Joint Committee On Human Rights Second Report


Introduction


Background

1. In our last report in our ongoing inquiry into Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights, in July 2007, we welcomed the Government's announcement of a new approach to counter-terrorism policy, in particular its commitment to extensive consultation and to proceeding on the basis of national consensus.[1] We looked forward to the Government demonstrating this change of approach in practice and to playing our full part in the deliberative process.

2. On Wednesday 25 July 2007 the Prime Minister made an oral statement to the House of Commons on national security, in which he outlined some of the measures on which the Government proposed to consult for possible inclusion in a counter-terrorism bill in the autumn.[2] On the same day the Home Office published two documents: a "bill content paper" setting out more detail of the measures being considered for possible inclusion in a future bill[3] and an analysis paper on pre-charge detention.[4] The Home Office also placed two further documents on its website: one prepared by the Crown Prosecution Service outlining the current procedures for obtaining an extension of pre-charge detention[5] and one prepared by the Home Office analysing the French examining magistrates system.[6]

3. The publication of these detailed documents, and the opportunity given for their detailed consideration and debate, demonstrated the Government's seriousness of intent in signalling a change of approach to counter-terrorism legislation. In its bill content paper the Home Office expressly recognised that the fast tracking through Parliament of all counter-terrorism legislation since 2000 had resulted in criticisms and stated that it was committed to a wide discussion of the measures to be included in a counter-terrorism bill later this year, with the Opposition parties, parliamentarians, relevant organisations and with wider communities before the Bill is introduced in Parliament. In addition to the commitment to widespread consultation over a number of months, the Prime Minister's statement and the accompanying documents also maintained a highly consensual tone, stating that the Government's aim was to seek to achieve consensus where possible about the measures which are necessary to counter terrorism.

4. From a human rights perspective, we were very pleased with the change of approach, because of the greater opportunity consultation gives for rigorous scrutiny of proposed measures for human rights compatibility, and the smaller risk of counter-productivity posed by a genuinely consensual approach. The period of consultation has enabled us to take evidence from ministers and others about the measures being contemplated and to ask various questions in correspondence. Transcripts of the oral evidence and copies of the correspondence are appended to this Report.

5. In our view, however, the Government now faces a critical test of its commitment to a consensual approach and of the sincerity of its commitment to "winning the hearts and minds" of members of the communities from which the violent extremists are recruited. For it seems to us, for reasons that we explain in this report, that on one of the most important of the Government's proposals, to extend the period of pre-charge detention beyond 28 days, there is now a very clear national consensus that the case for further change has not been made out by the Government.[7] Notwithstanding the failure of the Government to prove its case, on 6 December the Home Secretary announced the Government's intention to legislate in the forthcoming counter-terrorism bill to increase the pre-charge detention period from 28 to 42 days, subject to various safeguards designed to ensure that the power to detain for that length of time is exceptional, time-limited and only triggered by "specific operational need". In our view, a truly consensual approach should lead the Government to accept that it has failed to build the necessary national consensus for this very significant interference with the right to liberty, and withdraw the proposal. To proceed with it, in these circumstances, calls into question the Government's commitment to a consensual approach.

6. The purpose of this report is to scrutinise the human rights compatibility of the Government's proposal to extend the period of pre-charge detention from 28 to 42 days. As always, we ground our analysis in the human rights standards with which the Government's counter-terrorism measures must be compatible. We agree with the Government that it has a duty to protect people from terrorism and to keep the legal framework under constant review to ensure that counter-terrorism measures remain adequate and proportionate to the threat posed by terrorism. Indeed, both we and our predecessor Committee have consistently drawn attention to the fact that these are duties imposed by human rights law itself, which imposes positive obligations on the state to take effective steps to protect people against the threat of terrorist attack.[8] The strength of these positive obligations is not to be underestimated: in our view they impose a duty on the State to prosecute those whom it suspects of being involved in terrorist activity in order to prevent loss of life in terrorist attacks.[9] We therefore also agree that the case made by the police and the Government for additional powers to detain terrorist suspects before charge must be treated with great seriousness and considered very carefully. That careful consideration involves subjecting the case for extended pre-charge detention to rigorous scrutiny to ascertain whether, on all the evidence, including the availability of alternatives to extended pre-charge detention, there really exists a risk to the public of sufficient magnitude to make it truly "necessary" to extend the period of pre-charge detention from 28 to 42 days, which is the test which human rights law requires to be satisfied where measures would interfere significantly with personal liberty.

