Joint Committee On Human Rights Written Evidence

14.  Submission from Human Rights Watch on the Draft Terrorism Bill

"But let us be clear about this: while the State has the right to employ to the full its arsenal of legal weapons to repress and prevent terrorist activities, it may not use indiscriminate measures which would only undermine the fundamental values they seek to protect."—Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General, Council of Europe[92]


  Human Rights Watch condemns all acts of terrorism as a direct assault on the fundamental values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.[93] However it is precisely in the aftermath of such atrocities as the London bombings in July that the strength of these values is tested, and the greatest vigilance is required. In order to preserve those values, it is vital that any new measures proposed in the legitimate fight against terrorism must fully respect international human rights standards.

  This briefing considers the draft Terrorism Bill published on 15 September 2005. It is a preliminary briefing to assist members of those parliamentary Committees considering the measures prior to a final Bill being formally introduced. As it is only a preliminary briefing we concentrate on offences criminalizing free expression (clauses 1 and 2) and the proposal for extending pre-charge detention (clauses 19 and 20).

  These far-reaching provisions are to be introduced in the fifth major piece of anti-terrorist legislation in five years. The offences of "provocation" (cl.1) and "glorification" (cl.2) criminalize speech-related conduct that is only peripherally connected to acts of terrorism. Human Rights Watch is of the opinion that these offences are neither necessary nor adequately defined, thereby posing a significant breach of the fundamental right of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). At the same time we consider that the extended detention period before charge of up to three-months is wholly arbitrary and disproportionate, not justified on the evidence and is likely to be as counter-productive as internment was in Northern Ireland.

  Human Rights Watch takes the view that the full integration of all citizens and residents into society is an important long-term prophylactic against radicalization. That depends upon an open debate, tolerance and full respect for universal human rights and the rule of law. Measures that breach human rights norms may deliver short-term security, but in the long-term, they are likely to erode confidence among minority communities, undermining their willingness to cooperate with the police and security service, and creating a fertile ground for messages of hate.In making these submissions we have taken account of a number of international instruments relating to human rights and anti-terrorist measures. These include the 1995 Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,[94] the 2002 Council of Europe's Guidelines on human rights and the fight "against terrorism,[95] and United Nations Security Council resolution 1456, which emphasizes that—

    States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.[96]

  Our analysis reflects the United Kingdom's obligations under international human rights law, as enumerated in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It also takes into account the four guiding principles set out by Lord Lloyd in his review of anti-terrorism legislation published in 1996, which remain highly relevant when assessing new legal measures in this area.[97]


  Human Rights Watch has serious concerns about the proposed new criminal offence contained in clause 1 of the bill. Clause 1 makes it an offence for a person to publish a statement when he or she "knows or believes, or has reasonable grounds for believing" that members of the public to whom the statement is published are likely to understand it as a "direct or indirect" encouragement or other inducement to commit a terrorist act. It carries a sentence of imprisonment of up to seven years on conviction.

  This clause is intended to implement article 5 ("public provocation to commit a terrorist offence") of the Council of Europe's Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism adopted on 3 May 2005 and signed by the UK on 16 May 2005 and signed by the UK on May 16 2005.[98] The Convention requires states parties to "adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish public provocation to commit a terrorist offence. . . when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law."[99] Under the Convention, the offence is committed when a public message "with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist act" causes a danger that such an offence may be committed.[100] The message may either directly or indirectly advocate terrorist offences.

  In so far as this covers an offence of direct incitement the UK laws are already sufficiently in place as we show below. In terms of an offence of indirect incitement the real difficulty lies in assessing where the boundary lies between this and the legitimate voicing criticism as is acknowledged in the Explanatory Report to the Convention.[101]

  In assessing this fine line, it is important to recognize the special status enjoyed by freedom of expression under the ECHR, particularly as it is seen as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of many of the other rights and freedoms. As the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has said—

    Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual's self-fulfillment.[102]

  As a consequence, any proposed restrictions must be subjected to very close scrutiny as to whether the measure is both "necessary" and "proportionate" so as to comply with the grounds on which this right may be limited under article 10(2).

