Additional Memorandum submitted by The
Corner House (BB 55)
1. There was insufficient time on 11 June
when The Corner House gave oral evidence to the Joint Committee
to answer fully two points raised by Committee members. We should
like to respond to these in this additional written submission.
Lord Lyell of Markyate asked:
"We are a parliamentary democracy. If you
remove the power, and hence the responsibility, of the Attorney
General, how do you get parliamentary accountability?"
His oral question was supplementary to the Committee's
written question:
"To explore whether the draft Bill does
enough to reform the Attorney General's powers of consent and
direction; and whether it is likely that serious cases of bribery
may never be prosecuted due to 'national security' concerns."
Mr David Borrow MP stated:
". . . if you are the prime minister and
you feel that something is a threat to national security then
you want to have the freedom and the power to do what is necessary
to protect the nation without having lots of laws and restrictions
which would actually force you to demonstrate in public a lot
of stuff which may undermine that national security . . . [A]s
a backstop, at the end, at some point the person in No 10 needs
to be able to say, 'I need to be able to pull that lever to stop
that in order to protect national security'."
If you remove the power of the Attorney General,
how do you get parliamentary accountability?
2. The Corner House welcomes the Attorney
General's consent for bribery prosecutions being removed. At present,
the Attorney General is appointed by the Prime Minister, is a
member of the Government and a member of parliament and is the
Government's chief legal adviser; s/he is also responsible for
all crown or state litigation. As long as the office of Attorney
General has this dual role combining political and legal functions,
The Corner House (and the OECD Working Group on Bribery) contend
that a political appointee should not determine which bribery
cases are investigated and prosecuted and which not.
3. The UK's parliamentary democracy is based
upon a clear separation of powers between Parliament, the Executive/Government
and the Judiciary: Parliament creates, amends and ratifies laws;
the Judiciary interprets the law on a case-by-case basis (within
which independent prosecutors apply the laws as passed by Parliament);
and the Executive manages and administers the country on a day-to-day
management and promotes laws.
Under this separation of powers, the judiciary,
encompassing judges and prosecutors, is not accountable to Parliament,
and neither the executive nor Parliament should be involved in
prosecution decisions (which is why we welcome the removal of
Attorney General consent for bribery prosecutions).
Parliament and the Executive have no proper constitutional
role to object to or be involved in a specific decision concerning
a bribery prosecution or investigation; they should have no role
in applying the law. Parliament, however, does have the role of
amending a law if it is not content with the application of existing
law.
Indeed, one reason for removing Attorney General
consent for bribery prosecutions is to remove the obligation on
the prosecutorial decision maker to be accountable to Parliament
or the Executive.
4. If the Attorney General's consent for
bribery prosecutions is removed, however, there are mechanisms
for informing parliament about bribery investigations and prosecutions
that could be explored.
For example, since the Bank of England was granted
operational independence in 1998 allowing it to set domestic
interest rates, the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee explains
its actions regularly to parliamentary committees, particularly
the Treasury Committee.i
A similar mechanism could be introduced in order
that Parliament is fully informed about prosecutorial decisions.
5. The Corner House believes that the existing
mechanisms for informing Parliament about decisions to investigate
and prosecute bribery offences and for public accountability could,
in any event, be improved.
The OECD Working Group on Bribery has noted
that the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) does not have
to make public any decision about investigations or prosecutions,
or to give reasons for proceeding or terminating investigations
and prosecutions.ii
When the Attorney General gave a brief explanation
to the House of Lords about the Serious Fraud Office's termination
of its BAE-Saudi investigation in December 2006, he stated that
he did so only because of "the intense interest in this issue
and its market sensitivity".iii This suggests that, in the
absence of such interest or commercial considerations, the Attorney
General would not have made such a statement to Parliament.
6. Any duty or requirement to report to
or inform Parliament, however, does not substitute for judicial
review. It is important that whoever takes a controversial decision
knows that s/he may have to explain and justify that decision
before independent judges. As noted above, the judiciary can rule
whether a decision is lawful or not and can interpret and clarify
the law in the process; it would be up to Parliament to consider
changing the law subsequently if needs be.
Does the draft Bill do enough to reform the Attorney
General's powers of consent and direction?
