Joint Committee On Human Rights Seventeenth Report


Bills drawn to the special attention of both Houses


1  Employment Bill
Date introduced to first House

Date introduced to second House

Current Bill Number

Previous Reports

6 December 2007

HL Bill 49

None

Background

1.1 This is a Government Bill introduced into the House of Lords on 6 December 2007. It has a variety of purposes, repealing and amending existing legislation in the field of employment and trade union law. These include changes to the law relating to dispute resolution in the workplace, changes to the enforcement regimes for the National Minimum Wage and employment agency standards, and changes to trade union membership law in order to comply with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in ASLEF v UK.[1] The Bill completed its Committee stage in the Lords on 3 April 2008. Lord Jones of Birmingham has made a statement of compatibility under s.19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

1.2 A number of the Bill's provisions engage human rights. In our view the reasons contained in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill explaining the Government's view that the Bill is human rights compatible,[2] which are reasonably comprehensive, are for the most part satisfactory. However, we decided to subject to further scrutiny the provision in the Bill[3] designed to implement the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights against the UK in the ASLEF case,[4] which concerned the compatibility with the ECHR of the restrictions in UK law on the ability of trade unions to exclude or expel people from membership of the union because of their membership of a political party.

1.3 In the ASLEF case the European Court of Human Rights upheld ASLEF's complaint that UK law was in breach of the right to freedom of association in Article 11 ECHR because it had prevented the union from expelling a member for his membership of the British National Party, even though that was an organisation whose objectives were inimical to those of the union.

1.4 The Court held that the relevant provision in UK law,[5] which prohibited a trade union from expelling a member for membership of a political party, failed to strike a fair balance between the right of the union to freedom of association and the right of the individual to freedom of association. The UK had gone too far in its protection of the individual member against measures taken against him by his union, at the expense of the right of the union to choose its members.

1.5 The Government accepted the need to amend the law in the light of the Strasbourg judgment and conducted a consultation on two options:

Option A: to amend the relevant provision of trade union law (s. 174 TULRCA) to ensure there is no explicit reference to a special category of conduct relating to political party membership or activities (so that trade unions would in future be free to exclude or expel members for their membership of a political party);

Option B: to retain the special category of conduct relating to political party membership or activities, but significantly amend the rights not to be excluded or expelled for such conduct. On this option, the amendment to s. 174 TULRCA 1992 would refer to the limited conditions under which it would still be unlawful for the trade union to exclude or expel an individual on grounds of their political party membership or activities. Those conditions would specify that the union's decision would be unlawful unless the political party membership or activity concerned was incompatible with a rule or objective of the union, and the decision to expel was taken in accordance with union rules or established procedures.

1.6 Following consultation, the Government decided that it preferred Option A. Its reasons for this preference are summarised in the Impact Assessment accompanying the Bill: it is simpler to understand and apply in practice and therefore provides less scope for unnecessary legal action.

1.7 The Bill therefore proposes to give effect to the judgment by amending s. 174 TULRCA 1992 by removing all reference to "protected conduct".[6] The effect is to enable trade unions to apply membership rules which prohibit individuals who belong or who have belonged to a particular political party from membership of the trade union.

The human rights compatibility issue

1.8 We decided to scrutinise further whether the Bill strikes the "fair balance" between the competing association rights of the union on the one hand and the individual on the other which Article 11 ECHR requires. We wrote to the Minister on 1 February 2008[7] asking three questions:

1. Please explain in more detail the Government's reasons for preferring Option A over Option B.

2. In particular, please explain the existing safeguards which the Government considers to be adequate to ensure that a fair balance is struck in practice between the right of a union to control its membership, as defined in ASLEF, and the rights of the individual, including the right not to be expelled arbitrarily or in circumstances that would result in exceptional hardship?

3. What objection does the Government have in principle to circumscribing the scope of the power to expel by explicit reference to the union's rules and to compliance with the union's procedures?

1.9 We received a response from the Minister dated 20 February.[8] The Government states that its decision to prefer Option A over Option B was based on a number of considerations.

