Joint Committee on Human Rights Twenty-Ninth Report

8  Responsibilities and duties


250.  In his speech on liberty on 25 October 2007, the Prime Minister indicated that the Government was initiating a national consultation on the case for a new Bill of Rights and Duties and that:

… this will include a discussion of how we can entrench and enhance our liberties - building upon existing rights and freedoms but not diluting them - but also make more explicit the responsibilities that implicitly accompany rights.[211]

251.  In this chapter we ask whether there is any place for responsibilities or duties on individuals in a UK Bill of Rights. It is an issue on which we received a wide range of views in the evidence submitted to us.

The Government's position

252.  The Justice Secretary told us of his long-standing desire to ensure that people realise that with rights go responsibilities.[212] Indeed he mentioned this as the first reason why the Government is interested in moving beyond the HRA to a Bill of Rights. He said that he wants to be able to confront people who in his view assert their rights "selfishly", without regard to the rights of others, by pointing to a text which says, yes, you have rights, but you also have responsibilities.[213] He was, he said, "really keen on getting that out specifically."[214]

253.  It seems clear that the Government is contemplating the possibility of including within any Bill of Rights explicit responsibilities which are said to accompany certain rights. For example, the Justice Secretary suggested that it would be useful if the right to education was accompanied by an explicit statement that with this right come certain responsibilities, such as the responsibility of parents to ensure that their children attend school and "all sorts of more explicit responsibilities".[215] However, "all parents do not realise this." The thinking here appears to be that parents know all about their rights but are not aware of their responsibilities, and the inclusion of such responsibilities in a Bill of Rights would help to educate them about their responsibilities.

254.  Elsewhere, the Justice Secretary appeared to contemplate the possibility of "non-justiciable duties" being included in a Bill of Rights. He pointed out that in some countries there is a duty to vote in elections, and although he did not think that this would be acceptable in this country, he did suggest that, with a right to vote and a right to take things up (i.e. complain) in a democracy, perhaps there should be a debate about whether to include, at a declaratory level, a non-justiciable duty to vote.[216]

255.  In response to our question about whether the proposed responsibilities in any Bill of Rights will be enforceable in any way against individuals, the Justice Secretary said that the Government is looking at the possibility of framing certain responsibilities, such as the responsibility to respect the rights of others, as interpretive principles.[217] He said that there may be value in articulating and elevating some of the responsibilities so that they sit alongside rights in one place. "Responsibilities need not take enforceable form in order to achieve this objective."[218]

The relationship between rights and responsibilities

256.  A number of witnesses expressed strong concerns that the inclusion of responsibilities in a Bill of Rights might mean that only the "deserving" would have full rights entitlement.[219] They argued that making rights protection contingent on compliance with responsibilities goes against the basic premise that human rights are universal and inalienable.[220] As one witness stated:

… the notion that with rights come responsibilities, or that rights have to be earned, are essentially questions of morality, which cannot be legislated for, however much one might agree with them. Rights, in our view, belong to everyone equally … such standards are the hallmark of a civilised democracy, and should not be diluted by importing into rights legislation some kind of trade-off with responsibilities.[221]

257.  The Children's Rights Alliance for England pointed out that the emphasis on responsibilities is particularly problematic for children:

… respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals continue to be crucial to the long-term well-being of UK society as a whole. This is particularly important for children, who are at a crucial stage of development and potential, and for whom it is important to understand they have innate rights that do not have to be 'earned'.[222]

258.  Others were quite trenchant in their criticism of the notion that there should be a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. The journalist Henry Porter, for example, said:

I want to say something about the phrase "rights and responsibilities" … This springs from the telling belief among Ministers that rights are somehow in the gift of the government and that they are entitled to require people to sign up to a list of responsibilities in exchange. This is arrogant nonsense. The citizen's responsibilities are defined by common, civil and criminal law, and Ministers display a constitutional impertinence by suggesting otherwise.[223]

259.  In similar vein, Professor Conor Gearty of the London School of Economics objected:

The notion of responsibility is already weaved into the Human Rights Act … and requires no additional exposition. Indeed generalised qualifications to rights rooted in vague notions of "responsibility" would be subversive of the structure of the Act. Such pseudo-contractual approaches to rights are battering rams with which to undermine the universality of rights while seeming to preserve their essence.[224]