7. Even though the draft Bribery Bill would
remove the requirement for the Attorney General to give consent
to bribery prosecutions, concerns remain about the power of the
Attorney General to stop a bribery investigation or prosecution
in circumstances when continuing is deemed to threaten national
security, and the accountability of exercising such a power.
8. There seems to be general confusion as
to what the existing powers of the Attorney General are, a lack
of consensus as to what they should be and an underlying lack
of clarity as to what checks and balances should be applied when
prosecutions are halted on national security grounds. All these
issues are connected to the combined political and legal role
of the Attorney General; difficulties thrown up by this dual role
have still to be resolved and are part of ongoing constitutional
reform.
9. The confusion came to the fore after
March 2008 when the Government published its draft Constitutional
Renewal Bill, which aims, in part, to separate the Attorney General's
political and legal functions.
But it would also establish a statutory right
for the Government, through the Attorney General, to halt any
criminal prosecution or a Serious Fraud Office investigation on
the grounds of a broadly defined national security; would provide
for extremely limited oversight by Parliament when this power
is exercised; and would effectively prevent judicial review of
it.iv
Giving the Executive the statutory right to
intervene directly in the independent prosecution process raises
significant domestic constitutional issues that need to be properly
assessed, given the unprecedented nature of such a right.
10. The draft Constitutional Renewal Bill
is separate legislation that this Joint Committee is not considering.
But The Corner House notes that there is always the risk when
politicians rely on national security that it will be elided with
the interests of the Government, especially if there is no democratic
or legal scrutiny of the relevant decision (see further
below).
Will serious cases of bribery never be prosecuted
due to "national security" concerns?
11. If the Attorney General's consent to
prosecute a bribery offence is removed, consent in future will
be required only from the Director of the Serious Fraud Office
(SFO).
12. To halt a prosecution or investigation
on "national security" grounds, the Director should
be able to demonstrate to a court that his/her decision passes
a "strict necessity test". This test comprises three
elements:
(i) There was an imminent threat of loss of life
or serious injury to identifiable persons or groups of persons
unless the decision was taken.
(ii) All reasonable alternatives to violating
the rule of law had been tried and failed.
(iii) The consequences of violating the rule
of law had been properly recognised and considered (in particular
the encouragement given to others to make similar threats in the
future), and weighed in the balance.
13. It would not be necessary for the Director
to seek the permission of a court to apply this test before deciding
to stop on national security grounds an investigation or prosecution
that otherwise would continue. But if s/he made a decision and
if a judicial review of that decision were to be brought, the
decision-maker should satisfy this necessity test for the decision
to be considered lawful. This is similar to the onus on a decision-maker
to justify, when challenged, that their decision accords with
human rights legislation.
This test ensures that a proper balance is maintained
between the (sometimes urgent) interests of national security
and the integrity of the UK criminal justice system, including
that it does not easily capitulate to blackmail or threats. It
also ensures that the separation of powers and rule of law essential
to its functioning democracy is maintained.
14. The Director of the SFO is not a national
security expert, however, and may feel s/he does not have enough
expertise on national security to make such a decision. Depending
on when and how the role of the Attorney General is reformed,
the Director of the SFO should consult before taking such a decision
with a member of the Executive who would have greater access to
special information and expertise on security and international
law.
15. But given the evidence released during
the judicial review of the decision by the SFO Director to terminate
the SFO's BAE-Saudi investigation, The Corner House has grave
concerns about the manner in which national security issues are
currently raised and assessed by the Executive, and the real potential
for abuse.
Documents released during the judicial review
show that the national security issues raised were not based on
rigorous intelligence assessments from the Security Services themselves
on the basis of any objective criteria, but from an assessment
made by the Cabinet Office's Permanent Secretary for Intelligence,
Security and Resilience that did not include any detailed analysis
of the credibility of the threats, the reliability of the source
of the threats, the impact if such threats were to be carried
out, or the measures the Government and security services might
be able to take to mitigate any such impact.
16. Thus any decision by the Director of
the Serious Fraud Office to stop a briber investigation or prosecution
on national security grounds should be based on full, rigorous
objectively verifiable intelligence assessments from the security
services with no political mediation or interpretation through
ministers; the Director should see such assessments directly.
