Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill First Report


APPENDIX 5: FORMAL MINUTES


Extract from the House of Lords Minutes of Proceedings of Thursday 20 March 2008

Constitutional Renewal The Lord President (Baroness Ashton of Upholland) moved that it is expedient that a Joint Committee of Lords and Commons be appointed to consider and report on any draft Constitutional Renewal Bill presented to both Houses by a Minister of the Crown. The motion was agreed to and a message was sent to the Commons.

Extract from the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons of Wednesday 30th April 2008

Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (Joint Committee),—Resolved, That this House concurs with the Lords Message of 20th March, that it is expedient that a Joint Committee of Lords and Commons be appointed to consider and report on any draft Constitutional Renewal Bill presented to both Houses.

Ordered, That a Select Committee of eleven Members be appointed to join with the Committee appointed by the Lords to consider the draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (Cm. 7342).

That the Committee should report on the draft Bill by 18th July 2008.

That the Committee shall have power—

(i) to send for persons, papers and records;

(ii) to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the House;

(iii) to report from time to time;

(iv) to appoint specialist advisers; and

(v) to adjourn from place to place within the United Kingdom.

That Mr Alistair Carmichael, Mr Christopher Chope, Michael Jabez Foster, Mark Lazarowicz, Martin Linton, Ian Lucas, Fiona Mactaggart, Mr Virendra Sharma, Emily Thornberry, Mr Andrew Tyrie and Sir George Young be members of the Committee.—(Mr Alan Campbell.)

Message to the Lords to acquaint them therewith.

Extract from the House of Lords Minutes of Proceedings of Tuesday 6 May 2008

Constitutional Renewal The Chairman of Committees moved that the Commons message of 30 April be considered and that a Committee of eleven Lords members be appointed to join with the Committee appointed by the Commons to consider and report on the draft Constitutional Renewal Bill presented to both Houses on 25 March (Cm 7342-II) and that the Committee should report on the draft Bill by 18 July 2008;

That the following members be appointed to the Committee:

L Armstrong of Ilminster, L Campbell of Alloway, L Fraser of Carmyllie, B Gibson of Market Rasen, L Hart of Chilton, L Maclennan of Rogart, L Morgan, L Norton of Louth, L Plant of Highfield, L Tyler, L Williamson of Horton;

That the Committee have power to agree with the Committee appointed by the Commons in the appointment of a Chairman;

That the Committee have power to appoint specialist advisers;

That the Committee have power to adjourn from place to place within the United Kingdom;

That the Committee have leave to report from time to time;

That the reports of the Committee from time to time shall be printed, regardless of any adjournment of the House;

That the evidence taken by the Committee shall, if the Committee so wishes, be published; and

That the Committee meet with the Committee appointed by the Commons today at 4.00pm in the Boothroyd Room, Portcullis House.

The motion was agreed to, and a message was sent to the Commons.

Extract from the House of Lords Minutes of Proceedings of Monday 2 June 2008

Constitutional Renewal The Lord President (Baroness Ashton of Upholland) moved that, notwithstanding the Resolution of this House on 6 May, it be an instruction to the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill that it should report on the draft Bill by 22 July 2008. The motion was agreed to.

Extract from the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons of Wednesday 4 June 2008:

Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (Joint Committee),—Resolved, That this House concurs with the Lords Message of 2nd June that, notwithstanding the Resolution of this House of 30th April, it be an instruction to the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill that it should report on the draft Bill by 22nd July.—(Mr Dave Watts.)

Wednesday 6 May 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Mr Alistair Carmichael MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Christopher Chope MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Michael Jabez Foster MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Mark Lazarowicz MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Martin Linton MP

Lord Morgan        Ian Lucas MP

Lord Norton of Louth      Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Plant of Highfield      Mr Virendra Sharma MP

Lord Tyler          Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Williamson of Horton    Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Sir George Young MP

Members' interests: The full lists of Members' interests as recorded in the Commons Register of Members' Interest and the Lords Register of Interests are noted.

Emily Thornberry declared an interest in that her husband is a deputy High Court judge;

Lord Armstrong declared an interest as a former Head of the Home Civil Service;

Lord Williamson declared an interest as a former civil servant;

Lord Campbell of Alloway declared an interest as a QC (no longer practising);

Lord Hart of Chilton declared an interest as a solicitor;

Lord Tyler and Martin Linton MP declared an interest as Directors (unpaid) of Make Votes Count.

It is moved that Michael Jabez Foster MP do take the Chair.—(Lord Campbell of Alloway.)

The same is agreed to.

The Orders of Reference are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That written evidence received be shared with the Public Administration Committee and the Justice Committee in the House of Commons and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, pursuant to House of Commons Standing Order No 137A.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 7 May at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 7 May 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Christopher Chope MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Michael Jabez Foster MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Mark Lazarowicz MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Martin Linton MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Ian Lucas MP

Lord Morgan        Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Norton of Louth      Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Lord Tyler          Sir George Young MP

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Tuesday 6 May are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

The Call for Evidence is agreed to.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 13 May at half-past 1 o'clock.

Tuesday 13 May 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Christopher Chope MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Martin Linton MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Sir George Young MP

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Wednesday 7 May are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That the Lords Constitution and Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committees be invited to submit memoranda to the Committee.

Ordered, That the public be admitted during the examination of witnesses unless otherwise ordered.

Ordered, That written evidence received be published, and that the uncorrected transcripts of evidence given, unless the Committee otherwise order, be published on the internet.

Ordered, That Memorandum number Ev1 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Professor Vernon Bogdanor CBE FBA, Professor of Politics and Government, Brasenose College, University of Oxford, Professor Stuart Weir, Director of Democratic Audit, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex and Peter Riddell, Chief Political Commentator of The Times and Chairman of the Hansard Society.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Associate Fellow, International Law, Chatham House, Professor Steven Haines, Professor of Strategy and the Law of Military Operations, Royal Holloway, University of London and Professor Adam Tomkins, John Millar Professor of Public Law, University of Glasgow.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 14 May at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 14 May 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Christopher Chope MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Martin Linton MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Ian Lucas MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Morgan        Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Norton of Louth      Sir George Young MP

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Tuesday 13 May are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Professor Rodney Brazier be appointed a Specialist Adviser.

The following witnesses are examined:

Admiral the Lord Boyce, GCB, OBE, DL, Former Chief of the Defence Staff, Field Marshal the Lord Bramall, KG, GCB, OBE, MC, Former Chief of the Defence Staff and Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord Craig of Radley, GCB, Former Chief of the Defence Staff.

Professor Robert Hazell CBE, Director, Constitution Unit, University College London

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 20 May at half-past 1 o'clock.

Tuesday 20 May 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Martin Linton MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Ian Lucas MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Morgan        Sir George Young MP

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Plant of Highfield

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Wednesday 14 May are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

The following interest is declared:

Lord Hart of Chilton: that his wife is a solicitor and a Recorder

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev02, Ev23, Ev24 and Ev72 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Tim Dutton QC, Chairman, Bar Council, and Andrew Holroyd, President, Law Society

Joshua Rozenberg, Legal Editor, the Daily Telegraph, and Frances Gibb, Legal Editor, The Times.

The Joint Committee further deliberate.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 21 May at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 21 May 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Christopher Chope MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Mark Lazarowicz MP

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie      Martin Linton MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Lord Morgan        Sir George Young MP

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Tuesday 20 May are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That the Chairman seek private meetings with the Speaker and the Lord Speaker to discuss the provisions of the draft Bill relating to protests in the vicinity of Parliament.

Ordered, That Memorandum number Ev03 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Sebastian Payne, Kent Law School, University of Kent, Peter Facey, Director, Unlock Democracy and Michael Hammer, Executive Director, One World Trust

Rt Hon Lord Falconer of Thoroton QC

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 3 June at half-past 1 o'clock.

Tuesday 3 June 2008

Present:

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Mark Lazarowicz MP

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie      Martin Linton MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Morgan        Sir George Young MP

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Plant of Highfield

Lord Tyler

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Wednesday 21 May are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev04 to Ev11 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Gareth Crossman, Director of Policy, Liberty, Mike Schwarz, Partner, Bindmans, Baroness Mallalieu QC, President, Countryside Alliance and Milan Rai.

