Draft Bribery Bill - Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill Contents


APPENDIX 3

THE NEGLIGENCE TEST

The Offence

  The liability of a commercial organisation (as defined) for the offence is proved by the prosecution establishing the three elements set out in clause 5(1) sub-clauses (a) to (c):

A relevant commercial organisation ("C") is guilty of an offence under this section if:

    (a) a person ("A") performing services for or on behalf of C bribes another person,

    (b) the bribe was in connection with C's business, and

    (c) a responsible person, or a number of such persons taken together, was negligent in failing to prevent the bribe.

Negligence

  The test of fault included in clause 5(1)(c) of the draft Bill is the negligent failure to prevent the bribe proved under limbs (a) and (b).

In its Report "Reforming Bribery" the Law Commission does not offer any guidance on what the test of negligence is. However, in its Working Paper No 31 The Mental Element in Crime, the Law Commission described negligence thus: "a person is negligent if he fails to exercise such care, skill or foresight as a reasonable man in his situation would exercise".

  Thus it would be no defence for the allegedly negligent person to say that he considered whether there was a risk and decided there was none. According to this definition, if, objectively, he ought to have foreseen a risk, that is sufficient.

  However, if we have correctly described the test of negligence that a jury would be directed to apply, there is an argument that one of the factors a jury would be entitled to take into account in deciding how "a reasonable man in his situation" would behave is the training the allegedly negligent person received and the procedures he followed: essentially the anti- corruption policy of his employer.

  By importing into the test the anti-corruption policy and procedures of the employer, negligence is not necessarily a purely objective test, although this would appear to operate to the detriment of the allegedly negligent and the company which employs him. If the allegedly negligent person has a higher standard of knowledge and training than the reasonable person, as a senior employee may well have, a higher standard will be expected of him. The reverse is not true.

  Does this lead to an unintended consequence: that a corporate that has an exceptionally well thought out and implemented anti-corruption policy is in a worse position if a bribery offence is committed in connection with its business, as the standards expected of its employees and officers would be that much higher by virtue of the training received and procedures in place?

  If correct, and if the limitation on the availability of the statutory defence remains, a company with a well trained senior officer in charge of its anti-corruption policy who is allegedly negligent (or as described below, is not himself negligent, but is one of a number of persons whose collective actions were) a higher standard will be expected of him due to the company's exemplary anti-corruption policy, yet the company will be unable to rely on that exemplary policy to establish the statutory defence.

Negligence of a number of persons taken together

  It would appear that the negligence requirement can be satisfied by the collective actions of a number of individuals having an anti-corruption function falling below a reasonable standard (if that is what the negligence of a number of responsible persons taken together means). By implication the test must be satisfied where no one individual was negligent in failing to prevent the bribe, otherwise the words would be unnecessary.

This is notwithstanding the Law Commission counselling against the adoption of something akin to the regime introduced by the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 ("the CMCHA 2007"), where it is not necessary to prove that any one person possessed a subjective fault element (paragraphs 6.33 to 6.39 of the Report). Under the CMCHA 2007 it is possible to aggregate negligent acts to come to a global view that an unlawful killing was caused by gross negligence on the part of the company.

  However, whilst the CMCHA 2007 aggregates the individual negligence of a number of employees for the purpose of considering whether or not a company was grossly negligent, the current draft Bribery Bill proposes an aggregate of different acts or omissions, which may not individually be negligent, but which together form a basis for arguing that there has been `collective negligence'.

  The Law Commission was clearly opposed to this, amounting as it does to a significant extension of liability. It states at paragraph 6.103 of its Report that enabling the prosecution to fall back on proof of negligent failure to prevent bribery through proof of a series of acts or omissions (by one or more people connected to the company) that cumulatively amount to such negligence, would be inconsistent with the provision of the adequate systems defence.

  It is far from clear how this test of collective negligence might operate in practice. What is clear is that the sufficiency of collective negligence is an extension of liability to that envisaged by the Law Commission. It is, we suggest an unnecessary and unwarranted one, particularly bearing in mind what we say about the limitation of the defence where a senior officer with an anti-corruption function is one of those responsible persons but is not, by himself, negligent.

Gross Negligence

  The most serious example of negligence as a basis for criminal liability is that found in gross negligence manslaughter. Here, the negligence requirement is qualified: it must be gross negligence—an objective test requiring the failure to recognise a risk obvious to the reasonable and prudent professional which is so bad in all the circumstances as to amount to a criminal act or omission. Given the gravity of this offence, we suggest that gross negligence would be the appropriate test.

It is worth adding that although gross negligence does not require the prosecution to adduce evidence of a person's state of mind (which is probably irrelevant for the purposes of `ordinary' criminal negligence) such evidence might be relevant to the jury's consideration when assessing the grossness and criminality of the conduct (see Attorney General's Reference No.2 of 1999 [2000] 1 Cr App R 207).

Burden and Standard of Proof

  Finally, we are concerned to understand how the test of negligence will fit with the burden and standard of proof in criminal proceedings. It is clear that it will be for the prosecution to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that there has been negligence. However, it is less clear what test is to be applied by the jury in these circumstances ie must they be sure in relation to an act or omission which a reasonable "responsible person" would regard as negligent, or must they be sure of that, which on a civil standard (ie balance of probabilities), would amount to negligence? If it were the latter the prosecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that something happened/failed to happen which on the balance of probabilities amounts to negligence. This, we contend, is a confusing position.






 
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