As much of this assessment should be made public as possible to
ensure as much transparency as possible about the grounds on which
the decision is based.
17. The procedures outlined above would
go some way to ensuring that national security does not serve
as a pretext upon which to stop a bribery investigation or prosecution.
The incorporation of Article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
into domestic law would also assist.
Documents released during the judicial review
of the decision by the SFO Director to terminate the SFO's BAE-Saudi
investigation illustrate that concerns about the UK's national
security were raised only after the Director had refused
to stop the investigation because of commercial considerations
or potential damage to international relations—concerns
that had been raised by various Government ministers and BAE itself.
Article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention prohibits a
bribery investigation or prosecution from being stopped because
of these latter considerations.
Given that national security issues can become
intermingled with commercial considerations and potential damage
to international relations during bribery investigations and prosecutions,
the UK courts would be able to assess whether any decision by
the Director of the Serious Fraud Office to stop a bribery investigation
or prosecution was made on national security grounds or on Article
5 prohibitions, and whether the Director had correctly understood
and applied Article 5, if and only if Article 5 was incorporated
into domestic law (see Corner House first submission to
Joint Committee).
18. At present under UK law, the courts
cannot consider whether a decision to stop an investigation or
prosecution breaches Article 5 of the OECD's Anti-Bribery
Convention and the Director of the Serious Fraud Office has no
obligation to do anything to resist a threat made by someone abroad
if the UK Government asserts that the threat endangers national
security.
19. The Corner House believes that unless
Article 5 is incorporated by primary legislation and unless
the courts are required to assess whether a decision to abandon
a bribery investigation or prosecution follows a strict necessity
test, it may well continue to be the case that serious cases of
bribery may not be prosecuted because "national security"
concerns are cited.
How could the prime minister do what is necessary
to protect the nation from a national security threat without
having to reveal publicly information that may undermine that
national security?
20. The Corner House welcomes statements
in the Cabinet Office's March 2008 document, The national
security strategy of the United Kingdom,v that repeatedly
emphasise the importance of "legitimate and accountable government"
and "strong parliamentary and judicial oversight" in
maintaining national security.
21. The Corner House accepts that the Executive
has a duty to protect the public from threats to national security.
But it is critical that the public has absolute
confidence and trust that national security arguments are not
being abused in order to avoid political, commercial or diplomatic
embarrassment or to pursue the commercial interests of favoured
companies or for the UK to get out of its obligations under international
law. Public confidence and trust in such Executive decisions needs
to be upheld and maintained and is especially important at a time
of heightened concern about international terrorism.
As noted above, The Corner House believes that
there is always the risk when politicians rely on national security
that it will be elided with the interests of the Government, especially
if there is no democratic or legal scrutiny of the relevant decision.
22. Under current constitutional arrangements,
administrative decisions involving national security are generally
accepted to be the sole responsibility of the Executive; the courts
give wide discretion to the Executive on decisions that invoke
national security. But the UK courts do have competence, expertise
and responsibility to assess whether a decision justifies a departure
from the law, even in contexts of terrorism and national security.vi
Under general international law, moreover, when
a state wishes to breach an international obligation on the grounds
of national security, the state is not entitled to be the sole
judge of whether it has met the objective standard allowing it
to do so lawfully. A national security justification is a matter
for determination on objective grounds, one that should ultimately
be carried out by the courts. There is clear authority for this
from the International Court of Justice.
23. In the context of bribery investigations
and prosecutions, where the Executive has national security concerns,
its responsibility is to explain those concerns to an independent
prosecutor. Procedures for doing so have been established since
1951.vii
The prosecutor will make an impartial assessment
of the extent to which national security requires the investigation
or prosecution to be halted. This is the role currently undertaken
by the Attorney General in a quasi-judicial capacity entirely
independent from her/his political functions.
It is an important part of the UK's existing
constitutional framework that the Attorney General may disagree
with the opinions of the Executive (the Prime Minister or other
Government ministers) as to whether a bribery prosecution or investigation
should continue or not.
The Prime Minister (as head of the Executive)
does not have and should not have the power to halt a bribery
prosecution on national security grounds. It would be a retrograde
step undermining parliamentary democracy if the Executive were
to be given more power to do so (see paras 7-10 above).
