Joint Committee On Human Rights Eighteenth Report

Annex: Human rights laws and standards in healthcare

1. The way in which older patients and care home residents are treated is not simply a healthcare standards issue, but also a human rights issue. In this Annex, we set out the applicable human rights standards deriving from common law, UK statutes and international treaties, of which the most important is the Human Rights Act 1998.

Common law principles

2. Under the common law, the state is required to treat people humanely.[376] In addition, the courts recognise a common law principle of equality.[377] The corollary of the principle of equality is the requirement not to discriminate either directly or indirectly without objective and reasonable justification. These long standing common law principles are now also embodied in human rights and equality legislation.

Human Rights Act 1998

3. The HRA, which came into force in October 2000, brings the main rights and freedoms (known as Convention rights) guaranteed by the ECHR 1950 into UK law.


4. Since the Act came into force, everyone in the UK is entitled to respect for and protection of their Convention rights. They are also able to enforce their Convention rights in the courts in the case of a breach by a public authority.[378]

5. Convention rights which are particularly important for older people in hospitals and care homes are:

—  Respect for private and family life, home and correspondence (Article 8);

—  Prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3);

—  Right to life (Article 2);

—  Enjoyment of Convention rights must be guaranteed without discrimination on any ground (Article 14).

6. We consider each of these rights in more detail below. The following rights may also be relevant to older people's experiences in hospitals and care homes, depending on their circumstances:

—  Right to liberty (Article 5);

—  Freedom of thought, religion, expression and association (Articles 9-11).

7. Some rights, like the right to life (Article 2) and freedom from degrading treatment (Article 3), are absolute, which means that they cannot be qualified or limited. Others, like the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8) and freedom of thought, religion, expression and association (Articles 9, 10 and 11), are qualified. These rights may be restricted by public authorities, provided the restriction is proportionate (the minimum necessary to achieve the justification sought), is "necessary within a democratic society," and is set out clearly in law.


8. Under the HRA, statutory bodies such as the Department of Health, inspectorates, NHS trusts and primary care trusts, hospitals, local authorities, and local authority run care homes are public authorities with obligations under the Act.[379]

9. The HRA therefore applies in general terms to the provision of health and social care services in the UK.

Private bodies exercising public functions

10. Private providers of health and residential services are considered to be public authorities when exercising "functions of a public nature."[380] There has been much judicial investigation of this provision with several test cases concerning health and social care. In 2002, a private provider of mental health care was found to be exercising functions of a public nature.[381] In the same year, however, a well-known charity managing homes for disabled people with resident's places funded by local social services was found not to be a public authority.[382] The recent decision of the House of Lords in the case of YL[383] put beyond doubt, so far as the courts are concerned, that care homes run by private companies, even where they have a contract with a local authority for placement of residents, are not, as a matter of current law, to be regarded as "public authorities" for the purposes of the HRA. We have expressed our dissatisfaction with this state of affairs in our recent Report on the meaning of public authority.[384]

11. Even where providers of residential care services have been judicially determined not to be within the scope of the HRA, the residents of those care homes are still entitled to the protection of their human rights. This raises a question about whether the Government has provided an "effective remedy" under human rights law for people in this situation as required by Article 13 ECHR.[385]


12. Under the HRA, it is unlawful for any public authority to "act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right".[386] This means that public authorities have to take Convention rights into account in relation to all of their functions, including the provision of public services to individual users.

Positive obligations

13. Although not discernible on the face of the HRA, public authorities also have positive obligations under the Convention. These duties may require public authorities to do more than merely avoid breaching people's human rights. Article 1 of the ECHR requires States to 'secure [the ECHR rights] to everyone within the jurisdiction'. Although the government did not incorporate Article 1 into the HRA, this Article remains an obligation under the Convention and has been reinforced by decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and, since the HRA came into force, decisions of the UK courts. This means that public authorities have an additional responsibility, in certain circumstances, to take reasonable measures to protect people's rights.