The Joint Committee further deliberate.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 4 June at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 4 June 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Martin Linton MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Emily Thornberry MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Sir George Young MP

Lord Hart of Chilton

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Tyler

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Tuesday 3 June are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev12 to Ev14 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Baroness Prashar CBE, Chairman, Judicial Appointments Commission, Professor Dame Hazel Genn QC DBE, JAC Commissioner and Professor of Socio-Legal Studies, University College London, Jonathan Sumption QC OBE , JAC Commissioner

Chris Allison, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, Dean Ingledew, Director of Community Protection, Westminster City Council, Kit Malthouse, Deputy Mayor for Policing, Greater London Authority

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 10 June at half-past 1 o'clock.

Tuesday 10 June 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Christopher Chope MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Mark Lazarowicz MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Martin Linton MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Ian Lucas MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Morgan        Sir George Young MP

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Plant of Highfield

Lord Tyler

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Wednesday 4 June are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev15 to Ev21 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Jonathan Baume, General Secretary, First Division Association and Charles Cochrane, Director of Policy, Public and Commercial Services Union and Secretary of the Council of Civil Services Unions

Sir Christopher Kelly KCB, Chair, Committee on Standards in Public Life, Sir Christopher Foster, Chairman, Better Government Initiative and Sir Richard Mottram GCB, Better Government Initiative.

Lord Hart declared an interest as a former Special Adviser, and Lord Maclennan as a Member of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 11 June at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 11 June 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Martin Linton MP

Lord Fraser of Carmylie      Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Sir George Young MP

Lord Hart of Chilton

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Williamson of Horton

Lord Tyler

Michael Jabez Foster (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Tuesday 10 June are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

The following witnesses are examined:

Professor Peter Hennessy, Attlee Professor of Contemporary British History, Queen Mary, University of London, Lord Wilson of Dinton, former Cabinet Secretary and Lord Turnbull of Enfield.

Mr Andrew Tyrie declared an interest as a former Special Adviser

Dr Malcolm Jack, Clerk of the House of Commons, Mr Michael Pownall, Clerk of the Parliaments, Lt General Sir Michael Willcocks KCB, Black Rod and Jill Pay, Serjeant at Arms.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 17 June at half-past 1 o'clock.

Tuesday 17 June 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Mark Lazarowicz MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Martin Linton MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Lord Morgan        Sir George Young MP

Lord Plant of Highfield

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Wednesday 11 June are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev73 and Ev74 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Rt Hon Tony McNulty MP, Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing, Home Office

Janet Paraskeva, First Civil Service Commissioner, and Sir Gus O'Donnell KCB, Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 18 June at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 18 June 2008

Present:

Lord Hart of Chilton    Martin Linton MP

Lord Morgan      Ian Lucas MP

Lord Norton of Louth    Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Tyler      Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Williamson of Horton  Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Sir George Young MP

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The Order of Adjournment is read.

The proceedings of Tuesday 18 June are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev51 and Ev52 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Rt Hon Lord Lyell of Markyate QC, Rt Hon Lord Morris of Aberavon QC and Rt Hon Lord Mayhew of Twysden QC

Lord Carlile of Berriew QC and Professor Jeremy Horder, Criminal Commissioner, Law Commission.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 24 June at half-past 1 o'clock.

Tuesday 24 June 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Martin Linton MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Fiona Mactaggart MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Sir George Young MP

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Plant of Highfield

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Wednesday 25 June are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev02a and Ev53 to 58 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined:

Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal, Attorney General, Sir Ken Macdonald QC, Director of Public Prosecutions, Richard Alderman, Director, Serious Fraud Office, and David Green QC, Director, Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office

Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 25 June at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 25 June 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Mr Alistair Carmichael MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Mark Lazarowicz MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Martin Linton MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Ian Lucas MP

Lord Norton of Louth      Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Plant of Highfield      Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Lord Tyler          Sir George Young MP

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Tuesday 24 June are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev59 and Ev60 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witness is examined:

Graham Allen MP

The Joint Committee further deliberate

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 1 July at 4 o'clock.

Tuesday 1 July 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Mr Alistair Carmichael MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Christopher Chope MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Martin Linton MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Ian Lucas MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Morgan        Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Norton of Louth      Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Lord Plant of Highfield      Sir George Young MP

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster (in the Chair)

The proceedings of Wednesday 25 June are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev14a and Ev61 to Ev65 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

The following witnesses are examined: Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, and Mr Michael Wills MP, Minister of State, Ministry of Justice.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 2 July at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 2 July 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Christopher Chope MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Mark Lazarowicz MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Martin Linton MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Ian Lucas MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Morgan        Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Norton of Louth      Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Lord Plant of Highfield      Sir George Young MP

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster (in the chair)

The proceedings of Tuesday 1 July are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 8 July at half-past 1 o'clock.

Tuesday 8 July 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Christopher Chope MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Martin Linton MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Ian Lucas MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Morgan        Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Norton of Louth      Sir George Young MP

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP, in the Chair

The proceedings of Wednesday 2 July are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev65 to Ev69 and Ev76 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 15 July at half-past 1 o'clock.

Tuesday 15 July 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Martin Linton MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Fraser of Carmylie      Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Sir George Young MP

Lord Hart of Chilton

Lord Maclennan of Rogart

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP, in the Chair

The Joint Committee deliberate.

The proceedings of Wednesday 8 July are read.

Ordered, That Memoranda numbers Ev77 and Ev78 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Wednesday 16 July at 4 o'clock.

Wednesday 16 July 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Mr Alistair Carmichael MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway      Martin Linton MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen    Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart      Sir George Young MP

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Plant of Highfield

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP, in the Chair

The proceedings of Tuesday 15 July are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memorandum number Ev79 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be adjourned to Tuesday 22 July at 10 o'clock.

Tuesday 22 July 2008

Present:

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster    Christopher Chope MP

Lord Campbell of Alloway    Martin Linton MP

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen  Ian Lucas MP

Lord Hart of Chilton      Fiona Mactaggart MP

Lord Maclennan of Rogart    Emily Thornberry MP

Lord Morgan        Mr Andrew Tyrie MP

Lord Norton of Louth      Sir George Young MP

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

Michael Jabez Foster MP, in the Chair

The proceedings of Wednesday 16 July are read.

The Joint Committee deliberate.

Ordered, That Memorandum number Ev80 submitted to the Joint Committee be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

A draft Report is proposed by the Chairman.

It is moved that the draft Report before the Committee be read.

The same is agreed to.

Paragraphs 1 to 8 are agreed to.

Paragraph 9 are agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 10 to 23 are agreed to.

Paragraph 24 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 25 to 47 are agreed to.

Paragraph 48 reads as follows:

We accept that all demonstrations have the potential to create noise and that the reasonable use of loudspeakers should be allowed in the area around Parliament. Depending, however, upon the time of day and the level of background noise from traffic, there are exceptional occasions during which the duration and volume of noise from loudspeakers causes serious disruption to large numbers of Members, staff and others within Parliament. There is a need to either develop or better use existing powers to ensure that in those exceptional cases the police or other authorities can control noise, including the use of loudspeakers by both groups and individuals. While a range of approaches have been suggested to us, we accept the Home Office Minister's commitment to work with the Parliamentary Authorities and others to develop a "coherent framework". As a minimum, there should be a statutory power to move or arrest an individual, or to confiscate sound equipment.

An Amendment is made.

It is moved by Lord Armstrong of Ilminster in line 11 of paragraph 48, after the second "a" to insert "specific".

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?

ContentsNot Contents

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster      Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen

Lord Campbell of Alloway        Ian Lucas

Christopher Chope          Lord Maclennan of Rogart

Lord Hart of Chilton        Fiona Mactaggart

Martin Linton          Lord Morgan

Mr Andrew Tyrie          Lord Norton of Louth

Sir George Young          Emily Thornberry

              Lord Tyler

              Lord Williamson of Horton

The Amendment is disagreed to accordingly.

It is moved by Fiona Mactaggart in line 14 of paragraph 48, after "move" to leave out "or arrest".

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?

ContentsNot Contents

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster      Lord Campbell of Alloway

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen      Christopher Chope

Lord Hart of Chilton        Mr Andrew Tyrie

Martin Linton          Sir George Young

Ian Lucas

Lord Maclennan of Rogart

Fiona Mactaggart

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Emily Thornberry

Lord Tyler

Lord Williamson of Horton

The Amendment is agreed to accordingly.