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS
FROM THE
JOINT COMMITTEE
24. After The Corner House had given oral
evidence, the Joint Committee asked two further supplementary
questions to which it requested written replies:
You stated that the "legitimately due"
test should be removed from Clause 4 [of the draft Bribery
Bill]. Would this lead to any conduct being criminalised which
should not be criminalised? In particular, should clause 4 be
amended to require the "advantage" to be "undue"
or "improper"?
It has been suggested that clause 5 should
be turned into a civil/regulatory regime for imposing fines on
companies rather than imposing a criminal offence. This would
leave corporate criminal liability for bribery to be addressed
(as with other criminal offences) by the Law Commission's ongoing
review. What are your views, including whether a civil regime
would meet the UK's international commitments?
If the "legitimately due" test was removed
from Clause 4, would any conduct be criminalised that should not
be criminalised?
Should Clause 4 be amended to require the
"advantage" to be "undue" or "improper"?
25. The Corner House believes that the "legitimately
due" test can be removed without criminalising conduct that
should not be criminalised, provided that Clause 4 is amended
to embrace an intention to induce or reward improper behaviour.
The Corner House would support amending Clause 4 to require
the "advantage" to be "improper".
26. Clause 1 of the draft Bribery Bill
clearly conditions the act of bribery on its intended effect,
namely to induce or reward improper behaviour. Merely making
a payment or giving a gift to a person is therefore, by definition,
not a crime under the proposed Bill. Corporate hospitality would
thus be legal under the Bill, unless its intention was to induce
or reward improper behaviour. Similarly payments made under, say,
a consultancy agreement would be protected from criminalisation
except in circumstances where it could be shown that the purpose
of the agreement was to provide a vehicle for making a payment
that was intended to corrupt. Where that intention is demonstrated,
no payment is legitimate, regardless of whether it appears to
have a legal contractual basis, since, under the draft Bill, it
would by definition constitute a bribe.
27. Clause 4 of the draft Bill abandons
this approach, however, making the test of legality not an intention
to induce or reward improper conduct but instead whether the advantage
offered, promised or given to a foreign official is "legitimately
due"or not. As the explanatory notes make clear, Clause 4 "does
not require that action expected in return [for a financial or
other advantage] must itself be improper", only that "the
giver of the bribe must intend to influence the recipient in the
performance of their functions as a public official, and must
intend to obtain or retain business or a business advantage".viii
As a result, the offering of an advantage that is not intended
to induce or reward improper behaviour could be criminalised if
the legitimately due test was removed. Corporate hospitality,
for example, is clearly intended to gain influence in order to
obtain a business advantage.
28. The Corner House believes that the draft
Bill should adopt a uniform approach to what constitutes bribery
throughout all its clauses. The test should be whether the advantage
offered to a foreign official, whether directly or through a third
party, is intended to induce or reward improper behaviour which,
in turn, would secure an improper advantage for the briber.
29. The Corner House would therefore argue
for the removal of the "legitimately due" test and for
the phrase "advantage" to be amended to "improper
financial or other advantage". The definition of "improper",
if it is needed, could be based on improper influence or improper
conduct models, where the intention behind the advantage offered,
promised or paid is to induce a public official to conduct an
improper act. As in Clause 3 of the draft Bill ("Function
or activity to which briber relates") defining what is reasonable
and unreasonable, "improper" can be defined in relation
to general, universal norms of a duty on public officials, including
breach of trust, duty to act impartially, and duty to act in the
public interest (as recognised by the International Code of Conduct
for Public Officials adopted by the UN General Assembly in December
1996 and noted in the UN Convention Against Corruption, Article
8 on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials). Such norms would
recognise that receiving advantages in return for taking a particular
action in favour of an individual or company is never in the public
interest. This approach would be in keeping with the commentaries
on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which state that where (for
instance) the notion of a breach of duty is implied in a statute,
it must be "understood that every public official had a duty
to exercise judgment or discretion impartially and that this was
an 'autonomous' definition not requiring proof of the law of the
particular official's country".ix
30. If Clause 4 was amended along these
lines, The Corner House believes that the removal of the "legitimately
due" test would not result in the criminalisation of behaviour
that should not be criminalised. It does not know of any countries
whose written laws require or permit an official to accept an
advantage that is intended to induce or reward improper behaviour.