14. These positive obligations may have implications for law and policy. For example, the European Court of Human Rights required the UK to have laws in place that sufficiently protected children from excessive corporal punishment in breach of Article 3.[387] Similarly, the European Court held that Article 8 was breached where a 16 year old woman with a mental disorder, and her father acting on her behalf, were both prevented from lodging a criminal complaint in respect of a carer who sexually assaulted her. The court stated "this is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal law provisions."[388]

15. There may also be a duty in practice to "take effective operational steps to guard against […] ill-treatment."[389] For example, the state has a legal duty under Article 2 (right to life) which may require the police or other authorities to take reasonable steps to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of others[390] and to protect the public from environmental hazards which threaten life.[391] To take a more recent example, the probation service had a duty under Article 2 to take reasonable steps to protect the public from the risk created by the release of the prisoner, Anthony Rice, a convicted rapist serving a life sentence. As was noted in the recent review conducted by (what was then) the Department for Constitutional Affairs "there seems to be insufficient recognition that the prison, parole and probation services are themselves subject to a positive obligation under the Human Rights Act to take proper steps to protect the public from dangerous criminals such as Rice."[392]

16. The requirement for public authorities to take action to protect people's human rights can also arise in less high profile cases, which nevertheless have a significant effect on the quality of people's lives. In Bernard v London Borough of Enfield[393] the court held that the local authority was in breach of Article 8 ECHR having failed to provide suitable accommodation to a severely disabled woman and her family within a reasonable period of time.

17. The state and its agencies may have positive obligations to take action in relation to the acts of private individuals to protect the human rights of one individual from infringement by another. As the European Court of Human Rights stated in X and Y v Netherlands:

    [Article 8] does not merely compel the State to abstain from . . . interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private and family life . . . These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of relations of individuals between themselves.[394]

18. For example, where private care providers do not have duties under the HRA, local social services departments may have to take action to ensure that the human rights of private care home residents are protected. This point was made clear by Forbes J. in the case of Johnson v Havering:

    A transfer of the [care] homes to the private sector does not absolve the Council of its duty under Section 6(1) to act compatibly with Convention rights, including the Convention rights of the claimants. Thus, if a transfer does take place, the Council will continue to be obliged to take appropriate steps (for example) to safeguard the lives of the claimants, to protect them from inhuman and degrading treatment and to safeguard their private and family life, home and correspondence. The real and effective protection of the claimants' rights will continue to be ensured by the Council and, if necessary, by the Courts.[395]

19. The fact that the positive obligations doctrine is not specified clearly in the UK statute and instead derives from Convention obligations and caselaw has not assisted either understanding or application of it by public authorities in the UK.

Dignity in law

20. We provide outlines of Articles 8, 3, 2 and 14 below but, because each of these Convention rights is dependent upon protecting people's dignity, this section briefly considers the extent to which this fundamental human rights principle has been given the force of law.

Dignity in international human rights instruments and statutes

21. The concept of dignity is prominent in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948:

    Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

    Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.[396]

22. Two years later, however, when the ECHR was drafted, dignity was not expressly referred to. This may have been due to a natural reluctance on the part of the British lawyers contributing to the drafting, schooled as they would have been in the more precise tradition of British law-making, to legislate about basic values. As we consider below, any such reluctance amongst legislative draftsmen has diminished since the HRA was passed.

23. The international Covenants that brought the principles of the Universal Declaration into legal effect do, however, refer to dignity as a human right to be upheld. The preambles to both the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966 state:

[…] in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, Recognising that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.

24. The more recent Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2005 devotes the whole of its first chapter to dignity.[397] That chapter, containing the first five Articles of the Charter, declares that human dignity is inviolable, and asserts the rights to life, to integrity of the person, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the prohibition of slavery and forced labour.

