Joint Committee On Human Rights Nineteenth Report

Bill drawn to the special attention of both Houses

1  Education and Skills Bill
Date introduced to first House

Date introduced to second House

Current Bill Number

Previous Reports

28 November 2007

Bill 81



1.1 This is a Government Bill introduced in the House of Commons on 28 November 2007. Ed Balls MP, Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families has made a statement of compatibility under s. 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill set out, in just over two pages, the Government's view of the Bill's compatibility with the Convention rights at paragraphs 187-199. The Bill completed its Committee stage in the Commons on 28 February 2008. Report and Third Reading are scheduled for 13 May 2008.

1.2 We wrote to the Minister on 20 December 2007 asking for a fuller explanation of the Government's view of the compatibility of the Bill with the Convention.[1] We received the Minister's reply on 10 January 2008.[2] We are grateful for the Minister's prompt response.

The effect of the Bill

1.3 The Bill follows two Government publications (the Green Paper Raising Expectations: Staying in education and training post-16[3] and World Class Skills: Implementing the Leitch Review of Skills in England[4]). According to the Explanatory Notes, the purpose of the Bill is:

… first, to change the statutory framework to put a duty on all young people to participate in education or training until the age of 18, with corresponding duties on local education authorities and employers to enable and support participation. Second, it amends legislation about the provision of adult education and training, and support for young people. Third, the Bill changes the regulatory framework for inspection of independent educational institutions, non-maintained special schools and providers of initial teacher training. The Bill also includes a number of miscellaneous provisions in relation to behaviour, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) and schools forms.[5]

1.4 Certain aspects of the Bill have significant human rights implications which we detail below:

a)  The duty to participate in education or training;

b)  Information sharing provisions;

c)  Inspection of independent educational institutions; and

d)  Religious worship and education in schools.

Duty to participate in education or training

1.5 The central focus of the Bill is contained in chapter 1 which requires that young people between the ages of 16 and 18, who have not obtained a level 3 qualification (equivalent to two A-Levels) must participate in education or training ("the clause 2 duty"). The duty to participate in education and training includes full-time education or training, training related to an apprenticeship, or a combination of employment and a minimum number of hours training/education.

1.6 Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) requires States to give weight to the views of children[6] where they are of sufficient maturity. In its most recent conclusions on the UK, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child stated that the UK must:

Ensure that legislation throughout the State party reflects article 12 and respects children's rights to express their views and have them given due weight in all matters concerning their education.[7]

1.7 The English Secondary Students' Association wrote to us to express concerns about the Bill. In particular, they felt that young people were not adequately consulted on the Bill and that the views of young people were not given "due weight" under Article 12 UNCRC.[8]

1.8 The Explanatory Notes do not deal with the human rights implications of this Clause, save to explain, relying on human rights principles, the reason why the Government chose to impose the primary duty on young adults themselves:

The Government has considered whether placing the primary duty to participate on the young person, with an ancillary but lesser obligation to assist on their parents, is consistent with ECHR law principles (given that where a child is of compulsory school age, the duty to ensure attendance rests solely on the parent).

The Government's view is that having the primary duty to participate on the young person is in keeping with the general emphasis in domestic and ECHR case law on the increasing autonomy of young people as they approach majority and the need to uphold the rights and independent views of young people.[9]

1.9 We welcome the Government's recognition of the "increasing autonomy" of young people approaching adulthood and the positive duties incumbent on the state to respect and facilitate the enjoyment of their rights, independent of their parents or carers. However, we suggest that it is, at the very least, confusing why, given this recognition, the Government has chosen to coerce young people into education and training through the use of criminal sanctions, in a way which it could not possibly do in relation to those over the age of 18. We also regret the Government's failure to give any real consideration to the human rights implications of the proposed duty in the Explanatory Notes. This hinders effective parliamentary scrutiny of the clause's compatibility with human rights.