It cannot therefore conceive of any "legitimately due"
advantage that is permissible to a foreign official but which
would be unfairly criminalised as a result of removing the "legitimately
due" test. For this reason, The Corner House would argue,
as stated in oral evidence, for the removal of the "legitimately
due" test.
Should Clause 5 be turned into a civil/regulatory
regime imposing fines on companies rather than a criminal offence?
Would a civil regime meet the UK's international
commitments?
31. The Corner House believes that Clause
5 of the draft Bribery Bill ("Failure of commercial
organizations to prevent bribery") should not be turned into
a civil or regulatory regime for imposing fines on companies rather
than imposing a criminal offence.
32. Bribes are invariably paid by an employee
or individual for company benefit and advantage, if not with company
facilitation and knowledge, rather than solely for the employee's
or individual's personal gain. As the Serious Fraud Office itself
has noted:
". . . it is in the pursuit of corporate
objectives that individual employees use bribes. Individuals do
the bribing, corporations benefit. Thus to sideline the key player/offender
is to ignore the essence of the problem. This is not a case of
an offence which sometimes corporations also commit, such as for
example fraud or even manslaughter. The mischief at which the
bribery offences are directed is almost entirely confined within
business activity . . . "x
As such, it is the company that should face
criminal liabilities for the criminal offence of bribery.
Imposing a civil or regulatory scheme of fines
would send a message that bribing and any attendant fines are
simply the cost of doing business abroad. It might also encourage
companies based in those countries that do have corporate criminal
liability to channel their bribes through their UK-registered
subsidiaries and affiliates.
33. It would be preferable for corporate
criminal liability to be introduced across the board for all criminal
offences. But it is unclear when the Law Commission's ongoing
review of corporate criminal liability for criminal offences will
be completed and its recommendations followed up by Government.
The process is, however, likely to continue for another few years.
The OECD Phase 2bis report on the United
Kingdom recommended that "the UK adopt appropriate legislation
on a high priority basis irrespective of any broader reform
efforts on corporate liability".xi
Given that the UK has not introduced an effective
regime against corporate bribery with dissuasive sanctions despite
signing and ratifying the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention more than
ten years ago, The Corner House does not believe that corporate
criminal liability for bribery should be left any longer.
When the Law Commission's review is completed,
however (and depending on its conclusions, recommendations and
Government follow-up), there should be scope to improve the Clause
5 offence of corporate failure to prevent bribery and bring
it into line with overall corporate criminal liability. The OECD
Working Group on Bribery and others have noted that "any
appropriate harmonisation of the law relating to bribery with
a broader corporate liability regime could be addressed if broader
reform is subsequently achieved."xii
34. In considering whether to turn the proposed
criminal offence, "Failure of commercial organizations to
prevent bribery", outlined in Clause 5 into a civil/regulatory
regime, The Corner House would like to stress the opening points
made in its oral evidence to the Committee: bribery is not a victimless
crime; it kills.
June 2009
REFERENCES
i "The Bank's relationship with Parliament",
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/parliament/index.htm
ii paras 113 and 114, OECD Working
Group on Bribery, United Kingdom: Phase 2bis, Report
on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the
1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International
Business Transactions, 16 October 2008, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf.
113. There is no guarantee of publicity for
decisions in the UK to shut down viable investigations based on
the public interest (or not to open investigations for the same
reason). No statistics are kept. The existence of allegations
not investigated for public interest reasons may never become
known to the public; if the allegations were received in confidence
by the SFO, they also may remain secret after the case is closed.