(I) EVIDENCE BASED POLICY MAKING AND BETTER REGULATION

1.10 The Minister states in his letter that the Government wishes to "ensure that policy is based firmly on evidence and the principles of better regulation", which are said to apply as much to trade union law as they do to any other aspect of employment legislation. Option A enhances union autonomy by giving trade unions greater freedom to apply membership rules concerning membership of political parties. Option B, by comparison, is more restrictive of union autonomy because it limits the power to exclude or expel for membership of a political party by including safeguards against the potential abuse of that power. Applying principles of better regulation, the Government decided whether those safeguards were necessary by assessing (a) whether there were other existing safeguards against abuse which served this purpose and (b) whether there was any evidence of a practical problem of abuse which needed to be addressed by further safeguards.

1.11 As far as safeguards are concerned, the Government points to other safeguards in the event that the union breaches its rules or commits other abuses when expelling or excluding a member. First, a member or former member of a trade union can make a complaint to the Certification Officer about a breach or threatened breach of union rule in relation to certain matters, including expulsion.[9] The Certification Officer can issue enforcement orders requiring a union to take steps to remedy a rule breach, and his decisions can be appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Second, a member or former member of a union can bring a claim for breach of contract in the civil courts if they have been, or are threatened with being, expelled in breach of the union's rules, or without the union's established procedures being followed, or without a fair procedure. The rule book of the union, including any disciplinary procedure laid down in the rules, form part of the contract, and the principles of natural justice (or procedural fairness) are implied into the union's rules. Taken together, the Government considers that these safeguards already provide adequate protection against abuse by unions, and considers it questionable whether a further set of safeguards, enforceable by the employment tribunal, is really needed.

1.12 As for whether there is any evidence of a practical problem of abuse requiring additional safeguards, the Government argues, applying principles of better regulation, that there is no evidence that the power of trade unions to exclude or expel members for membership of a political party has ever been abused, and therefore to introduce further safeguards against abuse "runs the risk of over-regulating".[10]

(II) CLARITY AND SIMPLICITY

1.13 The Government's decision to prefer Option A over Option B was also influenced by its desire to achieve clarity in the legislative framework and simplicity of its application in practice. Option B was considered to introduce a degree of complexity which the Government considered unnecessary given the safeguards against abuse which already exist and the lack of evidence of abuse being a practical problem.

(III) VEXATIOUS LITIGATION

1.14 Because of its greater complexity, Option B was considered to introduce greater uncertainty into the law, providing an opportunity for vexatious litigation by political extremists seeking publicity through litigation.

(IV) RESPONSES TO CONSULTATION

1.15 The Government was also influenced to choose Option A by the fact that there was majority support for it in the responses to consultation, including amongst non-union organisations which responded.

The debate in Lords Grand Committee

1.16 The issue was debated in Grand Committee in the House of Lords on 13 March[11] and 3 April 2008.[12] Lord Lester of Herne Hill, a Member of our Committee argued that the Government's proposal to implement the ASLEF judgment through clause 18 is too broad because it would enable a trade union to exclude someone from membership of the union on the sole ground that the person concerned is or has been a member of a political party. This ignored the important caveat in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, that the State must ensure that individuals are protected from abuse of a dominant position by a trade union. The Court recognised (at para. 43) that

"For the individual right to join a union to be effective, the State must nonetheless protect the individual against any abuse of a dominant position by trade unions ... Such abuse might occur, for example, where exclusion or expulsion from a trade union was not in accordance with union rules or where the rules were wholly unreasonable or arbitrary or where the consequences of exclusion or expulsion resulted in exceptional hardship."

1.17 Lord Lester therefore argued that clause 18 should be narrowed in two respects. First, a trade union should only be able to expel or exclude an individual if that individual belongs to a political party where the political values and ideals clash fundamentally with the political values and ideals of the trade union. Second, there should be a requirement that the exclusion of the individual must not prejudice his livelihood or conditions of employment or place him at risk of, or leave him unprotected from, arbitrary or unlawful action by his employer. He proposed an amendment designed to narrow the scope of the clause in these two ways.

