Draft Bribery Bill - Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 540 - 553)

THURSDAY 11 JUNE 2009

MR JEREMY CARVER, MR MARK PYMAN, MS SARAH SEXTON AND MR NICHOLAS HILDYARD

  Q540  Mr George: Excuse me, can I finish my question and you can carry on afterwards? National security interests, you do not pay much attention to that, do you?

  Mr Carver: If national security has a place in this it is not surely in an anti-bribery bill, it is to be dealt with with the quite different processes that legislation specific to national security has to deal with where submissions can be properly tested in whatever appropriate in camera arrangements are there. It is not something that should feature and it flies a very nasty flag to the world to say that we sanction bribery.

  Q541  Chairman: Mr Hildyard, you wanted to add something on this, I think.

  Mr Hildyard: First of all, I should say that we welcome the Attorney General's consent being removed, that is a very necessary step. We are concerned about the Constitutional Renewal Bill and some of the clauses there, but that is to be dealt with at another time. There is a real concern that national security can be invoked to get a government out of an embarrassing situation, whether it is because it is causing a diplomatic ruckus if a bribery prosecution goes forward or, indeed, whether it is because a major industry may be economically affected.

  Q542  Chairman: Is that what you are saying happened in the BAE case?

  Mr Hildyard: I would not want to rerun the BAE case here. The security advice was never tested in court. The Director of the Serious Fraud Office never saw the security advice; he only had it second-hand. The ambassador, who relayed it to him, as far as we know, never saw the security advice. We do not know what the security advice was. The Parliamentary Intelligence Committee never saw the security advice. What we do know from the court proceedings is that whatever threat was made, it was not imminent. Our position, and it has been confirmed—the interpretation of the OECD Convention Article 5—in the OECD Phase 2bis report, very much takes the same line that our lawyers took, is that there is not a national security exemption in Article 5 but it is a matter of customary international law that a state can always invoke necessity in order to derogate from an international obligation if doing so is the only way to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril. There are two tests. First of all, have all the alternatives been considered? Our view in the BAE case was that they had not. Secondly, is a threat imminent? There is always a possibility of closing down an investigation on national security grounds as long as it meets those two tests. Because Article 5 is not part of domestic law neither the High Court nor the Law Lords ruled on a construction of Article 5. Had it been part of UK law it might have been possible for the courts to have ruled as to whether or not the indication of national security was legitimate under Article 5, or similar wording. It is of great concern to us, but maybe we will come to this more in a later question, that from the very start, despite the Attorney General having given an assurance that Article 5 would be taken into consideration, despite the British Government giving an assurance to the OECD that Article 5 would be taken into consideration in investigations, the position of the Serious Fraud Office was that Article 5 was not a matter that needed to be considered. That was from the very first witness statement of the Serious Fraud Office. We do have real concerns that there is an opening for abusing national security to close down embarrassing investigations.

  Chairman: Mr George, do you want to pursue Article 5?

  Q543  Mr George: No, I think most of the questions have been answered.

  Mr Carver: Can I just add one supplemental answer because I did not answer the second part of Mr George's question. As an international lawyer I do not recognise the derogation that was discussed at length that there was some permission under the OECD Convention to do what the United Kingdom does. I do not think that is a valid legal argument at all. It was never tested and it probably never will be tested. What I do want to see, which ought to be quite sufficient, is that the code of practice for prosecutors firmly and unequivocally recognises Article 5 as a necessary element of the decision when they exercise their discretion. That way they can be properly tested by the courts.

  Q544  Chairman: That would be the place to put it, would it?

  Mr Carver: In my view.

  Mr Hildyard: In our view that would be insufficient. The OECD has repeatedly asked for the code to be amended but it has not happened yet and there are no signs that it is going to be. In any event the code is merely guidance, it is not binding. It lacks effective force of primary legislation. As I have just mentioned, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office declared that he would have ignored Article 5 even if he thought his decision was in breach of it, and he presumably would have done so if Article 5 was in the code because it is not binding. In our view only primary legislation will stop this. Moreover, primary legislation would allow the courts to decide on the meaning of Article 5 and not leave interpretation of Treaty obligations to a prosecutor or, indeed, to the executive. It is really important that the courts should be able to have a say in the interpretation of those particular clauses.

  Q545  Chairman: They would not if it was just in the code of practice.