Paragraph 48, as amended, is agreed to.

Paragraph 49 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 50 to 59 are agreed to.

Paragraph 60 reads as follows:

We note that opinion is divided in relation to whether permanent and overnight protests should be allowed to continue outside the Houses of Parliament, although there appears to be a majority against within Parliament. We see merit in distinguishing between permanent protests on the one hand, and the more traditional one day marches and demonstrations on the other. We call for a careful and comprehensive review of permanent protests, especially in light of the possible redevelopment of Parliament Square, with a view to seeking the removal of encampments (as opposed to individuals) if this is compatible with human rights legislation.

It is moved by Emily Thornberry in line 7 of paragraph 60, to leave out from "Square" to the end of the paragraph.

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?

ContentsNot Contents

Christopher Chope          Lord Armstrong of Ilminster

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen      Lord Campbell of Alloway

Lord Hart of Chilton        Martin Linton

Ian Lucas            Lord Maclennan of Rogart

Fiona Mactaggart

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Emily Thornberry

Lord Tyler

Mr Andrew Tyrie

Lord Williamson of Horton

Sir George Young

The Amendment is agreed to accordingly.

Paragraph 60, as amended, is agreed to.

Paragraphs 61 to 76 are agreed to.

It is moved by Lord Tyler to leave out paragraphs 77 to 133 and insert the following new paragraphs:

"CHAPTER 3: ATTORNEY GENERAL AND PROSECUTIONS

Background

1._The office of the Attorney General is an historic one, with roots stretching back as far as the 13th Century. The title of "Attorney General" is first thought to have been used in the 15th Century, whilst the title of the second law officer, the "Solicitor General", was first recorded early in the 16th Century. The role gradually attained its modern shape—the Attorney became legal adviser to the Crown in the 17th Century, and the Law Officers' Department was created in 1893. In the words of the Government's recent consultation paper, "[o]ver the years the role of the Attorney General has therefore developed from being the legal representative of the sovereign to being an important figure in Government and finally a salaried Minister of the Crown."[196] The Attorney presently has three key roles:

(i)  Legal adviser to the Crown;

(ii)  Guardian of the public interest, including decisions on individual prosecutions; and

(iii)  Minister of the Crown with responsibility for superintending the prosecutorial authorities, and (with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Justice) for criminal justice policy.

Though the Attorney is a Minister and a Member of Government, she exercises the first two of these functions independently of Government and independent of collective ministerial responsibility. She is however subject to collective responsibility in respect of her function as Minister with responsibility for the prosecuting authorities and for criminal justice policy.

2._The debate on the role of the Attorney General has been given impetus by three controversies during the tenure of the previous Attorney, Lord Goldsmith:

(i)  The nature of the Attorney's advice to the Prime Minister on the legality of the invasion of Iraq in 2003;

(ii)  The 2006 decision by the Serious Fraud Office to halt an investigation into whether BAE Systems had paid bribes to Saudi Arabian officials in order to secure a defence contract; and

(iii)  The debate over the requirement for the Attorney General to give his assent to any prosecution in the "cash for honours" investigation.

3._The Governance of Britain Green Paper stated that the Government was "fully committed to enhancing public confidence and trust in the office of Attorney General".[197] It also recognised that more explicit separation of powers—between the executive, legislature and judiciary—could be properly considered in the context of a rebalanced constitution. A consultation document on reform of the role was published shortly afterwards. The House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee (now the Justice Committee) published a report in July 2007, calling for a radical reform to the role, citing the "inherent tensions in combining ministerial and political functions on the one hand, and the provision independent legal advice and superintendence off the prosecution services, on the other hand, within one office." They proposed the separation of the Attorney's "legal" and "political" functions, the former to be given to an independent law officer and the latter to another Government Minister, most likely the Justice Minister.[198] The House of Lords Constitution Committee published a report in April 2008 which outlined the various arguments for and against reform.[199] During our inquiry, the Justice Committee published a follow-up report in response to the Government's proposals.[200]

The Government's proposals overall

4._The Government's proposals for reform were set out in the Constitutional Renewal Draft Bill, and accompanying White Paper. The Government propose:

  1. The Attorney should retain his or her role as the Government's legal adviser;
  2. The Attorney's legal advice should not be disclosed as a matter of course;
  3. The Attorney should remain a Minister and a Member of either House of Parliament, and should attend Cabinet on the invitation of the Prime Minister;
  4. The Attorney will produce an annual report on her work to be laid before Parliament, and the Government are open to suggestions for improved Parliamentary accountability;
  5. The Attorney's responsibility for criminal justice policy (alongside the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office) will be retained;
  6. The Attorney will not have the power to direct an individual prosecution, except in cases affecting national security;
  7. The majority of requirements for the Attorney's consent to prosecutions will be abolished or transferred to the relevant prosecutorial director, and the power to enter a nolle prosequi will be abolished;
  8. The Attorney's superintendence relationship with the prosecutorial directors will be retained and set out in a protocol, with some clauses on the tenure of office of the directors placed in statute;
  9. The Attorney's oath of office will be reformed, but not by statute.

5._There have been three broad responses amongst witnesses to the Government's proposals:

  1. Some witnesses have broadly supported the Government's proposals;
  2. Others have argued in favour of a more radical reform;
  3. Others have argued that some aspects of the Government's reforms would remove too much power from the Attorney.

The Attorney General's role as legal adviser and as a Government Minister

6._The Government propose that the Attorney should remain as the Government's chief legal adviser and as a Minister within the Government. The Attorney General told the Committee that it was easier for an Attorney "of similar rank" to give "trenchant and robust" advice to Government colleagues, and emphasised the value of the Attorney sitting "at the apex of all the legal advice which is given" to government. To "uproot and pull out" the present arrangements would risk replacing them with a mechanism without "the same force, the same resonance, the same efficacy, the same potency as it has now". (Q 627) The Bar Council agreed that "the maintenance of a Law Officer at the heart of government is essential in an increasingly legalistic and regulated world". (Ev55, para 13) Some former Attorneys agreed. Lord Lyell of Markyate told the Committee that it was possible for a "political" figure to fulfil the role because "[t]here is a really strong ethos in the office that you will be completely independent and straightforward in your advice giving". (Q 587) Lord Morris of Aberavon agreed that "the job can be better done by a political figure. He takes a holistic view. He has to take into account the whole range of issues". (Q 588) Professor Robert Hazell, Director, Constitution Unit, University College London, thought that "there would be just as much controversy about the advice coming from a more detached figure as there is from the Attorney as currently constituted". (Q 71)

7._Others disagreed. Professor Vernon Bogdanor, Professor of Politics and Government, Brasenose College, University of Oxford, argued that "one of the consequences of the Iraq war [is] that the public, in general, do not believe any more that people are capable of wearing more than one hat". (Q 14) Former Lord Chancellor and Solicitor General, Lord Falconer of Thoroton agreed that public perception that the Attorney was part of "the gang" made it necessary for the Attorney to be "a trusted, independent figure … [who] is no longer part of the government itself". (QQ 191, 194) Professor Jeffrey Jowell argued that the role of legal adviser should, as in other "Westminster-style" democracies like Ireland or India, "be performed by an independent Attorney General who is not under the shadow of the perception of political bias … We have had some very independent Attorneys, but I think they have had to fight against their own political inclinations in order to be so".[201] The Justice Committee concluded that "the ambiguity of the Attorney General's position in the public eye remains. As a consequence the Draft Bill does not fully satisfy the concerns … about the need to reform the office and restore public confidence in the office of Attorney General."[202]

8._The House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee inquiry found that "Allegations of political bias, whether justified or not, are almost inevitable given the Attorney General's seemingly contradictory positions as an independent head of prosecutions, his or her status as a party political Prime Ministerial appointment, and his or her political role in the formulation and delivery of criminal justice policy." It concluded, "This situation is not sustainable." We agree.

9._We have carefully considered the evidence we have received and the recommendations of the Justice Committee, and of the previous Constitutional Affairs Committee. We recognise that there are different and strongly held views on this issue. However, we accept the approach of the committees in seeking to separate the Attorney General's legal and political functions. The former should be exercised by a genuinely independent senior lawyer, the latter by a Minister in the appropriate Government Department. We do not accept that the job is "better done by a political figure, [taking] a holistic view", since legal advice should not be confused with political imperatives.