260.  Professor Robert Blackburn was equally critical:

There are already responsibilities and obligations inherent in the concept of human rights … These public interest factors are the other side of the same coin that stipulates our fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The key question here is on what side of the coin do you wish to place the primary emphasis? In a free society the emphasis must be on the side of the rights and freedoms of the individual. If the government wants to promote ideas or obligations of civic responsibility and active citizenship, especially if they are to be compulsory ones, this must be done by way of some document or initiative other than through a new British Bill of Rights.[225]

261.  When we pressed the Human Rights Minister on his suggestion that "there is a tendency among some people to assert [their rights] promiscuously and that devalues them",[226] he explained that there are certain people who fuel the public's misunderstanding about the HRA by claiming rights under the Act in circumstances where in fact the limitation or restriction on their right is perfectly justifiable:

That is why we want to articulate the responsibilities better than perhaps we have managed to do up until now. It is very important that any legislation in this area is owned by the British people as a whole otherwise you get the sorts of problems that we have been having - problems of misunderstanding - and the more that people are encouraged to believe that these rights are proportionate, they are accompanied for the most part by responsibilities, the greater the degree of ownership. The more the majority of the British people feel that these rights somehow privilege unfairly certain groups of people and they are encouraged to do so by people who claim, often usually without any justification whatsoever rights, that is the point. That is what I mean by promiscuous. You can claim these rights but it does not mean that the courts will uphold them. They are often based on a profound misunderstanding of what the Human Rights Act actually does, but we have to be very clear about that.[227]

262.  When we first saw the reference to "responsibilities" in the Governance of Britain Green Paper, we were concerned that the Government's emphasis on responsibilities was another attempt to "rebalance" human rights law, by increasing the weight given to considerations such as safety and security. Including responsibilities within a Bill of Rights was seen by the Government as a way of ensuring that public authorities accord appropriate priority to protection of the public when balancing rights.[228] We demonstrated the falsity of the premise of this argument in our Report on the DCA Review of the implementation of the HRA.[229] The HRA does not put prisoners' interests before public safety and there is no evidence that any public official had misinterpreted the Act as requiring that. To the extent that the Government's interest in "responsibilities" balanced against rights is an attempt to reopen that argument about public safety, it is misconceived, for the reasons we have given in previous Reports.[230]

263.  It appears, on closer inspection of the Government's arguments, and in particular the evidence of Michael Wills MP cited above, however, that the Government's interest in "responsibilities", like its interest in characterising the rights in the HRA as "British", is primarily for presentational reasons: it is motivated by a concern to educate the public.[231]

264.  We find the Government's thinking about the relationship between rights and responsibilities extremely muddled. On the one hand, we welcome the Government's apparently unequivocal acceptance that, in the words of Michael Wills MP, "rights are not contingent on discharge of responsibilities."[232] We agree and regard this as being of fundamental importance in this debate. Human rights are rights which people enjoy by virtue of being human: they cannot be made contingent on the prior fulfilment of responsibilities.

265.  On the other hand, we note that the Government also says that an individual's failure to carry out his or her responsibilities does have consequences for that individual's rights.[233] We find the distinction between responsibility being a precondition of rights and loss of rights being a consequence of irresponsibility an elusive one to grasp. Notwithstanding the Government's unequivocal acceptance that rights are not contingent on the performance of responsibilities, we are left with a distinct unease about the message which is sent by the Government's determination to link rights to responsibilities. We appreciate the importance of educating the public about the true nature of human rights legislation, and displacing myths about human rights law only benefiting the undeserving. However, it is hard to escape the sense that the language of responsibilities is a rhetoric which plays well with those in the media and the public at large who are hostile to the HRA and indeed to any form of legal protection for human rights.

266.  In our view, by insisting on the importance of "responsibilities" in any new Bill of Rights, Ministers tread a fine line between educating the public on the one hand and giving sustenance to the myths about the HRA which have been so damaging to that legislation. As we have observed before, in our Reports on the DCA Review of the HRA and our Annual Report for 2007, and in this Report in relation to the Government's emphasis on "Britishness", misperceptions about human rights should be countered by exposing them as misperceptions.