1.10 Local education authorities (LEAs) are required to make arrangements to identify young people who are not complying with clause 2. Where it believes that a young person is failing to comply with his/her duty under clause 2, the LEA may issue an attendance notice.[10] It is a criminal offence for an individual to fail to comply with an attendance notice, without reasonable excuse.[11] During the Second Reading debate, Ed Balls MP, the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, stated:

… it is only by requiring that every young person participates in education or training until the age of 18 that we can ensure that they have all the opportunities they need and that all employers, schools and colleges are galvanised to play their part so that no young person falls through the cracks.

Those duties must be enforced. That is necessary to strike the balance between rights and responsibilities. Of course, sanctions will be a last resort and … they are at the discretion of the local authority.[12]

And John Denham MP, the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, described the Bill as having a "modest, mild bit of compulsion."[13]

1.11 Whilst we do not dispute the potential benefits to young people of remaining in education or training until the age of 18, we had concerns about whether the imposition of a duty on pain of criminal sanction was necessary and proportionate to meet the Government's aim or whether less intrusive alternatives exist. We therefore wrote to the Minister on this point.[14]

1.12 In his reply, Jim Knight MP, the Minister for Schools and Learners, stressed that a criminal sanction was "the very last stage in the enforcement system" but that, in his view, it was necessary in order to ensure compliance.[15] During debates on the clause in Public Bill Committee, the Minister addressed the reasons for using criminal rather than civil penalties stating:

We think that the combination of all these measures will get us to 90 per cent [participation] … When we considered the challenge of the last 10 per cent, because those are probably the most disadvantaged young people in our country and the ones who would benefit most from education and training, the view was that only through compulsion could we get to them. That is not because they will think "Oh, goodness me, it's now the law that I have to do it." It is more that, for us in the Department, for local authorities and for our non-departmental public bodies - for the whole system - we have a much stronger driver, beyond our passion for social justice, to make the policy work.[16]


Without compulsion, young people with lower aspirations … will be missed out. We believe that raising the participation age to 18 is the most effective way of galvanising the education system to provide better for all young people.[17]

1.13 The Minister confirmed that any criminal record would be expunged two and a half years after the conviction and that the offence was not recordable,[18] would not be placed on the Police National Computer or be disclosable in a Criminal Records Bureau check.[19] Nick Gibb MP proposed an amendment which would remove the compulsory element of the Bill and replace it with a duty on local authorities to "enable and assist" young people to participate in education and training,[20] reflecting the language of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment on the Right to Education.[21] The amendment was negatived.

1.14 On why alternatives were not appropriate in the Government's view, the Minister told us in correspondence:

My officials have worked very closely with the Ministry of Justice in the development of this enforcement system and given extensive consideration to alternatives to criminal sanctions. The Government has considered whether there are administrative sanctions that could be used to enforce the requirement, such as withholding benefits or financial support, but has concluded that none of these administrative provisions would be effective… We also considered whether there are any age-related rights, such as driving licences, that could be withheld as a means of enforcing the duty, but identified none that would be appropriate, universal and practical to implement.[22]

1.15 The duty to participate in education or training raises issues under Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect for private life, which can include aspects of an individual's working life and employment). Such rights may only be interfered with when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, in pursuit of a legitimate aim. Whilst we do not deny the potential benefits to some young people and the economy of their continuing in education and training, in our view, relying on criminal coercion for its enforcement is potentially disproportionate.

Information sharing

1.16 The Bill contains a number of information sharing provisions in Parts 1-4.[23] These raise potential human rights issues, notably the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). The human rights section of the Explanatory Notes refers to some, but not all, of these provisions. Whilst the Explanatory Notes state generally that the provisions in chapter 2 of Part 1 pursue the aim of economic well-being,[24] they do not explain specifically, in relation to each of the disclosure provisions, how they are both necessary and proportionate to the achievement of that aim. In addition, the Notes make no reference to the human rights compatibility or otherwise of Part 2[25] and, whilst accepting that Convention rights may be engaged under Part 4, state, without further explanation, that there would be no unjustifiable interference.[26] We wrote to the Government requesting clarification of the aims and necessity of each of the information supply provisions and an explanation of the safeguards that would be in place to ensure their compatibility with the right to respect for private and family life.[27]