  The ICCPR also requires that restrictions on free expression be shown to be "necessary."[103] In considering the limitations of free expression under the ICCPR, it is important to take note of the analysis of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the body which supervises state compliance with the treaty. In its General Comment on freedom of expression, the Committee emphasized that "when a State party imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself."[104]

Not shown to be necessary

  According to the ECtHR the question of whether a restriction on free speech is "necessary" must be convincingly established as a matter of general principle.[105] The situation is that there are a plethora of existing offences available in the context of incitement in the UK. Some are terrorist-specific such as the offence of incitement of terrorist violence made illegal under section 59 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Others are to be found in the ordinary criminal law where the offence of incitement is common—ranging from a general offence of incitement to commit an indictable offence to the offence of incitement to murder. Making linguistic changes by using "encouragement" and "inducement" rather than "incitement" does not show that the proposed new offence is necessary. Indeed, both a commonsense understanding of these words and the way in which they were variously used in the discussions preceding the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, suggests that they cover the same or sufficiently similar behavior so as to come within the existing offence of incitement under the 2000 Act. This is certainly so in relation to a direct offence of incitement.

  The government has yet to explain why existing criminal offences are not sufficient to meet the threat posed by speech which incites violence or other criminal acts. They have also not produced evidence showing how existing offences are operating in practice. In this context it is worth noting that a minister of Islam known as "Sheikh Faisal" was recently convicted of offences of soliciting murder under section 4 Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the public order offence of racial hatred. He was accused of creating a number of inflammatory audio tapes urging Muslims to fight and kill, among others, Jews, Christians, Americans, Hindus and other "unbelievers".[106] Sheikh Abu Hamza has been charged with similar offences, including solicitation to murder of non-Muslims, incitement to racial hatred.[107] Both prosecutions suggest that the law is sufficient to cover speech that incites violence.

  As the Newton Committee of Privy Counsellors noted in their review of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the difficulties with sustaining prosecutions for terrorism offences in the United Kingdom are primarily related to matters of evidence rather than the gaps in the criminal law.[108] The Newton Committee did not identify any of the proposed new "speech" offences as being necessary. In 2004, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (ICHR) reached a similar view, arguing that the evidential see above problem in terrorism prosecutions "is unlikely to be helped by the creation of still more criminal offences."[109] In evidence to the JCHR, the Director of Public Prosecutions said that there is already "an amount of legislation that can be used in the fight against terrorism" and that the existing criminal law "covers a huge swathe of activity that could be described as terrorist". It is also notable that the Home Office February 2004 consultation paper, Counter-terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society, did not itself identify a need for these new offences.

Offence lacks legal certainty

  It is a well-established principle that laws must be of such certainty and legal precision that people are able to regulate their conduct to avoid infringement. This principle of legality under article 7 ECHR is confirmed by the Commissioner for Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, in commenting on the draft article 5 [then article 4] of the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. He said that "if the Article were incorporated as it stands in the States Parties' domestic law, it would be particularly difficult to predict the circumstances in which a message would be considered as public provocation to commit an act of terrorism and those in which it would represent the legitimate exercise of the right to express and idea or voice criticism freely."[110] As a line of cases before the ECtHR confirms, this is even more important in the area of free expression where it is essential for any democracy to ensure that controversial or shocking ideas, including criticisms and points of view be neither inhibited nor prohibited.[111] We believe that this is exactly what has happened in the drafting of the offence of encouraging terrorist acts. It lacks sufficient clarity to know what behavior constitutes the offence, and thus violates the principle of legality under the ECHR.