The Government's current position

7. On 6 December 2007 the Home Secretary announced that the Government is proposing to legislate in the forthcoming Counter-Terrorism Bill to increase the pre-charge detention limit beyond 28 days to 42 days, but only for a strictly limited period of time and in response to a specific operational situation. She also published a short paper, prepared by the Home Office, setting out the Government's case for extending the limit beyond 28 days, and describing in detail the Government's preferred option for achieving this;[10] the report of Lord Carlile, the reviewer of terrorism legislation, into the Government's proposed measures for inclusion in a counter-terrorism bill;[11] and the Home Office's summary of consultation responses.[12]

8. The Home Secretary's paper acknowledges that extending the current limit on the extension of terrorism suspects prior to charge is a contentious issue on which it has not been possible so far to achieve consensus. On the one hand, both the police and the Government's reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, have expressed their professional judgment that it is likely that, at some point in the near future, the situation will arise in a small number of exceptional cases where there will be a need to hold terrorist suspects for more than the current limit of 28 days. On the other hand, the paper says, concerns have been expressed "by community groups and others" that that there has not yet been any firm evidence to support an extension to pre-charge detention.

9. The Home Secretary, in her introduction to the paper, declares her belief that there already exists a strong consensus that it is desirable to achieve the strongest level of public protection and to secure the successful prosecution of terrorists, but in a way that is compatible with human rights and which protects the hard won liberties of individuals. The purpose of the Government's proposal is said to be to set out the case for making it possible to go beyond 28 days, in a way which strikes this balance appropriately and which is therefore capable of commanding consensus.

The Government's case for change

10. In the recent Home Office paper on pre-charge detention, the Government bases its case for extending pre-charge detention on two principal arguments:

(1) the seriousness of the threat from international terrorism and "the way in which that threat is developing";

(2) the trend for increasingly complex plots involving increasing amounts of evidence and data, in a great variety of forms, often with very significant international links, demonstrated by the fact that the full 28 days have been needed in two separate investigations so far.

11. The Government says that the combination of these factors gives rise to "the risk that, in the near future, it is possible that a serious terrorist suspect may need to be released because the police have insufficient time to bring a charge for a terrorist related offence." Based on these trends, the Government believes that there is a clear case for going beyond 28 days in future in a small number of exceptional cases. The case is expressly a "precautionary" or "prudential" one.[13] The Government does not contend that the current limit has yet proved inadequate in any single case.

12. We subject this case to careful scrutiny below, after setting out the Government's preferred option for extending pre-charge detention.

The Government's preferred option

13. In the most recent Home Office paper the Government has settled on a preferred option for extending pre-charge detention. The proposed approach is said to be guided by the approach taken by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004: any increase in pre-charge detention must be exceptional, temporary and dependent upon specific operational need.

14. The Government's proposal is to legislate to increase the pre-charge detention limit from 28 to 42 days, but to impose a number of limits on the availability of the new 42 day limit:

15. In relation to any statements to Parliament about the extension of pre-charge detention, we would expect reasoned explanations from Ministers, rather than mere assertions in the form of "statements", to ensure that Parliament is transparently and fully informed about the justification for particular decisions and that ministerial reports to Parliament do not become simply formalities.

16. The Home Secretary refers to this system imposing a "triple lock" on the new temporary limit of 42 days: (i) a report by the police and DPP demonstrating a specific operational need; (ii) the agreement of the Home Secretary; and (iii) a set of strong parliamentary and judicial safeguards.

17. The judicial safeguards envisaged are the same as those which already apply to extensions of detention beyond 14 days: they would require judicial authorisation at least every 7 days, which is only to be granted if the judge is satisfied that the suspect's continued detention is necessary to obtain or preserve evidence and that the investigation is being carried out diligently and expeditiously.[15] The only additional procedural safeguard proposed in relation to applications for warrants of further detention is that applications for extensions beyond 28 days would require the consent of the DPP.

18. The Government says that its proposed approach is "significantly different" from the one it originally proposed when it began the consultation in July. Then, the Government put forward four options for revising the current 28 day limit:

(i) extending the 28 day limit with additional safeguards;

(ii) extending the 28 day limit but deferring its coming into force;

(iii) relying on the Civil Contingencies Act, as recommended by Liberty; and

(iv) introducing judge-managed investigations.