267.  The responsibilities referred to by the Justice Secretary in relation to education, for example, are already legal obligations, enforceable under the ordinary law. It is an offence for parents to fail to ensure that their children attend school. We cannot see what purpose is served by articulating a responsibility as general as the responsibility to obey the law, nor do we believe that a Bill of Rights is the place to set out legal responsibilities which are already legally binding on the individual. We do not accept that educating people about their legal responsibilities is an appropriate function of a Bill of Rights.

268.  The South African Constitution includes a reference to duties and responsibilities in its Founding Provisions concerning citizenship. It provides:

3 Citizenship

(2) All citizens are -

(a) equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and

(b) equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.

269.  During our visit to South Africa we tried to ascertain exactly what this provision about duties and responsibilities means in practice and whether it has any practical application. We asked lawyers, academics, judges, politicians and NGOs, but no-one could provide us with an explanation of what it means. It does not appear ever to have been litigated, nor does it appear to feature very prominently in public discourse about the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.

Responsibilities already implicit in human rights standards

270.  A number of witnesses noted that existing human rights standards already recognise responsibilities towards others which may, in certain circumstances, legitimately and proportionately restrict rights or imply a duty on an individual or body.[234]

271.  The Justice Secretary cited Tom Paine, the author of The Rights of Man, in support of his view that a Bill of Rights ought to articulate the responsibilities owed as well as the rights to which people are entitled:

A Declaration of Rights is, by reciprocity, a declaration of duties also. Whatever is my right as a man is also the right of another and it becomes my duty to guarantee as well as to possess.[235]

272.  Others before us have pointed out that this is a very selective quotation. As Sir Stephen Sedley recently observed:

… he [the Justice Secretary] may have overlooked the fact that Paine was making the point in order to demonstrate the shortsightedness of members of the French National Assembly who had demanded that the Declaration of the Rights of Man be accompanied by a declaration of duties. There was no need for the latter, Paine argued, because it was implicit in the former. [236]

273.  It seems to us that the Government is saying no more, than that rights are capable of being limited by competing interests. That is already provided for in the text of the ECHR and to the extent that it is not appreciated, it is surely a matter for education of the public rather than any attempt to amend the text or to redefine in the text of any new Bill of Rights.

274.  We are therefore strongly opposed to any UK Bill of Rights being called either a Bill of Rights and Duties or a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. Rights should not be contingent on performing responsibilities, nor should a Bill of Rights impose enforceable duties on individuals or responsibilities which they are already required by the general law to discharge.

The proper relevance of responsibilities in human rights law

275.  The evidence was by no means all one way on this issue, however. Some witnesses, such as the International Association for Human Values, supported including responsibilities within a Bill of Rights.[237] Martin Howe QC was also, in principle, in favour of including responsibilities in a Bill of Rights, although he noted that this led to a broad range of choices as to what those responsibilities should be.[238]

276.  The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) rejected the idea of including legally enforceable duties, but saw some value for responsibilities "as a discrete concept, [to] play a useful role in fostering a greater sense of greater social awareness, community cohesion and a culture of respect for others."[239] The EHRC referred to the example of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights:

The Charter contains both legally enforceable rights, as well as a series of non-enforceable social responsibilities which individuals owe to their family, their community and the State. The Charter elevates core social values to the status of constitutional protection in their own right, without compromising the relationship between the individual and the State in respect of individual rights and freedoms. This is a model of how values of mutual respect can be expressed in a bill of rights.[240]

277.  The JUSTICE Report on a Bill of Rights saw some value for including responsibilities in a preamble to the Bill but no further. Baroness Hale said:

The balancing of rights between different individuals, there are obviously responsibilities involved in that. There are responsibilities involved in a free press not to trespass on certain people's privacy rights. There are responsibilities involved in having a family not to do harm to your children. There are responsibilities inherent in quite a few of the rights as they are and that seems uncontroversial and not difficult.[241]

278.  The fact that there was considerable support for there being some place for responsibilities in a UK Bill of Rights is not surprising when one recalls the shift which took place in the nature of human rights law in the mid-20th century. The broadening of the values which were the concern of human rights law, from the bundle of freedoms which make up negative liberty to include rights to a bare minimum of security, entailed the recognition by human rights law of positive obligations on states and duties and responsibilities on individuals. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights expressly states that human beings "should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." The preambles to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR also contain explicit references to duties and responsibilities:

… realizing that the individual having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognised in the present Covenant.