Disclosure of the Attorney General's legal advice

10._The Government have argued that the Attorney General's legal advice should not be published on a routine basis.[203] The Attorney General told us that there were "serious difficulties", in particular in terms of the disclosure of sensitive information, as well as the fact that, "like any proper legal advice, it will include an analysis of the competing arguments and risks." She foresaw a risk that disclosure would mean that lawyers and clients were less "brutally frank" with each other, thus undermining the quality and fullness of the advice given. (Q 628) A number of witnesses, including Sir Michael Wood, a former Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Legal Adviser, agreed with the Government's arguments, whilst Elizabeth Wilmshurst, a former FCO Deputy Legal Adviser, also felt that the frankness of legal advice would be compromised by the prospect of publication. (Ev18, paras 4-5, Q 27)

11._Whilst few witnesses argued in favour of full disclosure of legal advice, some argued for greater transparency. For instance, Lord Mayhew of Twysden told us that "the character of the advice should be made public". (Q 589) Others argued that advice about the legality of armed conflict should be published. Lord Falconer thought that it was "inconceivable" that the Attorney's advice in relation to the use of force could remain confidential. "The idea that we are not being told the basis on which we are going to war in relation to international law seems to me to be inconceivable now as a matter of basic transparency". (Q 203) Lord Morris agreed that "if the responsibility is going to be on Parliament to decide we are going to war … then Parliament should be fully informed". (Q 589) Lord Goldsmith suggested that the legal advice should be "set out in some detail and Parliament can then judge that". (Q 660) The Bar Council agreed that "[w]here assurance on legality is likely to be a crucial underpinning to executive action in the international sphere…we think it unlikely that the question of legality would not be raised publicly and in Parliament such that government would have to address the question of legality publicly and would be unlikely to proceed without appropriate advice." (Ev55, para 18)

12._The Attorney General told us there was "an appropriate honourable compromise … which enables people to know the basis upon which you have made the decision and does not trespass against the sort of client/adviser confidentiality that enables people to make the most of the advice they are given so they can really make the best decisions." (Q 628)

13._David Pannick QC, writing in the The Times on 27th February 2007, said that 'the Attorney General's ultimate client is not the Government but the public, the Attorney General should have the right, if necessary, to publish his or her legal views on important matters, while maintaining the confidentiality of discussions with ministers'.

14._The Government should be accountable to Parliament for its actions. For Parliament properly to discharge its accountability function, it must be sufficiently informed of the basis—including the legal basis—for the actions of Government. In particular, where Parliament is asked to take a decision on the basis of legal advice given to the Government—whether by an independent adviser, or a holder of the present politicised role—Parliament should normally see that advice. In that sense we endorse the position adopted by David Pannick QC. We echo the recommendation of the Justice Committee that it should become established practice to 'publish all or most of an advice where it is referred to in support of a political case being put forward by the Government.'[204]

Parliamentary accountability and transparency

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ATTENDANCE AT CABINET

15._The current Attorney General has been asked by the Prime Minister to attend all Cabinet meetings in her capacity as the legal adviser to the Government.[205] She told us that "[a]ttendance at Cabinet is very much a matter for the Prime Minister … and I do attend whenever I am able to do so". She suggested that it was advantageous to be able to "get your legal advice [in] early", since it is not always possible to predict in advance legal issues that would arise in Cabinet. She also claimed that the Attorney's more pronounced criminal policy role means "it has become increasingly important for the Attorney … to be the spokesperson for the development of that prosecutorial policy within the criminal justice framework". (QQ 634-635) Lord Goldsmith broadly agreed, and pointed out the difficulties that had arisen when he had only attended cabinet when the Cabinet Secretary said there was a specific issue where legal advice would be required. (Q 663)

16._This has not always been the arrangement. Lord Mayhew argued: "It never was [the practice] in my day, nor in the days of my predecessors … I do not think it is conducive to belief in his detachment from government that he should go as of right". (Q 594) Lord Morris agreed that the present arrangements were "a very unhappy practice" because "[T]here is a point in being a little distant from political colleagues [and] aloof from his colleagues". (Q 595) Lord Falconer thought that the Attorney should only attend Cabinet to give legal advice as required. For him, this debate demonstrated "why the Attorney General should become an independent figure, because he is unquestionably perceived to be a member of…the political government". (Q 202) On the other hand, the Prime Minister argued that regular attendance at Cabinet was not a recent innovation: "I do not believe it is the case that in the last ten years the Attorney General has rarely attended the Cabinet. The Attorney General has mainly attended the Cabinet".[206]

17._The Constitutional Affairs Committee found its witnesses in "unanimous agreement" that [the Attorney General] should not regularly attend Cabinet meetings.

18._We note the evidence of the present Attorney General that "The Prime Minister of the day has indicated that he wants me as Attorney to attend Cabinet and I do attend whenever I am able so to do".[207]

19._Whilst we accept that attendance at Cabinet is ultimately a matter for the Prime Minister, we endorse the Constitutional Affairs Committee's recommendation that "the old convention with respect to the Attorney General's attendance at Cabinet should be re-established."[208] We recommend that the Attorney should only attend Cabinet when the Prime Minister, on specific occasions, requires his or her legal advice, not routinely on the assumption that it might be required.

20._Since we propose to separate the legal and political functions of the Attorney, the need will not arise for the holder of the legal office to attend on matters for which he or she has Ministerial responsibility.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AS A MEMBER OF EITHER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT

21._The Attorney General told the Justice Committee that it was necessary for Attorneys to be a Member of either House of Parliament in order to deliver Parliamentary accountability, and in particular to allow members "to grill them, if necessary, within an inch of their lives." She added that "no-one has suggested [an accountability] construct which improves upon that which we currently have."[209] A number of witnesses agreed. Professor Hazell argued that since "the law officers have to be accountable, they have to be accountable to Parliament, and the best way for them to be directly accountable to Parliament is for them to be Members of Parliament, of either House". (Q 68) All the former Attorneys who gave evidence to us reached a similar conclusion. (QQ 595, 663)

22._Other witnesses disagreed. JUSTICE argued that "[a] statutory legal adviser could be held accountable through a Parliamentary Committee in the same way as the [Parliamentary] Ombudsman". (Ev45, para 17) Professor Jowell also referred to the example of the Ombudsman, and noted that the independent Irish Attorney appears before Select Committees as and when appropriate.[210] Lord Falconer suggested that a more appropriate accountability model for the non-political role currently undertaken by the Attorney would be the Director of Public Prosecutions. (Q 200)

23._Some witnesses considered which of the two Houses it was more appropriate for the Attorney to sit in. The Attorney General has been a member of the House of Lords since 1999. Professor Jeremy Horder, Criminal Commissioner, Law Commission, and Member, Criminal Justice Council, saw some advantage in the Attorney sitting in the Lords, since it created "a little bit of distance in the public eye, at any rate, from the hurly-burly of party … politics". (Q 606) Lord Morris said that he would prefer it if the Attorney sat in the Commons, whereas Lord Goodhart thought that this might create a conflict of interest between the requirement to give unpopular device and the desire to retain his or her seat. (Q 595, Ev05, para 4)

24._Roger Smith, Director of JUSTICE, argued that it was "a bit unsatisfactory" that the Commons were only able to hold the Solicitor General directly to account, when, as in recent times, the Attorney General sits in the Lords.[211] Lord Lyell suggested that the Lords should have a regular question time for an Attorney sitting in the Lords, while Lord Carlile of Berriew saw no reason why the Attorney should not answer questions in the House of Commons. (QQ 595, 605)

25._The Constitutional Affairs Select Committee noted that in Scotland "if a Law Officer is not an MSP he or she is empowered to participate in the proceedings of the Parliament but may not vote. The Lord Advocate can therefore be questioned by MSPs about the exercise of his or her functions."[212]

26._We recommend that, in order to establish and entrench political independence, the Attorney should not be a member of either House of Parliament. At present, select committees—not least the Justice Committee—could summon him or her to give evidence. Both Houses of Parliament could consider the Scottish model to allow for direct questioning by Members in the two chambers.

PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF THE WORK OF THE ATTORNEY AND THE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Annual Report

27._Clause 16 of the Draft Bill requires the Attorney General to lay an annual report before Parliament "on the exercise of the functions of the Attorney General during the year." (This would be in addition to the annual Departmental Report of the Law Officers' Departments.[213]) However, the Attorney would not be required to include in this report any information that she judges might impinge on legal professional privilege, could prejudice national security or seriously prejudice international relations, or that would prejudice the investigation of a suspected offence or proceedings before a court. The Attorney General told us how important the annual report was and that it should not be underestimated. She said that it would meet a need amongst the public and politicians alike to understand what the Attorney did. (QQ 646-647) Professor Jowell and Lord Goldsmith both agreed that it was a positive development (Q 654).[214]

28._A number of witnesses had specific concerns about the extent to which it would increase accountability. Mark Ryan, Senior Lecturer in Constitutional and Administrative Law, Coventry University, and Global Witness were both concerned that there would be less than effective Parliamentary oversight of the annual report. (Ev36, para 9, Ev39) Lord Carlile suggested that there could be more frequent periodic reports that were subject to scrutiny by Parliamentary committees. (Q 618) The Justice Committee concluded that it was "hard to gauge what the new Annual Report would add to the existing system. Without further information we are unable to reach a firm conclusion about whether it will significantly add to the process of accountability of the Attorney General."[215]

29._We welcome the proposal for an annual report on the exercise of the Attorney's functions, as far as it goes, but seek further information from the Government in its response to our report as to whether the report will add significantly to the process of accountability.

Improved Parliamentary accountability mechanisms

30._Some witnesses suggested new or improved mechanisms for ensuring the Attorney's accountability to Parliament. The Government suggested that one option would be for a new select committee to scrutinise the work of the Attorney General and the Attorney General's office, although they stressed this was a matter for Parliament.[216] Democratic Audit supported this proposal and Lord Goldsmith was also sympathetic. (Ev04, para 51, QQ 682-684) However, the Justice Committee concluded that there was no need for an additional, specific Committee to scrutinise the Attorney General: "we have that function and look forward to exercising it increasingly."[217] The Bar Council agreed. (Ev55, para 16)

31._We agree with the House of Commons Justice Committee that the current arrangements for select committee scrutiny of the Attorney General and her office are sufficient and work well. There is no need for an additional committee.

The Attorney General's role in the formulation of criminal justice policy

32._The Attorney General told the Justice Committee that it was important that the Attorney should retain her current criminal justice policy responsibilities because this helped "to make sure that each part of the system worked in a better and more conjoined way…Having an Attorney General whose main focus is going to be on prosecutorial authority and the roles that they play is very important".[218] Sir Ken Macdonald, Director of Public Prosecutions, told us that previously it had been felt that "prosecutors had too limited a role and they should be more influential … We have deliberately driven a process in which prosecutors have some influence on the development of criminal justice policy … It is absolutely critical from our point of view…to have, through the Attorney, a seat at the top table when criminal justice discussions are taking place". (Q 636) The other prosecutorial directors agreed, as did Lord Goldsmith. (QQ 637, 667)

33._Others were less convinced. Lord Lyell thought that the Attorney acting formally as a part of tripartite ministerial responsibility alongside the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice did not sit "particularly easily with the role in general". Lord Morris agreed that there was "a danger of being too mixed up with policy", and Lord Mayhew thought the combined roles meant that the Attorney could get herself into a position where her independence "does seem to be rather diminished". (Q 596) Lord Falconer agreed that the Attorney's policy role had made "his or her independent role much more obliterated and confused". (Q 197) The Constitutional Affairs Committee recommended that the Government should "separate the policy functions and the prosecutorial functions of the Attorney General. The 'ministerial' functions would be more appropriate carried out by a minister within the Ministry of Justice."[219] The Justice Committee echoed their conclusions and said there were "other mechanisms for ensuring that the prosecution authorities have a voice" and that "[t]he Ministerial role of the Attorney General in relation to criminal justice policy should be separated from the role of legal adviser."[220]

34._We endorse the recommendations of both the Constitutional Affairs Select Committee and the Justice Committee. The Attorney's role should be separated from that of formulating public policy in relation to criminal justice. Like any other senior civil servant, he or she could be asked to advise on implementation.

The Attorney General's role in prosecutions

REMOVING THE ATTORNEY'S POWER TO DIRECT PROSECUTIONS IN INDIVIDUAL CASES

35._Clause 2 of the Draft Bill removes the Attorney's power to give a prosecution direction in relation to an individual case. Such powers would rest with the prosecutorial directors. The Lord Chancellor argued that this change was "very significant" and Professor Jowell told the Justice Committee that it would mean that there would be "less opportunity for the Attorney to interfere in the prosecutorial process". (Q 778)[221] The Corner House believed that the proposal was "an important principle enshrining the independence of prosecutors", (Ev10) and the Justice Committee also approved of this transfer of powers.[222]

36._On the other hand, Sir Ken Macdonald was sceptical about the practical impact of this change. He told us that he had always been "something of an agnostic in this debate about whether there was a power to direct, although most people believed that there was. In the sense that it has never been exercised so far as anyone can discover there may not be a dramatic change of practice or any change at all". (Q 638)

37._Other witnesses were also hostile to the proposed change. Several of the former Attorneys stated that, though it was a power that was rarely if ever used, it should be retained. (QQ 597-598) Lord Morris argued that it was the "ultimate nuclear weapon because unless you have the power, how can the director in each department be made to listen to your decision?" Lord Lyell argued that, since the Attorney was answerable to Parliament for any decision, the power should be retained on grounds of Parliamentary accountability: "[Y]ou cannot have responsibility without power." Lord Mayhew agreed, and added that "you would end up with something much less accountable and much less satisfactory". He argued that the Government was seeking "to feed an asserted perception that anybody holding the present functions and responsibilities…cannot be trusted to exercise them fairly and with integrity". The Bar Council and Lord Mackay of Clashfern also expressed their concern over the proposal. (Ev55, paras 21-26, Ev47, paras 3-5, 8)

EXCEPTION TO THE BAN IN CASES AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY

38._Clause 12 of the Draft Bill sets out the Government's proposal that the Attorney should have a power to direct if the Attorney is "satisfied that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of safeguarding national security." The Attorney General argued that such a power was necessary "because of the importance of that issue to our country and because the fundamental nature of government is to make the safety and security of our citizens of primary importance".[223] She argued that, as the independent guardian of the public interest, and, pending reform of the oath, of the rule of law, the Attorney was the appropriate Minister to exercise these powers.[224] The Bar Council thought that the proposals were "well-balanced. We agree there should be provision for the (rare) need to stop a prosecution in the interests of national security; and the requirement for a report to Parliament on any occasion when the power is exercised seems to us an appropriate means of accountability and restraint." (Ev55, para 22) Lord Carlile agreed that it was a necessary power. (Q 617)

39._Other witnesses had deep concerns. Democratic Audit thought that the proposal was "entirely improper", in particular since "[t]he concept of 'national security' is notoriously susceptible to distortion; and leaving any such decision in the hands of a minister is likely to provoke public suspicion of abuse for political ends." (Ev04, para 47) The Corner House and JUSTICE also felt that the change from an ill-defined discretionary power to an explicit statutory power marked an increase in the Attorney's powers. (Ev10, Ev45, para 6) Professor Bogdanor saw "very considerable danger" in the proposal, since "it would be perfectly possible for national security to be used as a cloak by a politician for some other matter, and there are suggestions…that this has in fact happened in the recent past". (Q 17) Mark Ryan suggested that any proposed use of the power should be immediately brought to the attention of a specially appointed Select Committee, which could alert Parliament of any concerns. (Ev36, para 8) JUSTICE argued that the Attorney should only have a power to make a submission on national security to the prosecutorial director. (Ev45, paras 4-13) The Corner House recommended that a system of "strong checks and balances" needed to be in place. (Ev10)

40._Several witnesses made comments on specific aspects of the national security provisions, specifically clauses 12(1), 13(5) and 14(3).

