Conclusions and recommendations
1. The
evidence presented to the Payne court martial, and accepted
by the Crown, and the findings of the Aitken report would appear
to show that:
- conditioning techniques such as hooding and the
use of stress positioning were used by some British troops in
Iraq, despite such techniques having been prohibited in 1972;
- the use of hooding and stress positioning by
1 Queen's Lancashire Regiment in 2003 was based on legal advice
received from Brigade headquarters;
- the prohibition on the use of conditioning techniques
may have been interpreted narrowly, as only applying to interrogation
personnel and to operations in Northern Ireland;
- at least until the Baha Mousa case came to light,
the prohibition on the use of conditioning techniques was not
as clearly articulated to troops in Iraq as it might, and indeed
should, have been;
- even as late as January 2008, when the Aitken
report was published, the prohibition on the use of conditioning
techniques was not clearly articulated to service personnel other
than those responsible for interrogation; and
- until 2005, interrogation personnel were trained
in proscribed techniques, if only to demonstrate the techniques
to which they might be subject if captured. (Paragraph 13)
2. These
conclusions call into question the evidence we received from Lieutenant
General Brims and which our predecessor Committee received from
the Minister for the Armed Forces. Lieutenant General Brims's
assertion that ordinary troops would recognise that techniques
such as hooding were prohibited is not supported by Brigadier
Aitken's findings or the events surrounding the death of Baha
Mousa. Nor does Mr Ingram's claim that the training of interrogation
personnel took full account of the prohibition on the use of the
five conditioning techniques seem consistent with the facts which
have now come to light. (Paragraph 14)
3. The
evidence we received from Lieutenant General Brims and Mr Ingram
formed the basis for the section of our Report on the UN Convention
Against Torture dealing with interrogation techniques. It would
appear that this evidence was incorrect and that, as a result,
we were unable to give a full account to Parliament of the human
rights issues relating to the use of such techniques. (Paragraph
15)
4. We
have yet to receive an explanation from the Ministry of Defence
for the discrepancies between the evidence given to the Joint
Committee in 2004 and 2006 on the use of prohibited conditioning
techniques and the facts which have emerged from the Payne court
martial and the Aitken report. The issues relating to the death
of Baha Mousa are now the subject of a public inquiry. We recommend
that, in response to this Report, the Secretary of State for Defence
should confirm we will receive a detailed explanation of the discrepancies
between the evidence to the Committee by Mr Ingram in 2004 and
Lieutenant General Brims in 2006 and the facts which have subsequently
emerged concerning the death of Baha Mousa, as soon as possible
after the conclusion of the public inquiry (Paragraph 16)
5. We
recommend that the terms of reference of the public inquiry into
the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa should be
as broad as possible and, in particular, should cover the matters
mentioned in this Report. We intend to pay close attention to
the report of the public inquiry and to keep the compliance of
the UK's armed forces with the UN Convention Against Torture under
scrutiny. (Paragraph 19)
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