279.  Responsibilities therefore often have some role to play in modern Bills of Rights, albeit falling far short of directly enforceable duties. It may be in the form of a preamble referring to responsibilities; a limitation clause acknowledging that some rights can be justifiably limited to serve some other competing interest; positive obligations on the state to protect the rights of individuals against other private individuals; the indirect effect of the Bill of Rights on the law governing private relations because of the duty on courts to interpret the common law compatibly, including the common law governing private relations; or a prohibition on abuse of rights. All of these are manifestations of responsibilities being taken into account in Bills of Rights and none are controversial.

280.  We now turn to consider two such examples of responsibilities playing a well established and accepted role in bills of rights: where private parties perform a public function they are bound by the Bill of Rights, and when courts apply the law in cases between private parties the court, as a public authority, must also act compatibly with the Bill of Rights.

Public function

281.  One way in which the HRA was intended to impose responsibilities on private parties was by its definition of a public authority as including "persons certain of whose functions are of a public nature". As is well known, in the YL case, a majority of the House of Lords held that a private residential care home was not performing a "public function" for the purposes of the HRA when providing services to an elderly person funded by the local authority pursuant to its statutory duties. We have consistently taken the view it was clear from the HRA that this was meant by Parliament in 1998 to be included within the definition of "public function" in the HRA.[242]

282.  The Government has brought forward an amendment to the Health and Social Care Bill designed to reverse the effect of the YL judgment on care homes. It has not so far, however, brought forward any measure to reinstate what the Committee considers to have been Parliament's original intention when enacting the HRA. Instead it has said that it will consult on the matter as part of its forthcoming consultation on a Bill of Rights. This leaves unresolved the general problem of the meaning of "public authority" in the HRA, which continues to be a problem across a number of different sectors of Government activity. We have advocated resolving the general problem of the scope of the HRA by way of a separate bill amending or clarifying the meaning of "public function" in the HRA, to reinstate Parliament's original intention.

283.  Professor Klug suggested that the Bill of Rights process provided an opportunity to get the public function test right, by undoing the House of Lords decision in YL.[243] In our view, which we have frequently expressed in recent Reports, the resolution of the YL problem in the HRA itself is relatively straightforward and need not await the outcome of the Bill of Rights process. Our Chair has introduced private members bills designed to do so, but so far we have not persuaded the Government of the need to remedy this problem for all sectors as a matter of urgency.[244]

284.  We asked the Government for its justification for not moving to solve this problem sooner in relation to the HRA, given the clarity of the Government's original intention when introducing the Human Rights Bill in 1997. We have still not received a substantive answer going beyond the assertion that there are those within Whitehall who are opposed to the HRA applying widely to those exercising a public function, and it appears that the Government would prefer to deal with these mysterious objections in private than expose them to the cold light of rational argument.[245]

285.  Whatever happens in the interim in relation to the HRA, we are clear that any UK Bill of Rights should find a way of achieving what was originally intended in the HRA, that is, binding private persons or bodies performing a public function. In the outline Bill of Rights and Freedoms annexed to this Report we suggest the formulation put forward in our Chair's latest bill on this subject: it takes up a suggestion made by Baroness Hale in evidence to us,[246] by listing the factors which have to be taken into account when deciding whether a particular function is a function of a public nature. The factors set out in the Bill are those referred to in the judgments of Lord Bingham and Baroness Hale in the YL case.

The effect of the Bill of Rights on private parties

286.  In his lectures and speeches about the possible Bill of Rights, the Justice Secretary has referred to the "horizontality" of the South African Bill of Rights, that is, the fact that in certain circumstances it applies in disputes between private parties, such as in a defamation action against a newspaper. He cited Justice Kate O'Regan of the South African Constitutional Court, who explained that in South Africa when a court develops the common law, such as libel law, it must consider the obligations imposed by the Bill of Rights. During the Committee's recent visit to South Africa, reference was frequently made to the "horizontality" of the South African Bill of Rights and a number of those with whom the Committee met expressed the view that any modern democratic Bill of Rights should have some horizontal effect because of the growing significance of private power. The Committee also heard that the courts in South Africa had been very cautious in the way in which they give effect to this aspect of the Bill of Rights, finding not that the Bill of Rights creates new free-standing causes of action against private parties, but that it imposes a duty on courts to develop existing causes of action where it is possible to do so.