25. Dignity as a human rights concept is being increasingly used by parliamentary draftsmen in the UK. Recent research revealed that 57 statutes in the last five years have referred to dignity as compared to 16 in the previous five (with most of the references concerning the dignity of ordinary humans as opposed to references to the dignities of a particular office).[398] For example, regulations on adult placement schemes state:

    The registered person shall make suitable arrangements to ensure that the scheme is conducted, and that care or support (including any accommodation) is provided […] in a manner which respects the privacy, dignity and wishes of service users, and the confidentiality of information relating to them.[399]

26. More recently, the statute establishing the Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR) imposes on it a general duty to exercise its functions "with a view to encouraging and supporting the development of a society in which […] there is respect for the dignity and worth of each individual."[400]

Dignity as interpreted by the courts

27. Although it has been said that "there is hardly any legal principle more difficult to fathom in law than that of human dignity",[401] the concept is frequently referred to in the jurisprudence of the Convention in the context of Articles 8 and 3 ECHR, not as a legal standard but as a fundamental value.[402] The European Court of Justice has also held that it must ensure that the fundamental right to human dignity and integrity is observed.[403] Courts in the UK have considered the importance of dignity as a principle and value both before and after the incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law, although they have declined to define the concept precisely. For example, as Baroness Hale recognised in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza "the essence of the Convention […] is respect for human dignity and human freedom", along with equal treatment.[404]

28. Recent research has looked at the extent to which British courts are referring to dignity. This research showed that 48 cases which referred to dignity occurred in the last five years, while in the previous five there were only 19 references. It concluded that there has been an "exponential growth in dignity discourse in the courts of England and Wales" and that "judges, advocates and legislators feel increasingly confident in referring to dignity."[405]

29. In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland[406] a case which explored the moral issues of withdrawing life support (decided before the HRA), Hoffmann L.J. (as he then was) said the principle of dignity reflects:

    [ …] our belief that quite irrespective of what the person concerned may think about it, it is wrong for someone to be humiliated or treated without respect for his value as a person. The fact that the dignity of an individual is an intrinsic value is shown by the fact that we feel embarrassed and think it wrong when someone behaves in a way which we think demeaning to himself, which does not show sufficient respect for himself as a person.[407]

30. Since then, in a recent case, Lord Hoffmann sketched out a definition of dignity when he observed that the jurisprudence shows that dignity is a core value being "the right to the esteem and respect of other people [...]".[408]

31. The importance of dignity both as a human rights concept and as a fundamental value was emphasised in a case concerning the way in which two severely disabled sisters were cared for by local authority carers in their home. Munby J. said:

    True it is that the phrase [human dignity] is not used in the Convention but it is surely immanent in Article 8, indeed in almost every one of the Convention's provisions. The recognition and protection of human dignity is one of the core values - in truth, the core value - of our society […][409]

32. The essential characteristics of dignity are beginning to be explored by judges and academics. Professor Feldman, a former legal adviser to our predecessors has observed that dignity operates at three levels, the dignity attaching to the human species, the dignity of groups within the human species and the dignity of human individuals.[410] He notes that dignity of individuals:

    requires the right to make one's own decisions, and to contribute to decisions made by others which affect one's life […] But we may be required to respect the dignity of people who lack freedom of choice, such as those in a permanent vegetative state. Such cases present difficult questions about the relationship between dignity and autonomy, and between different kinds of dignity.[411]

33. There is no question that the concept of dignity and the developing jurisprudence on it is significant to our inquiry on the human rights of older people in hospitals and care homes.

Respect for the person and family life

34. Article 8 ECHR provides:

  • Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
  • There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic ell-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

35. The right to respect for private life has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including a right to physical and psychological integrity.[412]

36. Since the HRA came into force, there have been several decisions based on Article 8 involving the protection of vulnerable people, particularly those who are elderly or have disabilities. A local authority has been found liable under Article 8 for failing to carry out meaningful consultation with elderly residents of its care homes following a decision to close them. The Court held that the decision-making process should have taken into account Article 8 and there should have been a careful balancing process to make sure that the council's interference in the residents' rights was 'proportionate.'[413]

37. In the East Sussex case, referred to above, which considered the local authority's handling and lifting policy with regard to the care of two sisters with profound disabilities in their home, the court found that Article 8 required protection of the sisters' dignity and this needed the human touch of some manual handling by their carers.

Freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment

38. Article 3 ECHR prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It provides:

    No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

39. Article 3 is mirrored by Article 7 ICCPR. The prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute and cannot be opted out of in any circumstances. Treatment must attain a "minimum level of severity" to fall within Article 3 ECHR. The assessment of the minimum is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case such as the nature and context of the treatment that is in issue. [414]

40. The European Court of Human Rights has defined inhuman and degrading treatment as:

    […] "ill-treatment" that attains a minimum level of severity and involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering […] Where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual's moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article 3 […] The suffering which flows from naturally occurring illness, physical or mental, may be covered by Article 3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which the authorities can be held responsible.[415]

41. The UK High Court has held that Article 3 brings out "[…] the enhanced degree of protection which may be called for when human dignity at stake is that of someone who is […] so disabled as to be critically dependent on the help of others for even the simplest and most basic tasks of day to day living."[416]

Right to life

42. The first sentence of Article 2 ECHR provides:

    Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law.

43. This right is replicated in Article 6 ICCPR. The corollary of the right to life is the duty to protect life. The state has a positive duty to take steps to safeguard the lives of those within the jurisdiction.[417] An issue may arise under Articles 2 and 14 ECHR where the state puts an individual's life at risk through the denial of healthcare which is available to the general population.[418] The impact of the HRA on the dilemma for the NHS of providing life-saving treatment in a context of limited resources is considered below.

Equality and non-discrimination

44. The ECHR protects against unjustified discrimination in the way that other Convention rights are enjoyed. Article 14 ECHR provides:

The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.

45. Although there is no clear authority, we proceed on the basis that Article 14 includes age within "other status". In the enjoyment of any Convention right, the state is prohibited from discriminating without objective and reasonable justification.[419] This is an overarching principle which applies to all ECHR rights. It encompasses both direct[420] and indirect discrimination.[421] Article 2(2) ICESCR contains a similar provision.

46. Unlike the ECHR, Article 26 of the ICCPR provides a freestanding equality guarantee:

    All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

47. Protocol 12 to the ECHR extends the Convention to provide a freestanding prohibition on discrimination. The Protocol is designed to advance the ECHR's protection of equality beyond the relatively limited guarantee in Article 14. The UK Government has not ratified the Protocol. In previous Reports, we have recommended that the Government should ratify Protocol 12 and include it within the rights protected in the Human Rights Act, in order to provide protection in domestic law equivalent to the equality rights which bind the UK internationally, such as under the ICCPR and the ICESCR.[422]

Protection / absence of protection on the grounds of age

48. The CEHR has statutory duties to work towards "the elimination of prejudice against" particular groups and "enabling members of groups to participate in society." "Age" is listed as one of these groups, along with disability, gender (including gender reassignment), race, religion or belief and sexual orientation. These categories have come to be known as the "protected groups" or the "equality strands." The groups do, however, enjoy different underlying legal protection from each other.

49. Although older people are now protected against discrimination in employment on grounds of age,[423] they do not, as yet, enjoy comparable legal protection in the following areas:

—  Protection from discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services, which would include health and social care, by contrast with race, gender, sexual orientation or disability.

—   A positive duty on public bodies to promote equality of opportunity, by contrast with race, disability and gender.

50. The recently published consultation from the Discrimination Law Review[424] addresses these issues in detail and invites responses on possible law reform.

51. In the international arena, ICESCR General Comment No. 6 on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons includes age.

52. The new UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) and its Optional Protocol opened for signature on 30 March 2007, and was signed by the UK on the same day. They will provide protection for people with disabilities, including older people. The Convention refers to the right to life (Article 10), freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse (making reference to "age-specific assistance" and "age-specific needs") (Article 16), respect for privacy (Article 22) and the right to health (Article 25) (with specific reference to older persons).