1.17 In addition, we raised specific questions about the proportionality of the provisions in Part 3, which permit disclosure of identifying information by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs to the Secretary of State or to devolved bodies. Whilst the Explanatory Notes set out the aim (economic well-being) which the Government suggests will be achieved by these disclosures, no explanation is given of how the interference with an individual's private and family life rights under Article 8 ECHR is proportionate to that aim; they simply state that the powers will be "exercised in a way that is proportionate."[28]

1.18 The Minister responded by annexing a detailed 12 page table addressing our questions, for which we are grateful and will return to below.[29]

1.19 As we stated in our recent Report on Data Protection and Human Rights, we have noticed a marked increase in the number of provisions in Government Bills which authorise the sharing of personal information. In our view, this has not been accompanied by a sufficiently strong commitment in Government to the provision of effective safeguards. We have repeatedly expressed concerns, from a human rights standpoint, about the adequacy of the safeguards accompanying such wide powers to share personal information.[30] Whilst the sharing of information is not, in human rights terms, objectionable in itself, the sharing of personal data inevitably raises human rights concerns and, the more sensitive the information, the stronger those concerns. The Government must show that any proposal for data sharing is necessary to meet a legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim, and that appropriate safeguards are in place to ensure that personal data is only disclosed in circumstances where it is proportionate to do so.[31] In our Data Protection and Human Rights Report, we concluded:

We fundamentally disagree with the Government's approach to data sharing legislation, which is to include very broad enabling provisions in primary legislation and to leave the data protection safeguards to be set out later in secondary legislation. Where there is a demonstrable need to legislate to permit data sharing between public sector bodies, or between public and private sector bodies, the Government's intentions should be set out clearly in primary legislation. This would enable Parliament to scrutinise the Government's proposals more effectively and, bearing in mind that secondary legislation cannot usually be amended, would increase the opportunity for Parliament to hold the executive to account… Setting out the purposes of data sharing and the limitations on data sharing powers in primary legislation would give a clear indication to the staff utilising such powers of the significance of data protection.[32]

1.20 A number of the problems we identified in our Report are exemplified in this Bill.


1.21 The information sharing provisions with which we are principally concerned are those contained in clauses 13-17 (Part 1), 57, 61-62 (Part 2), 72-76 (Part 3) and 116 (Part 4). With the exception of clause 116, the Government relies on the economic well-being of the country to justify any interference with human rights. According to the Government, clause 116 is needed to protect the rights of children.

1.22 We reiterate that, as a first step, any interference with Convention rights must be shown to be necessary. According to the European Court of Human Rights:

… "necessary" in this context does not have the flexibility of such expressions as "useful", "reasonable", or "desirable", but implies the existence of a "pressing social need" for the interference in question.[33]

1.23 The Government is required to provide reasons for any interference which are "relevant and sufficient" in the context of the case as a whole.[34] A measure will be proportionate to the aim it pursues if supported by sufficiently persuasive reasons.[35] In determining whether the reasons advanced are sufficient, regard must be had to the nature and degree of the particular interference with the individual's rights.

1.24 As a general point, we note, with concern, that a number of the information sharing provisions in Part 1 permit the disclosure of information for the vague purposes of "enabling" or "assisting" various authorities to perform their statutory functions.[36] We question whether simply "enabling" or "assisting" the performance of statutory functions is sufficient, in every circumstance, to meet the necessity test. We recommend that these particular provisions of the Bill be amended to provide more precise purposes for which information may be disclosed.