41._The Justice Committee and Democratic Audit (Ev04, paras 46-47) were particularly concerned about clause 12(1)(a), which would give the Attorney the power to halt an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office. The Government justified this power on the basis that the Director of the Serious Fraud Office was the only one of the prosecutorial directors who has an investigative function.[225] However, the Justice Committee concluded that there was no justification for such powers.[226] Professor Horder was also concerned that this clause went too far. (Ev63)

42._Professor Jowell and a number of others were concerned that clause 13(5) (whereby a certificate signed by the Minister is "conclusive evidence" that a direction on the grounds of national security was necessary) was an 'ouster' clause that would prevent judicial review of any decision, "which is really contrary to every tenet of the rule of law which requires access to courts to challenge ministerial decisions".[227] The Justice Committee,[228] The Corner House and Global Witness made similar points. (Ev10, 39) However, Mark Ryan argued that the use of judicial review in this context would be inappropriate. (Ev36, para 8) Professor David Feldman, Professor of English Law, University of Cambridge, argued that the possibility of judicial review would be dependent upon the approach of the courts to any certificate issued under clause 13(5). (Ev66, paras 35-41) He also disagreed with Professor Jowell that the proposed clause would be vulnerable to challenge under the Human Rights Act. (Ev38a, para 34, Ev66, paras 40-41)

43._Professor Horder was concerned that clause 14(3) (which states that information need not be included in a report to Parliament which is required whenever the power to direct is exercised, if the Attorney is satisfied that (a) a claim to legal professional privilege could be maintained, (b) the inclusion of the information would prejudice national security or would seriously prejudice international relations, or (c) the inclusion of the information would prejudice the investigation of a suspected offence or proceedings before any court) was too broadly drafted. He recommended that clause 14(3)(b) should make no reference to international relations, because, as currently drafted, the sub-clause would "put the UK in danger of breaching its international obligations", and that, "[i]f information under this heading is withheld, there will be no way of knowing if a decision has been taken for reasons of economic advantage, as opposed to a wish to protect national security or secure human rights". (Ev63) The Justice Committee concluded that "accountability to Parliament cannot be a sufficient safeguard since the Reports to Parliament are unlikely to contain all the information relating to making the decision to halt proceedings or an investigation."[229] The Corner House and Global Witness raised similar objections. (Ev10, p4, Ev39)

44._We believe that political decisions should be taken on a transparent basis by political representatives. We therefore endorse the recommendation of the Constitutional Affairs Committee that there should be a transparent mechanism "through which Ministers can communicate to the independent Attorney General their recommendation or insistence that a particular prosecution should not proceed on national security grounds."[230] Both responsibility and power for such interventions ought to lie with Ministers, not with legal advisers. We also share witnesses' concern that impact on 'international relations' (as in Clause 14(3)(b)) should not be equated with issues of 'national security' We see merit in the Attorney reporting to Parliament if he or she gives a direction, on ministerial advice, in relation to an individual case and we recommend that the Government establishes a procedure for the Attorney to do so.

TRANSFER OR ABOLITION OF MOST OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ATTORNEY'S CONSENT TO INDIVIDUAL PROSECUTIONS

45._Clause 7 and Schedule 1 of the Draft Bill outline the Government's proposals for transferring or abolishing most of the current requirements for the Attorney General's consent to individual prosecutions, although the requirement would be retained in a small number of cases "which are particularly likely to give rise to consideration of public policy or public interest".[231] In a letter to the Committee, the Attorney General noted that "[d]etermining which of the…categories each offence falls into is not straightforward" and that "further work is needed on this aspect of the draft Bill. In particular, discussions with the prosecuting authorities are on-going." (Ev76, see also Ev72)

46._A number of witnesses commented on the proposals. Lord Lyell agreed that the various consent requirements "have become a little bit of a hotchpotch over the years. A substantial number of them are, quite rightly, left with the Attorney", and there are some "which are to be handed over to the Director in the draft Bill which actually I would keep with the Attorney". (Q 581) Lord Mayhew agreed that "there is a strong case for rationalising the list of offences". (Ev67) Others such as Democratic Audit argued that the requirement for consent should be transferred entirely to the DPP or other appropriate directors, in order to "depoliticise decisions over prosecutions". (Ev04, para 48) The Corner House argued that "there should be a proper public and Parliamentary debate about which offences would continue to require the Attorney's consent". (Ev10)

47._The question of how Parliamentary accountability would be retained when consent requirements are transferred was also raised in evidence. The Attorney told us that "we will need to think as to how any assurance that Parliament may need can be given because I should imagine that the conduit through which such assurances will be given to Parliament would still end up being the Attorney". (Q 645) In a subsequent letter to the Committee, she added that it would still be open for the Attorney to seek information about a case "and to convey that information to Parliament in response to Parliamentary Questions or otherwise". (Ev76) However, Professor Horder told us that "I regard it as wrong to think that there should be accountability to Parliament for the conduct of prosecutors in individual cases". (Ev63)

48._We recognise the merit of an independent legal adviser acting as arbiter of the public interest. Separating the legal and political functions of the present role will increase public confidence that decisions to prosecute or not are taken in that wider interest, rather than to serve the purposes of a particular Government. Since the new legal adviser will be at the apex of a number of other prosecuting authorities, we accept the Government's proposal to transfer the majority of requirements for the Attorney's consent to individual prosecutions. We do, however, recommend that further work should be undertaken to determine the category into which each consent requirement falls, and to ensure there is an effective accountability mechanism if and when powers are transferred. We recognise that the conduit for accountability to Parliament in each case may still be the Attorney.

ABOLITION OF THE POWER TO HALT A TRIAL ON INDICTMENT (BY ENTERING A PLEA OF NOLLE PROSEQUI)

49._Clause 11 of the Draft Bill proposes to abolish the Attorney's power to halt a trial on indictment (by entering a plea of nolle prosequi). The Attorney General told the Committee that this was in line with the proposals to end the power to direct and to refine the range of offences for which the Attorney's consent to prosecute is required. (Ev76) A number of witnesses, including The Corner House and Democratic Audit, supported the Government's proposals, (Ev10, Ev04, para 49) whilst Professor Horder asserted that the nolle prosequi power was not necessary because "the more active role of the judiciary in modern times (to stay proceedings for abuse of process), coupled with the development of a professional prosecution service bound by a code of conduct, is enough". (Ev63) The Justice Committee was uncertain of the utility of the proposal, but thought that it would "in a small way remove some power over prosecutions from the Attorney General."[232]

50._However, some of the former Attorneys did not agree. Lord Morris conceded that the nolle prosequi power was "an ultimate power not often used these days", but referred to specific cases where he had seen fit to use the power, and "[h]ence, it is important to maintain it, and I think the Government are going…the wrong way completely." Lords Lyell and Mayhew agreed. (QQ 601-602) Lord Goldsmith told the Committee that the fact this power existed was probably more important than its exercise. (Q 678) In response to these comments, the Attorney General conceded that the proposal to abolish the nolle prosequi power risked creating a "gap" in which neither the prosecuting authority nor the Attorney would be able to stop a prosecution. "For this reason we are considering whether it is appropriate to modify the powers of the main prosecuting authorities to discontinue proceedings [but t]his in turn raises difficult issues." (Ev76)

51._We endorse the view of the Justice Committee that the proposed abolition of nolle prosequi is 'of little practical importance'[233] but would support the removal of this power were the Attorney General's role to remain unreformed. However, since we recommend that the Attorney's legal role be radically altered, we believe the power to halt a trial on indictment (i.e. to enter a nolle prosequi) could be retained for such a position since there would be no risk, perceived or actual, of such decisions being taken to achieve political ends.

The Attorney General's superintendence function

RETENTION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SUPERINTENDENCE FUNCTION

52._The Governance of Britain White Paper argued that the Attorney General should maintain her superintendence functions over the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (DSFO), and the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions (DRCP). The Government argued that superintendence was necessary because Ministers had a legitimate interest in the objectives and policies of the prosecutors, because it would prevent the directors being drawn into the political arena, and because the Attorney was in the best position to do the job as an independent lawyer and guardian of the public interest.[234] The Directors themselves told the Committee how much they valued their relationship with the Attorney. (QQ 636-637, 640-642) The Bar Council agreed that the relationship was "appropriate and necessary and that no other Minister would be appropriate for this role". (Ev55, para 20)

53._Other witnesses were less convinced. Professor Bogdanor argued that an independent legal adviser "should not be responsible for superintending the prosecuting authorities". (Q 17) Professor Horder saw "the organisational logic of giving the superintendence role to the Ministry of Justice or to the Home Office", adding, however, that "so long as the prosecution services and the AG are content that the current arrangements work well, I see no pressing reason for change". (Ev63)

54._The Constitutional Affairs Select Committee found that "the present situation where the Attorney General has both ministerial functions an dis responsible for making decisions with regard to prosecutiosn results ina potential conflict of interest…The 'ministerial' functions [of the Attorney] would be more appropriately carried out by a minister within the new Ministry of Justice' This would allow the Attorney General to be a truly independent superintendent of the prosecution services, responsible for deciding on prosecutions and exercising a propriety and public interest role."