287.  Another way in which the HRA, through its application to public functions, imposes responsibilities on private parties is in the way that individuals employed to provide a public function are not able, without express statutory provision - which must itself be justified - to assert their right to manifest a personal belief (religious or otherwise) to deny access to public services to another person or persons, or to discriminate in the provision of such services. An example of the way this has been used is the restriction on the freedom of individuals or religious organisations working in adoption services to discriminate against gay and lesbian prospective parents. The balance of rights underpinning this is discussed more fully in our report on the Equality Act Sexual Orientation Regulations.[247] We recommend that any UK Bill of Rights should make clear the responsibility, when performing a public function, to subordinate the manifestation of a personal belief which would discriminate against, or undermine the rights and freedoms of, others to the interests of those seeking to access public services.

288.  We agree with the Government that any Bill of Rights should not have "direct horizontal effect", that is, it should not give freestanding causes of action to individuals against other private parties for breach of their fundamental rights. We agree with Justice Kate O'Regan's analysis that this would be a recipe for uncertainty and confusion, cutting across the well-established categories of private law liability, and giving rise in practice to difficult questions of practice and procedure.

289.  However, we think it is important that any new Bill of Rights acknowledges the reality, already acknowledged by our courts under the HRA, that in certain circumstances certain rights impose a positive obligation on the State to ensure that some protection for the right is available against another private party, and that this may require the courts to develop the existing law governing relations between private parties where it is possible to do so. For example, in the well known case of Michael Douglas's claim against Hello magazine for publishing his wedding photographs, the courts have developed the common law of breach of confidence in order to provide a remedy for a breach of the right to respect for privacy in Article 8, where that right imposed a positive obligation on the state to protect the rights against interferences by other private parties.[248] Decisions about the right to respect for family life in Article 8 ECHR are frequently made by family law courts in cases between parents concerning custody and access. As Sir Stephen Sedley recently put it, writing in the London Review of Books:

One of the subtler but more profound shifts in the eight years of the HRA's operation has been the progressive realignment of a number of human rights from restrictions on the power of the state to positive standards of human conduct: in other words, from the vertical to the horizontal.[249]

290.  The South African Bill of Rights includes a provision which expressly makes the Bill of Rights binding on a private party "if and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right."[250] On the face of it this looks like a radical departure from traditional conceptions of Bills of Rights, by imposing duties on private parties to act compatibly with the rights in the Bill of Rights ("direct horizontal effect").

291.  During our visit to South Africa we inquired whether this provision had resulted in frequent litigation against private parties for breach of fundamental rights. Justice Kate O'Regan told us that the provision in the Bill of Rights had been applied sensibly by courts, by the incremental development of existing causes of action, rather than as giving rise to any new free-standing cause of action.[251] In practice, it seems, the position under the South African Bill of Rights is therefore substantially the same as that which has been arrived at by UK courts under the HRA. It enables rights in the Bill of Rights to be relied on against private parties only where there is a positive obligation on the state to ensure that the right in question is protected against breaches by private parties and there is some pre-existing cause of action into which the claim can be fitted, if necessary by the courts developing the law to make the action possible ("indirect horizontal effect"). When we asked Baroness Hale how revolutionary it would be to follow South Africa's example and provide for some rights to have a degree of application to private parties according to the nature of the rights, she said:

It would not be tremendously revolutionary because we have already, in a sense, applied concepts from the Human Rights Convention in situations between private parties, the Naomi Campbell case being one of them, in which we obviously balanced her right to respect for her private life against the newspaper's freedom of expression. We did that explicitly by reference to the two Convention rights involved. Our reason for doing that was that we, as courts, are public authorities and we, therefore, have to act compliantly with the Convention rights. We cannot make orders that are incompatible with the Convention rights of either party so in that way we introduce obligations on private individuals and companies to respect the rights of others. It is not that revolutionary.[252]

292.  In the light of the South African experience, we recommend that any UK Bill of Rights should not include express provision along the lines of the equivalent South African provision giving full horizontal effect to the rights and freedoms in certain circumstances. As Baroness Hale explained, the position of the indirect horizontal effect of the HRA has been arrived at as a result of the courts themselves being public authorities and therefore obliged to act compatibly with Convention rights, including in their application of the common law governing private disputes. The same effect can be achieved by similar means in any UK Bill of Rights.