1.25 A number of the clauses permit the disclosure of wide categories of information, for a variety of different purposes:

a)  Clauses 14(3)(c) and 57 permit the disclosure of "information in the institution's possession about the pupil or student."

b)  Clauses 15 and 61 allow the Secretary of State to "supply information, including social security information." Whilst "social security information" is defined to include "personal information," the information which may be supplied goes beyond social security information alone. However, such further "information" is not defined.

c)  Similarly clauses 16 and 62 allow "information about a person" to be supplied by a wide range of public bodies, without any further definition of what that information may include. In correspondence with us, the Minister explained that information to which clauses 16 and 62 refer may include "health, family, personal and social."[37]

d)  Clause 17 refers to "relevant information" which is subsequently loosely defined (clause 17(7)).

e)  Clause 116 permits the disclosure of "any information relating to a person."

1.26 Whilst we are pleased to note that the Government has chosen to deal with the categories of information which may be disclosed in primary rather than secondary legislation, we draw attention to the vagueness of many of those categories. We recommend that the Bill be amended to ensure that the information which may be disclosed is defined with greater specificity, preferably in an exhaustive list. This is vital to ensuring that both the authorities making the disclosures and the individual subjects of disclosures understand the information which may or may not be disclosed and the circumstances in which that disclosure may take place.


1.27 The Government points to a number of safeguards which will protect individuals' privacy rights and ensure that any disclosures conform to Article 8. Safeguards such as offences relating to the unlawful disclosure of certain types of information are to be welcomed.[38]

1.28 The Government also relies on the safeguards in the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA):

The Data Protection Act will govern how those involved in the provision of Connexions services can use the personal information shared in accordance with these information sharing provisions, including how they acquire, store or dispose of it. Any unlawful disclosure or use of information will be subject to the offences and associated penalties under the Act.[39]

1.29 In our Report on Data Protection and Human Rights, we noted the importance of the DPA in implementing the UK's positive obligation to ensure that its laws provide adequate protection against the unjustified disclosure of personal information. However, we also stated that:

Its mere existence does not exhaust the obligation on the State to provide adequate safeguards. The Data Protection Act must itself be interpreted so as to be compatible with Article 8, and it may still be necessary for legislation which authorises the disclosure of personal information to contain detailed provisions circumscribing the scope of that power and providing safeguards against its arbitrary use.[40]

1.30 We repeat this conclusion in relation to this Bill.

1.31 Two clauses in the Bill permit young people or their parents to object to the disclosure of information going beyond names and addresses, if they have instructed the body holding such information not to disclose it.[41] No similar possibilities for objecting to disclosure are proposed for the other information sharing provisions. Whilst on the face of it, the possibility to object would appear to be a helpful privacy safeguard which we would welcome, there is confusion as to how this would operate in practice. This issue was the subject of much discussion during the Public Bill Committee debates. In response to a number of opposition amendments proposing the inclusion in clauses 14 and 57 of a requirement for written consent, Jim Knight MP, the Minister for Schools and Learners, relying on the DPA, stated:

… the Bill, as currently written, reads as if there would be an opt-out, but it has to be read in conjunction with the data protection legislation, which requires active consent for that sort of information to be passed on.[42]


… young people have the right under the Data Protection Act 1998, to know if their information is going to be passed on. They can request a copy of it and can request that it be corrected if they think that it is wrong. They can prevent their school or college from passing on certain information about them. Connexions obtains their consent before passing on their information to other bodies. Young people can consent to the information being passed on to some bodies and not to others…. It is fair to say that it is not clear on reading the Bill where the act of consent comes in, because it is provided for by other legislation.[43]

1.32 Later in the debate, the Minister expanded on his comments:

The basic information requirement affects every pupil… Subsequent information, such as that in respect of the DPA and whether there is an opt-in or an opt-out depends on the circumstances. In most cases, much of that information will be passed on, because parents will not withhold their consent, as they value the support generated from the Connexions services and others.

… The Data Protection Act 1998 already requires public bodies, including schools, colleges and training providers, to inform an individual if personal data relating to him or her is disclosed. In practice, that means, for example, that the school will actively approach the young person, or their parent, to inform them about the purposes of data processing, such as the type of information and the bodies with whom data may be shared and why. The school would need to repeat that annually, and every year, it should send some kind of notice home to parents setting out how the data will be used.