55._We endorse the recommendation of the Constitutional Affairs Committee. A newly independent Attorney could retain the superintendence functions in relation to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions.

THE PROTOCOL

56._Clause 3 makes provision for a new protocol setting out "how the Attorney General and the Directors are to exercise their functions in relation to each other." The protocol has not yet been published, although the Draft Bill indicates the areas it should cover. The proposal of a protocol was welcomed by the Bar Council, (Ev55, para 27) and Lord Lyell, who told us that the superintendence relationship "is an area which … has not been spelt out and could probably quite usefully be spelt out". (Q 581) Sir Ken Macdonald told us that it was a critical document since it set out the superintendence relationship for the first time, and it therefore "has to find a balance between reassuring the public that prosecutors make decisions free from political pressure and from an independent position at the same time as maintaining a level of appropriate accountability to Parliament". He did not want the protocol to be set out on the face of the Bill, as he wished to preserve some element of flexibility. (Q 641) The Attorney herself emphasised that this was a "living document" that was "not necessarily going to be one which will be permanently set in stone because it may have to change and adapt". (Q 640)

57._Witnesses expressed some specific concerns about the status of the protocol and the extent of Parliamentary scrutiny of it. In their joint submission to the Committee, Lords Lyell, Mayhew and Morris argued that "[i]t would be much better for the draft bill itself to contain the protocol in carefully considered language which can then be debated and amended by Parliament". (Ev40) Global Witness and The Corner House also argued for stronger Parliamentary scrutiny of the protocol. (Ev39, Ev10) Professor Horder, although generally in favour of a protocol, thought that the elements of the protocol set out in the Draft Bill were "slightly curious", for instance clause 3(2)(h) on media relations, and 3(2)(i) on complaints. He also argued that in addition to consulting the directors about revisions to the protocol, as specified in the Draft Bill, the Attorney should also consult with other interests such as the police. (Q 621) The Justice Committee regretted that the Draft Bill had been published before the protocol was ready, and called for it to be published before the Bill is introduced.[235]

58._We welcome the proposal for a protocol setting out how the Attorney, the Ministry of Justice, and the prosecutorial directors should exercise their functions in relation to each other. However, we echo the Justice Committee's regret that a draft of the protocol was not placed before Parliament along side the Bill. We recommend that the proposed protocol should be published in draft and subjected to Parliamentary scrutiny before the Bill is introduced. The final version should be subject to an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament. We note that that any future revisions of the protocol will be the subject of scrutiny by the House of Commons Justice Committee.

QUALIFICATIONS AND TENURE OF OFFICE OF THE DIRECTORS

59._Clauses 4 to 6 provide new provisions about the tenure of office of the prosecutorial directors. The Attorney General wrote to the Committee explaining that the new provisions setting a five year term, and ensuring that the Director may only be removed under certain circumstances, provide "a significant enhancement to the security of tenure for the Directors", since "[c]urrently, the Directors are appointed for whatever term of office the Attorney considers appropriate (which has ranged from 1 year to 5 years) and are dismissible by the Attorney subject only to the limitations of contract law and public law." (Ev76) In his written evidence to the Committee, the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions, David Green asserted that "[g]reater flexibility would be achieved by maintaining the ability of the Attorney to reappoint a serving Director for a term of less than 5 years." (Ev69) The Attorney General, however, stated that there might be a case for a limit on re-appointment, both to re-emphasise independence and to prevent a director becoming "stale". This was an area "where the Government is still thinking". (Ev76)

60._Democratic Audit and JUSTICE welcomed the new clauses, (Ev04, para 46, Ev45, para 10) but Global Witness argued that it was "inappropriate for the Directors to be appointed by the Attorney General as long as s/he remains a member of the Executive", and that any "decision to remove the Directors should be subject to an independent and impartial review". (Ev39) The Corner House questioned whether the proposals met the security of tenure criteria for public prosecutors set out by the Council of Europe in 2000. (Ev10) Professor Jowell was particularly concerned that a Director could be dismissed by the Attorney as "unfit" for failing to have regard to the (as yet unwritten) protocol.[236] The Justice Committee argued that this left the position of the Directors unclear: "The Directors ought to have clearer security of tenure than is apparent in the Draft Bill."[237] In her letter to us, the Attorney General rebutted these claims, claiming that "it is right that compliance with the protocol is recognised as a key indicator as to the fitness of the Director. But the test remains one of unfitness—a high test." (Ev76)

61._We welcome the proposed new clauses relating to the tenure of office of the Directors, but recommend that the Bill be amended to make clear that it will be possible for the Directors' terms of office to be renewed. If they are answerable to an independent Attorney, Directors' decisions cannot be said to have been taken in the interest of political patronage.

OATH OF OFFICE

62._The Government are committed to reforming the oath of office of the Attorney General, but are not planning to place it on a statutory basis. The Attorney General told the Committee that that was simply because "we do not need to have a piece of legislation. I do not think it is any more complex than that. I tend to take the view…that if you do not need legislation then we should not have it". (Q 648) Lord Goldsmith agreed. (Q 686)

63._There was general agreement amongst witnesses that it was necessary to reform the oath, and several argued that it would be best to do so by way of statute. Lord Mayhew argued that "it had better be achieved by statute", although he was more concerned with the fact that the Bill made "no reference to the traditional role of the Attorney General as the guardian of the public interest". (Ev67, Q 600) The Bar Council thought that a statutory approach was essential, to "giv[e] it Parliament's full endorsement". (Ev55, para 15) The Constitution Committee believed that the responsibilities of the Attorney (and possibly other ministers) in upholding the rule of law should be acknowledged in statute, and that the Attorney's oath of office should be updated through primary legislation. (Ev71, paras 9-11) The Justice Committee agreed that the Attorney's oath of office "should be reformed to cover the duty to uphold the Rule of Law."[238]

64._The Constitutional Affairs Select Committee further found that "it is not appropriate that the responsibility for upholding the 'Rule of Law' lies with one member of the Government" and suggested "this be explored within the context of the development of a new Ministerial Code." The Justice Committee also favoured 'a statutory duty being placed on all ministers to observe the Rule of Law'.

65._If the Attorney were no longer a Minister, the oath of office would necessarily be reformed to reflect that change. The oath should be strengthened to include a public duty to observe the Rule of Law and to make clear that the Attorney acts in the public interest. We endorse the Justice Committee's view that a statutory duty with respect to the Rule of Law should be placed on all Ministers."

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?
ContentsNot Contents
Christopher ChopeLord Armstrong of Ilminster
Lord Maclennan of RogartLord Campbell of Alloway
Lord MorganBaroness Gibson of Market Rasen
Lord TylerLord Hart of Chilton
Mr Andrew TyrieMartin Linton
Sir George YoungIan Lucas
Fiona Mactaggart
Lord Norton of Louth
Emily Thornberry
Lord Williamson of Horton
Michael Jabez Foster

The Amendment is disagreed to accordingly.

Paragraphs 77 to 79 are agreed to.

Paragraph 80 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 81 to 87 are agreed to.

Paragraph 88 reads as follows:

The Government should be accountable to Parliament for its actions. For Parliament properly to discharge its accountability function, it must be sufficiently informed of the basis—including the legal basis—for the actions of Government.

It is moved by Lord Armstrong of Ilminster at the end of line 3 of paragraph 88, to add "though not necessarily of the text of the Attorney General's advice."

Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived.

Paragraph 88 is agreed to.

Paragraphs 89 to 90 are agreed to.

Paragraph 91 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 92 to 95 are agreed to.

Paragraph 96 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 97 to 148 are agreed to.

Paragraph 149 is, agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraph 159 reads as follows:

We do not accept that it is appropriate to give the Lord Chancellor a power to set targets or to issue directions to the Judicial Appointments Commission. Such a power would have the potential seriously to undermine the independence of the appointments process, which was a primary reason for the 2005 reforms.

