Draft Bribery Bill - Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill Contents


APPENDIX 2

SENIOR OFFICER: LIMITS TO THE ADEQUATE PROCEDURES DEFENCE

The adequate procedures defence is set out in clause 5(4). Clause 5(5) limits the circumstances in which the defence is available:

    ...the defence is not available if the negligence referred to in subsection (1)(c) was wholly or partly that of a senior officer of C or a person purporting to act in such a capacity.

  Although the Law Commission recommended that the defence should not be available when the negligence was attributable to a director of the company (or equivalent person), the Government's draft Bill goes further than this. The defence is not available where the negligence is wholly or partly that of a senior officer or someone purporting to operate in such a capacity. This is far wider than the Law Commission envisaged.

  The fundamental question is whether the fault of a senior officer should mean that an organisation cannot rely on the adequate procedures defence. In our view it should not.

  In deciding to recommend the creation of an offence of corporate liability for bribery, the Law Commission in its Report stated that "it would be right to recommend that the criminal law be used to address the issue of culpable organisational failure to prevent bribery offences" (paragraph 6.42). By making pivotal the fault of a senior officer, both the Law Commission's proposal and the Government's draft Bill place incidents of negligence, which may be a "one off" occurrence, in an inappropriately paramount position, rather than effectively target the systemic failure of an organisation.

  Further, given that one of the purposes of criminalising a failure to prevent bribery is to encourage the adoption of the appropriate preventative measures, it is surprising that a commercial organisation which takes its obligations seriously and appoints a senior officer to carry out an anti-corruption function arguably opens itself up to a greater risk of prosecution. On the face of it, a commercial organisation would limit its risk of being found criminally liable if it appointed someone below senior officer level, as it would then at least have an opportunity to rely on the adequate procedures defence.

  However this would pose a significant difficulty to multinational organisations which are subject to the jurisdiction of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Under the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which describe what an effective compliance programme entails and upon which many corporate ethics and compliance programmes are based, an organisation must give overall responsibility for compliance to a member of high level personnel in order to obtain sentencing credit. The problem is that whilst appointing a senior officer with overall responsibility is clearly desirable from the US perspective, as the draft Bill stands, it is equally undesirable from the UK perspective.

  In any event, and for the reasons we set out more fully below, we are concerned that the exclusion means that the prospect of a corporate defendant being able to employ the defence are more illusory than real.

  There are three distinct reasons for this: (a) the definition of "senior officer", (b) the concept of collective negligence and (c) the concept of purporting to act.

Senior Officer

  A senior officer is defined in clause 5(7) as:

    (a) in relation to a body corporate, means a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate, and

    (b) in relation to a partnership, means a partner or any person who has control of management of the business of the partnership.

  This is a very wide definition, and one that will lead to considerable uncertainty and inconsistency of application. Different organisations will designate different levels of employee as directors or managers, but by including managers at all in the definition the exclusionary net is cast unnecessarily wide.

  In order to avoid the potential problems caused by the involvement of a senior officer of a company in an anti-corruption capacity, there may be an understandable inclination to outsource the anti-corruption function. The use of the phrase "any person... connected with" a company to define a "responsible person" (clause 5(3)) appears to cover the delegation of the anti-corruption function to either a subsidiary or even a wholly independent entity. If the delegation were to such a wholly independent entity, such a person/body could not fall within the definition of "senior officer" in which event the adequate procedures defence would be available notwithstanding negligence on the part of that wholly independent entity.

  This might present as an attractive possibility to the corporate: delegate the function out as such a course may allow the adequate procedure defence to be claimed. However it may be contended either that (i) a senior officer was responsible for the delegated function and that therefore the negligence of that person overseeing the wholly independent entity could be a basis for liability, or (ii) such a delegation is not, by definition, an adequate procedure. Clearly, the Bill as drafted leaves significant issues for corporates to wrestle with, and given the consequences of conviction should they get it wrong, such a state of affairs is highly unsatisfactory.

Collective Negligence

  Given that the offence in the draft Bill is committed not only where the senior officer himself was negligent, but where the appropriate standard was not reached by the senior officer as one of a number of persons charged with preventing bribery, the circumstances in which the exclusion will apply are widened further.

Notwithstanding that a commercial organisation might have procedures which go beyond mere (and sufficient) adequacy, a single instance of negligent failure to prevent a bribe, which, may be due partly to a one off lapse of attention by a senior officer, which although not by itself negligent, when taken as part of the conduct of a number of persons taken together, is found to be negligent, the organisation cannot rely on what may, in all other regards, be a model of best practice.

Purporting to Act

  It is not clear what "purporting to act" in the capacity of a senior officer means. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "purport" as "appear to be or do something; especially falsely".

It is unclear whether a person must have the knowledge and intention to act "falsely" in order to come within this test.

  More fundamentally, given that the involvement of a senior officer in the collective negligence of others prevents reliance upon the adequate procedures defence the temptation for a prosecutor will be to invoke this provision. It is possible that prosecutors may argue that, given the importance to an organisation of having an effective anti-corruption policy, any person, whatever their level, whose function was to prevent the payment of bribes was purporting to act in the capacity of a senior officer. The phrase further unnecessarily limits the availability of the defence.



 
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