Draft Bribery Bill - Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 474 - 479)

THURSDAY 11 JUNE 2009

MR DIMITRI VLASSIS, MR NICOLA BONUCCI, MS CHRISTINE URIARTE AND MR WILLIAM YIU WAH LOO

  Q474  Chairman: Good morning. Thank you all for coming. It is quite an important contribution that you have got to make to our considerations, so you are very welcome indeed. Could I start by asking for a general overview? You have already provided us with something of the kind and there is a piece of paper which I think says very much the same that you have supplied us with today. Would anybody like to do a general introduction to your views about this legislation?

  Mr Bonucci: Thank you, my Lord Chairman. With your indulgence I will make a general introduction but I will try at the same to answer questions 1 and 11 of your suggested questions on our general reaction vis-a"-vis this Bill. Let me first say that I am Nicola Bonucci and I am the Director of Legal Affairs at OECD. On my left I have two colleagues from the OECD. I woke up at 5.30, I took a train, I walked one hour to get here, so I think this is already an indication of the importance that the OECD attaches to this particular issue. The importance is reflected in all our written reports, which I am sure you have seen, about the necessity for the United Kingdom to have a modern and efficient legislation. While I represent the Secretariat and not the OECD member countries, you have seen in the letter of January 2009, followed by letters on 3 February 2009 and 27 April 2009 from the Secretary-General, that the OECD supports, if I may quote the Secretary-General, "the Government's effort and wishes this draft legislation be adopted as early as possible and certainly before the next general election". This draft, if enacted, would significantly improve the UK foreign bribery framework—I must specify that I am addressing merely the foreign bribery issue because this is where our remit is—and would address a number of concerns expressed on various occasions by the Working Group, which is the body which encapsulates all the OECD members, all the parties to the Convention. Let me be very clear that when I say that this draft would significantly improve the UK foreign bribery framework I mean this draft. If the main elements of this Bill on the foreign bribery offence or on the corporate liability for failure to prevent foreign bribery were to be missing in the legislation to be adopted by the Parliament, naturally it would not be this draft; it would be a different piece of legislation that the Working Group would be assessing in the future. I will try to respond to question 11, which is to ascertain whether there are any remaining issues that were raised in correspondence by the Chair which would prevent the OECD offering its unqualified support for the draft Bill. I do not think the OECD has ever offered unqualified support to anybody and I would certainly not be in a position to do that.

  Q475  Chairman: Do you not think that there will be points arising in the course of the other questions?

  Mr Bonucci: Yes, naturally, but this is on the general aspect. As I said, this will be an important improvement and will enhance the credibility of the UK legal framework. One often has alternatives, and the alternatives you have here are to adopt it or not adopt it, and we respect that, but let me quote what the Working Group said in the Phase 2bis Report, page 71, "The Working Group stresses"—and this is the Working Group, not me—"that failing to enact effective and comprehensive legislation undermines the credibility of the UK legal framework and potentially triggers the need for increased due diligence over UK companies by their commercial partners on multilateral development banks". This is the context in which we would like you to address this important issue and naturally we will discuss more technical details throughout the evidence. Thank you.

  Chairman: I think we are trying to address it and with your help we will address it further. Shall we go on then to this question of clause 4, "foreign public officials"?

  Q476  Baroness Whitaker: We hope that this clause satisfies the UK's obligations under the OECD Convention but perhaps you could give us the OECD's view on that matter.

  Mr Bonucci: I think clause 4 is a major improvement over the current law for the following reasons. It abolishes the reference to the concept of agent and principal and therefore eliminates the risk of having to prove that the official who receives the bribe violated the trust between an agent and principal. It expressly states that bribes that are paid directly to third parties with the approval of the foreign public official are captured by the offence. In terms of the definition of the offence, it uses a lot of the terminology and the concepts that are used in the Convention, so we are quite happy with that. There is one caveat and I can address it now or I can address it later on at the request of the members of the Committee, which is something which is also touched upon in question 3, which is on the concept of "legitimately due".

  Baroness Whitaker: Please do raise it now.

  Q477  Chairman: Bring them together.

  Mr Bonucci: Okay. Let me first finish my conclusion. On Article 2, we are overall quite satisfied except for this caveat. On clause 4 and vis-a"-vis Article 2 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, again this is a major improvement over the current state of the law. For the moment the only theory which can work in order to trigger the liability of the legal person is identification. By adding the failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery under clause 5 you will be meeting what are the standards of the Working Group, as they have defined them in an exercise, which we call the mid-term study. Let me recall what the standards are. The bribery of a foreign public official committed personally by a senior company officer should be covered, but also the bribery by a lower level person at the direction or with the authorisation of a senior officer, and the bribery by a lower level person where he or she was not adequately supervised by a senior officer or a senior officer knew the lower level person was going to bribe but failed to try to stop him. We believe that with the new clause 5 you will be capturing all those figures. May I say a word on "legitimately due" and the Convention?

  Q478  Chairman: Please would you because this is quite an important point from our own legal point of view?

  Mr Bonucci: And we understand that. The draft as it is goes a long way to replicating the language of the Convention and the concept of the Convention. However, one simple word which is missing but which I must say we would strongly prefer to see is "written". If you look at commentary 7 and commentary 8 to Article 1 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, in particular commentary 8, it says, "It is not an offence, however, if the advantage was permitted or required by the written law or regulation of the foreign public official's country, including case law", case law in the sense of written case law, that is. This express reference to written law does not appear in the draft as it is. Paragraph 36 of the explanatory note to the Bill refers to "custom or tolerance". While it says that "custom or tolerance" is only there in order to demonstrate that it is the law, we believe that there might be some confusion and I would like to make it very clear that the Working Group has been very clear on a number of occasions that this was a very restrictive exception. In 2006 the Working Group on Bribery recommended to Australia that they amend the defence in this regard because it was not in compliance with commentary 8 of the Convention. At the time Australia provided a defence where the conduct of the foreign public official that was sought by the briber was lawful in the foreign public official's country. They used the concept of "lawful" without really defining what was lawful or not lawful. If you remember, this was something which was used in a case which was important in Australia, dealing with the Australian Wheat Board. The Australian Wheat Board was involved in what we called the oil for food case and the report which an independent commission published relied on the fact that the Iraqi law was silent on the matter to say that because it was silent this was permitted, which certainly was not the reading of the Working Group.

  Q479  Chairman: Yes, but that is the common law position, is it not?

  Mr Bonucci: But, as I say, this was not the reading of the Working Group. Australia then modified its legislation which now says that this shall be expressly permitted or required by written law.


 
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