This requirement exists even where consent for the sharing of information is not required as a matter of law. The interests of the young person, and any consequences for them of information sharing, must be the paramount consideration. Adding a specific requirement for young people to give their written consent every time their school or college passed information to the local authority or its Connexions service would greatly increase bureaucracy and add complexity to the system.[44]

1.33 Clause 14 relates to information disclosed to local authorities and clause 57 to information disclosed to those delivering Connexions services. The Minister distinguished between the two types of information:

We believe that the nature of the information that will enable Connexions to fulfil its duty of support to all young people means that it is proportionate to have an opt-out approach to consent. We take a slightly different stance on the information that is held by Connexions and may be passed to other agencies…. That later category of data held by Connexions can be sensitive.

In some cases, because of an individual's needs, the Connexions service may want to pass specific information to another professional working in a specific area, such as a social worker or a health professional. That would be done on a case-by-case basis and with the active consent of the young person. The young person can agree to information being passed to one professional but not to another. The provisions strike the right balance between enabling the local authority to fulfil its duty of promoting participation by providing the Connexions service and tracking young people effectively, and respecting young people's right to prevent certain information about them being shared.[45]

In relation to clause 14, the Minister stated:

Consent will not necessarily be required where there is a statutory power for the disclosure to be made, but parents and pupils will be made fully aware of the right to opt out in the fair processing notice that is issued annually.[46]

1.34 We are concerned by the confusion surrounding the operation of the purported safeguard in clauses 14(4) and 57(4), which is exacerbated by the need for public bodies to have regard to a number of pieces of legislation to interpret their statutory duties in relation to both clauses. We are therefore dubious as to whether the position will be sufficiently clear to enable staff to be sure when they may disclose information without consent, and when consent will be required. Such confusion is likely to be detrimental to the privacy rights of individuals. We recommend that the issue be clarified in guidance under clause 18.

1.35 The Government referred to the added bureaucracy and complexity of requiring consent before the disclosure of each and every piece of information.[47] We note the view of the European Court of Human Rights that administrative difficulties alone are unlikely to be sufficient to render a particular interference "necessary" for the purposes of Article 8(2) ECHR.[48] Whilst we accept that explicit consent need not be obtained for basic information (such as an individual's name and address) to be disclosed, the same cannot be said of sensitive or personal information, which already requires a heightened standard (under the DPA) before disclosure may be made. We recommend that, in relation to any of the information sharing provisions dealing with personal information, the Bill be amended to require that an individual and his or her parents be notified, at a minimum, annually of the personal information (beyond an individual's name and address) which may be disclosed, and be required to decide whether to opt-in to permit such disclosures being made. However, before the disclosure of sensitive information may take place, written consent should be sought and received.

Independent educational institutions

1.36 Part 4 of the Bill deals with the regulation and inspection of independent educational institutions. Such institutions are required to register with the Chief Inspector.[49] It is an offence not to be registered.[50] At all reasonable times, the Chief Inspector may enter and inspect premises and inspect and take copies of records or documents where he has reasonable cause to believe that such an offence is being committed.[51] The Chief Inspector also has the same powers to enter, inspect and take copies of records at all reasonable times for the purposes of carrying out an inspection.[52] The human rights section of the Explanatory Notes on this Part of the Bill simply state:

There is nothing in this Part of the Bill which would amount to an unjustifiable interference with Convention rights. Conceivably, Convention rights will be engaged when the Chief Inspector and the Secretary of State exercise their functions under this Part.[53]

1.37 However, in our view, the powers to enter, inspect and take copies of records raise potential issues around the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR, the right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR (which includes businesses)[54] and the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR.