1.18 In the course of debate Lord Wedderburn appeared to agree with the first part of Lord Lester's amendment, but queried whether there was any basis in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights for the proposed new restriction concerning prejudice to "the individual's livelihood or conditions of employment".[13] Lord Lester in response pointed to the passage in the judgment (para. 43) referring to the obligation on the State under Article 11 to protect individuals against the abuse of a dominant position by a trade union and explained that his amendment had "tried to narrow it to the only form of abuse of a dominant position - or trade union muscle power - that really matter to the individual."[14] Lord Wedderburn replied that he too would like to see sensible wording which limits the judgment, and commented that Lord Lester's words in his amendment "are rather good because they are almost as narrow as you can get", but he asked Lord Lester to consider whether they could be even narrower.[15] Others speaking in the debate pointed out that trade unions cannot themselves affect an individual's terms and conditions of employment.[16]

1.19 The Minister, Lord Jones of Birmingham, opposed Lord Lester's amendment on essentially the same basis as that contained in the Government's response to the Committee's letter, summarised above: existing safeguards are sufficient, there is no evidence that abuse of the power is a practical issue, loss of union membership cannot affect an individual's livelihood or terms and conditions, and to create further safeguards is therefore unnecessary and would amount to "gold-plating".[17] Nevertheless, the Government agreed to reflect on the case for some form of additional statutory safeguard, and reiterated on the Bill's last day in Committee that it remains open to others' views on the clause.[18]

Compatibility assessment

THE NEED TO REMEDY THE INCOMPATIBILITY

1.20 During the debate on Lord Lester's amendment, an argument was advanced that Clause 18 should be deleted from the Bill altogether, because "the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is not binding. We do not have to legislate on this."[19]

1.21 In fact the judgment is binding on the UK. By Article 46 ECHR the UK has undertaken to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which the UK is a party.[20] Refusal to implement the judgment by the UK would be a serious violation of the UK's obligations under the ECHR, with grave consequences. Deliberate refusal to implement a judgment can ultimately lead to expulsion from the Council of Europe.

1.22 Some legislation remedying the incompatibility is therefore necessary. We welcome the Government's recognition that it is an "important principle" that the UK abide by judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.[21] We also welcome the fact that there now appears to be a consensus across the parties that the Government is under such an obligation.[22] The need for remedial legislation is therefore uncontested. The only question is how that legislation should strike the balance between the competing interests under Article 11 ECHR.

BALANCING COMPETING RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

1.23 The ASLEF judgment unequivocally recognises that trade unions enjoy, under Article 11 ECHR, a right to freedom of association which includes the prima facie freedom to set up their own rules concerning conditions of membership. The judgment, however, is equally clear that this right of trade union autonomy is not unlimited: the Court clearly envisages a positive obligation on the State under Article 11 ECHR to protect the freedom of association of the individual against abuse of a dominant position by trade unions. This is clear from para. 43 of the judgment, quoted above. The question therefore is essentially whether clause 18 as drafted provides sufficient safeguards against possible abuse of the new power to exclude or expel for political party membership, and, if not, precisely what additional safeguards are necessary.

1.24 The TUC and the Government argue that clause 18 already strikes the right balance between the competing interests under Article 11. In any event, the Government argues that the availability of such remedies does not matter, because, under the conditions created by UK law, including the absence of the closed shop, a union's decision to expel or exclude an individual cannot obviously result in severe hardship. Unlike in the days of the closed shop, the inability to obtain or retain union membership will not lead to loss of livelihood.

1.25 The Government is clearly correct that certain safeguards against abuse already exist in the form of complaints to the Certification Officer and actions for breach of contract in the civil courts. We also accept that the effective prohibition of the closed shop means that the inability to obtain or retain union membership is unlikely to lead to loss of livelihood. However, there are some gaps in the safeguards which currently exist.