19. The Government's preferred option in July was option (i): extending, with immediate effect, the maximum limit beyond 28 days to a new maximum limit to be set by Parliament. It accepted that any such increase in the limit should be balanced by strengthening the accompanying judicial oversight and Parliamentary accountability. The additional safeguards envisaged in the July consultation papers, however, were mainly improvements to the current parliamentary safeguards, including a requirement that the Home Secretary notify Parliament of any extension beyond 28 days as soon as practicable after it has been granted, with a requirement to provide a further statement to Parliament on the individual case and an option for the House to scrutinise and debate this. In addition, the independent reviewer would be required to report on the operation of the extended period in any individual case, to inform any parliamentary debate.

20. The Government's second option was to legislate for such a power now but provide for that power to be triggered at a later date by an affirmative resolution in both Houses. The Government was less keen on this option because it would require a parliamentary debate in the middle of what might be a national emergency. The Government's current preferred option is something of a hybrid of its original options (i) and (ii): an extension to 42 days, only to be brought into force by the Home Secretary at a future date, with an opportunity for parliamentary debate and with a limited form of parliamentary approval (the approval of both Houses is required, not to bring the order into force, but for the order to continue in force for more than 30 days).

21. The third option was Liberty's suggestion that the Government need not legislate to extend the pre-charge detention limit but instead can rely on the Civil Contingencies Act to extend the period of pre-charge detention by a further 30 days to a total of 58 days. We consider this proposal in detail below.

22. The fourth option was to introduce judge-managed investigations. We gave this option careful consideration in our report on Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention in 2006.[16] After visiting France and Spain to see at first hand how judge-managed investigations work in practice, we reached the firm conclusion that the investigating magistrates model should not be borrowed wholesale and imported into our own institutional arrangements, nor did we think that there was anything in the investigative approach which might be borrowed or grafted on to our more adversarial common law tradition. We are pleased to note that the accompanying Home Office paper on terrorist investigations and the French examining magistrates system reaches a similar conclusion: that if we were to try to emulate the examining magistrates system here, we would need to import the system in its entirety rather than borrow specific aspects and bolt them on to our criminal justice system, and this would require fundamental changes to our adversarial, common law tradition. We do not propose to give this option any further consideration.

23. We now turn to consider the two main arguments relied on by the Government to make the case for a further extension of the limit on pre-charge detention.


1   Nineteenth Report of Session 2006-07, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 days, intercept and post-charge questioning, HL Paper 157/HC 394 (hereafter "JCHR Report on 28 days"), at paras 2-5. Back

2   HC Deb 25 July 2007 cols 841-845. Back

3   Possible Measures for Inclusion in a Future Counter Terrorism Bill, Home Office, 25 July 2007 (hereafter "bill contents paper"). Back

4   Options for pre-charge detention in terrorist cases, Home Office, 25 July 2007 (hereafter "pre-charge detention options paper"). Back

5   Scrutiny of pre-charge detention in terrorist cases, CPS, July 2007 (hereafter "CPS paper on pre-charge detention"). Back

6   Terrorist investigations and the French examining magistrates system, Home Office, July 2007 (hereafter "Home Office paper on examining magistrates"). Back

7   The majority of respondents to the Government's consultation were against an outright extension to the current 28 days: Home Office Summary of Responses to the Counter Terrorism Bill Consultation, Cm 7269, December 2007, para. 14. Back

8   See e.g. Eighteenth Report of Session 2003-04, Review of Counter-terrorism powers, HL Paper 158/HC 713, at paras 7-14; Third Report of Session 2005-06, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters, HL Paper 75-I/HC561-I (hereafter "JCHR Report on the Terrorism Bill 2006"), at paras 5-6. Back

9   Twenty-fourth Report of Session 2005-06, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention, HL Paper 240/HC 1576 (hereafter "JCHR Report on Prosecution and Pre-charge Detention"), at paras 15-17. Back

10   Pre-Charge Detention of Terrorist Suspects, Home Office, December 2007 (hereafter "pre-charge detention position paper"). Back

11   Report on Proposed Measures for Inclusion in a Counter Terrorism Bill, Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, December 2007, Cm 7262 (hereafter, Lord Carlile Report on Measures for inclusion in a Bill). Back

12   Above fn. 7. Back

13   See e.g. pre-charge detention options paper, pp. 9 and 12: "the Government believes that it would be prudent and right to prepare for that now." Back

14   This is essentially the same as the current statutory test for an extension of detention in an individual case: see paragraph 32 of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Back

15   Paragraph 32 of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Back

16   JCHR Report on Prosecution and Pre-charge Detention, above, at paras 45-76. Back


 
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Prepared 14 December 2007