53. The UN Guiding Principles on Older Persons (1991) (UNPOP)[425] encourage Governments to incorporate certain principles into their national programmes "whenever possible". Of particular relevance to this inquiry are the following principles:

  • Older persons should have access to adequate health care through the provision of income, family and community support and self-help (Principle 1);
  • Older persons should have access to health care to help them to maintain or regain the optimum level of physical, mental and emotional well-being and to prevent or delay the onset of illness (Principle 11);
  • Older persons should be able to utilize appropriate levels of institutional care providing protection, rehabilitation and social and mental stimulation in a humane and secure environment (Principle 13);
  • Older persons should be able to enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms when residing in any shelter, care or treatment facility, including full respect for their dignity, beliefs, needs and privacy and for the right to make decisions about their care and the quality of their lives (Principle 14);
  • Older persons should be able to live in dignity and security and be free of exploitation and physical and mental abuse (Principle 17); and
  • Older persons should be treated fairly regardless of age, gender, racial or ethnic background, disability or other status, and be valued independently of their economic contribution (Principle 18).

54. Although the impact of these Principles on the UK Government, in particular on the Department of Health, has been negligible, the Welsh Assembly has embedded the Principles into its strategy for older people[426] and the new Commissioner for Older People in Wales is required to have regard to them when considering the interests of older people.[427]


55. Even though the ECHR does not guarantee a right to healthcare, the cases referred to above demonstrate the application of Convention rights (especially the right to respect for private life under Article 8) where people are receiving health and social care services. The emerging jurisprudence also reflects how Convention rights operate as a "living instrument"[428] which changes with the times. Munby J. in the East Sussex case observed that "the concept of human dignity may be the same as ever, but the practical standards which require to be met are not. Changes in social standards demand better provision for the disabled if their human dignity is not to be impaired."[429]

56. This comment should be viewed in the light of the recent findings of the National Audit Office on the increase in the number of people with dementia to which we refer in Chapter 2.[430]

57. Article 12 of the ICESCR recognises the right of everyone to the "highest attainable standard of physical and mental health". This takes into account both the individual's biological and socio-economic preconditions and a state's available resources (General Comment No. 14, which further defines the right in Article 12). States are required to "progressively realise" this right by the adoption of all appropriate means, including legislation, without discrimination on any ground, including "other status" (Article 2). This could include age (see General Comment No. 6 on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons). In particular, Article 12 requires the creation of conditions which assure medical service and attention to all who are sick. There is no express reference to the rights of older persons in the Covenant, but its provisions apply equally to all members of society.

58. The right to health is also protected in Article 5(e)(iv) of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (1966) and Articles 11(1)(f) and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979). The EU Charter (Article 35) provides a right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment "under the conditions established by national laws and practices".

59. The question of the allocation of a State's finite resources is one which falls within the discretion given by courts to public authorities. The European Court of Human Rights has shown greater deference to the domestic legislature of member states in areas of economic and social policy[431] than it would in other areas, such as criminal procedure. Whilst it is inappropriate for the courts to engage in redistribution of resources, principles of non-discrimination and reasonableness of decision-making are relevant even in the area of economic and social policy. For example, in Nitecki v Poland, the European Court of Human Rights considered whether the State's refusal to fund a particular drug was discriminatory. Whilst it ultimately found that it was not, it stated:

    The Court recalls that Article 14 only prohibits differences in treatment which have no objective or reasonable justification. However, the Court finds such justification to exist in the present health care system which makes difficult choices as to the extent of public subsidy to ensure a fair distribution of scarce financial resources. There is no evidence of arbitrariness in the decisions which have been taken [...][432]

376   R v Eastbourne (Inhabitants) (1803) 4 East 103, 102 ER 769 at 770. Back

377   Matadeen v Pointu [1998] 3 LRC 542 at 552; [1999] 1 AC 98 at 109, M v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2006] 2 AC 91 at para 136. Back