It is moved by Fiona Mactaggart in line 2 of paragraph 159, to leave out from "Commission" to the end of the paragraph.

Question, That the Amendment be made, put and negatived.

Paragraph 159 is agreed to.

Paragraphs 160 to 167 are agreed to.

Paragraph 168 reads as follows:

We accept the proposal for statutory key principles, but we encourage the Lord Chancellor to keep their impact under review in case the Judicial Appointments Commission is proved right in its argument that they are too broad to be meaningful or could lead to an unacceptable increase in speculative litigation.

It is moved by Lord Armstrong if Ilminster in line 1 of paragraph 168, to leave out from beginning to "encourage" and insert "We welcome the proposal to introduce key principles but are not convinced that they should be statutory. We".

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?
ContentsNot Contents
Lord Armstrong of IlminsterMartin Linton
Lord Campbell of AllowayLord Maclennan of Rogart
Christopher ChopeFiona Mactaggart
Baroness Gibson of Market RasenLord Tyler

Lord Hart of Chilton

Lord Morgan

Lord Norton of Louth

Lord Williamson of Horton

Sir George Young

The Amendment is agreed to accordingly.

Paragraph 168, as amended, is agreed to.

Paragraphs 169 to 186 are agreed to.

Paragraph 187 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 188 to 266 are agreed to.

Paragraph 267 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 268 to 282 are agreed to.

Paragraphs 283 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 284 and 285 are agreed to.

Paragraph 286 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 287 and 295 are agreed to.

Paragraph 296 reads as follows:

We agree with the continued treatment of special advisers as temporary civil servants on the grounds that it is preferable for them to work within the same framework as other civil servants. For this reason, we reject the proposal that they be paid from "Short money", which would have the effect of removing them from the ambit of the Civil Service Code. We note the intention set out in the Green Paper to clarify the role of special advisers. On balance, we do not support calls for restrictions on advisers' functions to be put on the face of the Draft Bill. However, we recommend that paragraph 7 of the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers should be amended to make it explicit that special advisers may not authorise expenditure; recruit, manage or direct civil servants; or exercise statutory powers. We recommend that a procedure should be included in the appropriate Code for establishing a cap on the number of special advisers.

It is moved by Fiona Mactaggart in line 10 of paragraph 296, to leave out from "powers" to the end of the paragraph.

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?
ContentsNot Contents
Baroness Gibson of Market RasenLord Armstrong of Ilminster
Martin LintonLord Campbell of Alloway
Lord Maclennan of RogartChristopher Chope
Fiona MactaggartLord Norton of Louth
Lord MorganLord Tyler
Lord Williamson of HortonSir George Young

The Amendment is disagreed to accordingly.

It is moved by Lord Armstrong of Ilminster in line 10 of paragraph 296, to leave out from "powers" to the end of the paragraph and add: "We recommend that a procedure should be included in the appropriate Code for limiting the numbers of special advisers, preferably not by establishing a cap".

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?
ContentsNot Contents
Lord Armstrong of IlminsterBaroness Gibson of Market Rasen
Lord Campbell of AllowayLord Morgan
Christopher ChopeLord Norton of Louth
Martin LintonLord Tyler
Lord Maclennan of RogartLord Williamson of Horton
Sir George Young

The Amendment is agreed to accordingly.

It is moved by Lord Armstrong of Ilminster at the end of paragraph 296 to add the words "We suggest this might be done by confining to Cabinet Ministers (or Ministers in charge of departments) the right to appoint special advisers and by limiting the number of special advisers that each Cabinet Minister should be able to appoint".

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?
ContentsNot Contents
Lord Armstrong of IlminsterMartin Linton
Lord Campbell of AllowayLord Maclennan of Rogart
Christopher ChopeLord Morgan
Baroness Gibson of Market RasenLord Tyler
Lord Norton of LouthLord Williamson of Horton
Sir George Young

The Amendment is agreed to accordingly.

Paragraph 296, as amended, is agreed to.

Paragraphs 297 and 298 are agreed to.

Paragraph 299 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 300 to 302 are agreed to.

Paragraph 303 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 304 to 317 are agreed to.

Paragraph 318 reads as follows:

We agree that there is a case for strengthening Parliamentary involvement in armed conflict decisions. We also agree with the House of Lords Constitution Committee that the Government's detailed resolution approach is a well balanced and effective way of proceeding.

It is moved by Martin Linton in line 2 of paragraph 318, to leave out from "decisions" to the end of the paragraph and insert: "We also agree with the House of Commons Public Administration Committee that the best approach would be a statutory one, as we accept the reasoning in the Government's Green Paper that prerogative powers should be put on a statutory basis".

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

Objected to; on Question?
ContentsNot Contents
Martin LintonLord Armstrong of Ilminster
Lord Maclennan of RogartLord Campbell of Alloway
Fiona MactaggartChristopher Chope
Lord MorganBaroness Gibson of Market Rasen
Lord TylerLord Norton of Louth
Lord Williamson of Horton
Sir George Young

The Amendment is disagreed to accordingly.

Paragraph 318 is agreed to.

Paragraphs 319 to 378 are agreed to.

Paragraph 379 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraph 380 is agreed to.

Paragraph 381 is agreed to with an amendment.

Paragraphs 382 to 389 are agreed to.

The Abstract is agreed to with amendments.

The Appendices to the Report are agreed to.

The Committee agrees that the draft Report, as amended, be the report of the Joint Committee.

Ordered, That certain papers be appended to the Minutes of Evidence.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No 134 of the House of Commons.

Ordered, That the Chairman make the report to the House of Commons and Lord Campbell of Alloway make the report to the House of Lords.

Ordered, That the Joint Committee be now adjourned.


196   The Governance of Britain: A Consultation on the Role of the Attorney General , July 2007, Cm 7192, para 1.6 Back

197   Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain, July 2007, Cm 7170, para 54 Back

198   Constitutional Affairs Committee, 5th Report (2006-07): Constitutional Role of the Attorney General (HC306) Back

199   Constitution Committee, 7th Report (2007-08): Reform of the Office of Attorney General (HL 93) Back

200   Justice Committee, 4th Report (2007-08): Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (provisions relating to the Attorney General) (HC 698) Back

201   ibid., Q 5 Back

202   ibid., para 40 Back

203   Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain-Constitutional Renewal, March 2008, Cm7342-I, para 66 Back

204   Justice Committee, para 75 Back

205   Liaison Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 3 July 2008, HC 192-ii, QQ 131-132 Back

206   ibid., Q 132 Back

207   Q634 (24 June 2008) Back

208   Para 86, Constitutional Affairs Committee Report Back

209   Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (provisions relating to the Attorney General), op cit., QQ 46-52 Back

210   ibid., QQ 9, 14 Back

211   ibid., Q 19 Back

212   Constitutional Affairs Committee, 5th Report (2006-07), p 3 Back

213   See e.g. Law Officers' Departments Departmental Annual Report 2008, Cm 7406, May 2008. Back

214   Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (provisions relating to the Attorney General), op cit., Q 4 Back

215   ibid., para 71 Back

216   The Governance of Britain-Constitutional Renewal, op cit., para 59 Back

217   Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (provisions relating to the Attorney General), op cit., para 89 Back

218   ibid., paras 33-5 Back

219   Constitutional Affairs Committee, para 83 Back

220   ibid., para 88 Back

221   ibid., Q 4 Back

222   ibid., para 42 Back

223   ibid., Q 76 Back

224   ibid., Q 77 Back

225   ibid., QQ 59-64 Back

226   ibid., para 45 Back

227   ibid., Q 22 Back

228   ibid., para 51 Back

229   ibid., para 52 Back

230   Constitutional Affairs Commmitee, para 82 Back

231   The Governance of Britain-Constitutional Renewal, op cit., para 90-92 Back

232   Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (provisions relating to the Attorney General), op cit., paras 66-69 Back

233   Para 69, Justice Committee Back

234   The Governance of Britain-Constitutional Renewal, op cit., paras 70-75 Back

235   Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (provisions relating to the Attorney General), op cit., paras 53-58 Back

236   ibid., QQ 27-30 Back

237   ibid., para 63 Back

238   ibid., paras 93-96 Back


 
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