1.26 Neither of the safeguards, for example, are available to a person who has been excluded (as opposed to expelled) from membership of a trade union. Only a member or former member can complain to the Certification Officer or bring a claim for breach of contract. The Government acknowledges that the safeguards relied on do not apply in exclusion cases, but argues that in practice expulsions are much more common than exclusions for political activities.[23]

1.27 There appears to be another gap in the existing safeguards, concerning exclusions or expulsions which would result in hardship for the individual concerned. The Government asserts that a remedy would be available in court: "the principles of natural justice would prevent an expulsion in circumstances which would result in hardship for the individual concerned",[24] and "case-law indicates that the courts could intervene to prevent an exclusion which resulted in hardship."[25] It appears that the case-law that the Government has in mind here is an old line of administrative law decisions in which the courts held that the principles of natural justice (or, in other words, procedural fairness) apply to decisions by bodies, including trade unions, which have the effect of preventing an individual from pursuing a trade or profession or from working in their chosen field.[26] However, while the administrative law principles of procedural fairness are likely to apply in exclusion or expulsion cases involving loss of livelihood, they may not apply to such decisions involving less severe personal hardship, and in any event they may only bring an entitlement to certain procedures being followed rather than prevent exclusion or expulsion per se.

1.28 In any event, in our view, the Government's reliance on the availability of remedies after an abuse of power is insufficient. Individuals need protection in advance and the best way to secure this is to write some detailed safeguards into the legislation itself.

1.29 There is clearly a positive obligation to provide some safeguards against abuse and, in our view, there do appear to be some gaps in the existing safeguards which leave individuals exposed to the possible abuse of a union's dominant position in a way which could have a detrimental impact on them. We therefore recommend that Clause 18 should be amended to provide additional safeguards in order to strike a "fair balance" between, on the one hand, the Article 11 right of a trade union to control its membership and, on the other, the Article 11 rights of the individual, including the right not to be excluded or expelled from a union arbitrarily or in circumstances that would result in exceptional hardship.

1.30 We recommend the following amendment to Clause 18, which seeks to take into account the criticism that unions cannot themselves directly affect a person's livelihood/conditions of employment, and to follow more closely the language of the judgment in the ASLEF case (particularly para. 43):

Page 16, leave out lines 20 to 25 and insert-

(a) at the end of subsection (4A) insert "but does not include membership of a political party where the values and ideals of the party are incompatible with a rule or objective of the union.

(b) after subsection (4B) insert-

(4C) For the purposes of subsection (2)(d), the exclusion or expulsion of the individual is permitted only if-

(a) the decision to exclude or expel was taken in accordance with the union's rules and a fair procedure;

(b) the union's rules are not wholly unreasonable; and

(c) the consequences of exclusion or expulsion would not result in exceptional hardship.

1.31 We recognise that such a formulation may be regarded as an invitation to litigate the reasonableness of a union's rules and we therefore also suggest, as an alternative, a narrower amendment to Clause 18 which would leave out the requirement in proposed new subsection (4C)(b) that the union's rules are not wholly unreasonable.


1   Judgment of 27 February 2007. Back

2   HL Bill 13-EN, paras 103-116. Back

3   Clause 18 of the Bill as amended in Grand Committee. Back

4   ASLEF v UK, 27 February 2007. Back

5   Section 174 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act 1992 ("TULRCA 1992"). Back

6   Clause 18(2). Back

7   Appendix 1. Back

8   Appendix 2. Back

9   Section 108A(2)(b) of TULRCA 1992. Back

10   Appendix 2, at para 9. Back

11   HL Deb, 13 March 2008, cols GC300-GC318. Back

12   HL Deb, 3 April 2008, cols GC171-GC182. Back

13   HL Deb, 13 March 2008, col. GC309. Back

14   Ibid. Back

15   HL Deb, 13 March 2008, col. GC311. Back

16   See e.g. Lord Hoyle at col. GC313. Back

17   Lord Jones at cols GC314-316. Back

18   HL Deb 3 April 2008 col GC 181. Back

19   Lord Henley, HL Deb, 13 March 2008, col GC 313. Back

20   For a full explanation of what this obligation entails, see our Sixteenth Report of 2006-07, Monitoring the Government's Response to Court Judgments finding Breaches of Human Rights, HL 128/HC 728 at paras 4-13. Back

21   HL Deb, 3 April 2008, col GC178. Back

22   Ibid. Back

23   Appendix 2, para. 24. Back

24   Ibid. para. 22. Back

25   Ibid., para 24. Back

26   Eg. Lawlor v Union of Post Office Workers [1965] Ch 712; Nagle v Fielden [1966] 1 All ER 689; Edwards v SOGAT [1971] Ch 354; McInnes v Onslow-Fane [1978] All ER 211.  Back


 
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