378   Human Rights Act 1998, Section 7. Back

379   Ibid, Section 6. Back

380   Ibid, Section 6(3)(b). Back

381   R(A) v Partnerships in Care [2002] 1 WLR 2610. Back

382   Callin, Heather and Ward v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] 2 All ER 936. Back

383   YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] 3 WLR 112. YL was a resident of a care home run by a private healthcare company. The House of Lords held that, despite her placement being paid for, in part, by the local authority under its National Assistance Act duties, that the healthcare company was not a public authority for the purpose of the Human Rights Act. Back

384   Ninth Report of Session 2006-07, The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act, HL Paper 77/HC 410. Back

385   Ibid, paras 81-83; Seventh Report of Session 2003-04, The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act, HL Paper 39/HC 382, para 83. Back

386   Human Rights Act 1998, Section 6. Back

387   A v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 611. Back

388   X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235 at para 27. Back

389   R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2006) 1 AC 396 at para 92. Back

390   Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245. Back

391   Oneryildiz v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 12. Back

392   Department for Constitutional Affairs, Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act, July 2006, p 27. Back

393   R (Bernard) v Enfield London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 2282 (Admin). Back

394   X and Y v the Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235 at para 33, Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241. Back

395   [2006] EWHC 1714 (Admin) at para 44. Back

396   UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III). Back

397   Official Journal of the European Communities, 18 December 2000, C364/1. Back

398   Allen, R., QC., & Moon, G., 'Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: a Better Route to Equality', EHRLR 2006, 6, 610-649. Back

399   Adult Placement Schemes (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2071, Regulation 21(1)(f). Back

400   Equality Act 2006, Section 3(c). Back

401   See Opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl in Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellung GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn (Omega) at para 74. See also judgment of the European Court of Justice in the same case; 14 October 2004. Back

402   See, for a recent example, Ahmet OZkan and others v. Turkey (Application no 21689/93) 6 April 2004 at para 337. Back

403   See Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union, judgment 9 October 2001 at para 70. Back

404   [2004] 2 AC 557 at para 132. Back

405   Allen and Moon, op citBack

406   [1993] 2 WLR 316 (CA) (affirmed on other grounds by the House of Lords [1993] AC 789). Back

407   Ibid, p 851. Back

408   Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at para 51. As quoted by Allen and Moon, op cit. Back

409   R (A and B) v (1) East Sussex County Council (2) The Disability Rights Commission (Interested Party) [2003] EWHC 167 (Admin) at para 86. Back

410   Feldman D, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, p 126. Back

411   IbidBack

412   X and Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235. Back

413   R (Madden) v Bury Metropolitan Borough Council [2002] EWHC 1882 (Admin). Back

414   Ireland v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 25 at para 162. Back

415   Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at para 52. Back

416   R (A and B) v (1) East Sussex County Council (2) The Disability Rights Commission (Interested Party) [2003] EWHC 167 (Admin) at para 93 per Munby J. Back

417   L.C.B. v United Kingdom [1999] 27 EHRR 212 at para 36. Back

418   Cyprus v Turkey [2002] 35 EHRR 30 at para 219. Back

419   Belgian Linguistics Case (No. 2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252 at para 14. Back

420   IbidBack

421   Thlimmenos v Greece(2001) 31 EHRR 15 at para 44; Zeman v Austria App. No. 23960/02, 29 June 2006 at para 32. Back

422   Seventeenth Report of Session 2004-05, Review of International Human Rights Instruments, HL Paper 99/ HC 264, paras 29-34. Back

423   Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031. Back

424   A Framework for Fairness, op citBack

425   Resolution 46/91, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1991. Back

426   Welsh Assembly Government, The Strategy for Older People in Wales, January 2003. Back

427   Commissioner for Older People (Wales) Act 2006, Section 25. Back

428   Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at para 54. Back

429   Munby J, R (A and B) v (1) East Sussex County Council (2) The Disability Rights Commission (Interested Party) [2003] EWHC 167 (Admin) at para 98. Back

430   Improving services and support for people with dementia, National Audit Office, HC 604 Session 2006-2007, 4 July 2007. Back

431   Buckley v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 101. Back

432   Nitecki v Poland, App. No. 65653/01, 21 March 2002 (Adm.) at para 3. Back

previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2007
Prepared 14 August 2007