1.38 We wrote to the Minister raising our concerns that the Bill does not contain any protection from seizure for documents which are subject to legal professional privilege.[55] The Minister disagreed that it was necessary for protection for legally privileged documents from search and seizure to appear on the face of the Bill, relying on the fact that the Chief Inspector is a public authority who is required to act compatibly with Convention rights (Section 6(1) HRA 1998).[56]

1.39 We agree, of course, that the Chief Inspector is required, as a public authority, to act compatibly with Convention rights. However, in addition, in order to ensure the compatibility of these powers with the Convention, we would expect to see certain safeguards in place. As the Bill stands, the only safeguard which exists is that the powers be exercised "at all reasonable times." The Bill does not require the action to be proportionate with Convention rights or for there to be clear evidence that incriminating documents are on the premises. In addition, it does not specify which types of material may be inspected and copied, nor require a judicial warrant to be obtained authorising the search. The lack of safeguards on the face of the Bill is in our view unacceptable. Specific core safeguards in relation to the powers to enter, inspect and take copies of records should appear on the face of the Bill, not least to provide protection for documents subject to legal professional privilege.[57] Requiring the surrender of documents subject to privilege would create a significant risk of incompatibility with Articles 6(1) and 8 ECHR.[58]

Religious worship in schools

1.40 Clause 127 seeks to amend the Education Act 1996 to allow regulations to be made permitting sixth-form students to opt-out of religious worship and for younger students to be withdrawn from religious worship by their parents in non-maintained special schools. The regulations will also permit a child to be removed from religious education on the request of his or her parents. During the Public Bill Committee, John Hayes MP linked this provision with the clause 2 participation duty, suggesting that the Government's position was ironic. He stated:

It is the Government's contention that it is okay for someone at the age of 16 to say that they do not want to study religion, but not okay to say that they do not want to study everything else.[59]

1.41 Replying, the Minister said that the Government was:

… being consistent in saying that young people have a duty, that they are of sufficient maturity to be able to understand and fulfil that duty, and that we therefore similarly believe that they are of sufficient maturity to make up their own minds as to whether they want to participate in religious education and worship.[60]

1.42 We are pleased to note that the Bill proposes to permit sixth-form pupils to opt-out of religious worship in non-maintained special schools. This follows our recommendation in our Report on the Education and Inspections Bill.[61] However, we question whether the Bill gives sufficient weight to the rights of a child to freedom of thought, conscience and belief under Article 9 ECHR and to Article 12 of the UNCRC.

1.43 We wrote to the Minister to ask about the human rights compatibility of these provisions.[62] In particular, we asked why the Government did not propose to permit children who are not in the sixth-form, but who have sufficient maturity, understanding and intelligence to withdraw from religious education and collective worship, as we also recommended in our Report on the Education and Inspections Bill.[63]

1.44 In response, the Minister stated that the intention was to align the position of maintained and non-maintained special schools. Responding to our question as to why the Bill did not go further and follow our earlier recommendation, the Minister stated:

Currently only pupils above compulsory school age have the right to withdraw from religious worship. Schools must have clear criteria for making arrangements for curriculum matters and to have procedures for making judgements which are not disproportionately burdensome. We do not believe that it is practicable to require schools to conduct the individual assessments which a right to withdraw based on sufficient maturity would require. Such one-to-one assessments may well require professional advice in considering whether children have sufficient maturity, understanding and intelligence to make an informed decision.

The current framework for maintained special schools, and the amendments in the Bill for non-maintained special schools, draw a distinction between religious worship and attendance at religious education (RE) which the Government believes is consistent with a child's right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief. There is a proper distinction to be drawn between participation in religious worship and attendance at religious education lessons on the grounds of the nature of those activities.[64]

1.45 As we have stated in previous reports, provisions which fail to guarantee a child of sufficient maturity, intelligence and understanding the right to withdraw from compulsory religious education and collective worship are incompatible with the child's human rights.[65] Administrative burdens alone do not meet the necessity requirement for interference with the rights of children to respect for their Article 9 ECHR rights. We therefore recommend that the Government reconsiders its objection to permitting a child of sufficient maturity, intelligence and understanding to withdraw from religious education and takes into account our previously expressed views on this issue. As for religious worship, we recommend that children who are not in the sixth-form but who have sufficient maturity, intelligence and understanding be permitted to withdraw. This could be simply remedied in the Bill by replacing "sixth-form pupil" (in new section 342(5A)(b)(i) of the Education Act 1996 - see clause 127) with "child of sufficient maturity, intelligence and understanding."

