) commented on the potentially
damaging consequences of both indeterminate detention and the
nature of any interrogation or treatment experienced during detention
on detainees' mental health. While we recognise the distinction
between indeterminate detention and the provision of a three-month
period of detention by judicial authority, the British Psychological
Society is also concerned to protect the health of people thus
detained. The Joint Committee may wish further to consider the
appropriateness of this period, and may wish to consider whether
legal provisions and practical safeguards are necessary to protect
the mental health of detainees.
ADDITIONAL MATTERS
(I) HOME
SECRETARY'S
POWERS OF
EXCLUSION OR
DEPORTATION
In the Prime Minister's press conference on
5th August 2005 the grounds for the exercise of the Home Secretary's
powers of exclusion or deportation were described as:
"The new grounds will include fostering
hatred, advocating violence to further a person's beliefs, or
justifying or validating such violence."
The psychological issues pertaining to `fostering,
advocating justifying or validating' violence echo those relating
to "encouraging and glorifying" terrorism above.
(II) DEPORTATION
OF NON-UK
NATIONALS SUSPECTED
OF TERRORISM
ON THE
BASIS OF
DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES
The British Psychological Society is unambiguously
opposed to torture in all forms. We have recently adopted a declaration
repudiating torture and the involvement of psychologists in torture.
We therefore cannot condone the possibility that non-UK nationals
might be deported to countries where they may be at risk of torture
and other abuses of human rights.
We note that the Prime Minister commented that
"The assurances given by the receiving nation are adequate
for their courts, and these countries are also of course subject
to the European Convention on Human Rights and apply it directly
in their own law."
Non-Governmental Organisations report routine
human rights abuses in a number of the countries at issue. In
many cases these abuses are perpetrated by junior officials and
this may well occur without the direct and specific instigation
of the Head of Government. We recommend that the Joint Committee
examines closely the mechanisms proposed by which those countries
will ensure that individual persons deported from the UK will
not in fact be tortured.
There are practical psychological reasons for
questioning whether torture would serve any useful intelligence
purpose. Arrigo (2004), among other comments, pointed out that
up to 95% of the victims of torture fail to comply with the demands
of the torturer under even the most extreme pressure, and there
are convincing psychological reasons to believe that the practical
effectiveness of torture has been much over-emphasised—the
justifications for torture being more likely to be revenge on
the one hand and an instinctive desire to do `all one can' in
the face of a terrorist threat.
For all these reasons, the UK Government should
avoid all temptations to permit any person to be under any threat
of torture.
(III) THE
MEASURES ANNOUNCED
BY THE
PRIME MINISTER
AT HIS
PRESS CONFERENCE
ON 5 AUGUST
The British Psychological Society has less to
comment in these respects.
We note that the Prime Minister stated that
"anyone who has participated in terrorism, or has anything
to do with it anywhere will be automatically refused asylum in
our country". We note that the phrase "has anything
to do with it anywhere" is extremely loose, and hope that
the procedures themselves will be much tighter.
We do not feel particularly well qualified to
comment on other aspects of the Prime Minister's statement.
(IV) INTERCEPT
EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
Although interesting, the British Psychological
Society does not feel qualified to comment in detail in respect
to these proposals. We agree with other commentators who have
stressed the importance of any evidence in criminal cases being
open to being tested in court.
(V) A JUDICIAL
ROLE IN
THE INVESTIGATION
OF TERRORIST
CRIMES
Although interesting, the British Psychological
Society does not feel qualified to comment in detail in respect
to these proposals.
(VI) THE
OVERALL SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL
CONTEXT IN
WHICH HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS
ARE UNDERSTOOD
AND APPLIED
BY THE
COURTS, THE
GOVERNMENT AND
OTHERS, AND
IN WHICH
THE REQUIREMENTS
OF SECURITY
ARE RECONCILED
WITH THOSE
STANDARDS
As we have stated elsewhere (British Psychological
Society, 2004), we believe that a commitment to the promotion
and protection of Human Rights should be a priority for government.
Psychological science offers a valid basis for the consideration
of Human Rights (Kinderman, 2001; Doise, 2003). From this perspective,
human rights are seen as normative social representations embedded
in institutional juridical definitions—the codification
of how we collectively understand our relationships and obligations
to each other.
In this context, we believe that it is reasonable
to expect some limitations on freedom in return for security—such
compromises appear part of everyday life and seem entirely consistent
with ordinary interpersonal relationships. However, it is fair
to say that such limitations would be appropriate if they are
proportional to the threat or danger involved. From a psychological
perspective, it is important that the provisions such as those
in the draft Terrorism Bill are perceived as proportionate to
the threat.
Moreover, people actively appraise their personal
circumstances, developing and testing "models" of the
world (eg Johnson-Laird, 1985). They do not act as automata, but
actively formulate individual evaluative belief systems. When
discussing the perceived proportionality of the security response
to threats of terrorism in respect to personal liberty, it is
necessary not only that this proportionality is objectively established,
or established in the opinion of the security services and politicians,
but is also that the general public understand and accept that
such a case for proportionality has been made.
In respect to both the UK population and the
world community, one final psychological issue is to consider
how any UK legislation and extra-legislative procedures will be
interpreted by others. For legislation to be effective it has
to be seen to be fair. Great care needs to be taken to ensure
that consensually valued principles of fair procedure (regardless
of outcomes) are applied equally to potential terrorists and to
others. If a particular group feels that unfair procedures are
applied uniquely to them, it is highly likely that they will become
resentful, disgruntled and potentially seek to overturn the procedures
by legitimate or illegitimate means (Tyler and Blader, 2002; Wright
& Taylor, 1998). Commentators have suggested that some communities
(especially black and minority ethnic communities, Muslim and
other faith communities and Asian, East African, Arab and other
Muslim countries, etc) feel under attack at present. It has been
commented that some measures intended to address terrorism in
Northern Ireland in the early 1970s may have acted as a "recruiting
sergeant" for armed groups. We would hope that the Government
has conducted a psychologically-informed "cost / benefit
analysis", weighing up the likelihood of these measures reducing
the risk of terrorism versus increasing people's sense of injustice
and thus increasing the likelihood of radicalisation.
24 October 2005
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82 McKnight, Sechrest and McKnight (2005) recommend
that psychologists should avoid comment on matters of political
policy or opinion in the absence of direct evidence from psychological
science. For this reason, although there are many legal and civil
rights issues about the legal powers in relation to issues 5-12
which will be of great interest to psychologists who work with
the victims of abuses of human rights and which have a psychological
dimension, the British Psychological Society believes that these
are issues best commented upon by others at present. Back
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