Overly broad

  The new offence is overly broad. The breadth of the proposed offences is closely related to the definition of "terrorism" as it is this that triggers the offence in the first place. As newly defined in the Terrorism Act 2000, "terrorism" includes the use or threat of action including "serious damage to property" that is "designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public," and "made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause."[112] As written, the definition encompasses far more than obvious terrorist conduct such as participating in bombing and hijacking and could be read to apply to certain sorts of industrial action or unauthorized public demonstrations which cause significant economic loss.[113] Indeed it is so wide that on its margins it dispenses with the need for violence and focuses on such matters as creating "a serious risk to the health and safety of the public" and "actions designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system." It has therefore the potential to reach many forms of non-violent direct action as well.

No intention required

  As presently drafted it is only necessary to show that a person "knows or believes" or "has reasonable grounds for believing" that a statement is likely to be taken as an encouragement to an act of terrorism. Even putting aside the unusual, if not curious, mix of a subjective ("knows or believes") and an objective test ("has reasonable grounds for believing"), it is clear that the question of a person's specific intention is irrelevant.

  The absence of an intent requirement is contrary to article 5 of the Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism, where it is a condition that the offence of provocation be committed "intentionally" in order for criminal liability to apply.[114] It is also contrary to the ordinary requirements of criminal law that specific intent is an essential ingredient to the commission of offences considered so serious as to warrant a maximum prison sentence of seven years or more. It is incumbent on the government therefore to show why this offence is any different. Human Rights Watch considers that it is against the fundamental principles of criminal responsibility that people are at risk of losing their liberty for a substantial period not because of what they intend as to the effect that their words may have but solely because of what they believe others may make of those words. This is further emphasized by the fact that "members of the public" is defined in the Bill as including anyone in the world.[115] Without the requirement of intent, editorialists who discuss the phenomenon of terrorism in controversial terms, without having any intent of endorsing it or inducing others to engage in it, might find themselves liable because of the actions of their readers thousands of miles.

  The lack of a specific intent requirement is directly contrary to assurances from the UK government that the new offence would require intent. On 20 July 2005, the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, told Parliament: "So direct incitement, when it is done with the intention of inciting others to commit acts of terrorism—that is an important qualification—will become a criminal offence." Similarly, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, in dismissing concerns in a BBC News interview that the new offence of indirect incitement could prevent honest discussion said: "The proposal is that indirect incitement should consist of statements made with the intention of encouraging other people to commit terrorist acts."[116]

No causal link to violence required

  The other requirement for the offence of provocation in article 5 of the Convention is that the result of the statement must be to cause a danger that a terrorist act might be committed. This establishes the importance of a causal link between a statement deemed to be provocative and the act that is to be prevented. Although it is recognized that in most circumstances the prospect of violent crime is fairly remote from the act of provocation or encouragement complained of, the danger that it might be caused is the factor that ultimately justifies its criminalization.

  As presently drafted this causal link is only that "members of the public" to whom the statement is published "are likely to understand" it as an encouragement to a terrorist act. There is no need to show that any person is in fact so "encouraged" by the statement. Causality is further attenuated in that "members of the public" can include anyone in the world depending on how the statement is published.In particular the causal link in the new offence fails the imminence test as set down in the Johannesburg Principles—principles that have been endorsed and followed by many international institutions including the UN's Human Rights Committee. Principle 6 requires that there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood of such violence occurring.


  Clause 2 provides that it is an offence for a person to make a statement that "glorifies, exalts or celebrates" the commission of any terrorist act (whether in the past, in the future or generally) in circumstances where "it would be reasonable for members of the public. . . to assume that the statement expresses the views of that person". It carries a maximum term of five years imprisonment on conviction.

  This proposed offence attracts the same objections as clause 1 and, in some respects, with more force. It is again incumbent on the government to show that the offence is necessary given existing offences. These include not only the offence of incitement to terrorism (see above) but also the offence of displaying support in public for a proscribed organization under section 13 of the 2000 Act—which, in contrast to the five-year maximum prison sentence proposed for the clause 2 offence, carries a maximum sentence of six-months imprisonment.