1   Appendix 1. Back

2   Appendix 2. Back

3   Published in March 2007, this consultation closed in June 2007. It dealt with young people and proposed raising the age until which young people must remain in education or training to 18. This consultation was followed by legislative proposals in Raising Expectations: staying in education and training post-16 - from policy to legislation (published November 2007)Back

4   Published July 2007. Back

5   EN, para. 5. Back

6   Defined by Article 1 UNCRC as "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier". Back

7   Committee on the Rights of the Child, Thirty-First Session, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/15/Add.188, 9 October 2002, para. 48. Back

8   Appendix 3. Back

9   EN, paras.189-190. Back

10   Clause 39. Back

11   Clause 45. Back

12   HC Deb, 14 January 2008, Col. 662. Back

13   HC deb, 14 January 2008, Col. 759. Back

14   Appendix 1. Back

15   Appendix 2. Back

16   PBC Deb, 31 January 2008, Col. 276. Back

17   PBC Deb, 31 January 2008, Col. 283. Back

18   PBC Deb, 29 January 2008, Col. 207. Back

19   PBC Deb, 5 February 2008, Col. 328. Back

20   PBC Deb, 31 January 2008, Col. 301. Back

21   The right to education (Art.13): 08/12/99, E/C.12/1999/10. (General Comments), para. 47. Back

22   Appendix 2. Back

23   Specifically Clauses 14, 15, 16, 17 and 116. Back

24   Explanatory Notes, para. 191. Back

25   Clauses 57, 61 and 62. Back

26   Explanatory Notes, para. 198. Back

27   Appendix 1. Back

28   Explanatory Notes, para. 197. Back

29   Appendix 2. Back

30   Fourteenth Report of Session 2007-08, Data Protection and Human Rights, HL Paper 72, HC 132, para. 4. Back

31   Ibid., para. 14. Back

32   Ibid., paras. 20-21. Back

33   Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149 (para. 51). Back

34   Olsson v Sweden (1988) 11 EHRR 259 (para. 68). Back

35   Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149 (para. 54). Back

36   E.g. Clauses 14(2), 15(1) and 16(1). Back

37   Appendix 2. Back

38   E.g. Clauses 15(4) and 61(6). Back

39   Appendix 2. Back

40   Fourteenth Report of Session 2007-08, Data Protection and Human Rights, HL Paper 72, HC 132, para. 11. Back

41   Clauses 14(4) and 57(4). Back

42   PBC Deb, 19 February 2008, Col. 475. Back

43   PBC Deb, 19 February 2008, Cols 476-7. Back

44   PBC Deb, 19 February 2008, Col. 483. Back

45   PBC Deb, 19 February 2008, Col. 485-6. Back

46   PBC Deb, 19 February 2008, Col. 477. Back

47   PBC Deb, 19 February 2008 Col. 504. Back

48   Olsson v Sweden (1988) 11 EHRR 259 (para. 82). Back

49   Clause 80. Back

50   Clause 81. Back

51   Clause 82. Back

52   Clause 96(2). Back

53   EN, para. 198. Back

54   Funke v France (1993) 16 EHRR 297 (para. 57); Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97 (para. 37). Back

55   Appendix 1. Back

56   Appendix 2. Back

57   Cf. s. 317(5) Gambling Act 2005. Back

58   Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97 (para. 37). Back

59   PBC Deb, 28 February 2008, Col. 804. Back

60   PBC Deb, 28 February 2008, Col. 805. Back

61   Twenty-Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, Legislative Scrutiny: Fourteenth Progress Report, HL Paper 247, HC 1626, paras 2.3-2.4 Back

62   Appendix 1. Back

63   Twenty-Eighth Report of Session 2005-06. Back

64   Appendix 2. Back

65   Twenty-Eighth Report of Session 2005-06. Back

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