114. There is also no general requirement
for any written recording of the public interest reasons for termination
of the investigation. The only written recording of reasons by
the Director of the SFO in the Al Yamamah case is in the very
short SFO press release . . .
iii "BAE Systems: Al Yamamah Contract",
Statement by Attorney General Lord Goldsmith to House of Lords,
14 December 2006, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/61214-0014.htm.
iv For more information, see:
v http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf
vi The Law Lords have reviewed two executive
decisions (the use of evidence obtained by torture, and indefinite
detention) taken to combat terrorism and protect national security
to assess whether the correct legal principles had been applied
in making these decisions and whether the evidence for doing so
met the applicable legal standard.
vii The proper role of the Executive in
prosecution decisions was stated by Attorney General Sir Hartley
Shawcross in Parliament on 29 January 1951:
"I think the true doctrine is that it is
the duty of an Attorney-General, in deciding whether or not to
authorise the prosecution, to acquaint himself with all the relevant
facts, including, for instance, the effect which the prosecution,
successful or unsuccessful as the case may be, would have upon
public morale and order, and with any other considerations affecting
public policy.
In order so to inform himself, he may, although
I do not think he is obliged to, consult with any of his colleagues
in the Government; and indeed, as Lord Simon once said, he would
in some cases be a fool if he did not. On the other hand, the
assistance of his colleagues is confined to informing him of particular
considerations which might affect his own decision, and does not
consist, and must not consist, in telling him what the decision
ought to be. The responsibility for the eventual decision rests
with the Attorney General, and he is not to be put, and is not
put, under pressure by his colleagues in the matter."
The immediate genesis of this Shawcross statement
of principle was a series of illegal strikes during the third
Labour Government (1945-51) during which the Executive seemed
not to recognise or accept the proper role of an independent prosecutor.
Sir Hartley Shawcross was concerned about "some misunderstanding…
as to the constitutional position of the Attorney General in relation
to his political colleagues in such matters" (Edwards, p.320)
because there had been "wide-ranging discussions [in Cabinet]
in which, it is understood, some ministers exhibited an eagerness
to express their views on the wisdom of instituting criminal proceedings"
(Edwards p. 323).
Sir Hartley prepared a memorandum to the Cabinet
setting out his concerns:
"Cabinet discussion of these matters [prosecution
decisions]… may be as embarrassing for my colleagues as indeed
it is for me. For whilst my colleagues are scrupulously careful
to remind me that they do not share any responsibility for the
decision which is constitutionally placed upon me they do not
fail to make clear what they consider my decision should be!"(Edwards,
p. 321)
It was because Ministers were improperly expressing
their views on prosecution decisions that Sir Hartley Shawcross's
statement was drafted and consulted upon:
"This carefully phrased exposition of the
proper approach to be followed by the Attorney General, when faced
with a situation in which questions of national or international
public policy may surround the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion,
was the result of a major collaborative effort that serves to
further underline the major importance which has been accorded
to Shawcross's statement in the intervening years. For, as the
files in the Law Officers' Department reveal, the Attorney General
went to infinite pains to ensure, as he put it 'that the integrity
of the office should be very fully maintained since its position
is, I am afraid, often widely misunderstood'."(Edwards, p.
319-320).
The effect of the Shawcross statement of principle
is that Government Ministers may not express their view as to
what the prosecutor's decision should be. Their role is confined
to the provision of information as to the effect of a prosecution
on the public interest:
"What is not permissible and would be treated
as constitutionally improper is the expression by the Prime Minister,
another minister or the government of their individual or collective
view on the question whether or not the Attorney General should
prosecute. The same position must surely apply to the solicitation
of such views by the Attorney General or anyone acting on his
behalf (Edwards, p. 323).
See: John Edwards, The Attorney General,
Politics and the Public Interest, Sweet & Maxwell, London,
1984.
viii Draft Bribery Bill, Explanatory Notes,
paragraph 30.
ix "Commentaries on the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery", 21 November 1997, paragraph 3,
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_34859_20482129_1_1_1_1,00.html
x Serious Fraud Office, written response
to the Law Commission's consultation on anti-bribery legislation,
quoted in para 75, OECD Working Group on Bribery, United Kingdom:
Phase 2bis, Report on the Application of the Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions, 16 October
2008, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf.
xi After para 92, page 25, OECD Working
Group on Bribery, United Kingdom: Phase 2bis, Report
on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the
1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International
Business Transactions, 16 October 2008, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf.
xii Para 78, OECD Working Group on Bribery,
United Kingdom: Phase 2bis, Report on the Application
of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation
on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions,
16 October 2008, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf.
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