  In its terminology this offence falls within the category of an apologie du terrorisme offence. This category of offence is addressed in a study by a working party of the Council of Europe, the ad hoc Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER).[118] The Committee set out to examine the incidence and experience of national provisions criminalizing the public expression of praise, support, and justification of terrorist crimes in order to analyze the potential risk of a restriction of fundamental freedoms. The results show that the majority of states have so far been able to do without a specific apologie du terrorisme offence, with only three countries (Denmark, France and Spain) having such a provision but arising from a general apologie to crime offence that is already integrated into their domestic law.While the subsequent Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism indudes an offence of "public provocation to commit a terrorist offence" to cover direct and indirect incitement to terrorism, it is clear from the explanatory report to the Convention that the aim of article 5 is to "make indirect incitement a criminal offence."[119] The Convention does not use the phraseology to be found in a typical apologie du terrorisme offence. There is no evidence to suggest that it requires an "apologie du terrorisme" offence. Indeed, some states parties to the Convention have explicitly understood it not to do so. The UK cannot therefore seek to rely on the Convention to justify the introduction such an offence.

  While the drafting is similarly imprecise to that of the clause 1 offence, the consequences are likely to be more serious given the difficulties with separating this kind of apologie speech and acceptable free speech. This is confirmed in responses to the CODEXTER survey mentioned above when a number of countries acknowledged that making "apologie du terrorisme" a specific crime is the more problematic because of the possibility of infringing human rights. For example, the Netherlands in its reply explicitly states that in its country "apologie du terrorisme" is not a specific criminal offence at this moment, nor is the creation of such an offence envisaged since that would seriously infringe the constitutional freedom of expression".

  Despite these problems and the qualification of the proposed offence as a serious crime by the length of the prison sentence, there is no requirement of specific intent on the part of the statement-maker. Not only is this contrary to article 5 of the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism but it is also out of line with the "apologie du terrorisme" laws in most of the few countries where it is already an offence. For example, in Spain the crime of apologie is only a crime of provocation when, by its nature and circumstances, it amounts to intended "indirect incitement", that is, a statement that is specifically intended to cause its audience to take unlawful action. The statement is considered the exercise of free expression when these conditions are not fulfilled. In Denmark the public expression of approval (including appreciation and recognition) of terrorist acts is an offence but only where it can be shown that the person intended to contribute to the execution of a concrete terrorist offence.

  Unlike clause 1, in the Government's proposal there is no attempt to create a nexus between the glorifying statement and the actual risk that an offence is likely to be committed. Those objections mentioned above therefore apply with even more force. It is highly questionable whether creating such a serious offence can ever be justified in the absence of a causal link to the act that is being sought to be prevented.

  Human Rights Watch also considers that the new offence is likely to violate the freedom of expression under the ECHR. In a series of cases, the ECtHR has held that speech criticizing democracy and calling for the imposition of Sharia law[120] or containing separatist propaganda[121] cannot legitimately be subject to restriction provided that it does not incite violence.


On the media

  Both new speech offences are likely to have an impact on the media, whether through self-censorship, or the prosecution of journalists or editors. To put it at its most obvious, it is questioned, for example, whether transmitting a statement of a terrorist as happened with one of the London bombers could fall within the offence of "encouraging or inducing" a terrorist act. This is particularly so in the absence of a specific intent requirement and with no provisions for a media defense. It could therefore mean that material that may be freely transmitted in other European countries or anywhere else in the world may be banned on UK-based broadcasting services. This was effectively the case with the Sinn Fein ban introduced in 1988 forbidding the broadcasting of statements made by members of Sinn Fein. Not only did the media render it something of a farce by using actors to speak the words instead, it also reflected extremely badly on the UK internationally. John Simpson, a journalist with the BBC, complained in 1991 that the Iraqi government was using the example of the ban to justify its own censorship.

  Whilst such an impact on the media may not be intended, it is essential that this is clarified and assurances are given both by the government and in the drafting of the offences that media reporting on terrorism will not fall foul of any of the new measures.