  Mr Hildyard: I am not a lawyer. We have asked for a legal opinion which we will give to you.

  Q546  Mr Borrow: If you like, as a non-lawyer I just want to throw in the politician's point of view which is that if you are the prime minister and you feel that something is a threat to national security then you want to have the freedom and the power to do what is necessary to protect the nation without having lots of laws and restrictions which would actually force you to demonstrate in public a lot of stuff which may undermine that national security. I understand the way you are arguing on that point, but I am saying as a backstop, at the end, at some point the person in No 10 needs to be able to say, "I need to be able to pull that lever to stop that in order to protect national security".

  Mr Carver: Prime ministers have to act according to the constitutional remit and powers that they have. Governments commit the United Kingdom and, therefore, commit the constitutional powers and narrow the constitutional powers by entering into Treaties. If they have entered into a Treaty which precludes a particular course of action then that is that. If they can convince their Treaty partners that this is a legitimate course of action because this is of necessity that it has to be, and they can argue that case, that is fine. They can even breach international law if they want to, but they have to be answerable for that fact and they have to answer to their co-contracting states as to why they have done it and whether it is justifiable and what reparation has to be made for doing so. The Treaty requires a change in the freedom of the prime minister.

  Q547  Chairman: Mr Hildyard, I am terribly sorry but I have got an eye on the clock and the Committee is beginning to vote with its feet. Be very quick, please.

  Mr Hildyard: National security is very, very important and our point would be that it is extremely important for the public to trust the judgments that are made about national security and to have confidence that the power to invoke national security is not being abused, and that is why you need the checks and balances.

  Chairman: There are a number of questions which we have not yet reached. Parliamentary privilege, I dare say you—

  Lord Lyell of Markyate: My Lord Chairman, I am sorry. May I ask a very short question?

  Chairman: Yes, please.

  Q548  Lord Lyell of Markyate: We are a parliamentary democracy. If you remove the power, and hence the responsibility, of the Attorney General, how do you get parliamentary accountability?

  Mr Hildyard: This is—

  Q549  Lord Lyell of Markyate: I would quite like Mr Carver to answer.

  Mr Hildyard: Okay. You have got little time so go for Mr Carver. I have a view.

  Mr Carver: Parliament is sovereign here. It has its own rights and responsibilities. When you enter into an international commitment you are answerable to a wider public than just this one. That is where you have to answer to and you are accountable there. It takes it into a different framework. You may, as it were, argue as to whether it is sufficient but I think that Parliament has to be able to scrutinise the actions of ministers. I do not see any absence of being able to do so because it has been vested in the power of the Attorney General. I was not very convinced, frankly, by the extent to which the Attorney General at the time really was accountable for his actions.

  Q550  Chairman: Could I ask our witnesses this: we have got four questions left which we have not touched on yet and I do not think we have got time, to be perfectly honest, for verbal answers. Would you be prepared to express your views in writing about those last four questions because I think that would be very helpful to us?

  Mr Hildyard: Yes.

  Mr Carver: Yes.

  Q551  Chairman: I am sorry this has overrun a bit but it was important to hear what you had to say. We are very grateful to you for coming and saying it. We will read particularly carefully in the transcript what has happened this morning.

  Mr Pyman: My Lord Chairman, if I can just make one comment at the end dealing, as I do, with defence matters.

  Q552  Chairman: Yes. You have been very silent, so of course you may.

  Mr Pyman: You have heard a lot from defence companies over the last few weeks strongly supporting this Bill, and I am delighted to see it. A voice that you have not heard, which I deal with every month, is the people who buy the stuff, the governments doing the purchasing. I am asked almost every month by that purchasing community, the director general, minister of defence, "Why isn't the UK being clearer and stronger on defence anti-corruption?" It is a voice from the purchasers, many of whom are seeking to reform their ministries and they would welcome the UK being in a good position on this subject. You have got half of the story with the defence companies really supporting it and I think this is the other half that the law holds up in the same way. Thank you.

  Q553  Chairman: Thank you very much. We have got one matter of private business, if my colleagues could stay for a moment. In the meantime, I thank our witnesses very much indeed for what you have had to say with some force and with much appreciation from us. Thank you very much.

  Mr Carver: My Lord Chairman, thank you very much indeed for your time and attention.





 
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