293.  In the outline Bill of Rights and Freedoms annexed to this Report, we therefore suggest two provisions which should ensure the indirect horizontal effect of the rights and freedoms in the Bill. They are both modelled on provisions already in the HRA but go slightly further, partly to spell out more clearly what our courts are already doing as a result of being public authorities under the Human Rights Act, and partly in the light of the lessons learned from South Africa.

294.  The first requires any court or tribunal interpreting any legislation or applying the common law, so far as it is possible to do so, to read and give effect to it in a way which is compatible with the rights and freedoms in the Bill and which promotes the purpose of the Bill. This is modelled on the interpretive obligation in s. 3 of the HRA but it goes further by expressly making that obligation apply to the common law as well as statute and by requiring a reading of the relevant law which not only achieves compatibility with the rights and freedoms in the Bill but which promotes the purpose of the Bill as set out in the Preamble.

295.  The second includes the courts amongst the bodies under a duty to act compatibly with the rights and freedoms contained in the statement and to take active steps to promote and fulfil those rights and freedoms. This is modelled on section 6(3)(a) of the HRA, which makes courts "public authorities" bound to act compatibly with Convention rights and has been the crucial provision requiring courts, in cases such as the Hello magazine case, to develop the common law to provide a remedy for violations of Convention rights in disputes between private parties. The provision in the outline Bill, however, goes slightly further by making clear that public authorities are under a positive obligation to take active steps to promote and fulfil the rights and freedoms, which in the courts' case may require them to take the positive step of developing the common law in order to give a remedy for breach of a right or freedom.

211   Liberty, 5 October 2007. Back

212   Q 420. Back

213   Q 437. Back

214   Ibid. See also Q 440. Back

215   Q 425. See also Qs 437 & 486. Back

216   Q 435. Back

217   Ev 183. Back

218   Ev 183. Back

219   E.g. Ev 146. Back

220   Ev 116, 144 & 152. Back

221   Ev 104. Back

222   Ev 115. Back

223   Ev 165. Back

224   Ev 131. Back

225   Ev 95-96. Back

226   Q 437. Back

227   Q 440. Back

228   Governance of Britain, para. 210. Back

229   Thirty-second Report of Session 2005-06, The Human Rights Act: the DCA and Home Office Reviews, HL Paper 278, HC 1716. Back

230   See e.g., Thirty-second Report of Session 2005-06, The Human Rights Act: the DCA and Home Office Reviews, HL Paper 278, HC 1716. Back

231   Qs 437-8. Back

232   Q 487. Back

233   Martin Howe QC was similarly quite unequivocal that rights should not be contingent on the fulfilment of responsibilities, but at the same time he thought it is legitimate for the court to take into account, when an individual is seeking to enforce his or her rights, the extent, if it is relevant, that individual has failed to carry out his or her responsibilities: Q 20. Back

234   Ev 100, 146 & 152. Back

235   Modernising the Magna Carta, 13 February 2008. Back

236   No Ordinary Law, London Review of Books, 5 June 2008. Back

237   Ev 142. Back

238   Q 19. Back

239   Ev 129. Back

240   Ev 129. Back

241   Q 234. Back

242   See e.g. Eighth Report of Session 2007-08, Legislative Scrutiny: Health and Social Care Bill, HL Paper 46, HC 303, paras. 1.8-1.10 & 1.14. Back

243   Q 25. Back

244   See, in the current session, the Human Rights Act (Meaning of Public Function) BillBack

245   Qs 470-480. Back

246   Q 229. Back

247   Sixth Report of Session 2006-07, Legislative Scrutiny: Sexual Orientation Regulations, HL Paper 58, HC 350. Back

248   Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 WLR 992. See also Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] UKHL 22 and HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers [2006] EWCA Civ 1776. Back

249   No Ordinary Law, London Review of Books, 5 June 2008. Back

250   Section 8(2) of the South African Bill of Rights. Back

251   See also Q 25. Back

252   Q 231. Back

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