Chilling effect on free expression generally

  Even in the absence of any direct media restriction, the other obvious danger is that such laws have a chilling effect on free expression generally, creating self-censorship and inhibiting political discourse, including criticism of the government. Universities, schools, mosques and other places of worship are all likely to be affected by the measures. This runs directly contrary to the fact that public debates based on free and unhindered dissemination of ideas and opinions are an important way of promoting understanding and tolerance in the overall aim of preventing terrorism. And while there is little or no evidence that criminalizing such speech will deter terrorism, there is very strong evidence that it will deter free expression.

Counter productive

  In all these measures, unless it is convincingly shown that they are necessary and fair, there is a danger that the very communities whose support is needed in the fight against terrorism will be alienated. This is particularly the case for the Muslim community in the UK where previous counter-terrorism measures, including indefinite detention of foreign terrorism suspects, are regarded as having had a manifestly disproportionate impact. For example, apart from organizations related to Ireland, the majority of the groups proscribed under the 2000 Act are of Islamic origin[122] At the same time the new stop and search powers introduced by the same Act have resulted in reports of disproportionate stop and search of young Muslims. This includes a recent report from the Metropolitan Police Authority which says that current practice has created deeper racial tensions and severed valuable sources of community information and criminal intelligence.[123]


  The bill proposes that pre-trial detention without charge in terrorist cases may be extended up to three months with judicial supervision. Human Rights Watch is concerned that such an extended period of detention without even sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal charge may amount to a criminal punishment without trial, in violation of the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. It is unclear whether the arrested person will be informed promptly of the reasons for his arrest, as the ECHR requires.

  The current maximum period permitted in terrorism cases in the UK is 14 days. Originally the period was for seven days but this was extended to14 days with effect from January 2004.[124] This period was set after 30 years of UK anti-terrorism legislation, after a series of cases in the ECtHR, and after extensive parliamentary debate. Since the 14-day period came into effect, the statistics show that between 20 January 2004 and 4 September 2005, 357 people have been arrested under the relevant detention provision, of whom only 36 have been held in excess of seven days and only 11 of these being held for the full 14 days.[125] Despite such statistics showing that the present 14-day period is only rarely resorted to by the police, the current proposal is that detention can be extended to 90 days which is a six fold increase on the current period and is 30 times longer than that allowed for any other crime, including murder and drug trafficking, for example. As Human Rights Watch pointed out when the measures were first announced, this period is equivalent to the average time served for during a six-month prison sentence. As a point of comparison, one of the recently-announced measures in Australia that has been most criticized is the proposal to extend their detention period from seven to 14 days so as to bring it in line with the UK.

  The police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) have sought to justify the extension by arguing that the current limits are insufficient to investigate possible offences. It is claimed that the extension would avoid charges being amended as a result of ongoing investigations. In fact, it is common practice for charges to be reviewed based upon an assessment of the evidence and then amended.

  It is also claimed that this extra time is needed to review complex material. However the examples given of the quantity of material that has had to be investigated in certain terrorist cases including the 80,000 CCTV videos reviewed after the July attacks, could not on a simple calculation have been completed even within a three-months period. In addition to this the police cite problems of encryption, complex international networks, and possible hazardous materials. Whilst it is not doubted that these investigations take considerable time and expertise, this must be the same for major white collar fraud, drug importation offences and other organized crime especially as there is usually a similar international dimension to these crimes. No explanation has been given why an extended period of detention is necessary in order to facilitate the prosecution of terrorism offences when it is not deemed necessary for other complex investigations.

Counter productive

  The third advisory paper published with the Bill explains that the government is committed "to better understanding the process of radicalization and recruitment and tackling the focal points at which young men and women are tempted into violence." Since the majority of those held for extended periods will be Muslims, extended preventive detention has the potential to further antagonize a community who already feel that they are disproportionately affected by counter-terrorism measures. This concern will be exacerbated if the majority of those arrested are subsequently released without charged.

  A report from the Institute of Race relations indicates that hundreds of Muslims have been arrested under terrorist powers since the introduction of the 2000 Act before being released without charge. The Home Office's official statistics give further cause for concern. They show that of the 756 people arrested under the 2000 Act between 11 September 2001 and 30 June 2005, only 122 were charged with a terrorist-specific offence under the 2000 Act, 141 with other criminal offences. A total of 22 people were convicted. The measure therefore poses the very real danger of mirroring the disastrous policy of preventive detention ("internment") in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, which is now widely regarded as having served as a strong motivation for the recruitment of new members of the Irish Republican Army.

7 October 2005

92   Preface to the Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002 at the 804th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, Directorate General of Human Rights, December 2002. Back

93   See, for example, Human Rights Watch, UK: Nothing Can Justify London Bombings, 7 July 2005 [online], Back

94   Adopted on 1 October 1995 by a group of experts in international law, national security, and human rights. Back

95   Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002 at the 804th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. Back

96   UN Security Resolution 1456 (2003). Back

97   Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (Cm:3420, London 1996), para 3.1: "(i) Legislation against terrorism should approximate as closely as possible to ordinary criminal law and procedure; (ii) Additional statutory offences and powers may be justified, but only if they are necessary to meet the anticipated threat. They must then strike the tight balance between the needs of security and the rights and liberties of the individual; (iii) The need for additional safeguards should be considered alongside any additional powers; (iv) The law should comply with the UK's obligations under international human rights law." Back

98   The treaty has yet to enter into force. As of 6 October 2005, the treaty had 20 signatories, but no state had ratified the treaty. (Six ratifications are required for it to enter into force). Back

99   Council of Europe Convention on the Preyention of Terrorism, Article 5(2). Back

100   Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Article 5(1). Back

101   see para 92 [Online] Back

102   Ceylan v. Turkey 1999, para 2. Back

103   ICCPR, article 19(3). Back

104   UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 10-Freedom of expression (Art 19), 29 June 1983. Back

105   Sunday Times v UK (No 2) 1992 14 EHRR 123. Back

106   R v El-Faisal [2004]EWCA Crim 456 Back

107   Stewart Tendler, "Abu Hamza accused of inciting hate and murder," The Times (London), October 20, 2004;online], http:/,,2-1319188,00.html Back

108   Report (2003-04) HC 100) Back

109   Review of Counter-terrorism Powers, 18th Report of Session 2003-04. Back

110   Opinion of the Commissioner for Human, Rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, on the draft Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Strasbourg, 2 February 2005, BCommDH(2005)1, para 28. Back

111   See, for example, Lingens v Austria, 8 July 1986, HUDOC Ref.000000108. Back

112   Terrorism Act 2000, section I. Back

113   It is notable that protestors at the recent Labour Party conference were detained under the Terrorism Act 2000. Back

114   See also paras 80 and 99 of the Explanatory Report confirming the need for "intention". Back

115   See cl.16(3) of the Bill. Back

116   BBC News interview, 17 July 2005. Back

117   This analysis was being finalized at the time of the Home Office announcement on 6 October that the offence of "glorification" is now to be incorporated into clause 1 as a form of "indirect encouragement." This change does not, in our view, overcome the objections detailed in this section of the briefing. It has still not been shown why it is necessary to introduce an "apologie du terrorisme" offence in UK law and, contrary to some media statements, "intention" is still not required for an offence to be committed. The absence of an intent requirement means that the offence remains incompatible with the requirements of the Council on Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. Back

118   "Apologie du terrorisme" and "incitement to terrorism"-Situation in member and observer states to the Council of Europe. Back

119   Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Explanatory Report, Article 5, paragraph 98. Back

120   Muslum Gunduz v Turkey (No.1) (2003). Back

121   EKIN Association v France (2001); Okcuoglu v. Turkey (1999). Back

122   See, The Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Orders 2001 (SI 2001/1261) and 2002 (SIU 2002,2724). Back

123   Report of the Metropolitan Police Authority, "Scrutiny on MPS Stop and Search Practice", May 2004. Back

124   Criminal Justice Act 2003. Back

125   Statistics on arrests under the Terrorism Act 2000, Home Office [unpublished]. Back

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